Ukraine's Blockade Crisis

By Franklin Holcomb and Charles Frattini III

Rising instability in Ukraine has created an opportunity for Russia to further press its political-military campaign to weaken Kyiv and exert greater control over Ukraine. Ukrainian activists instituted a potentially crippling blockade against territory in Eastern Ukraine occupied by Russian proxies. The blockade has exacerbated tensions between the Ukrainian government and parts of Ukrainian civil society while increasing political and social tensions. Russia has further destabilized the situation by providing additional political and economic support to its separatist proxy forces, which have seized Ukrainian businesses and continue to conduct military operations. Russian President Vladimir Putin will continue to exploit vulnerabilities in Ukraine while American and Western policy remains in a transitional state. Efforts to strengthen Kyiv and enable it to defend Ukraine’s sovereignty against Russian aggression will be critical to U.S. interests in Europe.

An activist-led blockade of Russian proxy-controlled territory in Eastern Ukraine has increased political and social tensions in Ukraine. The activists, many of whom are Ukrainian veterans, intend to halt the flow of goods between separatist and Ukrainian territory. Blockade leaders condemned Ukraine for profiting from trade with separatists and demanded that Kyiv cease trade with the Russian proxies and release Ukrainian prisoners held by separatists. MP Semenchenko claimed that the blockade would “bring the entire war to an end” by putting economic pressure on the separatists. The blockade threatens a primary source of separatist income but it comes at a cost to Ukraine. The blockade prevents the transfer of anthracite coal, a shortage of which prompted Ukraine to declare a state of emergency in its energy sector on February 15, 2017, and continues to present economic risks. The blockade also provided an excuse for Russian-backed separatist forces to seize Ukrainian-owned and operated enterprises across their territory on March 01 as levels of fighting in the eastern Ukraine steadily increased. Ukrainian efforts to negotiate with the activists failed to make significant progress. Attempts to disperse the activist-led blockade on March 13 prompted protests in support of the activists nationwide. The Ukrainian government took no significant steps to disperse the activists, due to issue’s sensitivity, public support for the activists, and limited political capital to confront the veteran-led blockade. Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko announced a suspension of cargo traffic with occupied-Donbas on March 15^th, in an attempt to de-escalate rising tensions and in response to separatist seizures of assets. Poroshenko emphasized that the blockade will continue until the Russian-backed separatists return control of seized assets and comply with the Minsk agreements, an agreement signed by both sides to end the conflict. The Ukrainian government continued to condemn the blockade despite its policy shift. Ukrainian Prime Minister Volodymyr Hroisman condemned the blockade, stating that it was “in the interests of Russia” because it weakens the Ukrainian economy. Poroshenko accused the activists of finding and exploiting a “raw public nerve” and condemned the blockade as a “special operation aimed at pushing the occupied areas of Ukrainian Donbas towards the Russian Federation” on March 20.

Russia took steps to increase its economic and political support of its proxy forces in order to increase pressure on Kyiv as it struggles to deal effectively with the blockade crisis, and test Western reaction. The Kremlin maintains its objective of forcing Ukraine to re-integrate the separatist republics on Moscow’s terms in order to have a permanent lever of influence within Ukraine. The blockade threatens a primary source of separatist income and could lead to widespread unemployment and social crisis in separatist-held territory. Russia needs to intervene through financial support to prevent the economic collapse of its proxies, or end the blockade. Russia indicated that it would purchase goods from Donbas in order to maintain economic stability on March 06, although reports emerged that mines in Donbas were not operating on March 09. The Russian government also increased its political support for its proxies. Russia officially recognized legal documentation issued by separatist republics on February 18.  This decision prompted Ukrainian nationalist groups to barricade Russian state-owned banks across Ukraine, leading to an escalation of tensions and the 22 March announcement by Russian banks that they intend to immediately cease operations in Ukraine. The Russian lower house of parliament proposed giving preferences in employment and in pursuing Russian citizenship to citizens of the Donetsk and Luhansk Peoples’ Republics on March 20[i]. Russia and its proxies may use the blockade to justify further escalation of hostilities in order to force Ukraine to end its economic pressure and pursue legitimization of separatist forces on Moscow’s terms. The Kremlin will also seek to exploit any political crisis in Ukraine to destabilize the pro-Western coalition, undermine Ukraine’s reform efforts, and halt Ukraine’s integration with the West.

Ukraine took concrete steps to continue its fight against corruption and further integrate itself with the West despite increasing instability. The Ukrainian government suspended the Director of its State Fiscal Service due to a corruption investigation on March 03. This action may be a catalyst for a much-needed anti-corruption campaign. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) preliminarily approved Ukraine for a $1 billion loan on March 05. This loan strengthens the Ukrainian government’s ability to fulfill financial obligations that are key to its political stability. Ukraine and Canada extended their bilateral military cooperation through 2019, signaling Ukraine’s continued commitment to meeting Western military standards. The U.S. and its allies must continue to support Kyiv’s efforts to reform and counter corruption.

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[i] http://tass(.)ru/politika/4109410

Ukraine Warning Update: Russia preparing to ‘cash in’ its military gains in Ukraine

By Nataliya Bugayova and Franklin Holcomb 

Key Takeaway: Recent Russian maneuvering in Ukraine poses a growing risk to U.S. interests as Vladimir Putin presses to capitalize on his intervention. Russia may have assessed that it does not require a full-fledged separatist insurgency in eastern Ukraine anymore, as it sees a political opportunity to force Kyiv into accepting and legitimizing the occupied territories of Donbas on Russia's terms. Putin continues setting conditions to advance his political objective of creating a pliable, pro-Russian, anti-Western Ukraine, and to shape how the West should respond to Russian aggression in Eastern Europe. The U.S. must recognize Putin’s game and seize the initiative, including by boosting support for a sovereign Ukraine, rather than let the Kremlin transform the region toward its own destabilizing ends. 

Tripwire: Russian leader Vladimir Putin sees an opportunity to ‘cash in’ his military gains to get closer to his objective of reinstating a client regime in Ukraine.

Russia has recently shown little interest in preserving the combat effectiveness of its proxy forces. First, Russia has allowed a continuous purge of the separatist leadership. In the past two weeks alone, there have been three deaths of high-profile separatist leaders, including Mikhail “Givi” Tolstykh, a senior commander, notorious for his brutality against Ukrainian forces. Second, Russia allowed the separatists to suffer major losses in the most recent Avdiivka escalation. The Ukrainian Army was able to easily repel separatist attacks and force the dispersed, low-quality separatists from their positions. These defeats followed months of setbacks for separatist forces in the Svitlodarsk Arc, where Ukrainian forces had counter-attacked, driven separatist forces from their positions, and thereby threatened their supply lines. Ukrainian armed forces also killed or wounded several high profile separatist commanders, a previously rare occurrence. Russia chose not to provide the backing the separatists would have required to make major gains. This suggests that Russia was not primarily focused on separatist battlefield victories.

Having the most heinous separatist leaders out of the picture gives Russia additional framing leverage vis-à-vis Kyiv in the peace negotiations in Minsk. Their absence may weaken Kyiv's argument that Ukraine cannot consider direct negotiations or any form of legitimization of the occupied territories while the war criminals, who tortured and killed Ukrainian soldiers, are in power. It might also make it easier for Russia to sell legitimization of its proxies to the international community if the separatists are perceived as 'beheaded' and weakened. 

Additionally, various political actors inside and outside Ukraine have changed their rhetoric about what is possible in the context of Donbas peace deal. Yevhen Marchuk, Ukraine’s representative in the Minsk talks group, said in a Feb. 6 interview that Ukraine is approaching a “painful stage” in the peace talks, during which it will have to compromise. German Ambassador to Ukraine Ernst Reichel stated that elections in the non-government controlled areas in eastern Ukraine are possible while there are still Russian forces in the area. Meanwhile, Russia has intensified its various false narratives[i] about Ukraine in the West.

Timing: Uncertainly about the new U.S. administration's policy vis-à-vis Russia has opened two cracks for the Kremlin to exploit.

First, some European countries are delaying taking strong stands as they await the new U.S. administration's first move. The pause gives Russia time to exploit any divergences and shape a new narrative about the potential peace deal with Ukraine. 

Second, the fear among some decision-makers in Kyiv that the U.S. will 'abandon' Ukraine and leave them dealing one on one with Putin allows the Kremlin to coerce them into a deal. There have been informal reports that such a back door deal is already in the making. 

Lastly, Russia needs to make a decision about the cost-benefit of further investment in the separatist forces, which have continued to degrade in capability and have shown signs of little improvement over three years, while the Armed Forces of Ukraine have grown increasingly effective.

Most dangerous course of action: 

• Russia gets its preferred deal. It forces Ukraine into accepting local elections in the occupied territories that will bring representatives of these separatist territories into the Ukrainian parliament. Russia might also push for the creation of transitional local authorities in these regions and amnesty for the insurgents. 
• Russia manages to conceal its true intentions and frames these events as major concessions in the eyes of Europe and the U.S. 

Such arrangement places a permanent 'Trojan horse' inside Ukraine—an institutionalized political lever in the form of semi-autonomous regions and, potentially, their representation in the legislature. Russia would have gotten a 'foot in the door' and will expand on it until it reinstitutes its client regime. Moreover, the deal would be considered a betrayal by a large part of the Ukrainian population and might lead to violent internal confrontations and, if taken to an extreme, full political destabilization. 

Most likely course of action: A major push back from many decision-makers in Kyiv and the Ukrainian population will prevent Russia from getting its preferred arrangement at this time. Many top government officials in Ukraine reaffirmed that elections held in the non-government controlled areas of eastern Ukraine are inadmissible and impossible.

However, if unimpeded by the West, Russia is still likely to get a deal that includes some form of legitimization for the occupied territories. It is also likely to get European sanctions related to Donbas lifted. Russia still will have managed to get 'a foot in the door' and will continue expanding on it until it reinstitutes its client regime.

Russia is likely to continue advancing its proxy war in eastern Ukraine in the event that a strong alignment between Kyiv and the West prevents Russia from gaining increased legitimacy for its proxies or global pressure forces Russia to halt its military ambitions in Ukraine. 

Significance for U.S. policy:

• Such a deal would get Russia closer to its objective of restricting Ukraine's movement toward the West. It would increase the risk of having a non-U.S. friendly government in Kyiv in the future. 
• Such a deal would also mean that Russia will have achieved most of its objectives in Ukraine without paying a serious long-term price. 
• Removal of the European sanctions related to Donbas would ease Russia’s access the debt market and allow the Kremlin to finance continued military expansion and challenge other strategic U.S. positions around the world. 

It is critical that the U.S. understands exactly what kind of gains Russia is making in Ukraine and what ‘concessions’ Russia claims, but is not making, as the U.S. considers its strategic options. 

Recommendation: A core element of U.S. policy needs to be a focus on strengthening a partner in Kyiv that can resist Putin’s pressure campaigns. The U.S. must in this instance prevent any non-transparent back door deal between the Kremlin and one or more factions of powerbrokers in Kyiv. The U.S. should also develop a more effective effort to strengthen Kyiv using its full range of tools, including political, military, and economic assistance. The U.S. should simultaneously avoid premature concessions, such as weakening the sanction regime on Russia or ruling out options for increasing economic pressure. The U.S. administration should seize the moment to send a strong signal to Ukraine, Europe, and Vladimir Putin. It has an opportunity to do so this week with Defense Secretary James Mattis scheduled to attend a NATO Defense Ministerial Conference and the Munich Security Conference. 

[i] “Escalation in Donbass manifests Kiev’s gross violation of Minsk Agreements-Lavrov” TASS, February 10, 2017, http://tass(.)com/politics/930102

Ukraine Update: December 9, 2016- February 05, 2017

                                                                                    Franklin Holcomb and Ben Knudsen


Russian President Vladimir Putin is testing the new U.S. administration as it deliberates American policy toward Russia. Putin spoke with President Donald Trump by phone on January 28. President Trump subsequently stated publicly that he had not determined his position on the existing sanctions regime against Russia. Russia’s proxy forces in eastern Ukraine rapidly escalated hostilities with Ukrainian forces on January 29. U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Nikki Haley condemned Russia’s actions, vowing to maintain Ukraine-related sanctions.   President Trump held a telephone conversation with President Poroshenko on February 04 in which he promised to work with Ukraine to help “restore peace” along the Ukrainian-Russian border amidst discussions of  "Ukraine's long-running conflict with Russia." The United States and its partners should continue to support the Ukrainian government, the territorial sovereignty of Ukraine, and the Minsk II negotiations. The U.S. and European responses to this renewed crisis will shape how Russia perceives its freedom to act militarily in Eastern Europe. 

Russian-backed separatist forces launched a series of failed assaults on Ukrainian positions on December 18 near the Svitlodarsk Arc, a protrusion in the line of contact north of the strategic rail hub of Debaltseve. Separatists had previously seized terrain in this arc from Ukraine, overtly violating the Minsk II ceasefire. Ukrainian forces conducted an immediate counter-offensive and forced from their positions the dispersed, low-quality separatists, whose command structure has been undermined by factionalism. Ukrainian forces took ground left uncontrolled by separatist forces in a series of tactical advances and counter-attacks until January 12. Ukrainian units regained the terrain they had lost  in 2015  and thus came closer to separatist-controlled logistics nodes, such as the rail hub and the M-04 Highway. These defeats endangered separatist supply lines and left their northern border highly vulnerable.

The  Kremlin’s relatively high-quality proxy forces stationed around the separatist stronghold of Donetsk assaulted the Ukrainian controlled town of Avdiivka on 28 January. Ukrainian armed forces killed or wounded several high profile separatist commanders amidst heavy fighting, a rare occurrence, indicating that separatist forces were using their best available assets. The fight continues at publication time. Separatist forces could not push Ukrainian forces from their positions as of February 5, and Ukrainian forces’ counter-attacks gained control of separatist staging areas. Separatists deliberately targeted civilian infrastructure, cutting off electric power in Avdiivka during extreme winter conditions, creating a humanitarian crisis.

Putin intends to use this fresh assault to reset conditions on the ground, prepare for a new diplomatic initiative, and end the conflict on his own terms, which include ending the sanctions regime.  To that end, Russia launched a disinformation campaign portraying Ukraine as the aggressor and called for a dialogue between the Kremlin and the U.S. to address the humanitarian crisis. Russia’s proposed new framework for negotiation undermines the authority of France and Germany, who have led the Minsk negotiations, and exploits tensions in the U.S.- EU relationship . Russia  also intends to ignore Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko in the negotiations which would destabilize his pro-Western coalition and create opportunities to return Ukraine to its sphere of influence. The U.S. has not received Putin’s negotiation offer warmly. U.S. Ambassador to the UN Nikki Haley condemned Russia’s escalation in Avdiivka and previous seizure of Crimea on February 02, stating that the U.S. would not remove sanctions related to the latter. President Trump promised to work with “Ukraine, Russia, and all other parties involved” in a conversation with President Poroshenko on February 05.

The Kremlin will likely push its proxy forces to escalate further, in order to undermine the Minsk negotiations and pursue alternate negotiation formats. Ukraine may try to move separatist forces away from key infrastructure in and around Avdiivka to end the humanitarian crisis. Separatist forces do not have the capability to sustain operations  on the battlefield without direct Russian support. The Kremlin likely does not assess that its proxy forces alone can successfully assault Ukrainian forces but will instead use them to create temporary hotspots and humanitarian crises in Donbas to undermine the Minsk ceasefire. Russia maintains its own forces in separatist territory, however, and continues to lead, train, and supply its proxy forces. The U.S. must watch for signs that Russia will reinforce the separatists and increase their capabilities, which could dramatically change conditions on the ground.

U.S. and Western support to the Ukrainian military continues to increase that force’s professionalism and combat-effectiveness. The U.S. and allies provide the Ukrainian Armed Forces with training, materiel support, and assistance with institutional reforms. Ukraine has also increased incentives for military service and its forces have gained experience during ongoing operations in Donbas.  The U.S. must continue its support.

Ukraine Update:November 9-December 13, 2016

                                                                                 By: Franklin Holcomb, and Ben Knudson

The Ukrainian government implemented a series of reforms in the face of rising public dissatisfaction and protests. The slow pace of reform and perceived corruption of the Ukrainian government manifested in demonstrations of over 5,000 protestors in November. These movements enjoy the support of pro-Russia and populist parties that are making a concerted effort to capitalize on increasing public frustration in order to strengthen their movements and undermine the legitimacy of pro-western president Petro Poroshenko. Lack of unity and a clear direction from populist parties will likely prevent them from gaining meaningful traction among the Ukrainian electorate in the short term, however. Ukraine’s reformist movement also continued to voice its dissatisfaction with the Poroshenko administration. Former governor of Odessa Oblast, Mikheil Sakaashvili, announced the creation of a new reformist political party, held protests and launched a fundraising effort. President Poroshenko attempted to quell dissatisfaction by enacting reforms doubling the minimum wage, restructuring the health care system to make insurance universally available and protecting depositors against bank fraud. President Poroshenko will likely seek high-profile public victories, particularly EU visa liberalization, in order to stabilize support for his government.

Ukraine also continued to strengthen its military and political ties with the EU and NATO in its effort to distance itself from Russia and modernize its infrastructure and military. Ukraine and the EU signed a memorandum of understanding on a strategic energy partnership that enhances cooperation in efficiency and facilitates energy market integration in the future. The deal also makes progress towards a visa-free travel regime for Ukrainians visiting EU nations. Ukraine launched numerous domestically manufactured surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles near Crimea, forcing a strong Russian reaction. In an effort to avoid prompting Russian military action against their forces, Ukraine shifted the tests further inland, revealing its ability to utilize its military buildup in Crimea to alter Ukraine’s use of its sovereign territory. Russia went so far as to assert that it would use its military assets in Crimea against another Black Sea power. Despite Russian pushback, the missile tests demonstrated the growing capabilities of Ukraine’s military and domestic arms industry, which continues to improve and modernize from its post-Soviet state of disrepair.

Ukraine Update: October 13-November 9, 2016

                                                                      By: Franklin Holcomb and Dmytro Hryckowian


Despite the Ukrainian Government’s continued efforts to enact anti-corruption reforms, confidence in the government continues to fall. The Ukrainian parliament established the“Independent Anti-corruption Committee of Defense” and passed amendments to the tax code on October 26th in a public effort to reduce corruption and increase transparency. Ukrainian government officials also released ‘e-declarations’ of their personal assets in order to expose outsized earnings and assets of some government officials. This positive step to make the government more accountable to citizens was, however, greeted with outrage as Ukrainians realized the sharp disparities in earnings and wealth between average Ukrainians and some of their leaders. In another blow to the government’s reformist image, the Governor of Odessa Oblast Mikheil Saakashvili resigned on November 7, citing vast corruption and distrust in President Petro Poreshenko’s government. President Poroshenko will need to enact more substantial reforms targeting corruption in order to preserve trust in the post Euromaidan government.

Increased instability within the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) suggests a lack of control by the separatist leadership. The Commander of the DNR’s veteran “Sparta” Battalion Arseny Pavlov “Motorola” was assassinated on October 16th, and militant police chiefs and members of the DNR security forces were arrested in Donetsk city on November 2nd. This activity in the DNR follows a recent coup attempt and similar arrests in the Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR), indicating a general trend of internal purges aimed at reestablishing control over competing factions within the separatist territories. DNR leader Alexander Zakharckenko’s decision to further postpone local elections suggests that the purges may also be an effort to eliminate internal opposition before elections take place. If separatist leadership is unable to quell infighting amongst separatist ranks, Russia may become more active in order to maintain stability and control of pro-Russia forces in Donbas.

Moldova Update: Contested Elections Threaten to Destabilize Eastern Europe

By: Franklin Holcomb and Catherine Harris

Key Takeaway: Eastern European security could be seriously undermined should the closely contested October 30 elections in Moldova lead to civil strife. Clashes between pro-western and pro-Russia movements in Moldova are likely. Russian President Vladimir Putin supports the pro-Russian candidate Igor Dodon, who is leading in the polls, in an effort to both undermine what he perceives as the threatening expansion of the EU and NATO and increase Russia’s control over former Soviet states. Dodon and his Party of Socialists have a high chance of winning, or at least performing well enough that they will be able to contest the election results. Clashes between pro-Russia and pro-EU forces in Moldova might provoke a response from Russian soldiers stationed in the pro-Russia separatist region of Transnistria, critically destabilizing the region and threatening Ukraine’s western border and NATO member Romania.

Putin openly supports the pro-Russia candidate Igor Dodon and his Party of Socialists in order to expand Russia’s influence in the region and remove the current pro-western government.[i] Dodon has called for the “restoration of strategic relations with Russia” and accused pro-western forces of “taking orders from Washington.”[ii] Pro-Russia forces held a series of military exercises in Transnistria, a pro-Russia separatist region where Russia has maintained a military presence since it helped the region separate from Moldova in 1992, from September 30 – October 7. The Russian Ministry of Defense reported on October 17 that it was conducting readiness checks on its forces deployed in Transnistria.[iii]­­ The timing of these actions indicates that Russia is attempting to intimidate Moldova and discourage it from further pursuing a pro-western path.

Divided pro-western forces in Moldova face significant challenges in their effort to retain control of the presidency and may prove unable to keep pro-Russia forces from power. The pro-western movement in Moldova has struggled to maintain power in the face of charges of corruption, destabilizing levels of disunity, and the ongoing public dissatisfaction and from the theft of $1 billion (roughly 1/8^th of Moldova’s GDP) in 2015. Pro-western forces are attempting to unify behind former Education Minister Maia Sandu to stop pro-Russia forces from exploiting the fragile coalition’s disunity. A defeat for pro-western forces in Moldova would critically undermine the country’s efforts to integrate with western structures and significantly increase Russia’s influence in Eastern Europe.

Political unrest is likely regardless of the result of the election. Both pro-Russia and pro-western forces have laid the groundwork to contest the results of the election. The speaker of Moldova’s parliament accused the Kremlin of funneling resources to pro-Russia parties and promoting anti-government protests on October 4. Sandu warned of the potential of “massive fraud” in the coming election and claimed that unless Moldova received EU support “we will have people in the streets and a pro-Russia president.” Pro-Russia forces announced that they planned protests in the event of the victory of a pro-western candidate. They further accused the government of “illegally” interfering in the election by issuing an arrest warrant for Renato Usatii, the leader of Moldova’s second largest pro-Russia party, on charges of attempted murder.[iv] A close victory or a contested result could draw both factions to the streets, which would dramatically increase the chance of civil strife.

The security interests of the US, Russia, and their allies overlap in Moldova to a sufficient degree that severe civil strife would challenge NATO and undermine the stability of Eastern Europe. Putin perceives Moldova’s open courtship of the EU and NATO as a direct threat to Russia’s security interests and a provocative act of defiance. Putin will likely act to support pro-Russia forces in the event of conflict in Moldova against what he perceives as an aggressive and expansionist West. Putin also sees increased Ukrainian-Moldovan cooperation as a threat to his military bases in Transnistria.[v] Ukraine and Moldova share security concerns about Russia and have increased security cooperation in recent years. Ukraine would probably consider Russian intervention in its western neighbor a dangerous threat to its security. This could provoke a Ukrainian military response to civil conflict in Moldova, particularly in the case of overt Russian intervention, although Ukraine’s military weakness and overextension makes so dramatic an eventuality unlikely. NATO member Romania shares deep cultural, political, and economic ties with Moldova that have led to discussions of the unification of the two states. Romania would also strongly oppose further Russian intervention on Moldovan territory and may feel compelled to act to stabilize or check Russian military aggression on its eastern border. This dangerous convergence of clashing security concerns threatens to escalate already-high tensions in Eastern Europe and create yet another challenge to NATO and US policy.

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[i] “Vladimir Putin met with Moldova Socialist leader Igor Dodon in the Kremlin,” Bloknot, November 5, 2014 [Russian]. Available: http://bloknot(.)ru/politika/vladimir-putin-prinyal-v-kremle-lidera-sotsialistov-moldavii-igorya-dodona-126529.html

[ii] “Igor Dodon: if I am elected, I commit my first visit to Moscow,” TASS, October 11, 2016 [Russian]. Available: http://tass(.)ru/opinions/interviews/3694005

[iii] “Peacekeeping battalion of the Operational Group of Russian Forces in Transnistria is ready for rotation in the Security Zone,” Russian Ministry of Defense, October 17, 2016 [Russian]. Available: http://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12100002@egNews

[iv] “Moldovan court issues warrant for arrest of opposition figurehead,” TASS, October 25, 2016. Available: http://tass(.)com/world/908451

[v] “Russian FM: Kiev contributes to economic blockade of Transnistria,” TASS, March 18, 2015. Available:

http://tass(.)com/world/783446