By: Christopher Kozak
Tuesday, April 28, 2015
Monday, February 9, 2015
Sunday, February 1, 2015
Tuesday, January 20, 2015
Tuesday, December 9, 2014
Tuesday, December 2, 2014
Tuesday, November 25, 2014
Thursday, August 7, 2014
The Battle for Arsal
by Logan Brog
Key Takeaway: The current battle for Arsal represents the most significant spillover from the Syrian civil war into Lebanese territory and threatens to exacerbate Lebanon’s sectarian tensions. Although Syrian rebel operations in Arsal do not constitute an offensive by the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), the battle for Arsal demonstrates the potential for localized Syrian rebel groups to pledge support to ISIS in a bid for resources and notoriety, thereby expanding the reach of ISIS into Lebanon.
Battle for Arsal
For the first time, large-scale fighting from Syria has spilled into Lebanon. The Lebanese Armed Forces is currently battling rebels affiliated with Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) and Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) in and around Arsal, a Lebanese town 13 km west of the Syrian border in which a massive influx of refugees and rebels has long made the area a lawless enclave in a relatively weak state. This post examines the origins, significant actions, and key players involved in the battle for Arsal as well as the broader implications for Lebanese security.
As a result of the Syrian regime’s offensive to clear rebel strongholds along the Lebanese border since 2013, Syrian rebels and refugees have amassed in the Lebanese town of Arsal. The Syrian regime’s strategy of clearing and holding rebel strongholds has failed to destroy rebels in Qalamoun and has instead displaced these rebels into Arsal and surrounding areas. Arsal has therefore emerged as an important support zone for rebels in Syria, providing access to resources, reinforcements, and sanctuary. Increasingly, Arsal has functioned as a primary staging zone for rebels conducting reprisal attacks against Hezbollah targets within Lebanese territory. Rebel activity in Arsal therefore provides a shared strategic threat for the Lebanese government, Hezbollah, and the Syrian regime.
On June 10, Mosul, the second largest city in Iraq, fell to the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). Almost immediately, Iraqi Shi’a militiamen fighting alongside Hezbollah and the Syrian regime in Qalamoun returned to Iraq to secure Shi’a holy sites and Baghdad, requiring Hezbollah to deploy Lebanese fighters to fill their positions. As Hezbollah reinforcements trickled in, Syrian rebels revamped attacks against regime targets in the Qalamoun region in mid-June which had been largely uncontested in since April. The rebel offensive in Qalamoun has now spilled west of the porous Lebanon-Syria border, forcing the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to combat rebel groups which have pledged allegiance to ISIS as well as other Syrian rebels including Jabhat al-Nusra in Arsal.
In mid-July, the LAF announced the beginning of a “wide campaign” against militant activity in eastern Beqaa Governorate surrounding Arsal. On July 31, Hezbollah forces operating in the Qalamoun region closed the only major road connecting Arsal to Syria from the east, blocking the movement of people and goods between Arsal and Qalamoun. Meanwhile, the Syrian Air Force conducted airstrikes in Lebanese territory, targeting rebel positions in Wadi al-Ajram and az-Zamourani on July 31. Hezbollah also deployed troops to Shi’a towns west of Arsal, isolating rebels to a small area surrounded by Hezbollah fighters. This combination of movements by the LAF, Syrian regime, and Hezbollah forces suggests a coordinated, cross-border effort to isolate rebels in the town of Arsal. Coordination between the Lebanese Armed Forces and Hezbollah is also confirmed in a video showing a convoy of Hezbollah vehicles passing through a LAF checkpoint en route to Arsal without being stopped or searched.
The Battle for Arsal began on August 2, when the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) arrested Imad Ahmed Joumaa at a checkpoint east of Arsal. Joumaa is a commander of Liwa Fajr al-Islam, a small Syrian rebel group that recently pledged allegiance to ISIS. Shortly after, masked gunmen, likely led by Joumaa’s men, entered residential areas of Arsal. The rebels then captured soldiers, overtook government services and security buildings, and attempted to gain control of large parts of Arsal and the plains that surround it. While this is consistent with an attempt to emulate ISIS’ strategy for attacking urban areas throughout Syria and Iraq, the decision to seize territory in Arsal was likely an attempt to push back against restrictions on rebel freedom-of-movement rather than an ideologically-driven campaign. The LAF deployed additional troops to the area and quickly mounted a counteroffensive, retaking infrastructure, clearing territory, and targeting rebel positions. The Syrian Air Force also bombed fighters from aircraft flying over Lebanese territory.
As of the time of publication, efforts to halt fighting appear to have succeeded. During a prior cease-fire on August 6, Jabhat al-Nusra elements withdrew from Arsal. ISIS-affiliated militants withdrew from Arsal across the Syrian border on August 7 as part of a different cease-fire agreement. Arsal’s large refugee population and significant strategic value make future rebel operations likely.
The exact identity and group composition of rebels fighting in Arsal is not discernable from available information, but those fighting likely include rebels who were led by Imad Ahmed Joumaa, who pledged support to the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham in a YouTube video posted on June 20. Jabhat al-Nusra is also involved in the fighting, initially claiming that it entered Arsal to give the population humanitarian support. Video evidence and local media reports, however, indicate that the group’s fighters are also involved in kinetic activity, including the kidnapping of Lebanese soldiers.
ISIS involvement in Arsal does not necessarily indicate a western expansion of ISIS territorial control or a decision from ISIS leadership to expand the Islamic State into Lebanese territory. There is no indication that ISIS leadership ordered, authorized, directly funded, or knew about plans to launch an offensive to take Arsal. ISIS elements in Qalamoun have had a cooperative relationship with local rebel groups in the past, many of which ISIS fights elsewhere in Syria. For example, despite a large scale offensive by Syrian rebel groups against ISIS fighters in northern Syria in early 2014, ISIS and other rebel groups continued to cooperate against regime forces in Qalamoun.
This dynamic likely extends to the Battle for Arsal. Local ISIS-identifying groups with decentralized decision-making may fight under the ISIS banner without coordinating with ISIS leadership in order to ride the tailwinds of recent ISIS victories and attract recruits and donors willing to fund expensive weapons purchases. Significantly, official ISIS twitter accounts have had limited coverage of the events in Arsal and have not claimed responsibility for the offensive.
The Battle for Arsal also demonstrates that even when operating without orders from ISIS command-and-control, armed groups fighting under the ISIS banner can have devastating consequences for states throughout the Middle East. ISIS may seek to capitalize on the future successes of small armed groups by directly governing the territories seized on its behalf, rewarding the small groups who fought with the black flag and encouraging others to do the same. This also indicates that areas not specifically targeted by ISIS could become new battlegrounds for the group. Recent events in eastern Beqaa Governorate underscore the shifting extremist landscape in which ISIS may have supplanted al-Qaeda as the most desirable extremist organization to be affiliated with for the first time in a decade. Such a shift would have significant consequences for al-Qaeda’s global network, how states respond to threats from non-state actors, and the manner in which armed groups plan and execute attacks throughout the Middle East and North Africa.
To prevent violence from spreading from Arsal to the rest of Lebanon, the LAF deployed troops to areas from which Sunni militant activity may originate. Abra, the Sidon neighborhood where Sheikh Ahmed al-Assir led his failed Islamist insurrection against the government in June 2013, is now completely sealed by the LAF. Additional checkpoints leading to Ain al-Hilweh and Miye wa Miye, Palestinian refugee camps off-limits to the Lebanese government, were set up. Tawari, a neighborhood of Ain al-Hilweh, is a center of radical Islamist activity and home to Ash-Shabab al-Muslim, an off-shoot of Jabhat al-Nusra that is composed of Fatah al-Islam and Jund ash-Sham.
Spillover from the Syrian Civil War is not new to Lebanon, but previous incidents were isolated and posed a limited threat to Lebanon’s capacity to maintain general stability and security throughout the state. Until the Lebanese Armed Forces deployed to Tripoli as part of a new security plan in April 2014, Alawite residents of the Jebel Mohsen neighborhood, which support Bashar al-Assad’s government, and Sunni residents of the Bab at-Tabbaneh neighborhood, which support the Syrian opposition, engaged in violent clashes. Even when clashes expanded beyond the neighborhoods’ borders, they never posed an existential threat to the Lebanese state. Similarly, while rocket attacks, bombings, assassinations, and clashes throughout Lebanon have shaken society and prompted many to question the state’s ability to endure such a hostile environment, no single incident has been as destabilizing or dangerous as the Battle for Arsal.
Until now, groups carrying out attacks in Lebanon have almost exclusively targeted Hezbollah interests. Recent attacks against the Lebanese Armed Forces in Tripoli, fallout from the Battle for Arsal, represent a potential step-change that could lead to the LAF being targeted for its perceived role in supporting Hezbollah. On August 3, the Lebanese Armed Forces clashed with armed rebels for five hours in Tripoli during an attempt to secure the city in anticipation of sectarian blowback from LAF operations in Arsal. On August 4, the Committee of Muslim Scholars organized a protest in Tripoli to rally against LAF attacks against rebels in Arsal. When the LAF moved to block protesters, gunmen fired at soldiers. Eight LAF soldiers were injured in a separate incident, when a bus transporting them was the target of gunfire in Tripoli. While Sunni political leadership is standing by the LAF’s counteroffensive in Arsal, some Sunni sheikhs in Tripoli are not. Lebanese security forces’ capacity to conduct law enforcement in Sunni areas may be compromised by the perceived sectarian nature of its operations in eastern Beqaa Governorate.
The Battle for Arsal represents the most significant spillover into Lebanese territory from the Syrian civil war thus far. It is therefore important to consider the possible implications for Lebanon as events unfold.
The most likely outcome of the Battle for Arsal is the long-term engagement of Lebanese security services along the Lebanese-Syrian border. The Lebanese Armed Forces is unlikely to be able to meaningfully end illegal cross-border traffic, but it can make operating in Arsal costly and less desirable as a fall-back position for Syrian rebels. In order for this to work, Hezbollah would need to maintain its siege on Arsal from the west, Lebanese air power would continue to bomb rebel positions east of Arsal, and the Syrian Air Force would continue to target rebels crossing the mountainous border into Lebanon, which is their only avenue of approach. No actions indicate that the nature of this cooperation will change in the near future.
The most dangerous situation that could result from the Battle for Arsal has Lebanese security forces in sustained engagement with rebels near Arsal. The Institute for the Study of War assesses that a large portion of the rank-and-file of the LAF are likely Sunni. Long-term fighting may lead to defections if Sunni LAF members are increasingly ordered to crack down on Sunni-dominant areas such as Arsal. This would sectarianize what are now seen as national institutions and jeopardize the state’s ability to defend itself from sectarian threats. The demographic reality makes working in Arsal extremely difficult. A failure to rapidly achieve mission success may result in a significantly handicapped national defense.
Sunni militant organizations operating in different geographic regions of Lebanon may unify in acting against the state if Hezbollah deploys additional troops to Arsal and its Sunni surroundings. Sunni extremist groups in Tripoli, Sidon, eastern Beqaa Governorate, and the Palestinian refugee camps have few links and are generally separated by differences in geography and leadership. A legitimate threat to Sunnis in eastern Beqaa Governorate may bring these groups together. It is unclear whether the Lebanese Armed Forces has the capacity or bandwidth to fight a multi-front Battle against a determined extremist population.
Even before the beginning of the Battle of Arsal, extremist Sunnis in Tripoli began mobilizing protests against perceived injustice toward their community in Tripoli and the continued detention of Islamist prisoners in Roumieh Prison. The arrest of leaders directing fighting in Bab at-Tabbaneh and the infrequency of clashes since April 2014 means that hundreds of men previously occupied by localized sectarian fighting are now ready and itching for a larger battle more directly linked to the Syrian conflict. The young, unemployed population in Palestinian refugee camps already has links to organizations like Jabhat al-Nusra, but the Lebanese Armed Forces can more easily restrict access into and out of these locations.
The Battle for Arsal underscores Lebanon’s vulnerability to spillover from Syria’s civil war and highlights how instability and extremism have metastasized across Iraq and the Levant since the fall of Mosul on June 10. Current events also presage the danger of small armed groups adopting ISIS’ ideology and flag while seeking to replicate its military successes beyond Iraq and Syria. The degree to which Lebanon is able to maintain security and stability will largely be determined by wars fought and decisions made beyond its borders. The response mounted by Lebanese security forces may temporarily eliminate the presence of Syrian rebels along one swath of the western side of the Lebanese-Syrian border, but Lebanon is unlikely to be able to insulate itself from regional dynamics, many of which are intensified by the sectarianism at the core of Lebanese society and politics.
Friday, August 1, 2014
Echoes of Syria: Hezbollah reemerges in Iraq
By Alexander Orleans
Visibility on Lebanese Hezbollah’s current response to the crisis in Iraq has markedly increased, with reliable sources describing that military advisors are being deployed from Lebanon to assist Iraqi Shi’a militia forces. Nicholas Blanford, for example, has reported that sources close to Hezbollah have revealed that a 250-member advisory unit is being deployed to Iraq. The unit’s primary mission is to advise, train, and coordinate Iraqi Shi’a militias operating under the guidance of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The sources furthermore indicated that the advisory unit is also already engaged in conducting intelligence and reconnaissance operations against ISIS forces. This advisory mission echoes Hezbollah’s early primary role in Syria as advisers and trainers of pro-regime forces.
Operating in Iraq is nothing new to Hezbollah. In approximately 2005, Iran requested that Hezbollah stand up a group to support the training and operations of the Mahdi Army and the Special Groups in Iraq. The resulting organization was Hezbollah’s Unit 3800 (earlier known as Unit 2800), designed to supplant ongoing advisory efforts to Iraqi Shi’a militias being undertaken by Department 9000 of the IRGC-Qods Force’s (IRGC-QF) Ramazan Corps. Unit 3800 drew on expertise from Hezbollah’s Unit 1800, which provides support to Palestinian militant groups such as Hamas, as well as Hezbollah’s own special operations community.
According to a 2010 Defense Intelligence Agency report, Department 9000 and Unit 3800 were providing “the training, tactics, and technology to conduct kidnappings, small unit tactical operations, and employ sophisticated improvised explosive devices (IEDs).” From 2003 to 2005, Hezbollah’s primary engagement was with the Mahdi Army; after the Special Groups emerged in 2006, they became the primary recipients of Unit 3800’s attention. In 2007, with rising tensions between local Iraqi Shi’a and Iranian trainers alongside marked Coalition pressure on IRGC activities in-country, Unit 3800 more and more became the Arab intermediary for Iranian support to Iraqi Shia militias. By 2008, it was reported that Hezbollah’s Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah was spending “several hours” a day on matters related to Iraq.
As described by Matthew Levitt of the Washington Institute of Near East Policy, Unit 3800 conducted training missions in Iraq, Lebanon, and Iran – while also supporting actual militia operations. Unit 3800 trainer and Hezbollah liaison to IRGC Ali Musa Daqduq, who was in custody from 2007 to 2012 before being released by Iraqi authorities, was tied to the January 20, 2007 attack on the Joint Coordination Center in Karbala, which resulted in the abduction and murder of four American soldiers. That attack was carried out by Qais al-Khazali’s Iranian-sponsored Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH) and later linked to Abdul Reza Shahlai, the Deputy Commander of IRGC-QF Special External Operations Unit. Evidence also exists that Hezbollah may have been conducting its own operations in Iraq as well. When conducting operations outside of Lebanon, Hezbollah has traditionally relied on its feared External Security Organization (ESO), which is responsible for both terror operations abroad and contributes to some intelligence and special operations. If Hezbollah was operating in Iraq beyond providing training, it is likely that ESO members were taking part.
Since the departure of Coalition forces from Iraq, Unit 3800 commander Khalil Harb has been spotted in Yemen in 2012 and then-U.S. Homeland Security Advisor John Brennan described Hezbollah as “training militants in Yemen.” Unit 3800’s presence was likely in support of ongoing Iranian assistance to Houthi rebels there. The training requirements of Houthi groups are more conventional than the special operations-oriented training provided to the Special Groups. Thus, between missions in Yemen and the ongoing training of Iraqi Shi’a militias for action in Syria, Unit 3800 has likely developed a more sophisticated and multifaceted training capacity by drawing on both Hezbollah’s more conventional infantry experts and special operators, such as those from the ESO.
Elite trainers from Hezbollah, such as those fielded by Unit 3800, have also played a major role in Iran’s assistance to the Syrian regime. While Hezbollah’s support to the Assad regime is clearly multifaceted, trainers in particular have played a major role in contributing to force integration between pro-Assad militias, Iraqi Shi’a militants in Syria, and the Syrian military. Hezbollah’s combat operations in Syria have also produced a new generation of experienced fighters on which it can draw. Hezbollah, alongside Iraqi Shi’a militias that have deployed to Syria, are components of an “Axis of Resistance” that have shown the ability to operate together in multiple theaters. It is telling that Muhammad Kawtharani, who as of 2013 was Hezbollah’s manager of all Iraqi operations, has assisted in coordinating the movement of Hezbollah fighters to support pro-regime forces in Syria. It would be unsurprising for Kawtharani to be involved in Hezbollah’s renewed deployment to Iraq.
On June 29, Brigadier General Massoud Jazayeri, deputy joint chief of staff of the Iranian armed forces and a senior IRGC officer, announced that “the same winning strategy used in Syria to put the terrorists on the defensive … is now taking shape in Iraq.” Given Hezbollah’s experience, it is quite possible that the new advisory unit in Iraq will play a similar force integration role in working to coordinate between the Iraqi military and Iraqi Shi’a militias.
From this context, a plausible sketch of the new advisory unit clearly emerges. Given the past experiences of Hezbollah trainers in Iraq, Yemen, and Syria, the advisors now in Iraq have developed a solid idea on how to train militias for more conventional fighting in a timely and effective manner and direct the integration of their efforts with those of other forces. In this case, they are also stepping into an existing militia infrastructure with which they have familiarity both in the camp and the field, which can streamline the process. The advisors are probably a mix of Unit 3800 personnel, ESO members, and experienced fighters and special operators previously deployed to Syria. Based on reports that the advisors are already engaged in intelligence operations against ISIS, it is more than likely that a particularly sizeable portion of the advisors are special operations and intelligence personnel, expected to fill capability gaps of Iraqi Shi’a militias.
While significant extension into Iraq does pose a challenge for Hezbollah – which concurrently needs to maintain a strong presence in Lebanon, maintain the momentum of its operations in Syria, and increasingly fill the gap in Syria left by departing Iraqi Shi’a militias – there are reasons to believe that the number of advisors (250) should be considered a conservative estimate. Reports of younger Hezbollah fighters in Syria indicates that in its effort to reconfigure forces for operations in both Syria and extension into Iraq, Hezbollah is likely sending its more experienced fighters from Syria to support the vital force integration effort in Iraq and attempting to backfill the vacuum they have left in Syria with newer fighters.
On July 31, a Reuters report indicated that Ibrahim al-Hajj, a Hezbollah commander and technical specialist with ties to Hassan Nasrallah, was killed in Iraq on July 29. Initially, Lebanese news site Naharnet reported that al-Hajj had been killed in the Qalamoun region of Syria during a clash with rebel forces which left three other Hezbollah fighters dead. However, on next day – when al-Hajj was buried in his hometown of Qiyla in the Beqaa – an ISIS-supporter Twitter account claimed that al-Hajj had actually been killed in Samarra. The July 31 Reuters report, citing sources in Lebanon, claimed that al-Hajj had been acting as a trainer and was killed near Mosul. The AP has also reported that al-Hajj was part of the team which infiltrated Israel and kidnapped two Israeli soldiers in July 2006, triggering the 2006 Lebanon war. While the location of al-Hajj’s death remains unconfirmed, his public burial and the initial claim that he died fighting in Syria bears striking resemblance to the burials of early Hezbollah casualties in Syria. Those “martyrs” were supposedly killed doing their “jihadist duties,” which was intended to obscure the manner and location of their deaths; al-Hajj’s death has been described in the same terms by Hezbollah’s Al-Manar TV station. In this case, claiming that al-Hajj died in Syria would provide a plausible narrative for his demise while also masking the possibility of his deployment to Iraq.
Ibrahim al-Hajj martyr poster
Both the supposed number of advisors and the murky circumstances surrounding the death of al-Hajj would fit a pattern of Hezbollah’s initial foray into a conflict being intentionally understated, as it was in Syria during 2011 and 2012.
While Hezbollah’s early public messaging on the crisis in Iraq was quite guarded, it eventually did progress to Hassan Nasrallah being quoted as saying on June 17 “We are ready to sacrifice martyrs in Iraq five times more than what we sacrificed in Syria, in order to protect shrines.” Also, in Nasrallah’s Quds [Jerusalem] Day address on July 25 he denounced ISIS saying “This is the most dangerous phase since the occupation of Palestine because there is a systematic destruction of countries, peoples, armies and societies … Iraq has entered into a dark tunnel in the name of Islam, unfortunately … Our duty as Muslims today is to condemn what Christians and Muslims are facing in Iraq.” It is reasonable to suspect that Hezbollah is already doing more rather than less in Iraq. Hezbollah activity in Iraq is likely to serve as a force multiplier for Iraqi Shi’a militias, making their activity more effective, but at the possible cost of galvanizing Iraqi Sunni resistance against the government. Furthermore, if Hezbollah’s commitment to Iraq truly is more than significant than advertised, the increasing attacks it is facing from Syrian rebels may begin to constitute a rising risk to the continued success of its operations in Syria. How these challenges are balanced, supported, and coordinated with other actors across multiple fronts will remain an area to watch.
Edited on August 21, 2014 to include information about Ibrahim al-Hajj.
Edited on August 21, 2014 to include information about Ibrahim al-Hajj.
Sunday, June 29, 2014
Friday, May 16, 2014
Fallout in Lebanon: The Impact of Yabroud
By Geoffrey Daniels
The Syrian regime’s decisive victory over rebel forces in the Qalamoun stronghold of Yabroud, bolstered by support from Lebanese Hezbollah and Syrian National Defense Forces, has significant implications in the overall context of the three-year conflict. Yet also worth a careful examination is the impact of the fall of Yabroud on Syria’s fragile neighbor, Lebanon, whose own security situation remains fragile as the conflict continues to spill across the border. The ripple effects from Yabroud test the resilience of Lebanon, a country less than one decade removed from a 29-year Syrian military occupation, by flooding the border regions of Arsal and Wadi Khaled with militants, weapons, explosives, and refugees while threatening tenuous sectarian divisions.
Thursday, March 27, 2014
The Fall of Yabroud and The Campaign for the Lebanese Border
by Isabel Nassief
The regime’s ongoing Qalamoun offensive and recent victory in Yabroud should be understood within the context of a larger campaign for the Lebanese border. In the last month, regime forces seized control of several towns and villages along Lebanon’s northern border with Homs province. For the regime, this campaign is significant as it demonstrates the regime’s strategic interests and priorities. It will be necessary for rebels to maintain access to resources and reinforcements along the Lebanese border in order to contest key terrain along the central corridor. Rebel positions along this border are also instrumental in maintaining logistical connections between areas of control in northern and southern Syria, which is crucial for any attempts by rebel groups to form national level command and control structures.
Tuesday, December 31, 2013
Arsal: Lebanon’s Gateway to the Syrian Conflict
by Geoffrey Daniels
Following the victory of the Syrian regime and their Hezbollah counterparts at al-Qusayr in early June 2013, Sunni extremist groups began conducting escalatory reprisal attacks against Hezbollah in Lebanon. In the months since, the predominantly Sunni Lebanese border town of Arsal, located directly across the border from the Qalamoun area where most of the surviving rebel fighters from al-Qusayr fled, has functioned as the primary staging area and support zone for these attacks into Lebanon. As a result, nearby Hezbollah strongholds in the Bekaa Valley are on high alert for potential car bombs and cross-border rocket attacks originating from elements in Arsal, forcing Hezbollah on the defensive in Lebanon. The Lebanese Army, meanwhile, has taken concrete measures to mitigate the threat posed by Syria to Lebanon via Arsal.
Since the beginning of the Syrian conflict nearly three years ago, Lebanon’s Arsal, a lone enclave in the eastern Bekaa Valley for Sunnis sympathetic to the Syrian uprising, has served as a crucial logistical support network in the struggle against the Assad regime. Located in the northeastern corner of Lebanon on the border with Syria, the town lies nearly equidistant from Hezbollah’s Bekaa Valley strongholds of Baalbek and Hermel. In spite of its isolated position, the geostrategic relevance of Arsal lies in its close proximity across the border from the contested Qalamoun mountain range. Qalamoun is an opposition stronghold in western Syria between Homs and Damascus that is currently the site of an intense battle for control of key supply lines along the M5 highway.
Lebanese authorities have long neglected Arsal and the notoriously porous nature of the border region has made it a hub for smuggling people, weapons, and drugs across the border into Syria. The smuggling routes through the connecting mountains flow freely in both directions, as weapons and fighters flow from Arsal into Qalamoun while car bombs and refugees flow in the opposite direction. Since the start of the Syrian conflict, Arsal’s pre-war population of 40,000 has more than doubled as 60,000 Syrian refugees have fled to the town due to the nearby fighting, according to municipality figures.
In the past year, Arsal has become the primary staging area and support zone for Sunni extremist groups projecting violence into Lebanon. Left in its current state, Arsal threatens the interests of Hezbollah, the Assad regime, and the Lebanese government. The primary, short-term interests of these three parties align, as Hezbollah and the Lebanese government are keen on shutting down the flow of weapons and explosives through the border, while the Syrian regime looks to control the strategic central supply routes that dissect the country. Therefore, each group has a vested stake in disrupting the networks that run through Arsal.
The Aftermath of al-Qusayr
In the beginning of June, the Syrian regime achieved a decisive military victory following a 17-day siege of and clearing operation in al-Qusayr. Al-Qusayr is an important town in Homs province located adjacent to the Lebanese border, not far from the route that connects Damascus to Homs, which in turn links the Syrian capital to the Alawite heartlands along the coast. Many of the surviving rebel fighters from the assault fled south to the nearby Qalamoun region. This important regime victory six months ago was made possible by the large-scale involvement of Hezbollah fighters, whose overt presence in Syria prompted a series of reprisal attacks in Lebanon during the summer months that were likely linked to the logistical support hub of Arsal.
In July and August, for example, Hezbollah’s Beirut stronghold of Dahiyeh came under attack on two separate occasions. The first, a car bombing in the Bir al-Abed area, injured at least 53. Caretaker Defense Minister Fayez Ghosn tied the attack to Arsal residents. The second incident, another car bombing, occurred in the Ruweiss district of Beirut, not far from Bir al-Abed, killing at least 25 while injuring over 200. Lebanese authorities linked this attack to many of the same suspects based in Arsal. Similarly, Ghosn attributed a spate of roadside bombings in June and July that targeted Hezbollah convoys en route to Damascus to elements in Arsal.
Escalatory Trends
As the summer months concluded, there was an escalation in two distinct trends of confrontation in Arsal, and neither shows signs of abating. First, the Syrian regime carried out a series of high-profile attacks against opposition targets inside Lebanese territory. On August 3rd, a Syrian regime airstrike killed nine, and injured nine more, including women and children, in Khirbet Daoud, just east of Arsal. Two months later, on October 7th, Syrian warplanes targeted an ambulance in the Wadi Hamid area of Arsal that was presumably transporting a wounded rebel fighter seeking refuge in Lebanon. Just a few days later, Omar al-Atrash, an Arsal resident and the suspected head of Jabhat al-Nusra’s Lebanese faction, was alleged to have been killed in a Syrian airstrike along with several others in Nehmat, near Arsal on October 11th. Al-Atrash was reportedly responsible for the August 15th Dahiyeh bombing.
On November 15th, the Syrian regime, along with its Hezbollah counterparts, launched an operation aimed at retaking the Qalamoun area. As the tempo of the Syrian regime offensive on the rebels in Qalamoun continues to increase, so do the cross-border incidents. In mid-November, two Syrian gunships carried out a series of raids targeting the outskirts of Arsal in Wadi Atta and Hay al-Shamis striking several houses purported to be inhabited by opposition militants. In the following week, three more attacks targeted Arsal in a span of just ten days.
In a rare responsive measure, the Lebanese Army fired anti-aircraft missiles at Syrian planes flying over Arsal on December 30th, reportedly responding to orders from the Lebanese Army Command to “fire on any warplane that violates Lebanese airspace.” These orders signify a departure from previous incidents, in which President Michel Suleiman condemned the violations but refrained from overt action to halt them. The reasoning behind the change in policy is unclear, but the timing of a change in the strategic perspective of the Lebanese government regarding Syrian airspace violations suggests that the Lebanese Armed Forces felt the need to display a more muscular response to a serious threat in the Bekaa Valley.
The other noticeably intensifying trend occurring in Arsal is the number of confrontations between the Lebanese Army and Syrian rebels smuggling arms and explosives. On September 29th, the Army confiscated a truck from Arsal heading to Syria that contained two hundred 80mm mortar shells and an estimated 7,000 rounds of ammunition, which Lebanese officials ultimately determined was expired.
Two weeks later, on October 14th, Lebanese Armed Forces defused a car bomb rigged with 50-kilograms of explosives in Beirut’s al-Maamoura district of the Hezbollah-controlled southern suburbs. Thirteen individuals, the majority of whom were from Arsal, were indicted for the plot and allegedly confessed to being a part of Jabhat al-Nusra (JN). The following week, a leaked security memo from the Beirut Airport alleged that JN rigged four vehicles with explosives and sent them through Arsal with forged documents, prepared for operations against Hezbollah strongholds.
In perhaps the most high-profile attempt to smuggle explosives into Lebanon to date, on November 22nd, Lebanese Independence Day, security forces dismantled a car near Hezbollah’s Bekaa Valley stronghold Baalbek carrying 400-kilograms of explosives. For comparison’s sake, the explosives were nearly eight times heavier than the ones used in the Iranian Embassy suicide blasts in Beirut on November 19th that killed over 20 and injured more than 150. Authorities were alerted to the vehicle after reports of a shootout, and found the car with its front windows smashed and tires burst. Reports indicate that Hezbollah had monitored the car upon its entry into Arsal before confronting it and apprehending the passengers when it reached an isolated stretch of road just north of Baalbek, allegedly aware of its presence through the use of Iranian-made UAVs. If true, this would illustrate the substantial length to which Hezbollah is prepared to go to mitigate the threat posed by Sunni extremists in Arsal.
Most recently, on December 17th, Hezbollah fighters intercepted an explosives-laden vehicle heading for one of its military bases outside of Labweh, a town just 10 kilometers from Arsal. The targeted base in the town of Sbouba is reportedly a station used by the organization for rotating its fighters in Syria. It is clear that Hezbollah military assets in the Bekaa Valley are on high alert, and in this vein, the organization has increased security measures in Hermel to protect its interests against further attacks.
Notably, the U.S. and the U.K. have recognized the hazards posed by the porous, mountainous border with Syria, providing four-wheel drive vehicles with off-road capabilities and border-observation equipment and technology to the LAF. Similarly, the Lebanese Army itself has begun to take concrete measures to prevent the smuggling of weapons and explosives across the border. Army bulldozers constructed a 2.5-meter high, 25-kilometer long roadblock that stretches from Arsal to Ras Baalbek amidst reports of additional rockets and car bombs heading for Lebanese territory.
Looking Forward
Only a handful of Syrian rebel groups have used vehicle-borne IEDs, operate out of the Qalamoun region, and have the strategic resources and training to employ these devices. The recent announcement, therefore, from JN leader Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani about the formal presence of his organization in Lebanon, in conjunction with a Hezbollah ambush that killed 32 JN fighters near the outskirts of Nahle, just 30-kilometers away from Arsal, suggests that JN is the primary Syrian rebel group staging attacks from Arsal and its outskirts. Similarly, in mid-December, the organization jointly claimed rocket attacks on Hermel with the previously unknown Marwan Hadid Brigades.
In retaliation for the increasingly public involvement of Hezbollah in the fighting in Syria, specifically right across the border in Qalamoun, it would not be out of the question to expect more frequent car bombings and cross-border rocket attacks against the organization’s interests in Lebanon, mirroring the trend witnessed after al-Qusayr. The southern suburbs of Beirut, Baalbek and Hermel in the Bekaa Valley, and towns in southern Lebanon like Nabi Sheet and Bint Jbeil are particularly vulnerable targets.
With refugees fleeing Syria to enter Lebanon’s Arsal at an unprecedented rate due to the intensity of fighting in nearby Qalamoun, the aforementioned trends, confrontations between the Lebanese Army and Syrian fighters smuggling weapons and explosives, in addition to airstrikes against Syrian opposition fighters in Lebanon and potential responses from the LAF, will continue, and likely occur at an accelerated pace. Over 200,000 people live in the Qalamoun area, and as fighting spreads to the towns of Nabak and Yabrud, further displacement is expected.
A potentially dangerous impact of Arsal’s refugee influx is implicit in Oxfam’s November 2013 report, Survey on the Livelihoods of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon. A prominent majority of the Syrian refugee population in Lebanon is under 30, living in squalid conditions while struggling to survive amidst harsh economic circumstances. Similar to the case of Lebanon’s Palestinian refugee camps, Arsal could become a major recruiting ground for Sunni extremists, if it has not already.
Hezbollah’s involvement in the Syrian conflict remains undeterred in spite of incurring increasing casualties, including high-profile battlefield commanders. The uptick in attacks against Hezbollah in Lebanon facilitated via Sunni extremists in Arsal is undoubtedly directly linked to the overt, and increased, presence of Hezbollah fighters across the border. But, in the face of a greater perceived threat from Arsal, Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah highlights the necessity for increased Hezbollah presence in Syria to mitigate the danger posed to Lebanon.
With the Syrian war showing no signs of slowing and Hezbollah showing no sign of withdrawal, Arsal remains the primary staging and support zone through which JN and its allies will conduct attacks against Hezbollah in Lebanon. Should the Assad regime and Hezbollah’s operation in Qalamoun be successful, Arsal will effectively be cut off from its support line, leaving the some 60,000 Syrian refugees in the town surrounded by Hezbollah and regime soldiers. Whether the offensive is successful or not, given the demographic composition of Arsal, the town will continue to threaten the interests of the Syrian regime, Hezbollah, and the Lebanese government.
Wednesday, December 4, 2013
Hezbollah And The Fight For Control in Qalamoun
by Isabel Nassief
Fighting between pro-regime and rebel forces has begun to concentrate on the Damascus-Homs supply route through the Qalamoun Mountains, which saw sporadic violence throughout the summer of 2013. This battle – which is crucial for both regime and rebel resupply – will focus on contested sections of the M5 highway.
Hezbollah will also focus on cutting off logistical connections between Arsal, Lebanon, and rebels in Qalamoun. Although Hezbollah and the regime share a common goal of the regime’s survival in Syria, the battle for Qalamoun illustrates the potential for disparity in their strategic priorities.
Hezbollah will also focus on cutting off logistical connections between Arsal, Lebanon, and rebels in Qalamoun. Although Hezbollah and the regime share a common goal of the regime’s survival in Syria, the battle for Qalamoun illustrates the potential for disparity in their strategic priorities.
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Friday, October 18, 2013
Regime Counterpunch in Southern Aleppo
by Valerie Szybala and Charlie Caris
In late September the Syrian military launched an offensive to reopen a crucial eastern route between Hama and southern Aleppo. This route – which arcs east from Hama, through the desert and up through the Safira plain – provides an alternative to the main highway between Aleppo and Hama which is largely under rebel control. The regime lost control of large portions of the route in the September rebel wal-‘Adiyat Dabha [“The Panting Chargers”] offensive in southern Aleppo province. If the regime can gain control of this eastern route, it will gain a critical lifeline to forces stationed at the Nayrab and Kuweires air bases and as-Safira military base and chemical weapons facilities. Kuweires has been largely restricted to aerial resupply for several months due to ongoing rebel siege, and battles for control around Nayrab and as-Safira have made regular ground resupply difficult for the Syrian army.
Map by Isabel Nassief
The first indications of the regime counteroffensive came on September 27-28 when Syrian activists on social media began reporting sightings of a large military convoy with well over 100 vehicles leaving from the area of the Hama Military Airport. Video footage from one source suggests that the convoy was comprised primarily of civilian trucks as opposed to military vehicles. Reports that the convoy consisted of 200-250 vehicles by the time that it left the vicinity of Hama city, as well as conflicting reports of smaller convoys of different sizes and composition, indicate that the initial column of supply trucks sighted near the Hama Military Airport joined with other forces prior to departing from the vicinity of Hama city. It is clear from later reporting and video evidence that the larger convoy which departed eastward contained significant armed elements, some suggesting that it included up to 25 T-72 tanks, in addition to a large number of personnel carriers, BMP attack vehicles, and support helicopters. Some sources also indicated the possible presence of irregular forces – including Hezbollah and the National Defense Forces (NDF) – within or alongside the regime convoy. While it is plausible that conventional regime forces are operating in an integrated manner with irregular forces, which has been observed since the battle of al-Qusayr, it is not confirmed in this case, and remains unclear how such forces would interact with regular armed units in terms of roles and responsibilities. The regime’s deployment of integrated forces warrants further study, but for now the presence of Hezbollah deep in Aleppo province cannot be validated.
After leaving Hama, the convoy moved east through as-Salamiya, which lies on the highway to al-Raqqa. The large size of this convoy, composed apparently of supply trucks, point the regime’s ultimate goal of resupplying its besieged troops at the air bases and as-Safira.
There are no reports of rebel engagements during the first part of the convoy’s journey, likely because the desert route is sparsely populated east of Hama. Upon reaching the village of al-Athriya, the convoy turned north towards rebel-controlled Khanasir, an important link in the Salamiya-Aleppo ground supply route. Rebel forces first seized control of the town in late August and continued to liberate a number of other villages in southern Aleppo throughout September as part of the wal-‘Adiyat Dabha operation. Prior to August, however, Khanasir was regime-controlled, and rebels were limited to long-distance rocket attacks on passing supply convoys in order to disrupt regime combat service support in Aleppo.
Just before arriving to Khanasir, reports indicate the regime convoy paused for a few days on September 30 near the village of al-Qurabatiya, just 5 km south of Khanasir, to receive additional reinforcements from Hama. During this time, regime planes and helicopters saturated Khanasir and surrounding villages with barrel bombs, more than 30 by some accounts, as well as shelling, in order to prepare the area for a ground assault. When the regime forces began to move into Khanasir, rebel forces were quickly outgunned, and by October 3, the city had fallen back into regime hands. The use of barrel bombs, which are basically improvised explosive devices dropped from planes and helicopters, by regime forces has become increasingly visible in recent months, particularly in Idlib and Aleppo provinces. These barrel bombs, which are not precision guided, are generally filled with oil, explosives, and metal, which sends shrapnel out over a wide area for maximum effect. Their heavy use in areas where the regime has a lighter ground presence could be indicative of a scorched earth policy of indiscriminate destruction to regain rebel-held territory. It could also point to decreasing reserves of standard ordinances and greater difficulty the regime faces in receiving new weapons shipments from abroad.
From Khanasir, the regime continued to press northward towards as-Safira on a route that skirts the shores of Lake Jabbul. Unlike the desert highway outside of Hama, both this route and the nearby Safira plains are populated with small villages, and regime forces suffered heavy losses along the way, including a rebel car bomb and large ambush. While regime forces were able to overrun a number of small villages from October 5-8, and even prematurely declared the Salamiya-Aleppo Highway open to civilian traffic, there are reports that rebels recaptured villages soon after the convoy departed.
On October 8, after receiving additional reinforcements from Tal Abour near Aleppo, the regime finalized preparations for an assault on as-Safira by beginning a devastating campaign of air strikes and bombardments on the city. As-Safira is an important city for several reasons: it is a key location on the alternate supply route to Aleppo, in close proximity to both the besieged Kuweires military airbase to the east of the city and the Nayrab military airbase, which is co-located with Aleppo International Airport; and the outskirts of as-Safira are home to site of some of Syria’s biggest chemical weapons research, production, and storage facilities. While the large number of supply trucks in the convoy suggest that the primary mission was to re-establish ground supply routes to besieged bases, with the OPCW inspectors visiting chemical weapons sites around the country it is likely that securing the area around the Safira complex in preparation for their visit was an additional objective of the regime offensive.
By the time the regime attempted its assault on as-Safira, rebel forces had received their own reinforcements. This is indicated by the FSA-affiliated as-Safira Operations Room, which issued a statement thanking all of the units that responded to their earlier call for assistance. The rebel forces participating in these battles include both Free Syrian Army brigades, coordinated by the as-Safira Operations Room, as well as more extreme Salafi Islamic groups including Ahrar al-Sham, Jabhat al-Nusra, and the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham. As of the time of posting, the battle around as-Safira was ongoing, with the regime still unable to make major gains north of the city.
If the regime is able to wrest control of as-Safira, it will be a major setback for rebel forces, who have been building up their presence along the Hama-Aleppo supply route since at least the beginning of the summer. With control of as-Safira the regime would not only have an open supply line to southern Aleppo city, it would also have a clear route to Nayrab and Kuweiris air bases. Both sites have faced challenges in ground resupply, and Kuweiris Air Base in particular has been under constant rebel siege for many months. Large-scale aerial resupply is not a sustainable strategy for the Syrian regime, particularly with capacity at all of its airports frequently diminished due to attacks. The regime must control a ground supply route to its remaining strongholds in Aleppo strongholds if it hopes to hold onto them and to make future gains in the northern Syria, where rebels continue to consolidate their gains.
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Tuesday, September 3, 2013
Saturday, June 1, 2013
Iraq's sectarian crisis reignites as Shi'a militias execute civilians and remobilize
Escalating violence in Iraq crossed a new and very dangerous threshold this week. Al Qaeda in Iraq launched a concentrated wave of car-bomb and other attacks specifically against civilian Shi'a targets in and around Baghdad. Shi'a militias are mobilizing and have begun a round of sectarian killings facilitated by false checkpoints, a technique characteristic of the 2006-2007 period. Prime Minister Nuri al Maliki has taken a number of steps to demonstrate that he remains in control of the situation. The expansion of Shi'a militia activity, however, is likely to persuade many Iraqis that he is either not in control or is actively abetting the killings. The re-mobilization of Shi'a militias in Iraq coincides with the formal announcement by Lebanese Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah of his organization's active military participation in the Syrian civil war. Al Qaeda in Iraq's sectarian mass-murder attacks coincide with the announcement by AQI's affiliate in Syria, Jabhat al Nusra, that attacking Hezbollah is that group's primary target henceforth. The stage appears to be set not merely for the collapse of the Iraqi state into the kind of vicious sectarian killing and sectarian cleansing that nearly destroyed it in 2006 and 2007, but also for the expansion of that sectarian warfare throughout both Mesopotamia and the Levant.
Sectarian violence has escalated sharply in Iraq. On Monday, May 27, al-Qaeda in Iraq conducted a coordinated operation to target Shi‘a neighborhoods in Baghdad with numerous and large vehicle-borne explosive devices (VBIEDs). This operation followed a wave of VBIED attacks on May 20 that targeted the lines of communication into Baghdad and some Shi‘a populations across Iraq. An estimated 212 people have diedin violent attacks in Iraq since May 20, and another 624 have been injured. May’s casualties are thus likely to surpass April’s, which had made that month the most violentin Iraq since 2008. Most of these attacks, especially VBIEDs and suicide attacks, conform to the methods usually attributed to AQI. Additional reports from Baghdad and Diyala also indicate that Shi‘a militant groups, including the Iranian-backed Sadrist splinter group Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, have begun to mobilize in Iraq to establish checkpoints in Baghdad and to conduct extra-judicial killings (EJKs) against Sunnis. Extra-judicial killings reportedlycarried out by militias also occurred in the city of Hilla in central Iraq. AAH, along with Lebanese Hezbollah and Kata’ib Hezbollah, publically acknowledgedits military involvement in Syria in April 2013. Lebanese Hezbollah has mobilized in Syria throughout May. This regional military activation, as well as the elevated threat to the Iraqi Shi‘a population posed by AQI, lends greater credibility to the reports that Iraqi Shi‘a militant groups have mobilized to conduct intimidation and violence against Sunni in the name of defending Shi’a populations.
AQI’s 2013 VBIED Campaign
Violent attacks by al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) escalated sharply in April and May. AQI has maneuvered among anti-government protests and Iraqi Security Force deployments to project attacks throughout Iraq, most prominently in Baghdad, Salah ad-Din, and Ninewa Provinces. Vehicle-borne improvised-explosive devices (VBIEDs) are re-emerging as a primary attack type, reverting to a trend first seen as the sectarian civil war expanded in 2006. In particular, the two waves of VBIED attacks on May 20 and May 27 demonstrate a concerted effort by AQI to exacerbate sectarian tensions and escalate violence, to fix Iraqi security forces in certain positions and drive them from others, to gain freedom of movement along lines of communication, and to set conditions for deliberate targeting of neighborhoods that were prime locations for sectarian violence in 2006-7. AQI conducted a campaign in July 2012 (under the banner of the Islamic State of Iraq) that focused on Iraqi government officials, security forces, Sahwa (Awakening) leaders, and Shi‘a civilians in order to limitthe reach and effectiveness of Maliki’s government and to regain lost territory. Since that time, AQI has conducted attacks using IEDs, suicide bombers, armed clashes, assassinations, and coordinated simultaneous explosions. The recent waves differ both in the number of VBIEDs used simultaneously and in the specific targeting of Shi’a civilians in known sectarian hot-spots.
The concentration of VBIED attacks in late May 2013 demonstrates AQI’s capacity to stage in the locations around the outskirts of Baghdad (the Baghdad belt) from which it had launched attacks in 2006-7, to procure the components necessary to build VBIEDs in large numbers, and to project force into Shi‘a communities and mixed areas within Baghdad. Moreover, the campaign has deliberately escalated violence and selected targets to shape not only the perceptions of Iraqi Sunnis, but also those of Iraqi Shi‘a, who may begin to lose faith in the Maliki government if attacks are allowed to continue.
GRAPHIC 1 | VBIED ATTACKS IN BAGHDAD, 20 AND 27 MAY 2013
Wave of VBIED attacks: May 20
A wave of 11 VBIED attacks and seven additional explosions struck urban centers across Iraq on Monday, May 20 resulting in at least 60 deaths and 178 injuries. Two other VBIEDs were defused before they could explode on their targets. Six of the VBIEDs detonatedin predominantly Shi‘a neighborhoods along the periphery of Baghdad city. These events, depicted on the map above, accounted for a small percentage of the total casualties on that day, yielding one death and 21 injuries. The low casualties may indicate AQI’s difficulty entering Shi‘a neighborhoods to hit prime targets. In light of the wave of attacks a week later that did hit such targets, however, it is more likely that AQI was using the first series of attacks to establish access routes into Baghdad and test its ability to synchronize operations. The neighborhoods chosen represent the outer rim of Shi‘a communities in Baghdad that are most easily accessible from main supply routes and proximate Sunni neighborhoods. The attacks collectively illustrate a campaign to attack a very selective target set just inside the city rim.
Other VBIEDs on May 20 in the cities of Basra, Mahmoudiyah, Wasit, Hilla, Balad, Samarra, and Baiji, accounted for the majority of the casualties. The most lethal attack occurredin Hilla city, Babel Province, where two car bombs exploded in a market near the Shi’a Wardiya mosque, killing 22 and wounding 77. Targeting of religious sites clearly indicates AQI’s intent to elicit a sectarian response, particularly given the centrality of the Samarra mosque bombing in 2006 to the subsequent mobilization of Shi‘a militias for sectarian combat. Additionally, the car bomb in Balad on May 20 targeted a bus full of Iranian pilgrimsbound for the Shrine of Imam Mohammed, leaving four dead and 10 wounded. This incident, along with another attack on Iranian pilgrims at the Samarra mosque on May 25, feed into the justifications being proffered by Shi’a fighting groups in support of their activities. Key figures within Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq have used these attacks recently as rallying cries to defend holy sites. Iran has also responded to previous attacks by launching probes into the deaths of pilgrims in Iraq. Iran’s Director General of the Hajj and Pilgrimage Organization in charge of Holy Sites Masoud Akhavan announcedin December 2012 that Iranian security companies were escorting Iranian pilgrims into Iraq. This practice may also be a vehicle by which Iran could funnel IRGC-QF augmentation into Iraq, for which there is historical precedent. It also explains AQI’s focused targeting of these pilgrims.
Comparing the VBIED attacks on May 20 to concurrent attacks using improvised explosive devices (IED) and adhesive explosive devices (AED), the VBIEDs were used to target large numbers of civilians, while IEDs and AEDs were often used for targeted killings or attacks against security force patrols or members of the Sahwa (Awakening). The Samarra VBIED on May 20 targeted Sahwa as they gathered to receive their salaries. VBIEDs have also been used in 2013 to target ISF at security checkpoints, but in May 2013 they have largely been used to target Shi‘a civilians.
Wave of VBIED attacks: May 27
Two days after Iraqi security forces moved to conduct operations in western Anbar, AQI launched a second wave of 13 VBIEDS and one additional explosion on May 27 that killed 36 and wounded 147. This time, all 14 attacks occurred in the vicinity of Baghdad, indicating a deliberate shift to focus upon the capital region. Within Baghdad, the map above demonstrates a geographic shift from the periphery to the center, in particular to neighborhoods at the heart of the sectarian strife in 2006-7 such as Saadoun (in Rusafa), Khadimiya, Huriya, Saadriya (in central Karkh), and Shaab (just outside of Sadr City). Attacks in Habbibiyah in Sadr City may also be meant to show the government and Shi‘a militant groups that AQI can attack even into the heart of their territory.
AQI’s ability to plan and execute 13 simultaneous VBIED attacks at strategically selected sites within Baghdad is also noteworthy. VBIEDs are among the most expensive and complex improvised weapons systems, capable of achieving massive effects in isolation, and often historically reserved for that purpose. The use of so many VBIEDs in a single day demonstrates a high degree of technical and organizational skill and suggests the ability to produce VBIEDs in large numbers and rapidly. It indicates the dramatic extent to which AQI appears to have recovered from the defeats inflicted on it in 2007 and 2008.
AQI attacks did not slow after May 27, moreover. Attacks have continued over the last three days, including six more VBIEDs in the vicinity of Baghdad, and one in particular against a wedding in Jihadon May 30 that claimed 20 casualties. Jihad is another predominantly Shi‘a neighborhood in southwestern Baghdad that was heavily contestedin 2006-7, and sufficiently Shi’ified through migrations and extra-judicial killings that it supported Moqtada al Sadr in the Baghdad Uprising in 2008. This attack occurred one day after a VBIED attackin the market of Jihad, which killed 16 and wounded 45. Cumulatively, these two events claimed the greatest number of casualties over the last ten days.
Shi‘a Militant Response
The recent bombing waves in Baghdad have gripped residents with fear of sectarian war. Their sentiments are reminiscent of the atmosphere that engulfed the city in 2006 as broader conflict loomed. As a result of the deteriorating security in Baghdad, commercial activity in the city has been declining. Social media posts and isolated reportshave been circulating since the beginning of the week that Iraqi Shi‘a militias, primarily Asai’b Ahl Al-Haq (AAH), have been patrolling streets of Baghdad, setting up “false checkpoints,” and conducting extra-judicial killings against Sunnis. Residents have beenexpressing fear of extra-judicial killings since early May. The evidence is clear; Shi’a militants have mobilized in Baghdad and are conducting executions of civilians.
GRAPHIC 2 | SHI'A MILITANT ATTACKS IN BAGHDAD, MAY 2013
Several attacks over recent days bore the signature of Shi’a militant groups. On 28 May, the bodiesof two university students were found in northern Baghdad in Agarguf area of the Mansour District with hands bound behind them, shot in the chest and head. They had been thrown from an unmarked vehicle according to witnesses who also noted that false checkpoints had been set up in the same area. Agarguf area was used by Shi’a militant groups to dump hundreds of bodies in 2007. Three people had been kidnappedby armed persons in an unmarked vehicle on the evening of 26 May at al-Mu’atham bus stop in central Baghdad, which is frequently used by students. It is possible that these events, both involving signature tactics of Shi’a militant groups, had the same victims. Additionally, on 26 May, armed persons wearing police uniforms invadeda home in al-Za’franiya in southeast Baghdad, dragging the owner outside and shooting him. The method of attack and geographic location correspond with historical patterns of Shi’a militancy and make attribution to Sunni terrorist groups implausible. Sunni mosques were also attacked in the Baghdad neighborhoods of Mansourand Saydiyahand twice in Diyalaprovince, which clearly points to Shi‘a militancy.
Morality policing executions have also been reported in areas of Baghdad just outside of Sadr City. On 14 May, unidentified armed men attackeda police checkpoint in Zayunah, handcuffing security personnel but leaving them unharmed. Afterwards, the same gunmen traveling in an SUV raided five liquor stores and killed 12 people. A week later, on 22 May, unidentified armed men attacked a brothelin Zayunah and killed five men, five women, the owner, and his wife with silenced weapons and knives. Also on 22 May, unidentified armed men travelling in a car shota liquor shop owner while driving near a market in al-Shaab, in northeast Baghdad. Zayuna and al-Shaab are predominantly Shi’a neighborhoods, and militia activity there most likely indicates the militia’s intent to re-establish control.
Additionally, several assassinations this week fit patterns of violence historically characteristic of Shi’a militant groups. On 26 May, the imam of the al-Qadisiyah Mosque was attackedby unidentified armed men with silenced weapons while driving in Diyala Province. The same day, unidentified armed individuals shot a policemanin al-Waziriyah, in the northeast quadrant of Baghdad, again using silenced weapons, and a primary school teacher was killedwith silenced weapons in al-Qahirah, a neighboring area in the northeast of Baghdad. On 27 May, another teacherwas shot with silenced weapons near the militia stronghold of Khalis in Diyala. Additionally, in an assassination that drew more public attention to this rise in targeted killings, Abbas Ja’far, the brother of a famous soccerplayer, was shot on 25 May by two armed men on a motorcycle outside his home in Habibiyah, a neighborhood in eastern Baghdad abutting Sadr City. Two other attacks involved drive-by shootings of civilians in Jisr Diyala in southeast Baghdad, one a civilianas he was leaving his home, and another the owner of a grocerystore. Other variants of these militia signature attacks included the killing of four civilians as they exited a taxi in al-Kadhimiyah, north of Baghdad, and the killing of two owners of a goldsmith shop in al-Mashtal, on the rim of southeast Baghdad. Some of these instances clearly demonstrate sectarian violence because they hit obviously Sunni targets. Others, in predominantly Shi’a areas of Baghdad, instead demonstrate intra-Shi’a violence.
Other attacks likely conducted by Iraqi Shi‘a militias can be detected by method and by target. The most recent target set has included cafés, where larger groups congregate. They include an improvised explosive device (IED) attackon a café in the western Baghdad neighborhood of Ameriya on April 18 that killed 27 people. Another café attack took place in Baghdad in the nearby Jamia neighborhood on May 5 (killing or wounding 15 people) and anotheron May 29 in the Hib Hib area in Diyala province that resulted in 22 people killed and wounded. While these attacks have not been clearly attributed, they differ from attacks customarily attributed to AQI, such as car bombs, suicide bombings, and attacks against Iraqi Shi‘a targets. These attacks all took place in predominantly Iraqi Sunni locales. In four of them, IEDs were used; in the fifth, the attack on the Ihsan mosque in Mansour, was conducted by hand grenades. On May 31, police sources in Babil revealedthat gunmen killed four people in Hilla. The sources describe the gunmen as traveling with impunity and using silenced weapons, killing former members of the Baath party and one shop owner in Hilla—again, hallmarks of Shi’a militia rather than AQI activity. This comes one week after the VBIED attack upon a Shi’a mosque there.
It is conceivable that AQI has conducted these attacks to instigate retaliatory violence. Their divergence from AQI’s attack methods and their locations, however, make it much more likely that they are reprisal attacks by Shi‘a militant groups. The widespread perception among the public that Shi’a militias conducted these attacks is a major driver and amplifier of fear among the population.
IMAGE 1 | MEMBERS OF ASA'IB AHL AL-HAQ IN PARADE ON 4 MAY 2013
AAH has been in the in the spotlight of renewed militant and political activities since April 2013. The group itself confirmed its role and participationin military activities in Syria along with other Shi‘a groups. Moreover, and in a major projection of force and political prominence, AAH organized a massive, campaign-style rally in Baghdad on May 4. The event was held in a government-owned soccer stadium in Baghdad, the Sina’a Club Stadium on the border of Sadr City, and was ostensibly to celebrate the 10thanniversary of the group. Members of the Iraqi Council of Representatives are reportedto have attended. Photos of the gathering reveal the presence of AAH’s senior leadership, parades, large attendance, tribal figures, and sophisticated organizational capabilities. During the event, AAH’s intentions and capabilities for increased activity were made clear. AAH leader, Qais Al-Khazali, calledon members of “the resistance across the spectrum” to maintain readiness and warned politicians who are connected to “regional agendas” that they will be pursued regardless of whether they are “in fortified areas, secured hotels, or armored vehicles.” The resistance is the title used by AAH to describe itself, as well as the word Iranian and Lebanese Hezbollahi leaders use referring to the “axis of resistance” against Israel and its allies. Al-Khazali also urged anti-government protesters to refrain from sectarian slogans and to reject the killing of ISF members. Those statements cameunder attack by some Iraqi politicians who also condemned the government for allowing the event to happen. AAH ability to hold events in government-owned facilities is attributed to its relations with Maliki. He has welcomed them into the political process and views them as a countervailing force against the Sadrist Trend, led by Muqtada Al-Sadr, from which the group split in 2004.
IMAGE 2 | LEADERSHIP OF ASA'IB AHL AL-HAQ ON 4 MAY 2013
Spread of “false checkpoints”
Since 2007, Baghdad’s security procedures have incorporated a vast network of street checkpoints manned by Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) members. The purpose of those checkpoints is to look for car bombs and capture wanted individuals. Reports describing “false checkpoints” suggest that some are not manned by ISF members, but instead by personnel in civilian clothes who may or not be security officials. Reportedly, these checkpoints have been inspecting identification cards and inquiring about the sectarian affiliation of passengers. There are also reportsthat the militias have kidnapped and killed people based on their identity and that the targeting has primarily been of Iraqi Sunnis. The areas where those checkpoints are reported to have operated are concentrated in western Baghdad, which has neighborhoods that are mixed between Iraqi Shi‘a and Iraqi Sunnis.
This way of operating closely echoes events in 2006-7, during which Shi’a militia groups established checkpoints in Baghdad at which they stopped cars, checked identification cards, and kidnapped and then executed Sunnis. They manned those checkpoints either in militia garb or dressed as Iraqi Security Forces. In 2006, the ISF was infiltrated by these militias and tolerated such checkpoints within sight of their official locations or operated them.
Further reports surfacedon May 30 detailing that individuals in civilian clothes have been present at multiple official Baghdad checkpoints; the Iraqi Ministry of the Interior described the individuals as “belonging to formation within the Ministry of Interior.” The MoI spokesperson added that the ministry relies on members from intelligence or other departments who are sometimes tasked with verifying identification cards. According to the same report and citing an unnamed senior security source, militias have been active in both the Rusafa and Karkh sections of Baghdad, but the report asserted that talks of false checkpoints are "exaggerated and intended to spread an atmosphere of fear among citizens.” Despite the explanation offered by MoI, the presence of civilian-clothed individuals is bound to stoke the fears of populations that encounter such checkpoints. It may, indeed, feed speculation that the MoI has become re-infiltrated by militias or is itself engaging in sectarian violence.
Allegations of militia reactivation in Baghdad have been emerging since early May. On May 8, just four days after the AAH parade in the soccer stadium, Iraqiyya issued a statement condemning the government for tolerating rhetoric and threats from Iraqi Shi‘a militias, including AAH, Kata’ib Hizballah (KH), and the Mokhtar Army (an Iraqi Hezbollah unit which was formed in February 2013). Iraqiyya positedthat statements from these militias are “directly or indirectly tied to those events that resulted in the death of innocent youth.” Iraqiyya may have been referring to increased attacks on cafes where youth congregate.
On May 21, Muqtada Al-Sadr,issued a statement in which he urged followers to “ostracize extremism and what is issued from some of those who belong to Wahhabism or what is issued by some Shi‘a militias.” With this statement, Sadr attempted to take the middle ground in condemning Sunni extremist groups while also criticizing Shi‘a groups. Sadr’s critique of groups like AAH is natural. They are rivals and they compete over turf in Baghdad and elsewhere in southern Iraq. Their rivalry is two-fold, as the leader of AAH, Qais al-Khazali, views himself as the heir to Sadr’s father Ayatollah Mohammed Sadiq Al-Sadr. Muqtada al-Sadr stands to lose if AAH mobilizes while the Sadrist Trend does not. AAH is also the Sadrists’ primary political, military, and increasingly social competitor; this competition is very likely to continue in the future.
The Iraqi government has made a number of announcements to reassure the public and assuage its fears. The cabinet announced on May 28 that it will “pursue all types of militias and firmly strike anybody who violates public order.” Additionally, Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki visited the areas in western Baghdad where most militia activities are reported to have taken place. He inspected checkpoints in Jihad, Amriyya, Mansour, Adel, Huriyya, Kadhimiyah, Taji, and Al-Adhamiyah on May 29. His deputy, Saleh Al-Mutlaq, visited the Saydiyah area on the same day. These are the mixed areas where much of the sectarian violence occurred in 2006-7 and where the public is most concerned about militia activities. The Ministry of Interior (MoI) denied the presence of false checkpoints and urged citizens to contact authorities with information regarding their presence. The Baghdad Operations Center, which absorbed ISF headquarters in Rusafa (East Baghdad) and Karkh (West Baghdad) last week, announced a travel ban for all unregistered vehicles starting at 0600 on Friday, May 31. Vehicles without license plates have been cited in reports of kidnapping and executions.
Maliki has recently ordereda major shift of key leaders across the security sector, ostensibly in response to heightened security concerns. Those major changes may signal his lack of confidence in their leadership for the security of Baghdad. The leadership changes might also have been a prerequisite for moving trusted leaders into vital positions in the provinces, where Maliki had begun to conduct more aggressive offensive operations after the Hawija incident. Such a hypothesis would seem more plausible if former trusted leaders emerge in new positions, and some of them have. It is also likely that Maliki’s recent restructure of Iraqi Security Force leadership heralds a new security strategy for Baghdad. It is not clear what new strategy he might have intended, but he has at this point either tolerated the mobilization of militias or lost control of their activities in Baghdad.
The possible reactivation of militias poses a serious challenge for him as a security breakdown in Baghdad will be seen as a major setback to ISF and the prime minister. Maliki has hitherto been able to isolate Baghdad from the protesting provinces. The large range of AQI and the reemergence of the militias links the violence in the capital and the provinces in ways he will not likely control. In that light, Maliki’s strategic embrace of AAH in 2012 in order to limit Muqtada al-Sadr’s influence may backfire in 2013. Muqtada may be marginalized, but so too may be Maliki.
And there is evidence that Muqtada is losing control of his militias as well. In a significant development, a member of the Sadrist trend office in Mahmudiyah organized a parade. The date of the parade is not known but on May 30 Muqtada Al-Sadr warned his followers to refrain from any action “that reignites sectarianism” and declared that organizing parades is his sole responsibility. He further disowned the actions of the organizer, Karim Al-Araji, and stated that Araji acted independently. The Mahmudiyah event carries a number of implications. It is a mixed area in the Baghdad belt and since 2006 has continued to be on the fault line of sectarian tensions. The parade suggests that, with reports emerging about militia activation, organizers perceived a need to project force to compete with reported activities by AAH. They may have acted independently of Sadr’s control but his statement demonstrates that he is concerned about ceding ground to AAH’s mobilization. For AAH, discontented members of the Sadrist trend would be prime recruitment targets that could significantly enhance the capabilities of the group.
For its part, AAH has deniedinvolvement in operations in Baghdad. Its spokesperson, Ahmed Al-Kanani, stated with regard to false checkpoints that AAH “in cooperation with the security apparatus investigated the news of a false checkpoint in Al-Liqa Square in Iskan and other areas in Baghdad, but did not find any trace of them.” AAH’s political bureau chief, Adnan Faihan Al-Dulaimi addedon May 30 that the group is not involved in any activities, but warned that the current conditions are similar to the ones that appeared in 2006. Al-Dulaimi emphasized that AAH “is ready for it [mobilization] and we are ready to protect our people.”
Despite the withdrawal of U.S. forces and AAH’s ostensible transition to a socio-religious and political role, AAH has remainedan active militant group that did not disarm. Moreover, as the group has been playing an active role in the Abu Al-Fadhel Al-Abbas Brigade (AFAB) in Syria, with responsibility to protect the Sayyida Zeinab shrine in Damascus, AAH has been activated for battle since 2012. This mobilization for Syria reduces the obstacles to taking up arms in Iraq.
AAH has overtly linked the conflict in Syria to the one in Iraq. According to AAH’s political deputy Al-Dulaimi, “The Sayyeda Zeinab shrine has had symbolic importance for Muslims all over the world and the targeting of this shrine by Takfiri extremists will result in a disaster, because an attack on it will be followed by a similar attack on the Imam Askari shrine in Samarra. An attack on the Imam Askari shrine in Samarra will inflame the sectarian crisis in Iraq.” The line of argument serves AAH well by justifying mobilization in both Syria and Iraq.
Dulaimi stated in the same interview that “[AAH] is alongside Iraq’s security forces and emphasizes the existing political process in this country.” With the escalation of attacks by AQI, it is also increasingly likely that AAH and other Iraqi Shi‘a militant groups will perceive the need to defend predominately Iraqi Shi‘a areas throughout Iraq; and in Baghdad especially. Attacks against Iraqi civilians have continued despite the efforts of Iraqi Security Forces to contain them. In 2006, when ISF was unable to contain the civil war in Baghdad and Diyala, Iraqi Shi‘a militant groups mobilized to provide protection. Although the ISF's capabilities have vastly improved since 2006, the continuation of AQI attacks in Baghdad will reduce the confidence of the population and set conditions for the return of Iraqi Shi‘a militias as defenders of the Shi’a.
AAH mobilization in Baghdad comes as other Iranian-backed groups have increased their involvement in the Syrian conflict. Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah made two visits to Tehran in April, the firstto meet with IRGC-Qods Force Commander Qassem Suleimani and the second to meet Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei. Afterwards, Nasrallah admitted his fighters’ involvement in Syria, announcedthat “Hezbollah could become more deeply involved in the future,” and said that Syria had “real friends” who would aid it. He further stated that there would be “very serious repercussions” if the shrine of Sayyida Zeinab was destroyed or damaged. This announcement was concurrent with Hezbollah’s sending of numerous reinforcements, probably more than two thousand, to assist regime forces in besieging the strategically important town of Qusayr.
In Qusayr, Hezbollah met fierce resistance, with estimatesof over 50 militants killed in action between May 18-21. On May 24, 75 fighters had been reportedkilled to that point in the month. The next day, Nasrallah officially signaledhis “undying loyalty” to the Syrian regime; this shift in rhetoric is notable, from a commitment primarily to defending Lebanese civilians in Syria and religious sites using veiled language to an explicit and overt commitment to defending the Syrian regime.
Compounding Hezbollah’s official commitment to the ongoing Syrian civil war, the group has come into direct conflict with Sunni-oriented extremist elements. Jabhat al-Nusra, the al-Qaeda affiliated rebel organization, announcedon May 15 that targeting Hezbollah would be their top priority. Jabhat al-Nusra has also clashed with the Abu Fadl al-Abbas (AFAB) brigade, which is a Shi‘a Syrian militant group affiliated AAH. AFAB and AAH, like Hezbollah, are all Iranian-linked militant organizations. This signals a broadening conflict between Sunni and Shi‘a militant groups expanding across the Iraqi and Syrian fronts.
Iraqis, and particularly the people of Baghdad, have proven resilient in the face of violence since 2008, but their reaction to increased attacks and the news of Iraqi Shi‘a militias resurgence indicate genuine concern. The overt mobilization of Iraqi Shi‘a militias has already included: public military parades, increased inflammatory and threatening rhetoric, leaflets and night letters dropped demanding the departure of Iraqi Sunnis, assassination of local Sunni clerics, and possible retaliatory attacks that target Iraqi Sunni areas. If AAH has mobilized, other Iraqi Shi‘a militias like KH and Sadr’s Promised Day Brigade will feel pressured to take part in order to burnish their credentials as protectors of the Iraqi Shi‘a, which could escalate quickly to sectarian war, not only in Iraq, but throughout the region.
Ahmed Ali is an Iraq Research Analyst at the Institute for the Study of War. Jessica Lewis is the Research Director at the Institute for the Study of War. Dr. Kimberly Kagan is the President at the Institute for the Study of War.
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