by: Christopher Kozak, Jennifer Cafarella, and the ISW Syria Team
Tuesday, April 14, 2015
Tuesday, March 31, 2015
Monday, March 30, 2015
Assad Regime Loses Idlib to Jabhat al-Nusra and Rebel Offensive
by: Jennifer Cafarella
Rebel forces led by al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) wrested control of Idlib City from the Assad regime on March 28, 2015. Removing the regime from a second provincial capital is arguably the biggest rebel victory since the fall of al-Raqqa to JN and rebel forces in March 2013. It represents a turning point in the Syrian civil war that is likely to alter the trajectory of the conflict in coming months, with implications for how rebels wage war in 2015. JN and Islamist rebel forces have achieved shocking success in reinvigorating the rebel campaign with the seizure of Idlib City. This is likely to provide momentum to the JN-Islamist axis in Syria at the expense of moderate rebel forces, and hinder efforts to foster a political solution to the conflict.
JN and rebel forces seized the northern provincial capital during a swift four-day assault, preceded by days of indirect fire bombardment. The assault exhibited highly effective command and control, which was made possible by a newly formed “operations room” named Jaysh al-Fatah. The operations room had participation from JN; Islamist groups Jund al-Aqsa, Harakat Ahrar al-Sham al-Islamiya (HASI), Faylaq al-Sham, and Ajnad al-Sham; and a few other local groups. By evening on March 27, JN claimed the fall of half of the city and shortly after noon the following day, the Jaysh al-Fatah operations room declared the complete “liberation” of the city. JN immediately raised a JN flag above the governorate building, and tweeted videos purporting to show Idlib civilians celebrating the capture of the city by JN and rebel forces.
The offensive was widely covered through social media, with all participating groups using a standardized hashtag as they tweeted their progress against the city. JN also branded its videos and photos with the Jaysh al-Fatah logo, illustrating JN’s desire to nest its military contribution within a wider rebel front. This follows a recent increase in JN twitter activity that makes careful mention of the rebel groups participating in JN-led attacks. A Twitter account was also established for the Jaysh al-Fatah operations room, gaining over 8,000 followers in the first 48 hours of the attack. This social media coverage generated a high degree of visibility regarding the offensive and illustrated the high propaganda value of the successful liberation of a provincial capital.
The JN and rebel seizure of Idlib city threatens the Assad regime by challenging its perceived staying power. Assad’s strategy hinges on its ability to maintain outposts in every province in order to portray an image of state power. This image is directly threatened by the loss of a second provincial capital, a psychological blow that may generate asymmetric military effects on other battlefronts. The regime must now defend its remaining isolated enclaves in Idlib Province, northeast, southeast, and southwest of Idlib City from a considerably weakened force posture. The inability to do so will affect Assad’s ability to maintain the support of his population base, which has already begun to show signs of war weariness. The establishment of alternate forms of governance within rebel-held terrain furthermore challenges the regime by offering a possible alternative form of stability. The Syrian National Coalition (SNC) seemingly affirmed this possibility when it issued a statement calling the seizure of Idlib city an important advance along the road to the liberation of Syria and announcing its intent to transfer its headquarters into Idlib City.
The fall of Idlib City also threatens the regime’s ability to defend Latakia Province to the southwest. JN and rebel forces remain active in the province’s eastern mountain ranges, where they recently advanced against regime forces to seize the town of Dorin on March 11. After declaring the seizure of Idlib City on March 28, the Jaysh al-Fatah twitter accounted tweeted that it is not a “temporary” operations room and that it will continue its operations soon. This likely indicates JN and rebel intent to capitalize on their victory in Idlib city to deepen the connectivity between JN and rebel-held terrain in Idlib and Latakia provinces, possibly by attacking the regime stronghold of Jisr al-Shughour at the seam between these provinces. This possibility is suggested by a statement released by a Liwa al-Furqan affiliate on March 29 indicating its intent to challenge the regime in Jisr al-Shughour and claiming to form an operations room to liberate the city.
The victory in Idlib City is likely to accelerate a shift in the nature and composition of the anti-Assad revolution in 2015 that favors JN. It occurred amidst a renegotiation of how JN and rebel forces cooperate through which JN has increased its relative dominance within rebel ranks. The success of the JN-led Jaysh al-Fatah operations room contrasts with the limited effectiveness of coalitions supported by regional and Western actors such as the Dera’a-based Southern Front and the Revolutionary Command Council. JN’s established value as a partner in the fight against Assad has led numerous rebel groups to deepen their cooperation with JN in order to increase unity across rebel ranks and to prevent an incursion by the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) into rebel-held terrain. JN is increasingly attractive as a partner to rebel forces on two planes, assisting in the revolution against the Assad regime while simultaneously securing rebel-held terrain against the threat of ISIS expansion. Remaining moderate forces may be forced to seek opportunities to participate in JN-led governance and military initiatives in order to remain relevant as JN and Islamist rebels consolidate their gains in Idlib and move forward with the implementation of governance.
The victory in Idlib City is as much or more of a victory for al-Qaeda in Syria than a victory for the Syrian revolution. JN’s success in Idlib will likely validate the al-Qaeda grand strategy in the view of many within the global jihadist community, enabling al-Qaeda to begin to counterbalance the ISIS rise to prominence. JN’s strategy of prioritizing joint governance serves the long-term objective of the al-Qaeda organization to establish an Islamic Emirate in Syria with the support and participation of local populations that can be a future component of its envisioned future global Caliphate. While al-Qaeda may attempt to coerce JN into issuing a more direct challenge to ISIS in Syria in the near term, the success achieved by JN to date is likely to encourage central al-Qaeda leadership to follow JN’s lead and remain invested JN’s long-term strategy. Over time, success in this effort by JN may enable al-Qaeda to invalidate ISIS’s brutal and unsustainable methodology and present its longer-term but still malign alternative.
The fall of Idlib City to JN-led rebel forces will reverberate across other Syrian battle lines. As the Assad regime absorbs the loss, it will likely attempt to demonstrate success in its own war effort, possibly by bringing increased combat power to bear on Aleppo City. The regime can be expected to use the fall of Idlib City to propagate its existing narrative that Assad must stay in power to “assist” the international community in “combating terrorism.” Nonetheless, Assad has already begun to retaliate against rebel forces through indiscriminate tactics such as barrel bombs, and is likely to conduct future chemical weapons attacks in the area. Assad therefore continues to be a radicalizing actor whose behavior serves to generate local support for groups such as al-Qaeda who are willing and able to resist. JN is likely to leverage its current momentum to deepen its cooperation with rebel forces on other battlefronts where JN and rebel forces remain less united. Given the dual threat of ISIS incursion and regime advance, rebels are increasingly likely to buy into JN’s model on other fronts. If successful in increasing their military capability through deepened cooperation, JN and rebels may be able to turn momentum in their favor. Resource constraints on all sides of the conflict, however, continue to define the Syrian conflict as one which no actor is capable of winning, ensuring that the war will continue until meaningful international engagement with Syria occurs. The longer this window is kept open, the greater al-Qaeda’s foothold in Syria will become.
Tuesday, March 24, 2015
Syria Situation Report: March 17 - 24, 2015
by: Jennifer Cafarella, Christopher Kozak, and the ISW Syria Team
Tuesday, November 11, 2014
Wednesday, October 29, 2014
Friday, October 17, 2014
Tuesday, July 15, 2014
Resistance Emerges as ISIS Consolidates in Deir ez-Zour
by Jennifer Cafarella
Following the declaration of a caliphate by ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, a cascade of surrenders by rebel and tribal brigades in Syria’s Deir ez-Zour province conferred large swaths of territorial control to ISIS. Beginning on July 2, these advances dramatically changed the balance of power within the province and provided ISIS the opportunity to achieve territorial continuity along the Euphrates River into Iraq’s al-Anbar. However, local resistance has since emerged to challenge full ISIS control within Syria’s Deir ez-Zour. While this resistance is currently too localized to meaningfully challenge the ISIS advance, it nonetheless highlights the existence of groups willing to serve as counter-ISIS forces within the ISIS Euphrates system. As ISIS continues to harden its defenses across its newly integrated Iraq and Syria theaters, the continued existence of local opposition will remain a crucial indicator of opportunities to disrupt ISIS control.
The surrender of a large number of local rebel and tribal brigades to ISIS in Syria’s Deir ez-Zour province was not a spontaneous event. Rather, it was the outcome of individual settlements between ISIS and local leaders regarding the terms of a peaceful ISIS occupation. Driven by apprehension in the wake of ISIS’s success in Iraq, a number of local leaders sought to avoid an armed takeover by reinvigorated ISIS forces and agreed to a set of ISIS-imposed conditions for the peaceful surrender of rebel forces. These terms included the repentance of residents and fighters, the relinquishment of personal weapons, and a full civilian evacuation of surrendered towns for a period of 10 days. While resulting in a temporary humanitarian crisis within the province due to the creation of tens of thousands of displaced persons, these agreements allowed ISIS to quickly and efficiently assert full control over a large swath of territory whose armed takeover would have otherwise required a significant and costly ISIS ground offensive. Critically, further surrenders have occurred as ISIS began to consolidate. In the border town of Abu Kamal, the small local FSA brigades Ahl al-Athar, Ibn al-Qa'im, and Aisha pledged allegiance to Baghdadi on July 7, solidifying ISIS control over the town and neighboring countryside. In Subaykhan and neighboring towns, twelve rebel and tribal brigades announced their surrender to ISIS on July 8 and pledged bay’ah to Baghdadi. From the town of al-Tiana, fighters from localized Ahrar al-Sham- and JN-affiliated brigades declared their allegiance to ISIS on July 10. Finally, the al-Mujahideen and Bani Zaid batallions are reported to have begun to deliver their weapons to ISIS in the first step of their full surrender. In addition to providing an additional windfall of small arms, these surrenders have expanded ISIS’s zones of control on the western bank of the Euphrates River and sustained the current ISIS momentum within the province.
ISIS mobilization to solidify control and institute governance in newly acquired territory is underway as ISIS negotiators pursue further surrenders. Using the operating space provided by the temporary evacuation of civilian populations, ISIS cleared and secured recently surrendered towns, removing symbols of past rebel control as it begins to impose its governance. Following the civilian evacuation from as-Shahil, ISIS destroyed the home of a leader of the local Liwa al-Taliban al-Islamiyya on July 5 and vacated homes of two JN commanders and a number of other houses in the town. Seven houses that had belonged to JN commanders were also destroyed in the village of al-Dahla. In consolidating its control over returning civilian populations, ISIS has instituted a central repentance office in the Islamic Court in the town of al-Mayadin and demanded that all fighters and civilians present themselves to the office with two forms of identification in order to formalize their repentance. This demand extends even to those who had repented to an ISIS authority in the past, who must now take their proof of repentance to the al-Mayadin Islamic Court for renewal. Internal policing has also begun, with ISIS executing three men on July 13 under the accusation that they had been creating counter-ISIS cells. In addition to raiding shops, homes, and vehicles for contraband, ISIS has begun to institute service provision by distributing gasoline to civilians under its control. After seizing control of nearly all Deir ez-Zour’s oil fields, ISIS distributed gasoline in its northeastern stronghold of as-Shaddadi, and reportedly intends to conduct such distributions in all areas under its control, from Abu Kamal on the Iraqi border to Northern Aleppo, as well as its tiny enclaves in the countryside of Hama and Homs. ISIS also significantly reduced the price of oil to civilians under its control and capped the maximum price traders can impose on other groups. These measures are the first stages of the full imposition of ISIS state governance, which will continue to unfold in secured territory according to the model visible in the ISIS capital of ar-Raqqa.
However, while the ability of ISIS to negotiate the wholesale surrender of rebel and tribal forces within the province has been staggering, resistance has nonetheless emerged in a number of key areas. In immediate defiance of the caliphate, the FSA-affiliated Liwa Jund al-Rahman put out a statement rejecting ISIS and declaring its commitment to continue to fight. In the towns of Abu Hamam and al-Jorzi on the eastern bank of the Euphrates River, the local Ibn al-Qayyem Brigade and al-Hamza Battalion attacked the homes of ISIS fighters and other ISIS positions on July 5 and 6. Demonstrations also occurred in the towns of al-Qureyyi and al-Ashara, where an unknown explosion targeted the agricultural bank on July 7. Finally, the resistance of the Jafar al-Tiyar brigade has precluded full control over Deir ez-Zour’s oil wells by keeping the al-Ward oil field momentarily outside of ISIS control. In the stronghold of al-Mayadin, a suicide car bomb (SVBIED) targeted a public market on July 13, killing 13 including 5 non-Syrian ISIS fighters. The attack remains unclaimed. The defiance of these individual rebel brigades constitutes a critical resistance to ISIS within the province. However, in the absence of outside support it is one that is likely to succumb once ISIS completes its consolidation and reinitiates offensive operations. For this reason, these brigades may continue to resist only so long as the terms of the negotiated surrender remain as severe as those imposed on the initial wave of surrenders. Testament to this possibility, a temporary surge in resistance against ISIS forces in the town of Khosham emerged after initial negotiations with local brigades failed but immediately dissipated once a settlement was reached. Upon the breakdown of talks, fighters from the Abdullah ibn al-Zobayr battalion attacked ISIS positions within the town, killing three fighters and burning the house of a fighter from the town who had defected to ISIS. An agreement was reached on July 10 in which civilians that had fled the town would be allowed to return so long as each family repented and delivered a Kalashnikov to ISIS. While it remains unclear whether the terms of this agreement also mandated a demobilization of the ibn al-Zobayr battalion, attacks appear to have been discontinued. The ability of ISIS to negotiate a settlement within actively resisting localities is a critical indicator of its strength within the province and highlights the likely inability of local groups to maintain resistance even in the medium term.
Two additional sets of negotiations are ongoing, and their outcome is likely to have significant implications for the continued existence of a moderate Syrian opposition within Deir ez-Zour Province. On the eastern bank of the Euphrates, the al-She’tat tribe remains a primary source of resistance to ISIS. The towns of Granij, Abu Hamam, and Keshkeyyi all remain under the control of the tribe, with a total population reportedly near 83,000. Fighters and civilians from al-She’tat continue to resist through demonstrations against ISIS and participation in attacks alongside local rebel brigades, however the tribe’s leadership has nonetheless continued to negotiate with ISIS regarding the terms of its surrender. In addition, other remaining local rebel and tribal brigades in the western countryside of Deir ez-Zour are reportedly also engaged in ongoing negotiations with ISIS and have declared their own set of terms. These include the stipulations that ISIS: (1) enter their towns with only non-Syrian fighters, (2) refrain from carrying out arrests or weapons confiscations, (3) cooperate in fighting against regime forces within the province, and (4) establish a joint Sharia body consisting of both local leaders and ISIS religious officials. While it is unclear whether these terms are congruent with those demanded by the al-She’tat tribe, in both cases ISIS appears to be maintaining its demand for the handover of all rebel weapons as a prerequisite for surrender. As a result, negotiations remain in a stalemate. If ISIS submits to these demands in order to neutralize these remaining pockets of resistance, it will have obtained effective control over nearly the entirety of Deir ez-Zour province. It will also have engaged in a significant step change within its Syria theatre, as direct confrontation against the regime has not yet manifested to a meaningful degree. If such an agreement occurs, an attack on regime positions in Deir ez-Zour city is likely to follow, a departure from historic ISIS trajectory that would likely have repercussions in other provinces, as rebel brigades may recalculate their opposition to ISIS in favor of bringing its force to bear against the regime. However, the ability of JN to consolidate its own ranks will also be a significant factor influencing the strategic calculus of remaining rebel forces, and may encourage increased rebel participation on either side in a further entrenchment of the ongoing JN-ISIS feud. Thus both the ISIS expansion and a reactionary JN consolidation are equally grave for the moderate Syrian opposition, whose relative influence continues to dwindle proportionate to the growing strength of these Jihadi elements.
Deir ez-Zour City
The ISIS momentum in the province has also translated into an ISIS foothold deep within Deir ez-Zour city. While not directly attributed to ISIS, pressure has increased on rebels within the city: an unknown explosion occurred in al-Jebelia neighborhood on July 11 and an IED detonated inside a JN HQ on the Fo’ad cinema street on July 12 alongside another IED detonation in the area. Combined with the strain of the ongoing siege, this pressure prompted JN and Ahrar al-Sham to abandon their headquarters inside the city on July 13 after a failed attempt to negotiate with ISIS. Following this withdrawal, ISIS fighters entered the city and seized control of a number of neighborhoods and the Sharia court while maintaining firm control of the al-Siyasa bridge. It is unclear how the JN and Ahrar al-Sham retreat was conducted, however it is likely these forces executed a tactical withdrawal from a number of locations in order to fortify their presence deeper within the city. There has been no indication that ISIS allowed rebel forces to withdraw across the al-Siyasa bridge, and it is equally unlikely these forces were allowed to exit the city through regime territory. According to official ISIS social media, JN emir Abu Hazem attempted to escape the city across the bridge and was shot at an ISIS checkpoint as he attempted to detonate a suicide belt following the discovery of his identity at the checkpoint. Within the city, ISIS arrested fighters from JN who reportedly hid inside a house as ISIS moved in to consolidate control, indicating that the tactical withdrawal may not have been fully disclosed or executed across rebel ranks. In response to the ISIS advance, a demonstration occurred in the remaining rebel-held areas in which demonstrators rejected an allegiance with ISIS. However, following the loss of territory within the city the now-isolated pockets of rebel fighters remain under a two-front siege by the regime and ISIS, and it is unlikely they will be able to mount a significant counterattack against ISIS within the city.
ISIS has not yet launched an assault against regime positions in or near Deir ez-Zour city. However, in addition to achieving a new proximity to regime forces within the city’s contested neighborhoods, ISIS is now in control of positions that may enable it to directly assault the Deir ez-Zour military airport from two fronts. Prior to the incursion into the city, ISIS fighters seized the town of al-Mar’iya directly to the east of the airport on July 7. While rumors immediately surfaced that the Syrian regime began to withdraw from the Deir ez-Zour military airport, this appears to have been small tactical withdrawal of non-critical elements rather than a full retreat. Regime forces were subsequently videotaped establishing barricades on the mountain overlooking the city and have since mobilized on the western side of the al-Hawiqa neighborhood in the north western corner of the city. Following the ISIS incursion, regime forces reinforced their checkpoints and set up new barriers within their areas of control and are likely to continue their holding pattern in the absence of a significant ISIS offensive operation against the military airbase or the remaining regime-held neighborhoods.
If ISIS is able to finish its consolidation along the Euphrates and to secure and expand its foothold within Deir ez-Zour city it will have obtained a strategic depth across the Jazeera desert that is likely to render a successful routing of its presence from Iraq’s Anbar both a pitched fight and a necessary but insufficient measure in order to secure the control and integrity of Iraq’s sovereign borders. Its implications for the Syrian civil war are equally severe, as a consolidated ISIS in Deir ez-Zour is unlikely to be unseated by existing rebel forces. While the opportunity exists to subvert ISIS control by strengthening local rebel and tribal groups that have or would be willing to resist, this window of opportunity as ISIS remains in its consolidation phase is likely to be fleeting. A rebel alignment with JN as a bulwark against increasingly strong ISIS forces should be viewed as a dangerous course of action, yet it becomes increasingly likely as ISIS expansion continues to go unchecked.
Friday, November 22, 2013
A Power Move by Syria's Rebel Forces
by Valerie Szybala
The Brigades
The seven rebel brigades that form the founding members of the Islamic Front include some of the country’s strongest groups. Ideologically they span the Islamist spectrum from those who have called for a modern, moderate state with a foundation of Islamic law, to those who have called for a state with strict interpretation of Sharia law and have at times appeared to have more in common with the al-Qaeda affiliates than with their fellow Syrian rebels.
Suqur al-Sham – Suqur al-Sham was founded in 2011 and is based in Idlib province. It was a member of the moderate Syrian Islamic Liberation Front (SILF), which came under the umbrella of the western-back Supreme Military Council (SMC). The group’s leader, Ahmad Eissa, was named as the head of the new Islamic Front. Eissa has previously called for a moderate Islamic state that is not imposed on society. Though its forces are formidable, Suqur al-Sham is by no means the strongest brigade in this alliance, making the choice of Eissa as leader notable. The group has had recent trouble with the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS).
Liwa al-Tawhid – Liwa al-Tawhid is by most accounts the strongest group in Aleppo, estimated to have around 11,000 fighters. It was formed in July 2012 as a merger of smaller militias in the area. Although they have cooperated with the more extremist groups in battle, they have espoused a moderate Islamic ideology and were respected by other rebel groups. This was demonstrated in September when they were called in to mediate fighting between ISIS and an FSA-linked brigade in the northern city of Azaz. Their former military commander Abdel Qader Saleh had previously stated that he wants a modern Islamic state with a basis in Sharia law, but with civilian rule, elections, and minority protection.
Jaysh al-Islam – Jaysh al-Islam, based in the Damascus area, was created in late September 2013 when Liwa al-Islam consolidated its power by subsuming dozens of other brigades. Liwa al-Islam had previously been a member of the SILF and therefore had fallen under the SMC’s umbrella, but made it clear that it was breaking completely with the SMC in its new incarnation. In recent weeks it has received criticism from ISIS for pulling out of several battles, pushing Jaysh al-Islam to make a public rebuttal.
Ahrar al-Sham – Ahrar al-Sham was the leading member of the Syrian Islamic Front (SIF), an umbrella coalition of more hardline Islamic groups, unaffiliated with the SMC. Though it is still widely referred to as Ahrar al-Sham, the full name for the group is Harakat Ahrar al-Sham al-Islamiyya, which it took on in January of this year when Ahrar al-Sham consolidated several groups into one. Ahrar al-Sham is one of the more extreme Syrian rebel groups, and has a Salafi jihadist ideology. Its leader, Hassan Aboud has stated that democracy is a tool of the west and Sharia is the only acceptable option. This group frequently fights in close cooperation with both of the al-Qaeda affiliates in Syria, and has also been one of the few rebel groups to regularly hold al-Qaeda style advocacy tents, trying to win over the Syrian people to their philosophy. Ahrar al-Sham is also one of the few groups that operates on a national level and is strong on several different fronts.
Ansar al-Sham – Ansar al-Sham was also a member of the SIF, and operates mainly in Latakia. It has not been as public with statements of its ideology as some of the other brigades, leading to speculation that it may not have a solid command and control structure among its various units. If its ideology can be gleaned from the founding charter of the SIF, it wants to topple the regime and create an Islamic state based on Sharia law. Notably, the charter does clearly state that the SIF's approach “is one of centrism and moderation. It is far from religious fanaticism and its resulting deviation of creed and action;” and makes specific mention of women’s rights. Although it is difficult to know how much of these words are aspirational rather than reflective of reality. Like Ahrar al-Sham, Ansar al-Sham has put some effort towards prosthelytizing and civil works.
Liwa al-Haq – Liwa al-Haq formed in August 2012 as a merger of other rebel brigades in Homs, and was also a member of SIF. Its founders have claimed that is not a Salafi jihadist group, and its members have a range of ideologies (which is probably true for all of the brigades in Syria). It is one of the smaller groups in this alliance.
Kurdish Islamic Front – By most accounts this is a very small fighting force, numbering less than 1,000 fighters. The Kurdish Islamic Front has fought with the al-Qaeda affiliates in Syria against the Kurdish YPG fighting forces. Coming on the heels of the recent announcement by the YPG of an interim Kurdish government in Hasaka – a move which was widely condemned by other rebels as an attempt to break up the country – the Kurdish Islamic Front’s inclusion in this new alliance is most likely a message to the YPG not to get too comfortable.
Admittedly, Syria’s armed opposition has faced challenges in unifying in the past. The atomized nature of the rebel forces is a product of the organic roots of the Syrian uprising. But changes in the conflict have forced the rebels to evolve in order to survive. One result of this evolution has been the increasing drive for unification among the internal fighting forces, independent of the political leadership-in-exile which has failed to provide the amount of support that the fighting groups have so desperately needed. The increase in foreign elements in the conflict, on both sides, has accelerated this evolution. Smaller, scattered, local rebel brigades have been unable to compete with the al-Qaeda affiliates – particularly the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham – which have demonstrated the ability to operate at a national level. On the other side, this year has seen a tremendous influx of pro-regime foreign fighters in the form of Hezbollah members, Iraqi Shi’ite militias, and Iranian trainers and strategists. These forces have significantly boosted the strength and fighting capabilities of the regime, which was operating with greatly diminished strength as of the end of 2012.
There have been a number of notable mergers among the rebel groups this year, particularly in the months since the August 21st chemical weapons attack. Some of those attempts have been successful, like Jaysh al-Islam, while others, like the September 24th Islamic Alliance, have fallen apart quickly. But with every attempt the rebel brigades have been learning important lessons about what they need to do to succeed in forming a larger rebel army, and the Islamic Front announced earlier today demonstrates this clearly. Notably, this group does not include either of the al-Qaeda affiliates in Syria. Also, in the announcement they were clear state that this was intended to be a full merger and not just another coordinating body. Both of these moves were intended to avoid the pitfalls that plagued previous mergers.
After the creation of Jaysh al-Islam under Zahran Alloush on September 29th, it was clear that the western-backed Supreme Military Council (SMC) was in trouble. General Salim Idris reportedly cut short a trip to France to rush back to Turkey to try to salvage the SMC with a reorganization that would be more inclusive of local leaders and give Zahran Alloush a seat at the table. But eventually this initiative died out, and shortly afterwards the social media chatter about an imminent rebel alliance of the country’s strongest brigades began. Then came the death of Liwa al-Tawhid’s military commander, Abdel Qader al-Saleh, in a regime airstrike near Aleppo over the weekend. Al-Saleh was a well-respected, charismatic leader, and it was rumored that he would be named as the leader of the new alliance. The loss of Abdel Qader al-Saleh is doubtless a blow to this unification, but despite this setback it seems that the groundwork had been fully laid and with some reorganization behind the scenes, the brigades went ahead with their announcement and subsequent interview live on Al Jazeera.
Implications
The creation of the new Islamic Front is a double-edged sword:
On one hand, this may be the nail in the coffin of the SMC. The western-backed umbrella group was wobbly enough after the resignation of a leading northern commander and the failed negotiations to bring Jaysh al-Islam back into the fold. With the additional losses of Suqur al-Sham and Liwa al-Tawhid it is hard to imagine that the SMC can now survive with any semblance of legitimacy or power on the ground. Additionally, the fact that it is an “Islamic” alliance and includes some of Syria’s truly hardline elements is worrisome, since it could mean that this new union will push the more moderate groups in that direction.
On the other hand, this new Islamic Front does not include either of the al-Qaeda affiliated groups in Syria. And as the Islamic Front has now set itself up as the most powerful rebel group in the country, it seems that they may attempt to sideline al-Qaeda and reclaim the Syrian insurgency. Around the same time of the merger announcement, Liwa al-Haq published a statement to clarify its views that seems to support this possibility. In the statement they say that while they appreciate ISIS for its support in fighting against the regime, they do not acknowledge the ISIS brothers as legitimate leaders for Syria. Additionally, the fact that Ahmad Eissa of Suqur al-Sham was named as the leader of the Islamic Front over commanders from more powerful brigades may be a sign that the Islamic Front will attempt to stay on the more moderate end of the spectrum.
This new group will be built gradually over the next three months as the brigades work towards integrating their organizational structures. We can also expect to see more rebel units joining the Islamic Front in the coming days, as they have indicated that they are current reviewing requests from prospective members. If they start to announce the addition of other power players like the Farouq Brigades, the Furqan Brigades, and the Nour al-Din al-Zenki Battalions, it will be a good indication that the Islamic Front is here to stay. Even as it stands with the current members, the new group will have an estimated 45,000 fighters, and span critical battlefronts that including Damascus, Homs, Idlib, Latakia, and Aleppo.
Another thing to watch for will be the response of the SMC leadership. FSA spokesman Louay Meqdad has already reached out an olive branch, saying that: “the alliance is welcomed because it represents a combined set of interests of the Syrian people. The SMC is not opposed to alliances that draw people together under the hope for a protective and democratic future Syria. They [the SMC] do not wish to discount such alliances that are not in nature harmful to those values.”
Tuesday, November 5, 2013
Regime Takes as-Safira and Continues Push to Aleppo
Regime elements overran the city of as-Safira on Friday, November 1st, after a siege and bombing campaign that lasted more than three weeks and drove more than 100,000 civilians from the city. As-Safira, located only 15 km southeast of Nayrab Air Base (co-located with Aleppo Int’l Airport), is a key point along the regime’s only usable ground supply line from Hama and also houses some of the largest chemical weapons production facilities in the country. After taking the city, regime forces continued to push northwest toward Aleppo, and appear poised to open a supply line to the embattled Nayrab Air Base. In addition, the regime may attempt to alleviate the siege on nearby Kuweiris Air Base, located almost 30km east of Nayrab Air Base, which has been ongoing for months.
One of the principal factors that contributed to the rebel defeat in as-Safira was a lack of coordination. This is evidenced by the recent resignation of Colonel Abdul Jabar Akidi, the Supreme Military Council’s top leader in Aleppo and the head of the FSA-affiliated Safira Operations Room. After the city fell, Col. Akidi issued a scathing video statement in which he accused the National Coalition of failing to support his command adequately and blamed a number of rebel groups for seeking to hold captured territory rather than coming to defend as-Safira itself.
The Safira Operations Room echoed Col. Akidi’s sentiments, saying rebel groups failed to deploy enough fighters into as-Safira and singling out the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) in particular as not having a single fighter inside the city. Jihadist sources pushed back against this allegation and instead blamed other groups for surrendering as-Safira, highlighting further the disunity present among the rebels.
The fall of as-Safira, which had served as a rallying point for a number of rebel groups in the region, including powerful Salafi group Ahrar al-Sham and al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra, is a major blow to the rebel campaign in southern Aleppo province. By controlling as-Safira and accompanying villages along the road to Hama, rebels had made regime resupply from its southern strongholds nearly impossible, and if the regime is able to hold onto its recent gains it could threaten rebel positions in Aleppo province as a whole.
Thursday, September 26, 2013
The wal-‘Adiyat Dabha Offensive in Southern Aleppo
by Charlie Caris and Isabel Nassief
This area of southern Aleppo was the site of a government offensive focused on securing airbases and supply lines while clearing surrounding towns. In late June, however, the regime was quickly forced to abandon its offensive and return troops to Homs, where rebels had been able to take advantage of the regime’s vulnerability. Since then rebels have made significant gains in Aleppo province, taking control of Khan al-Assal, a town on the western outskirts of Aleppo city, in July. On August 5th, rebel forces led by the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham captured Menagh airbase, and later that month rebels also took control of the town of Khanassir, which sits on a critical government supply route between Homs and Aleppo city.
The current rebel offensive was announced on September 20th with the stated objective of “seizing control of the major and secondary supply routes” in the countryside south of Aleppo. The operation, entitled wal-‘Adiyat Dabha (a Quranic phrase roughly translated as “The Panting Chargers”) was advertised as a milestone in cooperation between various rebel battalions in and around Aleppo.
As rebel battalions began their assault last week, the operation gained traction on social media, and Youtube videos appeared bearing a distinct logo specifically designed for wal-‘Adiyat Dabha. The following day Ahrar al-Sham, one of the most prominent partners in the operation, circulated a map showing villages south of Aleppo that the rebels wanted to wrest from regime control. The operational plan, as shown on the map, depicts rebel forces advancing from the west, south, and east, near a regime defense factory, and continuing on towards southern Aleppo city and Nayrab military air base. In the six days since the operation began, rebel forces appear to have stayed true to the map, and claim to have liberated at least 25 villages south of Aleppo city. The newly-liberated villages are: Kafr Hout, al-Zara’a, Kafr Kar, Banan al-Has, Sarj Far’a, Balouza, Burj A’zawi, Madrasa village, Im Jaran, Qanatrat, Samaria, Maghriyat al-Shebli, al-Mayan, al-Manatir, Rasm al-Safa, Rasm Humud, Mazra’a Ali Hussein, Diyman, Sada’aya, Rasm al-Shih, Mazra’a al-Ayoub, Rasm al-Hilwa, Tayeba, Rasm ‘Akirish, and al-Safira.
Pro-Assad forces have responded to the rebel offensive by reinforcing regime strongholds near the airport, shelling contested areas such as as-Safira village, and deploying troops from Nayrab airbase to engage rebels directly in the contested villages. New reports show rebel-fired Grad rockets striking Aleppo International Airport on September 25th, and videos indicate that rebel forces continued to shore up liberated villages including the heavily-contested Madajin area, on September 26th.
Of the rebel battalions we have documented taking part in wal-‘Adiyat Dabha, Ahrar al-Sham, Liwa al-Tawhid, Liwa al-Ansar, Kata’ib Nour al-Din al-Zenki, and al-Furqa 19 (aka Liwa Amjad al-Islam) are all signatories to the recent “Islamic alliance.” Other participants include Jabhat al-Na’im al-Islami, Liwa Halab al-Madina al-Islami, Liwa Ahrar Souria, Kata’ib Abu Amara, and al-Furqa 9 Special Forces, although this list may not be exhaustive.
Since the timing and location of this offensive coincide with the newly-announced Islamic alliance and its membership significantly overlaps with the offensive participants, wal-‘Adiyat Dabha might in some respects be viewed as a showcase of the strength of the Islamic alliance signatories. Their capacity to successfully launch operations and gain territory in Aleppo may give the Islamic alliance members additional leverage in talks with General Salim Idris, Chief of Staff of the FSA’s Supreme Military Council (SMC), who has cut his trip to France short in order to meet with alliance members. It might also strengthen the position of alliance members in Aleppo ahead of an impending battle with ISIS, which has taken the border town of Azaz and may be blocking rebel re-supply from that route.
Heavy fighting was ongoing as of the time of writing, and we expect to see additional development as rebel and regime forces continue to maneuver for control of key supply routes throughout Aleppo province. For those who wish to follow reports of this battle on social media sites, “ضبحا العاديات” is the name of the offensive in Arabic. We are also looking for indicators that additional rebel battalions have signed on to the Islamic alliance. A likely candidate for admission is Liwa Ahrar Souria, whose official Facebook page recently removed the FSA symbol from their logo.
Wednesday, September 25, 2013
Islamic Alliance Signatories
by Isabel Nassief
The graph below, made with Palantir, represents the eleven rebel brigades that signed the Islamic alliance document released September 24 near Aleppo. It also shows their existing alliances, including all of the major blocs in Syria (the FSA, the Syrian Islamic Front (SIF), and the al-Qaeda affiliates). At this time it remains unclear whether the FSA brigades that signed on to this alliance intend to maintain their FSA ties or break with the coalition completely.
The Islamic Alliance Emerges
by Valerie Szybala
A new coalition has formed among eleven Syrian rebel organizations, according to a statement that Liwa al-Tawhid released late on September 24. Liwa al-Tawhid has hitherto fallen under the umbrella of the Syrian Military Council. The new Islamic alliance – which includes some of the most powerful factions from the FSA, the Syrian Islamic Front, and also Jabhat al-Nusra –aims to fight to establish an Islamic state under Shari’a law in Syria. It also rejects the Syrian National Coalition and the leadership of Ahmad Tohme – recently elected as the head of the Syrian opposition’s interim government – by name. The signatories to the document claim to represent the following organizations:
Jabhat al-Nusra, Ahrar al-Sham, Liwa al-Tawhid, Suqor al-Sham, Liwa al-Islam, Harakat Fajr al-Sham al-Islamiya, Harakat al-Noor al-Islamiya, Kataib Nour al-Din al-Zinki, Liwa al-Ansar, Tajamu Fastaqm Kamr Umrat & Al-Forqat al-Tisaa Ashr
Initial reports on this event (and some still circulating) indicated that there were 13 brigades who signed on to the document instead of 11. The reason for this discrepancy is that the original text version of the brigade list posted on Liwa al-Tawhid’s website listed two additional brigades, although these brigade names did not appear on the scanned signature page of the hard copy of the document or in the list that was enumerated in the video announcement, and was subsequently removed from the website text. The two other brigades were Liwa al-Haqq (SIF, Homs area), and Liwa al-Forqaan (Quneitra area). According to a Tawhid brigade spokesman, both brigades were present for the drafting process but were not at the signing ceremony. Although some of the remaining brigades have a presence throughout the country, the strength of the 11 alliance signatories is concentrated largely in Aleppo, and the two additional brigades would have served to bolster their southern credentials.
The fact that this announcement comes amidst a spike in incidents in which the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) has clashed with the Free Syrian Army units and, atypically, Syria’s other al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra, raises the possibility that this new coalition is also a move against ISIS by its Syrian nationalist rivals.
This move follows a chain of events on the battlefield through which ISIS took the town of Azaz in Northern Aleppo and the nearby Bab al-Hawa border crossing with Turkey, which serves as an important supply route for rebel forces and was previously held by a Free Syrian Army-linked brigade. The maneuver to take the border crossing began with an incident between local ISIS fighters and members of the FSA-linked Asifat al-Shamal brigade on September 18.
The timeline of events is as follows:
September 18, 2013
ISIS raided the al-Ahli hospital in Azaz to arrest a German doctor. When Asifat al-Shamal refused to hand the doctor over to ISIS, clashes broke out between the two groups and ISIS killed two Asifat al-Shamal fighters.
ISIS assassinated Amr Diab Hajulh, a media activist affiliated with Asifat al-Shamal. Asifat al-Shamal and activists in Azaz called for the Tawhid Brigade to intervene and join in the fight against ISIS.
September 19, 2013
Clashes broke out between ISIS and Asifat al-Shamal in Azaz. ISIS also raided the Azaz Media Center, interrupting their news coverage. The Tawhid brigade arrived in Azaz.
Liwa al-Tawhid mediated a ceasefire agreement between ISIS and Asifat al-Shamal and published it. The agreement was signed by Abu Abdelrahman al-Kuweiti (ISIS) and Captain Abu Ghazala Al Rashid (Asifat al-Shamal brigade). The agreement called for the release of prisoners held by ISIS within 24 hours and for the implementation of standard checkpoints monitored by al-Tawhid.
September 22, 2013
The Asifat al-Shamal military administration issued a statement saying the agreement was nullified because ISIS failed to release its prisoners after 48 hours.
ISIS released a statement accusing Asifat al-Shamal of treason citing several examples. Asifat al-Sham then wrote a response defending itself against ISIS’s accusations.
By Monday, September 23, it was clear that ISIS was in full control of Azaz. The internet was abuzz with talk of the impending battle between FSA brigades and ISIS. The battle had even been given a name, نهروان, Nahrawan, after a famous battle of early Islam, in which Ali bin Abi Talib, the fourth caliph, fought and defeated the army of a heretical group of Muslims known as Kharijites, who can be seen as ideological ancestors of al-Qaeda.
Many were expecting Liwa al-Tawhid to release its statement announcing the Battle of Nahrawan on September 24. The coalition formation statement that was published instead could be a preparatory step, a pragmatic consolidation that precedes any sort of direct confrontation with ISIS. The fact that JN has joined a coalition with non al-Qaeda affiliates and that ISIS is not currently a part of this coalition could signal a break between ISIS and JN. It is far too soon to confirm such a break.
The coalition could also represent another major inflection point in the organization of the rebels in Syria. Repudiation of the interim government is a major development and cause for concern, though perhaps unsurprising given its inefficacy. The greater consequence may lie in the implicit departure of this coalition from the leadership of the SMC, the unified military command of the opposition. Erosion of FSA-controlled ground lines of communication across the Turkish border combined with an abandonment by some of its most powerful brigades has the potential to leave the SMC in shambles.
Reactions from many of the relevant players both inside and outside of Syria have yet to surface. One quick response has come from Asifat al-Shamal, the embattled brigade from Azaz. Their quick show of support strengthens the case that this new coalition is a move not only against the ineffective interim leadership, but also against the encroaching forces of ISIS.
We will continue to monitor the situation and post important updates as it develops.
Friday, September 6, 2013
A Video Tour of Regime Checkpoints in Hama Province
This video, released today by Ahrar al-Sham, details the locations of checkpoints manned by Assad’s forces in northwestern Hama province. It is stands out from the flood of information coming out of Syria both for its professional quality as well as the detailed information that it provides.
Below we have provided an overview map of the checkpoints along with a loose translation of the video, including time markers to guide you to each location referenced in the video.
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