Russian-Backed Separatists Seize Village Near Mariupol

By Franklin Holcomb

 

Russian-backed separatists demonstrated the Kremlin’s continued capability to escalate offensive operations in eastern Ukraine with a tactical advance into the uncontrolled village of Kominternove despite its intervention in Syria. An armored group of roughly 100 Russian-backed separatists seized the village on December 22. Kominternove lies ten kilometers outside the key Ukrainian port city of Mariupol. Separatist forces reportedly launched the operation as retaliation for Ukraine’s occupation of at least two uncontrolled villages east of Mariupol in early December, a move which both Russian and separatist officials claimed could lead to a resumption of hostilities. The advance of separatist mechanized units toward Mariupol is a direct violation of the most recent withdrawal agreement between Ukrainian and Russian-backed forces signed in September. Ukrainian authorities called the occupation of the village a large-scale provocation. The Ukrainian military has reported several incidents of shelling from the separatists' new positions around Kominternove on the neighboring uncontrolled village of Vodiane, located three kilometers closer to Mariupol. These advances underscore the potential for further separatist activity around the strategic port city, targeting weakly defended or uncontrolled villages between Ukrainian and separatist lines. 

The separatist advance into Kominternove gives the Russian-backed forces the ability to launch indirect fire on the outskirts of Mariupol with lighter weaponry, including mortars. This may hold tactical significance, enabling the separatists to project force against Ukrainian defenses around the city without launching a high-profile rocket artillery attack. The occupation of Kominternove, however, is not likely the precursor to a major offensive in the near term. Ukrainian forces have fortified Mariupol with a network of trenches, barriers, and mines, obstructing a direct Russian-backed separatist assault on the city from the east. Russian-backed forces would likely intensify operations near Mariupol and across the front line prior to an offensive on the port city, testing government defenses with probing maneuvers and bombarding Ukrainian positions with heavy artillery. Russian-backed forces would also likely seek to outflank heavy Ukrainian defenses east of Mariupol by seizing strategic terrain to the north of the city along the Donetsk-Mariupol highway. Although Russian-backed separatists now have the ability to threaten a strategic Ukrainian city with a wider array of weapons, they have yet to trip several indicators that would signal a looming large-scale offensive. 

Ukrainian Local Elections Leave Room for Russian Influence

By Daniel Pitcairn, Hugo Spaulding, and Daniel Urchick

Key Take-away: Ukraine’s local elections strengthened pro-Russian factions and local oligarchs in its southern and eastern regions, offering Moscow an opportunity for greater influence in the post-revolution political order.

Local elections on October 25 exposed cracks in post-revolution Ukraine that Russia may exploit.  Candidates linked to former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych and prominent oligarchs that rival current President Petro Poroshenko earned more support than the president’s faction in the south and east of the country, areas that are vulnerable to Russian political destabilization. Former Yanukovych allies with ties to the Dnipropetrovsk-based owner of Ukraine’s largest bank Ihor Kolomoyskyi earned crucial victories in the Black Sea port city of Odesa and Ukraine’s second largest city of Kharkiv. Mafia-linked Hennadiy Trukhanov was reelected in Odesa, marking a setback for Poroshenko, who has tried to overhaul the region historically plagued by organized crime with the help of provincial governor and reformist former Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili. Former Yanukovych ally Hennadiy Kernes was reelected in the key northeastern city of Kharkiv after allying with a Kolomoyskyi-backed party that reportedly earned a majority of seats in the city council. Two mayoral candidates from the pro-Russian “Opposition Bloc” and one candidate backed by Donetsk-based former Yanukovych ally and Ukraine’s richest man Rinat Akhmetov earned berths in runoff elections on November 15 in the provincial capitals of Dnipropetrovsk, Mykolaiv, and Zaporizhia. The “Opposition Bloc” also earned victories inside government-held areas of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts, including in the two previously separatist-controlled cities of Sloviansk and Lysychansk. Government authorities postponed elections in the key port city of Mariupol following allegations of ballot fraud favoring pro-Russian candidates backed by Akhmetov. These results highlight the challenges faced by Poroshenko’s pro-Western government in asserting control outside the western and central regions of Ukraine, where it largely preserved its influence.

Ihor Kolomoyskyi’s stronghold of Dnipropetrovsk has become the epicenter of competition between Poroshenko and his rivals since the October 25 elections. Poroshenko’s government reportedly backed the “Opposition Bloc” candidate and former deputy prime minister under Viktor Yanukovych Oleksandr Vilkul over the Kolomoyskyi-backed candidate, who will contest a runoff election on November 15. The Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) launched a “large-scale special operation” to detain Hennadiy Korban, a close associate of Kolomoyskyi and the leader of the oligarch’s UKROP (Ukrainian Association of Patriots) party, and his associates linked to organized crime in the southeastern city of Dnipropetrovsk on October 31. Hundreds of demonstrators gathered in Dnipropetrovsk to protest the arrest while a smaller protest was held in Kyiv against Poroshenko’s Prosecutor General Viktor Shokin, who was involved in organizing the arrest and is seen as an impediment to anti-corruption efforts. The timing of the arrest may indicate the intent of Poroshenko’s government to influence the outcome of the run-off election.  Poroshenko’s rivalry with Kolomoyskyi previously escalated in March 2015, when Kolomoyskyi was deposed as Dnipropetrovsk governor along with his deputy, Hennadiy Korban.  Kolomoyskyi was widely credited with preventing a Russian-backed separatist movement from taking hold of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast in March 2014. The efforts of Poroshenko’s government to root out his rival from the key region could directly lead to the expansion of a Russian influence.

The success of candidates receptive to Russia in southern and eastern Ukraine highlights the risk Poroshenko faces as he moves forward with the decentralization measures required by the “Minsk II” ceasefire agreement. If implemented, decentralization would offer greater authority to local officials, including those who oppose Poroshenko’s government in Kyiv and maintain ties with Moscow. Decentralization, in its proposed form, will grant broader fiscal powers to local governments rather than granting autonomy to Ukraine’s provinces, distinguishing it from the more debilitating federalization Russia initially pursued. Nevertheless, strengthened local governments in opposition to Poroshenko may present obstacles to his national reform agenda, which aims to root out corruption and overhaul Ukraine’s Russian and oligarch-controlled political economic order with the eventual objective of joining the European Union. The results of the October 25 elections reflect Russia’s ability to strengthen its political leverage over Ukraine without the need to escalate military operations in the southeast. Russia achieved political gains even as pro-Russian separatist forces continued to withdraw military equipment from the front lines in the southeastern Donbas region and remained largely compliant with a renewed ceasefire on September 1, 2015.

Russia seeks to prevent Ukraine from becoming a fully-fledged member of the European Union by leveraging its military intervention in Donbas to undermine the post-revolution government in Kyiv. Moscow successfully applied military escalation in January and February 2015 to set the terms of the “Minsk II” ceasefire agreement, which locks Kyiv into making major political concessions, including decentralization and the provision of “special status” to separatist-held Donbas. The Kremlin now has the opportunity to cultivate ties with stronger pro-Russian factions and oligarchs in the south and east, preventing these historically pro-Russian regions from fully escaping its sphere of influence. Moscow may not be willing or able to reestablish a client government in Kyiv in the short-term but it will continue to exploit opportunities to prevent Ukraine from becoming a prosperous European nation unified against Russia.

Russian-backed Separatists Postpone Disputed Elections

By Daniel Pitcairn

Key takeaway: Russian-backed separatists in eastern Ukraine have postponed unrecognized local elections from October and November 2015 to February 2016. The elections would have violated the “Minsk” peace process which requires the vote to proceed under Ukrainian law. The postponement will mitigate risks of armed conflict resuming in October but does not reflect a fundamental shift in Russia’s Ukraine strategy. Instead, it reflects Russia’s effort to balance this strategy with intervention in the Middle East and a desire to break out of international isolation and economic sanctions.

Russian-backed separatists in eastern Ukraine announced on October 6 their decision to postpone upcoming local elections unrecognized by Kyiv until February 2016. They would otherwise have transpired in October and November. The announcement follows an October 2 meeting of the heads of state of Ukraine, Russia, Germany, and France, where Russian President Vladimir Putin reportedly promised Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko that he would pressure Ukrainian separatists into cancelling the controversial elections. Kyiv, Paris and Berlin had decried the upcoming elections as a major violation of the February “Minsk II” ceasefire in Ukraine, because they would not have been held in accordance with Ukrainian law or in the presence of recognized international monitors. Although Moscow had originally defended the disputed elections, the decision to cancel them does not represent a fundamental shift in Russia’s strategy in Ukraine, which continues to rely on the threat and application of military force to pressure the Ukrainian government into making political concessions that allow Moscow to strongly influence Ukraine’s politics and policy. Instead, Russia is attempting to balance its strategy for Ukraine with intervention in the Middle East and to shed international economic sanctions.

The Minsk II agreement signed in February represents a concession to Russia because Ukraine had little choice but to consent to key Russian objectives, including decentralization and the assignment of “special status” to Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, amidst a major Russian-backed separatist offensive. Russia had thwarted its implementation by refusing to meet many of its provisions, including those pertaining to the elections and the withdrawal of heavy weaponry from the front lines. By pressuring the separatists to postpone their elections, Russia has shifted international and domestic pressure back onto to Kyiv to fulfill its side of the Minsk agreements and enact politically painful concessions. The separatists claim Kyiv must now “fulfill all obligations under the Minsk agreements” as a condition of election postponement. These include the provision of “special status” to Donbas, amnesty for militants in the region, and revising amendments to the constitution in agreement with the separatists.

The decision to delay elections all but guarantees that implementation of the Minsk II agreement will extend into 2016 and prolongs Moscow’s ability to exert pressure on the pro-Western government in Kyiv. This delay favors Moscow. Poroshenko had previously insisted that implementation of the agreement must be completed by the end of this year, whereas Moscow has indicated its willingness to extend it into 2016. By averting the agreement’s likely collapse over separatist elections and prolonging the implementation process, Russia has preserved the mechanism through it which it can most effectively convert its threats of military force into political concessions by Kyiv. Poroshenko knows that the Minsk II agreement traps him into choosing between military escalation in Donbas and a high probability of significant domestic political fracturing. A deadly riot by far-right groups in front of the Ukrainian parliament on August 31 highlighted this domestic political challenge. The riot came in response to initial approval of draft amendments extending special status to Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts.

Meanwhile, Moscow is keen to maintain the veneer of progress in Ukraine while expanding its military intervention in Syria and trying to escape international sanctions brought on by its war in Ukraine. Five days after Russia began airstrikes in Syria on September 30, Russian-backed separatists in Ukraine announced they would postpone their disputed elections, leading the EU, among others, to express “renewed hope for a sustainable political settlement.” An unnamed German government source even credited Russia directly for the progress, commenting, “Moscow has finally delivered.” In presenting itself as constructive actor in Ukraine, Russia also seeks to weaken political will within the EU to extend sanctions beyond their expiration in January 2016. French President Francois Hollande has already said that he “will ask for sanctions [on Russia] to be lifted” if progress toward the implementation of the Minsk agreements continues.

Although the postponement of disputed separatist elections to next year has been met with significant international approval for averting a breakdown of the Minsk II peace process in the short term, it does not presage a strategic reversal by Russia in Ukraine. Instead it reflects an effort to balance new geopolitical priorities, particularly in the Middle East, with a continuation of its destabilizing strategy in Ukraine over a longer term.

Read this update online here.