By: Jessica Lewis McFate, Theodore Bell, and Patrick Martin
Friday, May 22, 2015
Monday, May 18, 2015
ISIS Captures Ramadi
By: Patrick Martin, Genevieve Casagrande, Jessica Lewis McFate,
and the ISW Iraq and Syria Teams
For years, ISW has paid close attention to Ramadi and its strategic importance as the capital of the largely Sunni Anbar Province. ISIS first attacked both Ramadi and Fallujah in January 2014. Although driven from Ramadi by local tribes and the ISF, ISIS contested control of the city since then.
ISIS’s capture of Ramadi over May 15-18 was the culmination of months of ISIS probing and shaping operations around the city. Despite strategic gains by ISIS in Anbar and continued attacks on Ramadi throughout 2014, the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) largely defended Ramadi successfully and maintained supply lines into the city center. ISIS however came close to overcoming their defenses in October 2014 and December 2014. ISIS resumed major attacks on Ramadi in April 2015, and on May 15, 2015, ISIS launched a coordinated attack on multiple fronts, contesting and eventually seizing major government infrastructure in central Ramadi by May 17, 2015. This strategic gain constitutes a turning point in ISIS’s ability to set the terms of battle in Anbar as well to project force in eastern Iraq. It is also an important element of ISIS’s consolidation strategy, enhancing ISIS’s overall defense.
ISIS’s capture of Ramadi over May 15-18 was the culmination of months of ISIS probing and shaping operations around the city. Despite strategic gains by ISIS in Anbar and continued attacks on Ramadi throughout 2014, the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) largely defended Ramadi successfully and maintained supply lines into the city center. ISIS however came close to overcoming their defenses in October 2014 and December 2014. ISIS resumed major attacks on Ramadi in April 2015, and on May 15, 2015, ISIS launched a coordinated attack on multiple fronts, contesting and eventually seizing major government infrastructure in central Ramadi by May 17, 2015. This strategic gain constitutes a turning point in ISIS’s ability to set the terms of battle in Anbar as well to project force in eastern Iraq. It is also an important element of ISIS’s consolidation strategy, enhancing ISIS’s overall defense.
This presentation tracks the ISIS campaign against Ramadi from January 2014 to its capture this past weekend. See the full presentation here.
Friday, April 24, 2015
Monday, January 26, 2015
Wednesday, January 21, 2015
Sunday, January 18, 2015
Friday, January 16, 2015
Friday, October 31, 2014
Wednesday, October 29, 2014
ISF Withdraws to Defensive Positions in Anbar Province
By Christopher Kozak
Key Takeaway: Iraqi Army units in Anbar province have adopted a largely defensive posture in October 2014, retreating to their bases and leaving the defense of most urban areas in the hands of local Iraqi Police and Sunni tribal forces. The recent success of ISIS offensives in western Anbar will place the ISF in an inferior position for launching future counter-offensives. Many of the ISF units in Anbar are now understrength, suffer poor morale, and lack decisive leadership – leaving them vulnerable to ISIS attempts to isolate, encircle, and destroy the remaining Iraqi Army presence in the province. If the Iraqi Army cannot reinforce its positions and regain the offensive, the ISF may find itself hard-pressed to curb ISIS momentum in Anbar province and the western Baghdad Belts.
As demonstrated by the sudden fall of Hit district to ISIS forces on October 3, 2014, ISIS possesses significant offensive momentum in western Iraq which has not been entirely curbed by coalition airstrikes. As of October 29, 2014, ISF units augmented by local police and tribal forces man positions in Haditha, al-Asad Airbase, in the vicinity of Ramadi, and in Amiriyat al-Fallujah. Recently, on October 5, ISF units around Ramadi retreated from the city to their military headquarters. If the Iraqi Army cannot maintain these positions in outer Anbar, ISIS will exercise control of the Euphrates to project force into Amiriyat al-Fallujah, Abu Ghraib, and Baghdad itself. The poor performance of the Iraqi Army exemplified by retreats also threatens to raise the prominence of Iraqi Shi’a militias within the Iraqi military. These militias, which have won acclaim for their role in breaking the siege of Amerli in Salah ad-Din province in August and completing the clearing operation in Jurf al-Sakhar in northern Babil province on October 27, are highly sectarian and display ties to the Iranian government. Their rise at the expense of a national Iraqi Army poses an additional challenge to the Iraqi state.
Some of the disorganization in Anbar may be linked to leadership changes or losses. On October 7 - only a few days after reports of IA withdrawals in Ramadi and Hit – tribal leaders in Anbar province demanded that Anbar Operations Command chief Lieutenant General Rashid Flaih be removed from his post for “mishandling the security portfolio” in the province. On October 12, ISF leadership in the province took another blow when Anbar police chief Ahmed Saddak al-Dulaimi was assassinated by an IED, potentially weakening the command structure of the Iraqi Police units forming the front line of resistance against ISIS. Targeting local leaders to eliminate nodes of resistance is a long-standing ISIS tactic. On September 7, for example, Anbar governor Ahmed Khalaf al-Dulaimi was injured when ISIS militants attacked his convoy with rockets and on October 19 the commanding general of the Iraqi Army 8th Motorized Brigade was killed by a SVBIED at his headquarters in Amiriyat al-Fallujah.
However, Iraqi Army units in Anbar province suffer deficiencies of manpower and morale more broadly. This was true even before numerous Iraqi Army units deployed to reinforce Anbar in early 2014, but after many months of fighting these conditions may still prevail. The expansion of al-Jazeera and Badia Operations Command (JBOC) activities near Hit in mid-June and the deployment of elite Counter-Terrorism Services / Iraqi Army units east of Ramadi in early October, as well as an October 12 offer from the Badr Organization militia to intervene in Anbar province, may indicate a belief that Iraqi Army units under Anbar Operations Command have been put under severe pressure by recent events. In many cases, these units were already operating at reduced strength due to desertion and attrition. If the Iraqi Army cannot reinforce its positions and regain the offensive, the ISF may find itself hard-pressed to curb ISIS momentum in Anbar province and the western Baghdad Belts.
The following sections describe ISF units and their positions in key areas of Anbar province in greater detail. This information is a current estimate as of October 29, 2014.
The town of Haditha is garrisoned by a robust combination of Iraqi Army, Iraqi Police, and local tribal fighters. Units from the Iraqi Army 7th Infantry Division drawn from nearby Al-Asad Airbase remain on the frontlines in Haditha and have not adopted the passive stance seen in other areas of Anbar. Pro-government Sunni tribes – and particularly the al-Jughaifi tribe – maintain a highly active presence in Haditha and even engage in limited offensives on the outskirts of the district. Al-Jazeera and Badia Operations Command (JBOC) has coordinated effectively with the tribal fighters, providing them additional arms and convincing 28 local tribes to support ISF operations in the district on October 8. A unit of elite Counter-Terrorism Services (CTS) members is also present in Haditha. The active force posture of ISF units in Haditha likely reflects the importance which JBOC places on defending the nearby strategic Haditha Dam.
Al-Asad Airbase is the designated headquarters of the Iraqi Army 7th Infantry Division and remains the primary deployment location of the unit. However, the 7th Division was heavily depleted by desertions and had its leadership gutted by an ISIS ambush in Rutbah in December 2013 which killed the division commander and 17 members of his senior staff. Helicopter gunships and at least one unit of Emergency Response Brigade (SWAT) Iraqi Police are also reportedly located on the base. When ISF units retreated from Hit to their headquarters for ‘restructuring’ and withdrew from the surrounding areas, they likely pulled back to Al-Asad.
The areas along the Euphrates northwest of Ramadi, including Hit, are primarily the operation zones of local Iraqi Police and pro-government Sunni tribes – particularly the Albu Nimr and Abu Risha tribes – who continue to resist ISIS encroachment. When Iraqi Army units retreated to their headquarters at Camp Hit on the northwestern outskirts of Hit city, these Iraqi Police and tribal units stayed behind to defend their home territory in Hit district as well as the surrounding areas. On October 6, al-Jazeera and Badia Operations Command (JBOC) announced that it was preparing an offensive to retake Hit and on October 9 JBOC stated that it had participated in airstrikes against ISIS fighters near Hit. However, the exact forces which JBOC will bring to bear remain unclear and on October 13 the last Iraqi Army unit in Camp Hit – the 1st Tank Regiment, 27th Mechanized Brigade, 7th Infantry Division - withdrew to al-Baghdadi, near Al-Asad Airbase, leaving behind most of its tanks and armored vehicles.
Ramadi has been a central hub of ISF activity in western Anbar since ISIS took control of Fallujah in January 2014. The headquarters complex of Anbar Operations Command (AOC) lies on the northern edge of the city, while a headquarters containing at least two battalions from the 8th Motorized Brigade, 2nd IA Motorized Division (serving under the operational command of the 7th Infantry Division with additional regiments in Habbaniyah and Amiriyat al-Fallujah) sits on the western outskirts. Pro-government Sunni tribes – including the Abu Risha tribe – and Iraqi Police also helped secure the city against ISIS attack. On October 2 additional Iraqi Army troops and possibly Shia volunteer units arrived in Ramadi to reinforce the city. However, on October 5 the Iraqi Army units in the city withdrew to their bases in Anbar Operations Command and the 8th Brigade headquarters. Reports indicated that several neighborhoods in Ramadi fell to ISIS after the withdrawal, but at least some ISF units still operate in the city proper. Recent ISIS postings suggest that Emergency Response Brigade (SWAT) Iraqi Police and possibly Iraqi Army soldiers still engage ISIS on the outskirts of the city, while a review of Twitter reports surrounding Ramadi appears to indicate that Iraqi Police and tribal fighters still resist ISIS advances into the city despite the withdrawal of most Iraqi Army forces. These remaining tribal and police units have performed well in urban operations, repelling a major ISIS assault on October 17 and clearing several areas in the city, but their ability to project force outside Ramadi’s urban core appears limited.
A series of outposts held by Iraqi Army motorized regiments are scattered along the International Highway in a measure meant to protect the critical supply line connecting Ramadi to Baghdad. However, many of these units have been cut off and besieged by ISIS. News reports indicate that at least two units – the 10th Regiment, 30th Commando (Motorized) Brigade – Tank Battalion, 8th IA Division and the 2nd Regiment, 39th Motorized Brigade, 10th IA Division – have been surrounded in this manner. Both of these units come from southern Iraq and were deployed to Anbar province as reinforcements after the fall of Fallujah. The Iraqi Army appears to have committed portions of its elite units – including the Counter-Terrorism Services ‘Golden Division’ and the Iraqi Army 1st Rapid Reaction Force - to break the sieges of these outposts and reopen the supply lines to Ramadi.
Along with the precarious ISF positions in outer Anbar province detailed above, ISIS also threatens to overrun the strategic town of Amiriyat al-Fallujah. Amiriyat al-Fallujah is located in inner Anbar province, southeast of Fallujah, and controls access to the southwestern Baghdad Belts system, including Karbala and northern Babil province. Thus, the town occupies a critical node in the ISF defensive lines surrounding the capital. As of early October, Amiriyat al-Fallujah was garrisoned by at least one battalion of the Iraqi Army 8th Motorized Brigade as well as Iraqi Police and several local anti-ISIS Sunni tribes , including the Albu Issa, al-Fahailat, al-Halabsa, and Albu Alwan tribes. In response to reports that ISIS militants with armored vehicles and heavy weapons were surrounding Amiriyat al-Fallujah from three sides in preparation for an offensive, the Iraqi Army reinforced the area with unknown units from Baghdad and northern Babil province on October 17. After Iraqi Security Forces supported by coalition airstrikes repelled a major ISIS assault on Amiriyat al-Fallujah on October 22, the Iraqi Army deployed an additional two companies - totaling 200 soldiers - to the town. Two armored regiments were also sent to the town on 28 OCT after several additional ISIS offensives. The battle for Amiriyat al-Fallujah will be a key test of the ISF’s ability to resist ISIS ground advances in Anbar province and Iraq as a whole.
Sunday, October 5, 2014
Saturday, August 9, 2014
Friday, August 1, 2014
Monday, June 23, 2014
Saturday, June 21, 2014
Saturday, June 7, 2014
ISIS Launches Major Multi-Front Assault
by Aaron Reese and ISW Iraq Team
The Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham’s (ISIS) capabilities extend beyond Anbar. Although the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) have so far been able to respond to the ISIS incidents, current ISF operations to target the organization in Anbar will likely be insufficient to counter what is a broad and escalating threat that is capable of launching attempts to seize terrain in multiple provinces simultaneously.
The Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) has undertaken major attacks across multiple fronts between June 5 and June 7, including attempts to seize neighborhoods and buildings in Samarra, Mosul, Baquba, and Salman Beg; an assault against Anbar University in Ramadi; and large-scale VBIED wave targeting Shi’a neighborhoods of Baghdad. In Samarra, ISIS attempted to storm the al-Askari shrine, the Shi’a mosque the golden dome of which al Qaeda in Iraq destroyed in February 2006, provoking the sectarian civil war that followed. The ISF forced ISIS to withdraw in all of the locations after significant clashes except Anbar University, from which the militants withdrew of their own accord.
June 5th
Salman Beg: According to the Director of Salman Beg, Talib Mohammed al-Bayati, ISIS militants deployed throughout Salman Beg, detonating explosives and destroying houses belonging to civilians and “members of security services.” Iraqi Police (IP) and Iraqi Army (IA) forces took control of government and security headquarters as well as the main road that connects Baghdad and Kirkuk.
Samarra: ISIS fighters stormed the town of Samarra, located in central Salah ad-Din, with bulldozers and vehicles mounted with machine guns. The attack occurred at dawn and the militants took control of the al-Jabiria, al-Shuhada, al-Armushia, al-Khadra, al-Maalamin, and al-Dubat neighborhoods on the east side of the city. In response, an Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) regiment from Tikrit and an ISF regiment under the command of Lt. Gen. Ali Ghaidan, the commander of Iraq’s ground forces, entered the city. ISIS attempted to storm the al-Askari Shrine, but the ISF prevented this from occurring, forcing ISIS to maintain its positions half a kilometer away from the shrine. IA Aviation aided ISF ground forces in the response and bombed the al-Razaq al-Waqa’a Mosque and several neighborhoods, causing significant damage. ISF forced ISIS to withdraw from the city. ISF also allegedly burned civilian cars, tents, and a podium at the “sit-in square” in Samarra, known as Midan al-Haq (Square of the Righteous), while clearing the area of militants. The attack resulted in the deaths of six ISF members and two civilians and also caused 45 other ISF personnel and civilians to be wounded. The attack also resulted in the deaths of at least 13 ISIS militants, allegedly including the head of the organization’s military council, Abu Abdur Rahman al-Balawi, and a top commander, Abu Bakr al-Iraqi.
June 6th
Mosul: The ISF clashed with fighters from ISIS who were trying to take control of several neighborhoods in and around Mosul. Mortar shells fell on the al-Tink area, west of Mosul, killing 40, followed by clashes between gunmen and ISF. The neighborhood of al-Zahra, eastern Mosul, was also shelled on the evening of June 5th, and gunmen continued to engage with ISF on June 6th. Gunmen attacked two intelligence headquarters in the Qahira neighborhood, northern Mosul, and armed clashes took place between ISF and militants in the Tahrir neighborhood, eastern Mosul, and the al-Islah al-Zarai district, west of Mosul. The attacks resulted in the death of “dozens” of ISIS militants as well as three IA soldiers and the injury of seven policemen including a lieutenant colonel. Additionally, ISIS detonated two Suicide Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (SVBIED) in a seemingly coordinated attack that targeted worshippers as they were leaving the mosque in the village of Muqdadiyah Bartalah, east of Mosul. The attack killed five and wounded 43.
Baquba: ISIS fighters attacked a counter-terrorism headquarters on the eastern outskirts of Baquba. The attack lasted for approximately 30 minutes and began with ISIS firing mortars toward the building, followed by the explosion of a Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED) on a nearby side street, followed by a shootout near the building. Although the attack was repulsed, security sources stated that the operation was conducted in an attempt to release prisoners being held in the building.
June 7th
Baghdad: Multiple VBIEDs explodedin various neighborhoods of Baghdad, killing at least 52. Targeted areas includedKarrada, Saba’a Abkar (near Rabi), Ur, Baghdad Jadeeda, and Baiyaa.
Mosul: Elements of the ISF appear to be preparing for a clearing operation, cordoningoff neighborhoods in northwest Mosul. Fighting continuedfrom the previous day, killing at least 38 militants and 21 members of security forces.
Ramadi: Gunmen, likely from ISIS, stormedAnbar University, killing three guards and seizing a number of university buildings, briefly taking hostage some of the residents. The University contains nearly 10,000 students, although it is unknown how many were present at the time of the attack. Accounts indicate that militants encouraged people to leave the premises, suggesting that they wished to capture the compound for use. Details are still emerging, but the gunmen withdrew from the compound under unclear circumstances.
ISW assesses that these incidents constitute a concerted counter-offensive by ISIS. The attempt to seize the al-Askari mosque represents an important symbolic as well as practical effort. Additional attempts to seize neighborhoods, infrastructure, and facilities are likely, as are additional VBIED waves. ISW will continue to monitor ISIS activity and the ISF’s response.
Tuesday, May 27, 2014
Prime Minister Maliki Seeks to Create Momentum as Opponents Regroup
By ISW Iraq Team
Several notable political developments took place over the last week. For the Iraqi Shi’a political groups, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law Alliance (SLA) formally nominated Maliki for a third term. The SLA’s primary strategy has also consisted of increasing its momentum by enlisting the support of political groups that in most cases have historically supported Maliki. This is intended to bolster Maliki’s chances for a third term. The Sadrists continue with their anti-Maliki stance while offering an alternative form to Maliki’s “majority government” approach. Instead of a majority government, the Sadrists are offering a “national unity” model. The Sadrists’ success is certainly not guaranteed and will depend on their capability to cobble together a consistent anti-Maliki front. Meanwhile, the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) is maintaining a neutral posture while building influence through high-level engagements led by its leader, Ammar al-Hakim.
For the Iraqi Sunni political groups, there are consistent complaints with regards to the accuracy of the results of the elections in the crucial provinces of Anbar and Kirkuk. The most prominent Iraqi Sunni group, Mutahidun, continues to reject a third term for Maliki while indicating that another candidate from the pan-Shi’a National Alliance (NA) would be acceptable.
For the Iraqi Kurds, Iraqi Kurdistan President and leader of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), Masoud Barzani, stated that the Iraqi Kurds still have strong objections to a third Maliki term and that they will seek to find a “real partner” in the upcoming government in Baghdad. This statement underlines Barzani’s continued tensions with Maliki and may become a consistent negotiating position for the Iraqi Kurds especially in light of last week’s sale of oil from Iraqi Kurdistan to international buyers. Barzani also raised the possibility of a public referendum to determine a “new pattern” of relations with Baghdad if Maliki becomes Prime Minister. This escalating rhetoric is meant to raise the level of demands by the Iraqi Kurds prior to the commencement of full-fledged government-formation negotiations.
It is too early to tell if Maliki can secure a third term as his opponents are regrouping after the announcement of the results. At any rate, these dynamics indicate that government-formation will likely be a protracted process after the final results are certified.
Iraqi Shi’a Political Groups:
Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and the State of Law Alliance (SLA)
Theme: Formally nominate Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki for a third term while attempting to maintain Iraqi Shi’a unity. Importantly, the SLA seeks to amplify momentum by announcing alliances with long-standing SLA-leaning groups.
Statements:
MAY 23: The components of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law Alliance held a meeting and nominated PM Maliki for the premiership in the coming government. (Al Mada Press) MAY 23: Member of the State of Law Alliance (SLA) of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, Mohammed al-Saihud, stated that the alliance sent its program pertaining to the next government to the political blocs. Regarding current SLA efforts in government-formation, he stated that the alliance is working on restructuring the pan-Shi’a National Alliance (NA) and “being [open]” to other political groups to form a “majority government.” (Shafaq News) |
MAY 25: A delegation from the Efficiencies and Masses bloc that won 3 seats in the parliamentary elections visited Prime Minister Maliki and announced their joining the SLA in addition to supporting a third Maliki term. The delegation included Haitham al-Juburi, Ihsan al-Awadi, and former Minister of Interior Jawad al-Bolani. (Al-Sumaria News) |
MAY 25-26: The Maliki-leaning Solidarity bloc- which has one seat- in Dhi Qar province joined the SLA and agreed to nominate PM Maliki for a third term. Furthermore, governor of Najaf and leader of the Loyalty to Iraq bloc, Adnan al-Zurfi, announced that his bloc joined the SLA and supports PM Maliki for a third term. Loyalty to Iraq won two seats in Najaf. (Al-Sumaria News, Al-Sumaria News) |
MAY 26: Member of Salah ad-Din National Alliance and Maliki supporter Minister of Sports and Youth Jassim Mohammed Jaafar announced that four incoming members of the Council of Representatives from Ninewa and Salah ad-Din have joined the SLA and will support a third term for Prime Minister Maliki. All four members have established ties with the SLA. (Al-Sumaria News) |
Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI)
Theme: Exhibit neutrality while aiming to build influence through high-level engagements.
Statements:
MAY 24-26: Leader of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) Ammar al-Hakim met in his office in Baghdad with the leader of the Arabiyya Alliance, Saleh al-Mutlaq. On May 24, Hakim met with the leader of Mutahidun Alliance and Speaker of the Council of Representatives Osama al-Nujaifi. According to statements released by Hakim’s office, the discussions focused on political developments and elections results, in addition to “regional and global” issues. (Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq) |
The Sadrist Trend
Theme: Continued anti-Maliki position and countering SLA majoritarian approach by proposing national unity government.
Statements:
MAY 25: Hakim al-Zamili, a member in the Sadrist Ahrar bloc, stated that the bloc will enter the opposition should PM Maliki be given a third term, because it does not want to participate in another “weak government.” Zamili continued by stating that the bloc is negotiating with other political formations in order to form a “partnership government.” He stated that the bloc is waiting until the ratification of election results to announce its alliances. (Al-Sumaria News) |
MAY 26: According to Jawad al-Juburi, a member in the Sadrist Ahrar bloc, the bloc will not accept a third term for Prime Minister Maliki due to the performance of the government during his tenure. Juburi stated that the bloc will negotiate with all blocs, parties, and alliances in order to form a government. (Al-Sumaria News) |
Iraqi Sunni Political Groups:
Speaker Osama al-Nujaifi’s Mutahidun Alliance
Theme: Accepting Prime Minister from Iraqi Shi’a National Alliance but rejecting third Maliki term.
26 MAY: Leader in the Mutahidun Alliance Mohammed al-Khalidi stated that Mutahidun has been conducting ongoing talks with political blocs in order to form a government. Khalidi added that discussions have taken place to form an alliance between the Wataniyya List, the Arabiyya Alliance, the Kurdistani Alliance, the Mowatin bloc (ISCI), and the Sadrist Ahrar bloc, as well as others, excluding the SLA. He added that the alliance will be announced once election results are ratified and the alliance reaches 200 CoR members. Khalidi added that Mutahidun refuses a third term for PM Maliki and expressed willingness to accept “any” other nominee from the NA. (Al-Sumaria News) |
The Iraqi Kurds:
Theme: Anti-Maliki in light of recent Iraqi Kurdistan oil sales to international buyers.
MAY 27: President of Iraqi Kurdistan and leader of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), Masoud Barazani stated that the Iraqi Kurds will conduct a popular poll in Iraqi Kurdistan in order to determine the relationship with the central government if PM Maliki won a third term. (Sharq al-Awsat Newspaper) |
Provincial Complaints:
Theme: Iraqi Sunni groups in crucial provinces question the accuracy of the results.
19 MAY: The head of the Coalition of Kirkuk Arabs, Omar al-Juburi, stated in an interview that the coalition will challenge the election results because the coalition believes that the results are inaccurate. Juburi continued by saying that election monitors in the south and west of Kirkuk noticed high turnout and were surprised that the coalition did not receive more seats in the Council of Representatives (CoR). (Al Mada Press) |
25 MAY: A number of political groups in Anbar questioned the turnout rates in the province citing it as a sign of fraud. According to the head of the Loyalty to Anbar bloc, Qassim al-Fahdawi, the province had a 20% voter turnout and reports giving other numbers are untrue. He continued by stating that voter turnout did not exceed 10% in precincts for displaced persons. Member of the Arabiyya Alliance Rafi Abdul Karim also stated that voter turnout was not greater than 22% in the province. He stated that there was a 9% voter turnout rate in voting centers for displaced persons and that the votes in these centers were rigged by the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) in Anbar in favor of an “influential bloc” in the province. A member of Unity of Iraq’s Sons, Taha Abdul Ghani, also stated that widespread fraud occurred and that IHEC favored one particular bloc in the province. (Al-Sumaria News) |
Saturday, May 10, 2014
Iraqi Government Formation Negotiations Begin
By Ahmed Ali
Iraq’s government formation process has begun even before official results are released. Political groups are posturing and sending early signals about their positions and ambitions. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki continues to float the idea of a “political majority” government. His ambition will be tested by the results and his political opponents’ strong desire to weaken him. Even though Iraq’s election day was largely peaceful, the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) disrupted voting in several predominantly Iraqi Sunni areas, increasing the risks of marginalization of Iraq’s Sunni population as elections results come in and coalitions are formed.
Iraq held its national elections on April 30. Election day was free from major security breaches, likely because the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) increased security measures implemented prior to the vote. The al-Qaeda-linked Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) also likely chose to avoid engaging the highly alert and widely deployed ISF units. Given the ISF’s temporary tightened measures, attackers would have been dealt serious setbacks were they to attempt directly engaging the security force. ISIS is still a major threat to Iraq’s security despite its inability or tactical decision not to launch major attacks on elections day. Importantly, ISIS was able to disrupt the electoral process before the elections took place. ISIS’ control of Fallujah since January 2014 and its subsequent anti-elections campaign had an adverse impact on voting, particularly for the Iraqi Sunnis.
Security in the Provinces
In Anbar, poor security excluded fifteen areas from voting, and displaced residents of those areas were obligated to vote in other areas of the country. In Babil’s Jurf al-Sakhar area, which ISIS has used as a support-zone, voting was not held for security reasons. On election day, ISIS reportedly sent threatening text messages to Jurf al-Sakhar’s tribal leaders warning them not to participate in elections. As a result, IHEC allowed Jurf al-Sakhar’s residents the opportunity to vote in the nearby Mussayeb area. However, it is not yet clear to what extent turnout among Jurf al-Sakhar’s voters was affected. Participation was likely depressed due to security threats and Mussayeb’s distance from Jurf al-Sakhar (approximately 15 miles).
In Ninewa, Noura al-Bachari, a candidate of the Iraqi Sunni group Mutahidun, stated that 130 voting centers were closed due to lack of employees of the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC). Bachari added that there was no voting in the Jazeera area due to ISIS threats. The lack of IHEC employees at voting centers was also reported in Kirkuk. If Bachari’s statements are confirmed, this prospect will deal a significant blow to the perceived legitimacy of the voting process. Such claims are bound to lead to the rejection of the results by groups affected by lowered turnout.
The Beginning of Political Posturing
According to IHEC, the overall turnout for the general elections was 60%, an encouraging sign even though this figure is two points lower compared to the 2010 national elections. The southern and northern provinces registered higher levels of participation due to better security conditions when compared to western Iraq and Ninewa province. For example, Basra in the south had a 77% turnout rate, possibly indicative of voters’ political engagement in this crucial election. However, claims disputing these turnout figures are already circulating. Senior Sadrist leader Amer al-Kanani stated that the 91% participation rate announced for ISF members is likely 10% lower and that this difference is going to be manipulated in order to alter the results. Kanani attributed his observation to local and international elections monitors’ estimates. These allegations have thus far only come from the Sadrists and have not been corroborated by the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI). They serve to place IHEC under scrutiny as the vote-counting process continues. If these allegations are supported, they would provide another mechanism by which the results could be disputed by less successful parties.
IHEC has indicated that the final results will be announced by the end of May. However, political groups have been leaking results based on either their own observations or anonymous IHEC sources. Many claim to have taken the lead in voting. Some of these claims may be accurate, but it will be important to wait for the official IHEC results. In 2010, the final results by IHEC presented surprises as former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi’s Iraqiyya party garnered the highest number of seats and votes. In those elections too, political groups pre-empted the announcement of the final results with inaccurate claims that they were in the lead.
Initial Negotiating Positions of Iraqi Political Parties
May 4, 2014- May 9, 2014
May 4, 2014- May 9, 2014
Iraqi Shi’a Political Groups:
Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and the State of Law Alliance (SLA)
Theme: Calls for majority government and attacks Mutahidun Leader Osama al-Nujaifi
Statements:
MAY 08: Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki strongly criticized the performance of the committees of the Council of Representatives (CoR) and its presidency. PM Maliki added that he hopes for a new presidency instead of the current arrangement, describing it as “failure.” (Al-Sumaria News) |
MAY 08: PM Maliki stated that a government of political majority will not be based on “ethnic or sectarian” bases. Instead, it would be based on “principles” and “high values” under the constitution. PM Maliki added that the political majority would not exclude a “component, sect, or religion.” (Al-Sumaria News) |
MAY 08: A member of PM Maliki’s State of Law Alliance (SLA), Ihsan Awadi, stated that the SLA aims to prevent the leader of Mutahidun, Osama al-Nujaifi from holding “any position,” citing the “failing experience” the alliance had with Nujaifi in the past. He added that Mutahidun does not represent a “specific component,” therefore its exclusion does not mean the exclusion of that component [likely referring to Iraqi Sunnis]. (Assafir News) |
Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI)
Theme: Takes anti-Maliki position but acts as bridge-builder among Shi’a groups
Statements:
MAY 05: The Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq’s (ISCI) parliamentary bloc leader Baqir al-Zubaidi (also known as Bayan Jabr) stated that the next Iraqi Prime Minister will be nominated by ISCI’s Citizen’s (Mowatin) Bloc, the Sadrist Ahrar, and the State of Law Alliance (SLA) of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. He added that the decision will be made “according to a bilateral or trilateral agreement.” (Shafaq News) |
MAY 06: ISCI leader Adel Abdul-Mahdi stated that ISCI does not support efforts to isolate the SLA in forming the new government describing such isolation as “not wise and harming, exactly like the demand for a third term [for Maliki].” (Shafaq News) |
MAY 09: Spokesperson of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq Baligh Abu Galal described the possibility of securing a third term for the PM as “very difficult” adding that the PM cannot secure the majority of seats to form a government. (Assafir News) |
The Sadrist Trend
Theme: Takes Extreme Anti-Maliki Position
Statements:
MAY 07: Member of the Sadrist Ahrar bloc Hussein al-Sharifi stated that it is “not possible” to form the National Alliance with the participation of the State of Law Alliance (SLA). He added that the SLA will not be able to form the alliance by itself. Sharifi attributed his statement to the negative performance of the government. (All Iraq News) |
MAY 09: Member of the Sadrist Ahrar bloc, Hussein al-Sharifi, stated that the “Sadrist Trend” aims to prevent the PM from securing a third term. (Al Mada Press) |
Iraqi Sunni Political Groups:
Deputy Prime Minister Saleh al-Mutlaq’s Arabiyya Alliance
Theme: Take an anti-Maliki position while opening options for negotiation
Statements:
MAY 06 : Member of deputy Prime Minister Saleh al-Mutlaq’s Arabiyya Alliance, Talal al-Zobaie, stated that the alliance would not support PM Maliki for a third term, adding that the alliance is in support for a non-sectarian, non-ethnicity-based “political majority government.” (Al Mada Press) |
Speaker Osama al-Nujaifi’s Mutahidun Alliance
Statements:
MAY 08: Mutahidun Alliance announced in a statement that a meeting took place between the leaders of the alliance. The statement added that a delegation was formed in order to conduct negotiations with other political parties for government-formation purposes. Meanwhile, leader in the alliance Jabr al-Jabri stated that Mutahidun “has no red lines” regarding the formation of alliances “if our demands are met,” adding that no agreement took place with the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq [ISCI] or the Sadrist Ahrar bloc. (All Iraq News, Al-Sumaria News) |
MAY 08: Member of Mutahidun Hamza al-Girtani stated that the alliance aims to “withdraw” the premiership position from PM Maliki. Girtani added that the alliance aims to form a majority government citing the local government of Baghdad that was formed by ISCI, the Sadrist Ahrar, and Mutahidun. (Al-Sumaria News) |
The Iraqi Kurds:
Theme: Reject the political majority government and demand presidency
MAY 04: The Office of the Presidency of Iraqi Kurdistan Region announced that the Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Parliament must approve the nominee for the Presidency of Iraq, arguing that the position is reserved for the Iraqi Kurds “by right.” (Kurdistan Region Presidency) |
May 07: Member of the Kurdistani Alliance [KA], Mahdi Haji criticized calls to form a political majority government, adding that a government “cannot be formed without the Kurds.” According to Haji, the Iraqi Kurds are not a “political party” but rather a “major ethnicity.” (All Iraq News) |
A number of these post-elections statements shed light on possible initial strategies and negotiating positions for government formation. The Iraqi Kurds, for example, are seeking to maintain the position of the presidency in the federal government. Iraqi Kurdish Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) leader Jalal Talabani has been the president of Iraq for the last eight years and, according to the Iraqi Kurds, the presidency is their “right.” The Iraqi Kurdish position faced criticism from Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s ally Mohammed al-Saihud, who stated that it is not a constitutional mandate to have an Iraqi Kurdish president. In addition to this challenge from Maliki’s State of Law Alliance, the issue of the presidency will be contentious among Iraqi Kurdish parties, with the PUK facing challenges from both the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Gorran (Change) Movement challenge the PUK for the presidency. In addition to the Iraqi Kurds, Iraqi Sunni figures are likely to vie for the position of president in the federal government as well.
Beyond statements by figures in the different political organizations, actions by the Federal Supreme Court are also likely to affect the upcoming period of post-elections bargaining. The court issued a decision not to accept a lawsuit from Maliki against the speaker of the Council of Representatives (CoR), Osama al-Nujaifi, challenging the CoR’s inability to pass the budget. The ruling to dismiss this case was likely intended to project an image of independence for the court given its past pro-Maliki history. The court also, however, issued a decision postponing the case brought by the SLA challenging the legality of the Baghdad Provincial Council until June, after the elections results are announced. The court’s decision here means that the anti-Maliki Baghdad Provincial Council and local political positions will become a bargaining chip. The continuation of the case until June will allow the SLA to trade dropping their legal challenge to the Baghdad Council’s formation in exchange for cooperation in coalition-formation.
Conclusions
Political groups are currently testing the waters for their future alliances as they wait for the official results to be released. The groups anticipate a long government-formation period and are posturing to maintain their political flexibility. However, the development of an anti-Maliki front is likely to materialize, modeled after the anti-Maliki local governments that formed in Baghdad and Diyala after the 2013 provincial elections.
Prime Minister Maliki’s plan will likely continue to be floating the concept of a majority government and assessing which groups he can play against one another. Additionally, he will likely continue to attack speaker Osama al-Nujaifi, Mutahidun, and the Sadrists. Maliki will enjoy an advantage as he will be a caretaker Prime Minister with full authority. It will be particularly important to watch if Maliki will use the security forces to his own advantage. The current major operation to re-take Fallujah from ISIS may be an example of precisely this, seeking to demonstrate his strength as a Prime Minister.
Lack of elections in Fallujah and Jurf al-Sakhar can further increase sentiments of marginalization among the Iraqi Sunni population. To mitigate the consequences of these sentiments, the vote-counting that is underway must be transparent and occur without any alteration of results. Importantly, all political groups should work towards producing a government that is representative and inclusive.
Ahmed Ali is a Senior Iraq Research Analyst and Iraq Team Lead at Institute for the Study of War.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)