Russian Airstrikes in Syria: January 23 - 28, 2016

By Jodi Brignola

Key Takeaway: The Russian air campaign continued to target opposition-held terrain in an effort to solidify regime gains and increase negotiating leverage in the days immediately prior to the Geneva talks on January 29. Russian warplanes targeted over 40 separate locations in Aleppo, Idlib, Latakia, Hama, Homs, Damascus and Deir ez-Zour Provinces from January 26 – 28. Russia’s intervention has significantly changed the situation on the ground, enabling significant regime victories in Aleppo, Latakia, and Dera’a and placing the regime in a superior negotiating position after suffering a number of meaningful losses to both the armed opposition in Idlib and ISIS in Eastern Homs in early- and mid-2015.  Russian warplanes continued to support the regime’s clearing operations in Northeastern Latakia and target locations in Western Idlib, likely to set conditions to seize the strategic town of Jisr al-Shughour and secure regime control over the high ground in the Jebel al-Akrad and Jebel Turkmen mountain ranges. The Russian air campaign also continued to target opposition-held positions in Northwestern Aleppo and supported regime efforts to tighten the siege on the opposition-held pocket in Northern Homs. In the south, regime forces continued their offensive in Dera’a with the support of Russian air power after fully capturing opposition-held Sheikh Meskin on January 25. UK Envoy for Syria Gareth Bayley stated that Russian assistance in the Sheikh Meskin operation “reveals the hypocrisy of Russian targeting in Syria,” and that “this blatant targeting of opposition groups is deeply concerning, particularly as it comes just days before UN-led negotiations for a political settlement leading to transition in Syria.” The UK envoy also criticized Russia for the way Russian warplanes targeted the town, which has essentially left the city leveled. Russian warplanes continue to indiscriminately target civilian-populated areas, incurring high numbers of civilian casualties. The Russian air campaign targets ISIS-controlled territory in Northeastern Aleppo, ar-Raqqa, and Deir ez-Zour at the expense of civilian casualties. The activist organization Raqqa Slaughtered Silently reported that the majority of Russian strikes that target ISIS-held Raqqa City hit civilian-populated residential neighborhoods, while no more than 15 percent actually target ISIS’s strongholds in the city.  

The following graphic depicts ISW’s assessment of Russian airstrike locations based on reports from local Syrian activist networks, Syrian state-run media, and statements by Russian and Western officials. This map represents locations targeted by Russia’s air campaign, rather than the number of individual strikes or sorties.  

High-Confidence reporting. ISW places high confidence in reports corroborated both by official government statements reported through credible channels and documentation from rebel factions or activist networks on the ground in Syria deemed to be credible.

Low-Confidence reporting. ISW places low confidence in secondary sources that have not been confirmed or sources deemed likely to contain disinformation.

Russian Airstrikes in Syria: January 4 - 11, 2016

By Genevieve Casagrande and Jodi Brignola 

Key Takeaway: Russia expanded efforts to portray itself as a neutral actor in Syria ahead of the next round of negotiations by claiming to support tailored elements of the Syrian armed opposition. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reiterated during a press briefing on January 11 that “only joint efforts” by the Syrian regime and select Syrian opposition groups will “achieve victory over terrorism” in Syria, despite Russia’s continued targeting of armed opposition factions. The Russian MoD claimed that Russian warplanes are currently conducting strikes supporting ground operations of 11 opposition factions, which the Russian MoD described as “Syrian patriotic forces.” Alleged recipients of Russian air support primarily consist of groups supported by the U.S. such TOW anti-tank missile recipient Jaysh Asoud al-Sharqiya, an anti-Assad opposition faction that has previously accused Russia of targeting their headquarters in the Damascus countryside. Russia claimed to conduct strikes “in the interest of” Jordanian-backed opposition group Jaysh Ahrar al-Asha’er in the villages of al-Taf and Khosh Hammad in Dera’a Province, areas where the group is currently clashing with ISIS. Local reporting, however, did not verify Russian strikes in the area. The Russian MoD also reported strikes supporting U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces’ anti-ISIS ground operations near Ayn Issa north of ar-Raqqa City. Local reporting indicated a limited number of Russian airstrikes occurred in the area, although it remains unclear if the Syrian Democratic Forces benefitted from these strikes. Russia is overstating and, in some cases, fabricating its efforts to support armed opposition groups in Syria. Russia aims to use this disinformation to obfuscate its position as the regime’s guarantor against the armed opposition and present itself as a legitimate mediating actor ahead of negotiations. Russia also seeks to demonstrate that it does discriminate between opposition groups in order to position itself as an authority in determining which parties are able to participate in negotiations. In tandem with airstrikes against other armed opposition groups, these efforts also ultimately aim to disrupt the U.S.’s partnerships inside Syria.

Russia continues to target critical infrastructure and inflict heavy civilian casualties in Syria. French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius demanded the cessation of Russian and Syrian airstrikes on civilian locations on January 11, calling any such strike “inadmissible.” Russian strikes in Idlib Province resulted in 81 casualties, at least 22 of which were civilians, in a January 9 attack against a Jabhat al-Nusra prison in the town of Ma’aret al-Nouman. Local sources also reported that Russian strikes targeting three schools in the town of Anjara in Western Aleppo on January 11 killed as many as 35 civilians, including 17 children. Russian warplanes reportedly also targeted both a hospital and a relief warehouse in the Jebel Turkman Mountains of Northwestern Syria. The Syrian opposition demanded further confidence building measures from the regime ahead of negotiations to include the cessation of Russian airstrikes in Syria, stating that talks are not feasible while “there are foreign forces bombing the Syrian people.” The regime, however, remains unlikely to grant any such concession as Russian air operations have ensured the preservation of the regime and its superior position on the battlefield.

The following graphic depicts ISW’s assessment of Russian airstrike locations based on reports from local Syrian activist networks, Syrian state-run media, and statements by Russian and Western officials. This map represents locations targeted by Russia’s air campaign, rather than the number of individual strikes or sorties. 

High-Confidence reporting. ISW places high confidence in reports corroborated both by official government statements reported through credible channels and documentation from rebel factions or activist networks on the ground in Syria deemed to be credible. 

Low-Confidence reporting. ISW places low confidence in secondary sources that have not been confirmed or sources deemed likely to contain disinformation.

YPG and Rebel Forces Challenge ISIS in Northern Syria

By Joseph Sax

An important instance of unity among counter-ISIS forces has emerged in Northern Syria, possibly galvanized by recent effective operations against ISIS in Iraq by local Iraqi forces with the support of U.S. airstrikes. The Kurdish YPG, Jabhat al-Akrad [The Kurdish Front], and numerous FSA-affiliated rebel groups announced the formation of the “Euphrates Volcano” joint operations room in Northern Aleppo and Raqqa Provinces on September 10, the most significant rebel-YPG coordination to date. The video statement announcing the formation of the operations room declared the intent liberate to Qarah Qawzaq, Sireen, and Jarablus in addition to Manbij, Raqqa, and their surroundings, and called for material support from the international community in the fight against ISIS. The joint force appears to have immediately initiated operations against ISIS, claiming responsibility for a VBIED targeting an ISIS vehicle in the village of Qarah Qawzaq in the northeastern Aleppo countryside on September 11. A second VBIED in the ISIS-held city of Tabqa west of Raqqa went unclaimed, but is likely to have been conducted by groups within the operations room.

The formation of a joint Arab-Kurdish operations room against ISIS in Northern Syria is a significant inflection that is likely to force a shift in ISIS’s calculus. Significantly, the YPG is also involved in the fight against ISIS near Azaz, where a rebel coalition including FSA groups, Jabhat al-Akrad, Jabhat al-Nusra (JN), and Islamic Front groups appear to have been initially successful in blunting the momentum of ISIS’s advance against a key rebel supply line near the Turkish border. Furthermore, in Hasaka province, the YPG has made a number of recent gains against ISIS. The YPG successfully recaptured the town of Jaza’a near the Iraqi border, which had been seized by ISIS forces on August 19. In addition, a YPG offensive against the ISIS stronghold of Tel Hamis is currently underway, and initial reports indicate a successful advance by the YPG. 

The Euphrates Volcano Joint Operations Room is an important case study for how the rebel landscape in a given area can be expected to interact with U.S. airstrikes against ISIS in Syria, if such airstrikes are to be conducted. Airstrikes alone are unlikely to be successful in defeating ISIS. However, it is possible that rebel action against ISIS on the ground may make considerable gains while ISIS forces are under pressure. While it is too early to examine the battlefield effectiveness of this joint Kurdish-Rebel force, clashes between the YPG and ISIS in the summer of 2014 provide a crucial lens into the force the YPG is able to bring to bear as a member of the new alliance. While they have taken notable losses, YPG forces have consistently been successful in resisting ISIS advances. Furthermore, activity in the months preceding the formation of the operations room sheds light on how ISIS is likely to perceive this new threat to its “border.” An instance of cooperation between YPG rebel forces against ISIS in Northern Syria in March provoked immediate aggression from ISIS, which moved quickly to reassert its control over its own critical terrain.

Background: the Syrian Kurdish Dynamic

The Syrian Civil War placed Syrian Kurds in a position of both extreme risk and unprecedented opportunity. Taking advantage of the regime’s decreasing control, Kurdish leaders from the Democratic Union Party (PYD) formed an armed wing titled the People’s Protection Units (YPG) with the intent of securing control of predominantly ethnic Kurdish areas in Northern and Eastern Syria. Throughout 2012, the PYD assumed administrative and military control over large parts of northern and northeastern Syria. However, the PYD continued to cooperate locally with the Syrian regime, and YPG forces have shared joint control with the regime over Qamishli and Hasaka cities. As a result of this cooperation, Islamist and rebel groups in Eastern Syria frequently clashed with the YPG, including prominent advances by JN, Islamist rebel groups, and ISIS deep into Hasaka province in early 2013.

In a highly successful operation titled the Serekeniye Martyrs’ Offensive, YPG forces expelled JN and ISIS forces from the border town of Ras al-Ayn and its surrounding countryside in July 2013. During these clashes, the YPG proved itself to be a capable fighting force able to evict coalitions of rebel groups from predominantly Kurdish territory. The success of the offensive was closely followed by PYD’s declaration of the Self-Rule Transitional Government, which conferred de-facto autonomy to the Kurdish-majority “cantons” of Afrin and Kobane, in Aleppo province, and Jazira, in Hasaka province.

Fighting between rebel forces and the YPG also occurred in northern Aleppo province. In August of 2013, a coalition of Syrian groups including ISIS, Ahrar al-Sham, Suqour al-Sham, Liwa al-Tawhid, and local groups from the town of Shuyukh announced that they were placing Ayn al-Arab under siege “to liberate the highway between Manbij and Hasaka from PKK [a derogatory reference to Kurdish forces by groups hostile to the YPG] checkpoints.” Nevertheless, rebel forces and the YPG were brought in alignment against ISIS in Northern Syria in the aftermath of the counter-ISIS offensive in January 2014 spearheaded by the Syrian Revolutionaries Front.  

YPG support for rebels in Aleppo provokes ISIS containment operations

In the Spring of 2014, ISIS escalated hostilities against the YPG in northeastern Aleppo Province. The timing, geographical distribution, and intensity of ISIS attacks indicate three ISIS objectives. First, ISIS wanted to push back YPG positions in order to establish a buffer zone between the YPG’s area of free movement and the “borders” of ISIS’s infant Aleppo Wilayat [Governorate]. Second, ISIS sought to protect key terrain essential to the congruity of ISIS territory in Syria; specifically, the towns of Sarrin, Zawr Maghar, and Upper and Lower Shuyukh. Finally, ISIS sought to deter future YPG aggression against potential ISIS vulnerabilities surrounding the canton of Kobane.

A decision by the YPG to join an attack by the Euphrates Islamic Liberation Front against the ISIS stronghold of Sarrin on March 14 appears to have provoked a shift in ISIS’s disposition toward the YPG and is likely to have encouraged the subsequent ISIS assault against the YPG in Northern Aleppo province. ISIS had seized the towns of Sarrin and Shuyukh Fawqani in the southernmost outskirts of the Kobane canton on March 10 and 11 respectively, allowing it to secure two major crossings north of the Euphrates and more effectively link its control zone north of Aleppo to those in northern Raqqa province. A strategically located town, Sarrin provides access to the Qarah Qozaq bridge and is therefore critical to ISIS’s freedom of mobility in the area. Wresting the bridge from ISIS control would have allowed the YPG and other rebel groups to cut an ISIS ground line of communication (GLOC) between Manbij and Tel Abyad, forcing ISIS to rely on a circuitous route south through the contested Tishrin Dam region.

By participating in the attack, the YPG proved it posed a threat to the not-yet-hardened periphery of ISIS’s Aleppo region. In response, ISIS forces launched an offensive operation to force a contraction of the YPG’s area of operations and deter future aggression. According to Kurdish news site Welati, 700 ISIS fighters arrived in Sireen on March 18 after further clashes erupted between ISIS and YPG-backed rebels. On March 19, the YPG Central Command announced a general mobilization on its website, indicating that reinforcements from other cantons would be moved to Kobane to assist against “inhuman attacks from the ISIS gang.” Shortly thereafter, during Friday prayers on March 21, ISIS-affiliated preachers in Raqqa province declared Ayn al-Arab to be “inside ISIS’s borders.”

Likely seeking to relieve pressure near Sireen, ISIS forces based near Tel Abyad on the Turkish border in northern Raqqa province opened a second front against YPG forces in Kobane. As clashes west of Tel Abyad continued on March 29, ISIS launched its first of three nighttime raids on the town of Zawr Maghar, located just east of Jarablus on the Turkish border. A second attack on Zawr Maghar on April 3 prompted an alarmed statement from the PYD, calling the attacks “the most violent since ISIS began its siege on Kobane.” A third nighttime raid, rumored to have been staged from Khirab Ato, against Zawr Maghar was reported by the YPG on April 17 amidst continued ISIS shelling in eastern Kobane, the last major ISIS operation in the initial ISIS effort to encircle and contain the canton of Kobane in 2014.

Reports of ISIS-YPG clashes in Kobane largely died down in early April, with local sources claiming the ISIS offensive had been thwarted. A YPG commander declared on April 19 that ISIS “not in a condition to advance now” and had been “entirely broken.” Overall, ISIS forces had been able to secure the valuable Qarah Qozaq bridge, but failed to decisively punish and deter the YPG. In fact, the YPG announced “a new resistance campaign against attacks” on April 25, launching immediate attacks against ISIS southwest of Ayn al-Arab city. More importantly, the YPG continued to support rebel groups fighting ISIS in Sarrin as late as May 1, clearly demonstrating ISIS’ failure to contain the YPG and prevent it from threatening critical lines of communication. By the beginning of May, the only ISIS aggression reported in Kobane were isolated firefights along front-line positions, other than ISIS’ brief capture of a hill that was reportedly quickly retaken by the YPG.

After failing in its first attempt to deter the YPG through direct military action, ISIS changed tactics, launching a wave of kidnappings targeting the Kobane canton as well as groups of Kurdish civilians travelling through Aleppo province. On May 21, ISIS fighters abducted 15 Kurdish civilians from the town of Kun Eftar, located along the road between Shuyukh at Sarrin and reported to have been on the frontline between the YPG and ISIS. ISIS’s kidnapping campaign expanded significantly in late May, with ISIS fighters kidnapping 200 Kurds from the town of Qabasin in Aleppo province on May 30. It is possible that ISIS conducted these kidnappings with the intent of conducting swaps for captured fighters and remains. YPG spokesman Redur Xelil confirmed in an interview with McClatchy on June 21 that the YPG was “waiting for their demands to determine if there should be a prisoner swap.” Additionally, Kurdish journalist Multu Civiroglu suggested in an email sent to McClatchy DC that ISIS hoped to use the captured students as a “bargaining chip to pressure YPG.” However, it is also possible the attacks were simply punitive. The Guardian reported that over the following months ISIS tried to “brainwash” the captives and induct them into ISIS ranks, sparking intense fear within the Kurdish population.

A second ISIS offensive against western Kobane began in late June. On June 23, the YPG and Kurdish media reported a renewed ISIS ground offensive on Zawr Maghar. On July 3, ISIS finally succeeded in capturing Zawr Maghar, which had been the target of ISIS attacks since March. A YPG statement published on July 4 announced the YPG’s withdrawal from Zawr Maghar, Bayadi, and Ziyara, temporarily granting ISIS a buffer zone. In addition to denying the YPG the ability to target Jarablus with indirect fire, the capture of Zawr Maghar allowed ISIS to broaden its offensive against the YPG, paving the way for ISIS’s capture of Bayadiya on July 6. Similar to its previous attacks on Kobane, ISIS opened a second front against the YPG staged from northern Raqqa. On July 8, ISIS attacked a YPG cordon around the village of Abdi Kuwi, east of Ayn al-Arab along the Turkish border, and detonated a VBIED against a YPG checkpoint at a cement factory on the road between Sireen and Ayn Issa. This ISIS front appears to have been successful, and the YPG released an official admission on July 9 that its forces had withdrawn from the villages of Kiri Sor, Afdouki, and Kendal as ISIS claimed to have broken the YPG siege of Abdi Kuwi following massive bombardment with tanks and artillery.

However, YPG resistance continued. According to ARANews, the YPG recaptured Jubb al-Faraj, east of Shuyukh Fawqani, and Khirab Ato by July 6.. On July 11, the YPG announced an attack on ISIS-controlled Shuyukh Tahtani, situated along the road linking the key ISIS bridgeheads of Shuyukh Fawqani and Sireen. In mid-July, reports surfaced indicating that the PYD in the Hasaka “Jazira” canton had begun debating instituting compulsory service in the YPG, possibly for purposes of redeployment to Ayn al-Arab. However, the proposed law never came to a vote,, and instead upwards of 800 Turkish Kurds arrived from PKK training camps in Turkey to join the YPG’s fight against ISIS in mid-July. ISIS captured the village of Fiyunta in Eastern Kobane from the YPG two days after the arrival of the PKK reinforcements, but the fresh forces allowed the YPG to stabilize their defenses and begin to push ISIS forces back. On the western front, the YPG halted ISIS’s advance at the town of Jebneh, east of Bayadiya. By July 23, the YPG had recaptured the towns of Jel Oghlu and Darbazin, and took Katsh, Jabb al-Faraj and Kjel a week later, giving the YPG the positioning needed to attack the town of Shuyukh.

The YPG attack on Shuyukh Tahtani was the climactic moment of the Kobane campagin. During the attack, 14 YPG and 35 ISIS fighters were reportedly killed in about 12 hours of fighting. The YPG did not take control of the town, but the takeaway was clear: the YPG could still place significant pressure on the Jarablus-Sireen GLOC and compel ISIS forces in Jarablus to detour around the Shuyukh Fawqani bridge. While sporadic clashes continued through August, these occurred on a much smaller scale with no major territories changing hands. By the beginning of September, ISIS had decisively accomplished one of its primary objectives and decidedly failed in the other two: ISIS had captured Zawr Maghar, pushed the YPG back from Sireen, and held onto Shuyukh, demonstrating ISIS’ ability to secure certain critical locations on the eastern border of its declared Aleppo region. ISIS failed, however, to create a buffer zone around Shuyukh or Zawr Maghar that would preclude subsequent YPG penetration into ISIS territory.

Implications

Analysis of the Kobane fight in the summer of 2014 reveals important aspects of ISIS strategy in Syria, indicative of an ISIS prioritization of continuity between its Syrian territories. It is clear that ISIS perceived the YPG to be a threat to important lines of communication that run close to the canton’s borders, and was willing to make a concerted effort to contract the YPG’s area of operations. ISIS specifically mentioned the proximity of Zawr Magharto the city of Jarablus in a report it published on the attack, confirming that ISIS considered YPG control of the town to be an untenable threat to the borders of its declared Aleppo region. The failure of the first phase of the offensive in March and April revealed that ISIS’ forces in the area lacked the strength to consistently make significant gains against the YPG. However, after the Mosul offensive in early June, newly strengthened ISIS forces made important gains, inducing panic in the Kurdish canton. This increased ISIS strength was likely the result of newly acquired indirect fire capabilities acquired from weapons depots in Mosul, and possibly the deployment of veteran fighters to supplement those based in the Aleppo area. The ISIS attack on Zawr Maghar began with days of sustained indirect fire bombardment, distinguished from previous attacks that had almost exclusively consisted of nighttime raids. Testament to this inflection, a YPG statement published on July 4 claimed that ISIS fired over three thousand mortar shells at the town. While the veracity of this claim is impossible to verify, the extent of ISIS’s weapons seizures in Iraq has been well documented.

Despite the reinvigoration of ISIS forces, the YPG was largely successful in defending its border against ISIS. The summer offensives therefore exhibit the ability of the YPG to resist ISIS gains, and to challenge the ISIS interior in a meaningful way. Newly united with rebel groups against ISIS within the Euphrates Volcano Operations Room, YPG forces are likely to contribute both effective fighters and critical staging capabilities that may lead to success against ISIS in the province. The joint operations room is a critical indicator of the possibilities for the formation of local counter-ISIS coalitions within Syria, and, if effective, may provide much-needed rebel momentum within the province. While insufficient to defeat ISIS, effective counter-ISIS action in Northern Syria may nonetheless encourage further exploration of local counter-ISIS alliances throughout Syria. However, the YPG’s participation has once again provoked a strong ISIS response. At the time of writing, an ISIS offensive against the Kobane canton has commenced and made sweeping initial gains. Thus the recent dynamics in Northern Syria illustrate that counter-ISIS movements face high risk in the short-term, and are likely to require additional assistance to be successful in resisting ISIS aggression.

Syria Update: August 30-September 4, 2014

by Charlie Caris and ISW Syria Team

Syria Update: July 17 - 25, 2014

by Jennifer Cafarella

ISIS Connects Strongholds in Deir ez-Zour and ar-Raqqa

by Jennifer Cafarella

ISIS has successfully linked its territorial control between its ar-Raqqa stronghold and Deir ez-Zour city, solidifying an ISIS control zone that stretches from ar-Raqqa into Iraq’s al-Anbar province. ISIS seized control of eight towns located northwest of Deir ez-Zour city from the al-Bosarya tribe on July 18 likely after a set of negotiations over the terms of the tribe’s surrender concluded. This advance comes as Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) and Ahrar al-Sham forces surrendered control of the towns of as-Shametia and Jabal Kabous to ISIS, abandoning their local headquarters and withdrawing from the province. According to SOHR ISIS now controls 35% of Syrian territory. Interestingly, ISIS repulsed a subsequent regime attempt at reinforcement northwest out of the city with cooperation from local fighters. The terms of the al-Bosarya tribe surrender were likely those reported earlier in western DeZ province but not directly attributed to the tribe, namely, that the terms of surrender must include ISIS fighting alongside rebels against the regime. In response to ISIS’s gains, regime forces deployed military convoys from its positions near Deir ez-Zour city into the western outskirts of the city and are reported to have set up checkpoints in the al-Bo Jem’a area. However, ISIS seized control of al-Bo Jem’a following clashes between ISIS backed by fighters from local allied brigades against regime forces, which withdrew back the outskirts of Ayyash town near Deir ez-Zour city. The regime has therefore been unable to meaningfully challenge the ISIS advance, and can be expected to concentrate on consolidation of its fallback positions near the city itself.

On July 19 the regime launched a counterattack against the al-Sha’er oil field outside of Palmyra. Clashes are reportedly ongoing, with 51 regime fighters and 40 ISIS fighters killed.

Resistance Emerges as ISIS Consolidates in Deir ez-Zour

by Jennifer Cafarella

Following the declaration of a caliphate by ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, a cascade of surrenders by rebel and tribal brigades in Syria’s Deir ez-Zour province conferred large swaths of territorial control to ISIS. Beginning on July 2, these advances dramatically changed the balance of power within the province and provided ISIS the opportunity to achieve territorial continuity along the Euphrates River into Iraq’s al-Anbar. However, local resistance has since emerged to challenge full ISIS control within Syria’s Deir ez-Zour. While this resistance is currently too localized to meaningfully challenge the ISIS advance, it nonetheless highlights the existence of groups willing to serve as counter-ISIS forces within the ISIS Euphrates system. As ISIS continues to harden its defenses across its newly integrated Iraq and Syria theaters, the continued existence of local opposition will remain a crucial indicator of opportunities to disrupt ISIS control.

The surrender of a large number of local rebel and tribal brigades to ISIS in Syria’s Deir ez-Zour province was not a spontaneous event. Rather, it was the outcome of individual settlements between ISIS and local leaders regarding the terms of a peaceful ISIS occupation. Driven by apprehension in the wake of ISIS’s success in Iraq, a number of local leaders sought to avoid an armed takeover by reinvigorated ISIS forces and agreed to a set of ISIS-imposed conditions for the peaceful surrender of rebel forces. These terms included the repentance of residents and fighters, the relinquishment of personal weapons, and a full civilian evacuation of surrendered towns for a period of 10 days. While resulting in a temporary humanitarian crisis within the province due to the creation of tens of thousands of displaced persons, these agreements allowed ISIS to quickly and efficiently assert full control over a large swath of territory whose armed takeover would have otherwise required a significant and costly ISIS ground offensive. Critically, further surrenders have occurred as ISIS began to consolidate. In the border town of Abu Kamal, the small local FSA brigades Ahl al-Athar, Ibn al-Qa'im, and Aisha pledged allegiance to Baghdadi on July 7, solidifying ISIS control over the town and neighboring countryside. In Subaykhan and neighboring towns, twelve rebel and tribal brigades announced their surrender to ISIS on July 8 and pledged bay’ah to Baghdadi. From the town of al-Tiana, fighters from localized Ahrar al-Sham- and JN-affiliated brigades declared their allegiance to ISIS on July 10. Finally, the al-Mujahideen and Bani Zaid batallions are reported to have begun to deliver their weapons to ISIS in the first step of their full surrender. In addition to providing an additional windfall of small arms, these surrenders have expanded ISIS’s zones of control on the western bank of the Euphrates River and sustained the current ISIS momentum within the province.

ISIS mobilization to solidify control and institute governance in newly acquired territory is underway as ISIS negotiators pursue further surrenders. Using the operating space provided by the temporary evacuation of civilian populations, ISIS cleared and secured recently surrendered towns, removing symbols of past rebel control as it begins to impose its governance. Following the civilian evacuation from as-Shahil, ISIS destroyed the home of a leader of the local Liwa al-Taliban al-Islamiyya on July 5 and vacated homes of two JN commanders and a number of other houses in the town. Seven houses that had belonged to JN commanders were also destroyed in the village of al-Dahla. In consolidating its control over returning civilian populations, ISIS has instituted a central repentance office in the Islamic Court in the town of al-Mayadin and demanded that all fighters and civilians present themselves to the office with two forms of identification in order to formalize their repentance. This demand extends even to those who had repented to an ISIS authority in the past, who must now take their proof of repentance to the al-Mayadin Islamic Court for renewal. Internal policing has also begun, with ISIS executing three men on July 13 under the accusation that they had been creating counter-ISIS cells. In addition to raiding shops, homes, and vehicles for contraband, ISIS has begun to institute service provision by distributing gasoline to civilians under its control. After seizing control of nearly all Deir ez-Zour’s oil fields, ISIS distributed gasoline in its northeastern stronghold of as-Shaddadi, and reportedly intends to conduct such distributions in all areas under its control, from Abu Kamal on the Iraqi border to Northern Aleppo, as well as its tiny enclaves in the countryside of Hama and Homs. ISIS also significantly reduced the price of oil to civilians under its control and capped the maximum price traders can impose on other groups. These measures are the first stages of the full imposition of ISIS state governance, which will continue to unfold in secured territory according to the model visible in the ISIS capital of ar-Raqqa.

However, while the ability of ISIS to negotiate the wholesale surrender of rebel and tribal forces within the province has been staggering, resistance has nonetheless emerged in a number of key areas. In immediate defiance of the caliphate, the FSA-affiliated Liwa Jund al-Rahman put out a statement rejecting ISIS and declaring its commitment to continue to fight. In the towns of Abu Hamam and al-Jorzi on the eastern bank of the Euphrates River, the local Ibn al-Qayyem Brigade and al-Hamza Battalion attacked the homes of ISIS fighters and other ISIS positions on July 5 and 6. Demonstrations also occurred in the towns of al-Qureyyi and al-Ashara, where an unknown explosion targeted the agricultural bank on July 7. Finally, the resistance of the Jafar al-Tiyar brigade has precluded full control over Deir ez-Zour’s oil wells by keeping the al-Ward oil field momentarily outside of ISIS control. In the stronghold of al-Mayadin, a suicide car bomb (SVBIED) targeted a public market on July 13, killing 13 including 5 non-Syrian ISIS fighters. The attack remains unclaimed. The defiance of these individual rebel brigades constitutes a critical resistance to ISIS within the province. However, in the absence of outside support it is one that is likely to succumb once ISIS completes its consolidation and reinitiates offensive operations. For this reason, these brigades may continue to resist only so long as the terms of the negotiated surrender remain as severe as those imposed on the initial wave of surrenders. Testament to this possibility, a temporary surge in resistance against ISIS forces in the town of Khosham emerged after initial negotiations with local brigades failed but immediately dissipated once a settlement was reached. Upon the breakdown of talks, fighters from the Abdullah ibn al-Zobayr battalion attacked ISIS positions within the town, killing three fighters and burning the house of a fighter from the town who had defected to ISIS. An agreement was reached on July 10 in which civilians that had fled the town would be allowed to return so long as each family repented and delivered a Kalashnikov to ISIS. While it remains unclear whether the terms of this agreement also mandated a demobilization of the ibn al-Zobayr battalion, attacks appear to have been discontinued. The ability of ISIS to negotiate a settlement within actively resisting localities is a critical indicator of its strength within the province and highlights the likely inability of local groups to maintain resistance even in the medium term. 

Two additional sets of negotiations are ongoing, and their outcome is likely to have significant implications for the continued existence of a moderate Syrian opposition within Deir ez-Zour Province. On the eastern bank of the Euphrates, the al-She’tat tribe remains a primary source of resistance to ISIS. The towns of Granij, Abu Hamam, and Keshkeyyi all remain under the control of the tribe, with a total population reportedly near 83,000. Fighters and civilians from al-She’tat continue to resist through demonstrations against ISIS and participation in attacks alongside local rebel brigades, however the tribe’s leadership has nonetheless continued to negotiate with ISIS regarding the terms of its surrender. In addition, other remaining local rebel and tribal brigades in the western countryside of Deir ez-Zour are reportedly also engaged in ongoing negotiations with ISIS and have declared their own set of terms. These include the stipulations that ISIS: (1) enter their towns with only non-Syrian fighters, (2) refrain from carrying out arrests or weapons confiscations, (3) cooperate in fighting against regime forces within the province, and (4) establish a joint Sharia body consisting of both local leaders and ISIS religious officials. While it is unclear whether these terms are congruent with those demanded by the al-She’tat tribe, in both cases ISIS appears to be maintaining its demand for the handover of all rebel weapons as a prerequisite for surrender. As a result, negotiations remain in a stalemate. If ISIS submits to these demands in order to neutralize these remaining pockets of resistance, it will have obtained effective control over nearly the entirety of Deir ez-Zour province. It will also have engaged in a significant step change within its Syria theatre, as direct confrontation against the regime has not yet manifested to a meaningful degree. If such an agreement occurs, an attack on regime positions in Deir ez-Zour city is likely to follow, a departure from historic ISIS trajectory that would likely have repercussions in other provinces, as rebel brigades may recalculate their opposition to ISIS in favor of bringing its force to bear against the regime. However, the ability of JN to consolidate its own ranks will also be a significant factor influencing the strategic calculus of remaining rebel forces, and may encourage increased rebel participation on either side in a further entrenchment of the ongoing JN-ISIS feud. Thus both the ISIS expansion and a reactionary JN consolidation are equally grave for the moderate Syrian opposition, whose relative influence continues to dwindle proportionate to the growing strength of these Jihadi elements. 

Deir ez-Zour City

The ISIS momentum in the province has also translated into an ISIS foothold deep within Deir ez-Zour city. While not directly attributed to ISIS, pressure has increased on rebels within the city: an unknown explosion occurred in al-Jebelia neighborhood on July 11 and an IED detonated inside a JN HQ on the Fo’ad cinema street on July 12 alongside another IED detonation in the area. Combined with the strain of the ongoing siege, this pressure prompted JN and Ahrar al-Sham to abandon their headquarters inside the city on July 13 after a failed attempt to negotiate with ISIS. Following this withdrawal, ISIS fighters entered the city and seized control of a number of neighborhoods and the Sharia court while maintaining firm control of the al-Siyasa bridge. It is unclear how the JN and Ahrar al-Sham retreat was conducted, however it is likely these forces executed a tactical withdrawal from a number of locations in order to fortify their presence deeper within the city. There has been no indication that ISIS allowed rebel forces to withdraw across the al-Siyasa bridge, and it is equally unlikely these forces were allowed to exit the city through regime territory. According to official ISIS social media, JN emir Abu Hazem attempted to escape the city across the bridge and was shot at an ISIS checkpoint as he attempted to detonate a suicide belt following the discovery of his identity at the checkpoint. Within the city, ISIS arrested fighters from JN who reportedly hid inside a house as ISIS moved in to consolidate control, indicating that the tactical withdrawal may not have been fully disclosed or executed across rebel ranks. In response to the ISIS advance, a demonstration occurred in the remaining rebel-held areas in which demonstrators rejected an allegiance with ISIS. However, following the loss of territory within the city the now-isolated pockets of rebel fighters remain under a two-front siege by the regime and ISIS, and it is unlikely they will be able to mount a significant counterattack against ISIS within the city. 

ISIS has not yet launched an assault against regime positions in or near Deir ez-Zour city. However, in addition to achieving a new proximity to regime forces within the city’s contested neighborhoods, ISIS is now in control of positions that may enable it to directly assault the Deir ez-Zour military airport from two fronts. Prior to the incursion into the city, ISIS fighters seized the town of al-Mar’iya directly to the east of the airport on July 7. While rumors immediately surfaced that the Syrian regime began to withdraw from the Deir ez-Zour military airport, this appears to have been small tactical withdrawal of non-critical elements rather than a full retreat. Regime forces were subsequently videotaped establishing barricades on the mountain overlooking the city and have since mobilized on the western side of the al-Hawiqa neighborhood in the north western corner of the city. Following the ISIS incursion, regime forces reinforced their checkpoints and set up new barriers within their areas of control and are likely to continue their holding pattern in the absence of a significant ISIS offensive operation against the military airbase or the remaining regime-held neighborhoods.

If ISIS is able to finish its consolidation along the Euphrates and to secure and expand its foothold within Deir ez-Zour city it will have obtained a strategic depth across the Jazeera desert that is likely to render a successful routing of its presence from Iraq’s Anbar both a pitched fight and a necessary but insufficient measure in order to secure the control and integrity of Iraq’s sovereign borders. Its implications for the Syrian civil war are equally severe, as a consolidated ISIS in Deir ez-Zour is unlikely to be unseated by existing rebel forces. While the opportunity exists to subvert ISIS control by strengthening local rebel and tribal groups that have or would be willing to resist, this window of opportunity as ISIS remains in its consolidation phase is likely to be fleeting. A rebel alignment with JN as a bulwark against increasingly strong ISIS forces should be viewed as a dangerous course of action, yet it becomes increasingly likely as ISIS expansion continues to go unchecked.

Syria Update: June 21-24, 2014

by Isabel Nassief

Syria Update: June 15-20, 2014

By Isabel Nassief, Valerie Szybala, and Chris Harmer

Iraq continues to impact Syria. Rebel gains, particularly in Damascus and Qalamoun, may also suggest that Hezbollah recruitments to replenish the redeployed Iraqi Shi’a militants are either insufficient or not occurring quickly enough. There is no evidence that Syrian Air Force (SAF) is reducing air sorties in support of existing operations in order to reallocate sortie counts towards ISIS targets in central and eastern Syria.Continued movement of Iraqi Shi’a militia fighters

The return of Iraqi Shi’a militias from Syria to Iraq has continued to increase in response to ISIS operations in Iraq. The battlefield implications of this redeployment are most visible in Damascus where Iraqi Shi’a fighters played an important role. Opposition news site Zaman al-Wasl reported on June 19 that the majority of the Iraqi militias operating in Mleiha in the Eastern Ghouta suburb of Damascus have withdrawn from the battlefield and are returning to Iraq. The withdrawal of Iraqi Shi’a militants is having a direct impact on the regime’s forces composition. As rebels have made gains in the Eastern Ghouta suburbs over the last two weeks, the regime has failed to launch a successful counteroffensive. Rebel gains, particularly in Damascus and Qalamoun, may also suggest that Hezbollah recruitments to replenish the redeployed Iraqi Shi’a militants are either insufficient or not occurring quickly enough.

Regime airstrike reallocation

Reporting on kinetic activity in Syria by Sham News Network indicates an escalation in overall regime air raids throughout Syria in the last two weeks. Regime air strikes in eastern Syria against ISIS positions have continued to increase since ISIS began its attack on Mosul. It is likely that the expansion of regime airstrikes into eastern Syria will affect its ability to conduct airstrikes in key areas of contestation along the central corridor in western Syria. The regime’s reliance on airpower has also increased due to the manpower deficit caused by the redeployment of Iraqi Shi’a militias. To deal with this increased demand on airpower, the regime will likely commit standard ordnances to eastern Syria while concentrating rotary wing strikes and barrel bomb attacks along the central corridor in western Syria. This will allow the regime better precision targeting against ISIS in the east while enabling it to continue air strikes in key areas of contestation.

The Syrian Air Force (SAF) continues to show that it is capable of conducting targeted sorties at a distance from its operating bases. The increase in strikes targeting ISIS strongholds in central and eastern Syria, far from the Assad regime’s primary ground operations in and around Aleppo, Homs, Deraa, and Damascus, is evidence that the SAF is capable of fighting on two fronts simultaneously. It is clear that SAF continues to receive significant external, state based logistics and technical support resulting in adequate supplies of fuel, munitions, and spare parts enabling the SAF to operate over the entire stretch of Syrian airspace. There is no evidence that SAF is reducing air sorties in support of existing operations in order to reallocate sortie counts towards ISIS targets in central and eastern Syria. It appears that SAF has generated some additional “surge” capacity to service targets of opportunity in Syria that may be temporarily vulnerable due to increased ISIS operations in Iraq.

Rebels gains:

Recent rebel gains on fronts throughout Syria indicate that opposition forces may be capitalizing on both regime and ISIS vulnerabilities as a result of the escalation of violence in Iraq.

*Qalamoun: Rebels have continued to make gains in Qalamoun, seizing strategic hills near Hayrud and Hawsh al-Arab and ambushing the town of Rankous, reportedly killing 40 Hezbollah fighters.

*Deraa province: Opposition fighters have also made advances in Deraa province, taking a military base near the Tal al-Jumu’a hill. In response, the regime has escalated air raids in the southern province against rebel positions, including an camp for Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in the town of Shajara on the Syrian-Jordanian border.

*Damascus: Rebels have continued to make gains in Mleiha over the last two weeks, reportedly killing Captain Rudein Ali Issa, the NDF leader for Damascus’ Southern Front near Mleiha. In an attempt to undo recent rebel gains in the area, regime forces mounted an unsuccessful offensive on June 18 to retake the Dilati Mosque from Islamic Front (IF) forces in Mleiha. The following day the regime launched 23 airstrikes and nine surface-to-surface missiles on Mleiha amid ongoing clashes between rebel forces and the regime.

*Aleppo province: In northern Aleppo province, rebel groups including Jabhat al-Nusra continue targeting ISIS-controlled villages of al-Bab and al-Rai near the Turkish border as part of the Naharwan al-Sharq offensive. In the countryside south-west of Aleppo city, prominent rebel groups announced seizing the regime-held villages Buhayra, Mashfa, Qalaya, Dubagha, and Manashir. The seizure coincided with the announcement of a new operations room to coordinate the “Invasion of the Age of the Honest” offensive which began on June 11.

Changes in ISIS posture in Syria

In the past week ISIS in Syria has made several unusual moves that suggest the organization is adjusting its posture on the ground as a result of the crisis in Iraq.

*After a video appeared online on June 14 showing Abu Haf al-Masri, the ISIS emir of the northern border town of Jarablus, cruelly toying with an old man, the ISIS Wilayat of Aleppo released a statement that al-Masri had been reprimanded and removed from his responsibilities.

*On June 15 opposition reporting networks put out an alert that ISIS was removing its flags from its headquarters in several towns in northern Raqqa province including Tel Abyad, al-Sharakrak, and Saluk. ISIS had only weeks before raised a behemoth of a flag in Tel Abyad, which sits right on the border with Turkey. There are no indications that ISIS has withdrawn its presence or relinquished control in any of these locations.

*On June 18 aid was allowed to enter the city of Deir ez-Zour for the first time in weeks since ISIS took control of the rebels’ only supply route into the city and cut off access. The aid delivery was the result of negotiations between ISIS and opposition groups in the area and photos from the delivery clearly show vehicles from the Syrian Arab Red Crescent, but ISIS posted photos of the event claiming credit for having “saved” the city.

These incidents take place against the backdrop of events in Iraq, where on June 18 ISIS repealed the Medina decree which imposed harsh Sharia law in the city of Mosul. All together this cluster of ISIS actions suggests an internal strategic decision by ISIS leadership aimed at appearing slightly more moderate. It is not yet clear if ISIS is actually attempting an organizational shift to improve its relationship with civilians or if this is a temporary move intended to lower its profile and lessen backlash in Syria while it is directing resources and attention to the Iraqi theatre. Continuing reports from Syrians living in ISIS-controlled areas of Syria indicate that ISIS has not actually moderated its draconian methods, which means that this cluster of uncharacteristic moves by ISIS is likely just a temporary reaction to the increased international spotlight.

ISIS’s Second Front in Syria

by Jennifer Cafarella and Valerie Szybala

Key Takeaway:

ISIS has sustained its campaign in the countryside of Deir ez-Zour province throughout its escalation in Iraq, indicating its continued prioritization of this military effort inside of Syria despite increased pressure from the regime. Although it is possible that ISIS will take an operational pause in Syria to solidify its control and absorb its gains in Iraq, it is likely to move swiftly in a renewed offensive fully to rout JN and rebel forces from the Deir ez-Zour countryside and firmly to establish the lines of control and oil reserves within its state.

After the fall of Mosul, widespread celebrations were held throughout ISIS-held territory within Syria in the Aleppo strongholds of  Jarablus, al Bab, Manbij, Deir Heifer, and Maskana, with a full parade held in ar-Raqqa. ISIS social media outlets reported wildly on the ongoing advances in Iraq, using the hashtag #SykesPicotOver to celebrate the game-changing successes achieved in Iraq. In addition to the outpouring of support on social media and in the streets of ISIS’s Syrian territory, ISIS commander in northern Syria Omar al-Shishani issued a “general communication” urging support for our “brothers in Mosul.” These celebrations indicate the cross-border resonance of ISIS operations in Iraq and Syria.

Raqqa & Aleppo

ISIS firmly solidified its control over the de-facto capital of its emirate in ar-Raqqa city in early 2014. While local resistance to ISIS rule has continued, it has been limited to low-level clashes and civilian protests that have fallen short of posing a threat to ISIS’s control in the area. In northern ar-Raqqa province Kurdish YPG forces regularly target ISIS positions in the countryside surrounding the Tel Abyad border crossing with Turkey, but ISIS has been able to maintain control of the crossing and has engaged in a number of vicious reprisal attacks including executions and kidnapping of Kurdish civilians in an attempt to deter future offensive raids. Tel Abyad is a key strategic location for ISIS, likely serving as a transit point for foreign fighters and supplies into ISIS’s ar-Raqqa stronghold.

ISIS has come under increased pressure in Aleppo from rebel groups which have recently launched an offensive to regain territory in the northeast of the province. The Islamic front (IF), Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) and other Islamic brigades initiated a renewed push against ISIS positions in the countryside, seizing a string of villages north of the ISIS stronghold of al-Bab. The objective of the operation is to seize control of the northern border village of al-Ra’ii which is likely used by ISIS as a second route for foreign fighters and supplies. However, although the loss of al-Ra’ii would negatively affect ISIS’s supply routes into its Aleppo strongholds, there have been no indicators that the IF and JN intend to escalate this offensive beyond minor countryside villages and directly attack the ISIS strongholds of al-Bab, Manbij or Deir Heifer. In the absence of a significant rebel offensive against these cities, ISIS is likely to remain secure in its Aleppo strongholds as it transfers weapons, funds, and possibly new recruits into its Syrian theater.

Deir ez-Zour

ISIS’s offensive to take control of parts of Deir ez-Zourfrom other rebels and to secure critical supply routes between Iraq and ar-Raqqa has met with relative success since it began in March.  However, ISIS has been unable to claim a decisive victory as Syrian rebels, tribes, and JN all rallied together in defense of the province. The Mujahideen Shura Council, consisting of the IF, JN, other rebel brigades, and local tribal militias was declared on May 25 to counter ISIS in the province and has continued to challenge ISIS. Members of the council have continuously engaged in clashes with ISIS in the strategic as-Suwar – Deir ez-Zour – al-Basira triangle as they attempt to disrupt ISIS’s attempt to consolidate its supply lines and sources of revenue. This fighting has resulted in large civilian displacement in the area, prompting the FSA’s Supreme Military Command to declare the province a disaster area and to call for humanitarian assistance. 

Deir ez-Zour Province

Despite this resistance, ISIS seized a number of countryside villages to the west of Deir ez-Zour city in consolidation of its supply route from Aleppo province, and took control of the bridge connecting the city with the suburbs, cutting off rebel movement and the entrance of humanitarian aid. With the regime still maintaining control of the remaining supply routes into the city as well as a small presence in several northern neighborhoods, the city has been effectively under siege, prompting online activists to launch a campaign under the hashtag #DeirEzzorNeedYourHelp to draw attention to the crisis. Media reporting on Deir ez-Zour on June 12, 2014 highlighted the ISIS siege of the city and the possibility of an impending ISIS attack to fully secure the city, fears that were echoed by a plea by the SMC to “regional backers” to aid rebel forces in the province against ISIS. 

ISIS map of its positioning within ar-Raqqa and Deir ez-Zour provinces

Possible Courses of Action in Syria in the wake of ISIS’s Iraq Campaign

Indicators that ISIS is undertaking a significant transfer of captured vehicles and weapons back into Syria emerged at the very beginning of the currently ongoing Iraq campaign, beginning with the capture of Mosul in early June. Vehicles reportedly began arriving on June 12, 2014 in the ISIS stronghold of Tel Hamis in Hasaka province around 20 miles south of Qamishli, the provincial border crossing into Iraq. Activists posted photos purporting to show ISIS Commander Abu Omar al-Shishani inspecting U.S. Humvees reportedly transported from Mosul into Syria. In addition, a video was circulated by pro-ISIS media of a convoy arriving in ash-Shadadi, which lies on the Khabur River in Hasaka province north of Deir ez-Zour and serves as ISIS’s strategic rear across both Iraq and Syria. 

ISIS Emir in Northern Syria Abu Omar ash-Shishani Inspects Iraqi Army Humvees

Translation: Spoils of war that from God that his fighters (Mujahideen) have after the destruction of the Sykes-Picot Borders

Translation: ISIS spoils of war coming from Iraq and headed to the Levant after the destruction of the ‘artificial’ border,’ praise God

The infusion of significant military assets and resources into the Syria theater has provoked a regime challenge to ISIS in eastern Syria. In the wake of the Iraq campaign, regime warplanes have conducted numerous airstrikes against ISIS headquarters, targeting the Tabaqa dam, ar-Raqqa city, Tel Hamis, the ash-Shadadistronghold, and a number of other locations along the Syrian-Iraq border in Deir ez-Zour province. These air strikes are a notable escalation in the regime’s disposition toward ISIS, which to date it had largely refrained from confronting. However, while these strike may be disruptive to ISIS’s ability to consolidate and reinforce its effort in Deir ez-Zour province, there are no indicators that they will be successful in defeating ISIS in Syria. 

ISIS in Syria during the Iraq Campaign

ISIS has continued to pursue its objective in the Deir ez-Zour countryside throughout the Iraq campaign, indicating an ongoing prioritization of this effort despite the increased pressure from the Syrian regime. A direct ISIS attack on regime strongholds in ar-Raqqa and Deir ez-Zour provinces could attempt to relieve the pressure inflicted by ongoing regime airstrikes. However, there are no indicators that ISIS intends to escalate against the regime, as it is a course of action that would come at a much higher cost than ISIS is likely to accept. Instead, ISIS is likely to reinvigorate its efforts in Deir ez-Zour with its newfound military assets. In an early indicator of this line of effort, ISIS targeted a nearby JN headquarters with a suicide vehicular-borne explosive device (SVBIED) as it launched a concerted attempt to regain control of the contested al-Basira village on June 17. While clashes are still ongoing, this renewed effort indicates that ISIS is committed to securing key supply routes and oil fields in Deir ez-Zour province.

The control of critical supply routes has historically been the first step of an ISIS expansion. With the windfall of arms, men, and cash that it has taken from its gains in Iraq, ISIS may finally have the strength needed to rout other rebels from Deir ez-Zour and to secure full control of its supply lines and oil fields. If it is successful, ISIS may launch an expansive push back into western Syria in an attempt to regain territory lost after the outbreak of infighting between ISIS and JN in January 2014.