Iraq Situation Report: August 3-8, 2016

By Emily Anagnostos and the ISW Iraq Team

The Popular Mobilization, including major Iranian-backed Shi’a militias, sought to formalize their participation in operations in northern Iraq. IRGC-Quds Force Commander Qassim Suleimani reportedly visited unnamed locations in Ninewa Province to discuss operations in Mosul with Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and militia leaders on August 4. Suleimani’s presence in theater before the start of major operations in the past has preceded intense militia involvement in the operation. Suleimani’s visits to Fallujah at the start of the operation in late-May and Baiji in mid-October 2015 heralded a significant increase of militia participation in the operations. The pattern will likely remain true, and his visit to Ninewa Province on August 4 indicates that Popular Mobilization, including proxy militias, could play a serious role in upcoming operations in Shirqat and even Mosul. Senior militia leaders, including Badr Organization leader Hadi al-Amiri and Popular Mobilization Deputy Chairman Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, also met with senior ISF officials under Salah al-Din Operations Command on August 6 to discuss participation in Shirqat. The Popular Mobilization, however, will face resistance against their deployment to northern Iraq from Coalition, Kurdish, and Ninewa officials out of fear of sectarian reprisals on Ninewa’s majority Sunni population. The Coalition will also reject militias imposing on long-cultivated Coalition turf. The Coalition will shape the Mosul operation by leveraging air support to eliminate militia participation and by increasing its presence on the ground. The Pentagon announced on August 5 the beginning of the deployment of the 560 soldiers announced on July 11 in order to provide logistical support to Qayyarah airbase, which was recaptured on July 9. The base will serve as a logistics hub for operations into Mosul. Coalition basing in both Qayyarah and Makhmur may limit the militias’ expansion towards Mosul, though they are likely to participate in Shirqat. 

Russian Airstrikes in Syria: January 29 - February 7, 2016

by: ISW Syria Team

Russia’s four month long air campaign has set conditions for the encirclement of Aleppo.  Pro-regime forces backed by heavy Russian airstrikes severed one of two opposition supply lines into Aleppo City from the Turkish border on February 3 when they pushed northwest of the city to reestablish a regime supply line to the besieged regime towns of Nubl and Zahra’a. Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps fighters and Iranian-backed Shi’a militia forces played a prominent role in the offensive, demonstrating the lethality of combined Russian air and Iranian ground operations against the opposition in Syria. Reports of Russian Spetnaz activity at unspecified locations in Aleppo Province likely indicate the involvement of these forces in the operation. The gains position pro-regime forces to encircle opposition-held portions of Aleppo City by severing the last remaining opposition supply line that runs east from the Turkish border into the city. The regime can sever this final supply line at two locations: an outer location northwest of Aleppo City on the road to the Turkish border that passes through the towns of Huraytan and Kafr Hamra, or an inner location in the city’s eastern sector controlled by the armed opposition, such as the Hanano District. Russia’s air campaign has consistently targeted the outer location for the past three months, indicating that this is where pro-regime forces intend to complete the encirclement. This section of the supply line runs through rural terrain that Russian airpower can easily target and Iranian-backed ground forces can ultimately seize, whereas the inner location is more difficult as the terrain includes both topographic and urban barriers to rapid ground offensives. Pro-regime forces are meanwhile taking steps to buffer their forward line of troops (FLOT) to the north of Aleppo to make it possible to sustain the encirclement. Pro-regime forces will likely complete the encirclement of Aleppo in coming weeks and besiege the opposition inside the city in order to force Turkey and Saudi Arabia to concede to a negotiated settlement or ceasefire.

Assad Regime Gains in Aleppo Alter Balance of Power in Northern Syria

By: Christopher Kozak

Battlefield realities rather than great power politics will determine the ultimate terms of a settlement to end the Syrian Civil War. Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and his allies in Russia and Iran have internalized this basic principle even as Washington and other Western capitals pinned their hopes upon UN-sponsored Geneva Talks, which faltered only two days after they began on February 1, 2016. Russian airpower and Iranian manpower have brought President Assad within five miles of completing the encirclement of Aleppo City, the largest urban center in Syria and an opposition stronghold since 2012. The current campaign has already surpassed the high-water mark set by the regime’s previous failed attempt to besiege Aleppo City in early 2015. The full encirclement of Aleppo City would fuel a humanitarian catastrophe, shatter opposition morale, fundamentally challenge Turkish strategic ambitions, and deny the opposition its most valuable bargaining chip before the international community.

The campaign against Aleppo City began in October 2015 and proceeded in several phases. Regime forces enabled by Russia and Iran initially mounted probing attacks along multiple fronts in Aleppo and Idlib Provinces as part of a larger campaign designed to confuse and overextend the opposition. They conducted shaping operations in the southern, eastern, and northern countryside of Aleppo City in order to draw opposition forces out of urban terrain, relieve long-besieged pockets of regime forces, and set conditions for a future decisive operation to besiege the city, as ISW warned on December 30, 2015. They also secured core regime terrain along the Syrian Coast against further opposition attacks through a series of rapid offensives in Latakia Province. These gains marked a fundamental shift in battlefield momentum following dramatic losses experienced by the regime in the first half of 2015.

President Assad has used unconventional shaping operations to complement these ground offensives and further strengthen his bargaining position. The regime intensified its campaign of sieges and aerial bombardment against opposition-held pockets in Homs and Damascus Provinces in order to impose one-sided local ceasefires that would allow it to consolidate control in these two vital cities. These operations in some cases included the use of chlorine gas and other unidentified chemical weapons in violation of international prohibitions. The regime also escalated a campaign of targeted assassinations against key opposition commanders - most notably the Saudi-backed Damascus powerbroker Zahran Alloush - in order to weaken the political influence of its opponents. These gains strengthen the hand held by President Assad at the negotiating table and incentivize further violence among all sides in an attempt to secure additional concessions during an eventual settlement. The mounting pressure will tend to drive the opposition towards militarily reliable but politically irreconcilable Salafi-jihadist groups such as Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra. Conditions on the ground remain unsuitable for the achievement of any meaningful peace in Syria.

Aleppo Province

The regime and its allies have waged a multi-pronged campaign in Aleppo Province over the past four months to set conditions for an offensive to isolate and ultimately seize Aleppo City. The opposition is uniquely vulnerable in Aleppo City due to its position along a lengthy salient that relies upon one primary ground line of communication (GLOC) that faces compounding pressures from the regime, ISIS, and the Syrian Kurdish YPG. The return of the largest urban center in Syria to government control would represent a major victory for Syrian President Bashar al-Assad that would bolster his leverage in current or future political negotiations. A successful campaign for Aleppo City would also constitute a serious blow to the morale of opposition groups that have contested the city since mid-2012.

The operations in Aleppo Province have hinged upon heavy military support from both Russian warplanes and Iranian proxy fighters. Russia concentrated a significant portion of its air campaign against opposition forward positions and supply lines in Aleppo Province. Meanwhile, U.S. officials estimated in October 2015 that up to 2,000 Hezbollah, Afghan, and Iraqi Shi’a militia fighters led by Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) – Quds Force commander Maj. Gen. Qassem Suleimani currently operated in Aleppo Province. U.S. officials also stated that Russian Spetsnaz special operations forces recently began operating in conjunction with pro-regime forces near Aleppo City. The regime has become increasingly dependent on this foreign support in order to conduct successful maneuver warfare.

Southern Aleppo Province

The regime and its allies launched the first shaping operations of their reinvigorated campaign in Aleppo Province on October 15, 2015. Regime forces supported by heavy Russian air cover and Iraqi Shi’a militiamen mounted an offensive against the sparsely-populated opposition-held villages in the southern countryside of Aleppo City. The regime secured steady advances against opposition forces over subsequent weeks despite opposition attempts to reinforce the front with hundreds of fighters drawn from Aleppo City and northern Aleppo Province. Several Western-backed opposition factions also deployed multiple TOW anti-tank missiles systems to the region. An opportunistic attack by ISIS in late October 2015 managed to disrupt the ongoing operation temporarily by seizing several positions along the regime’s primary ground line of communication (GLOC) to Aleppo City. Pro-regime forces nonetheless seized the opposition-held towns of Hadher and Al-Eis on November 12, securing the only prominent population centers in southern Aleppo Province.

The opposition responded to the advances by deploying valuable reinforcements to the region. Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) and other key opposition groups reinforced the southern countryside of Aleppo City from Idlib Province. Prominent Salafi-jihadist group Ahrar al-Sham (HASI) issued a general call for mobilization to southern Aleppo Province on November 13, 2015. The arrival of fresh opposition reinforcements managed to blunt and in some cases reverse regime gains on a tactical level. These minor reversals also corresponded with an apparent operational pause by pro-regime forces to consolidate their new holdings and receive additional reinforcement, including several advanced T-90 main battle tanks provided by Russia. The regime mounted a renewed offensive in early December and seized the opposition-held town of Khan Touman directly southwest of Aleppo City by December 20. The regime and its allies have used these new gains to contest the strategic M5 Highway and the opposition-held southwestern suburbs of Aleppo City.

The regime designed its operational maneuvers in southern Aleppo Province to set conditions for the upcoming offensive to isolate opposition forces in Aleppo City. The offensive drew opposition reinforcements out of Aleppo City and fixed them in a battle of open terrain that allowed the regime to fully-utilize its advantages in armor, airpower, and artillery. The loss of this pool of combat reserves will weaken opposition defenses against future operations by the regime and its allies to isolate Aleppo City. The gains also position the regime to threaten the eastern flank of core opposition-held terrain in Idlib Province. Iranian-backed proxies have repeatedly asserted that the operation in southern Aleppo Province ultimately aims to relieve the besieged pro-regime towns of Fu’ah and Kefraya near Idlib City. The need to defend against this threat further constrains the flexibility and freedom of action available to opposition commanders in northwestern Syria.

Kuweires Airbase and Al-Bab

The regime and its allies began a second simultaneous shaping operation in eastern Aleppo Province on October 15, 2015 in order to relieve the besieged Kuweires Airbase. The base faced repeated challenges from ISIS that threatened to overrun the facility, fueling simmering discontent within the regime’s base of popular support along the Syrian Coast. Elite regime light infantry units supported by Russian aircraft and reinforcements from Lebanese Hezbollah conducted a slow battle of penetration along a narrow front in the face of heavy ISIS resistance. Pro-regime forces successfully established a ground line of communications (GLOC) to the Kuweires Airbase on November 10 in a major symbolic victory for Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. The operation revitalized the morale of regime loyalists and demonstrated the first tangible battlefield achievement for the regime since the Russian intervention on September 30.

The regime has since leveraged its forward position at the Kuweires Airbase as a staging ground to conduct follow-on operations against ISIS in eastern Aleppo Province. Pro-regime forces expanded the defensive perimeter of the Kuweires Airbase throughout late November 2015, enabling the regime to resume both fixed-wing and rotary-wing flights out of the airbase by December 15. Regime forces later conducted several advances west of Kuweires Airbase in an offensive aimed at encircling an ISIS pocket that threaten the key regime-held logistical hub of Al-Safira and the adjacent supply route to Aleppo City. This offensive sets the stage for a classic ‘cauldron battle’ drawn from Soviet military doctrine, illustrating the degree to which Russian advisors likely play a role in operational planning. The regime also advanced north from the Kuweires Airbase in January 2016, seizing several villages less than five miles from the major ISIS-held urban center of Al-Bab. Regime forces currently hold optimal positions to mount a potential operation to seize Al-Bab and secure additional legitimacy before the international community as a partner against ISIS. Russia reportedly deployed two hundred personnel and several air defense systems to Kuweires Airbase in February 2016 in likely preparation for such an operation. The regime may intend to use future anti-ISIS operations by the U.S.-led coalition in eastern Aleppo Province as an opportunity to secure its own gains near Aleppo City.

Northern Aleppo Province

The regime mounted its most significant shaping operation in Aleppo Province in February 2016 with a renewed attempt to complete the encirclement of Aleppo City. Pro-regime forces lifted the siege of the pro-regime towns of Nubl and Zahraa in northern Aleppo Province on February 3, linking regime forces in an arc of control that dominates almost all opposition supply lines between Turkey and Aleppo City. The regime previously failed to capitalize upon a similar offensive over the same terrain in February 2015. The opposition nonetheless faces a severe challenge in mobilizing sufficient forces to reverse this new attack given the conditions set by the regime and its allies in Aleppo Province over the past four months. The regime and its allies will likely attempt to complete the encirclement of Aleppo City in coming weeks by seizing its opposition-held northwestern suburbs. The end result of this operation could be a protracted siege of Aleppo City that bolsters the political leverage exerted by Syrian President Bashar al-Assad while subjecting the remaining civilian population in opposition-held districts to a punishing campaign of starvation and aerial bombardment.

Latakia Province

The regime and its allies simultaneously conducted major operations to expel opposition forces from core regime terrain along the Syrian Coast. Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) and other armed factions have occupied the Jabal al-Turkman and Jabal al-Akrad regions of northern Latakia Province since 2012, providing the opposition with a safe haven from which to threaten the Alawite population that constitute the popular base of support for Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. This threat reached unprecedented heights after opposition forces secured control over almost all of Idlib Province in mid-2015 and began posturing for an offensive into Latakia Province. The stabilization of this front thus constituted an immediate priority for the regime and its foreign backers. Russia provided extensive military support with the provision of technical advisors, armored vehicles, rocket artillery, and a heavy campaign of aerial bombardment based from its nearby airfield at Bassel al-Assad International Airport near Latakia City. Iran also committed significant numbers of proxy forces to enable the mobilization of local pro-regime militias. These deployments produced a significant reversal in the balance of forces in Latakia Province over recent the past three months.

Pro-regime forces launched an offensive against opposition forces in Jabal al-Turkman on November 19, 2015 in an attempt to deny opposition forces access to supply routes across the Turkish border. The regime seized multiple villages and hilltops in the mountainous region within several days with the support of heavy Russian airstrikes. The offensive drew immediate condemnation from Turkey as thousands of ethnic Turkmen refugees fled across the border ahead of regime forces. Two Turkish fighter jets later shot down a Russian warplane on November 24 after the aircraft violated the border while conducting operations against the opposition. The escalation in geopolitical tensions nonetheless failed to prevent continued tactical advances by the regime and its allies in both Jabal al-Turkman and Jabal al-Akrad.

The regime secured major breakthroughs in its operations to clear Latakia Province in January 2016. Regime forces seized the opposition stronghold of Salma in Jabal al-Akrad on January 12 after successfully surrounding the town from three sides over the preceding weeks. Salma occupied a dominant high ground and served as the anchor for the opposition frontline in northern Latakia Province. The regime and its allies exploited the collapse of the front in order to secure rapid advances deep into opposition-held terrain. Pro-regime forces later successfully encircled and seized the town of Rabi’ah on January 24, securing the primary command-and-control node for the opposition in Jabal al-Turkman. These gains threaten to expel all overt opposition presence from Latakia Province over the next few months. The regime and its allies likely intend to ultimately seize the opposition-held city of Jisr al-Shughour in western Idlib Province in order to anchor their advance and secure a buffer against future counterattacks.

Strategic Effects

The direct threat posed by Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to core opposition terrain in Aleppo City and other parts of Northern Syria will present a critical challenge for U.S. strategic interests. The realities on the ground currently being set by the regime will entrench the position of President Assad and his foreign backers, preserving Syria as a regional base of operations for both Iran and Russia. The renewed pressure being placed upon the opposition also risks driving opposition groups to deepen their coordination with Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) and other Salafi-jihadist factions. Major opposition factions in the Jaysh al-Fatah Operations Room based in Idlib Province reportedly came close to signing a unification agreement supported by Jabhat al-Nusra emir Abu Muhammed al-Joulani. The incentives to solidify this cooperation will only grow in the face of further regime gains. The current violence thus stands to solidify Syria as an arena for U.S. adversaries over the coming months.

The willingness of parties on both sides to pursue further conflict will only serve to prolong the bloodshed of the Syrian Civil War and exacerbate the humanitarian consequences of the conflict. UN officials reported that nearly 40,000 civilians fled the southern countryside of Aleppo City amidst regime operations in October 2015, while at least 70,000 civilians have fled the latest round of violence in northern Aleppo Province. The regime has also conducted a series of engagements in in Central and Southern Syria meant to increase the pressure brought to bear upon remaining opposition pockets, particularly through the use of sieges and starvation as weapons of war. The flows of displaced persons generated by this campaign will place additional strain upon regional U.S. allies while fueling further resentment and radicalization among the refugee population.

The looming siege of Aleppo City poses a strategic dilemma for Turkey. Turkish President Recep Erdogan provided weapons, supplies, and safe haven to opposition forces in order to advance Turkey’s strategic objectives, including the formation of a Sunni Islamist government to replace Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. The mounting opposition losses in Aleppo Province directly undermine these core strategic interests and bring Russian military personnel to vital positions within forty miles of the Syrian-Turkish border. Turkey will likely respond to these inflections through military force. President Erdogan may even consider a range of high-risk military options to reassert his control over the conflict that could include providing the opposition with man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS) or mounting a cross-border intervention into Northern Syria. These operations risk fueling an intensified regional proxy war or even a direct confrontation between Turkey and Russia. The current campaign undertaken by President Assad and his allies in Moscow and Tehran will be a driver of long-term disorder in Syria and the wider Middle East.

Control of Terrain in Syria: December 23, 2015

By: ISW Syria Team

The direct intervention of Russia into the Syrian Civil War has shifted battlefield momentum in favor of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad since ISW published its last Control of Terrain in Syria Map in mid-September. Russia began its air campaign in Syria on September 30, enabling the regime to mount renewed offensives against opposition-held terrain throughout Western Syria. In Aleppo Province, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and associated proxy forces launched a multipronged offensive on October 15 that has seized large swaths of rebel-held terrain in the southern countryside of Aleppo City, threatening to sever the strategic M5 Highway. Meanwhile, pro-regime forces relieved the besieged Kuweires Airbase in Eastern Aleppo Province on November 10 in a key symbolic victory that positioned the regime to exploit future U.S.-led coalition operations against ISIS along the Syrian-Turkish border. The regime also achieved tactical gains against the opposition in Northeastern Latakia Province and parts of Northern Hama Province as well as the Eastern Ghouta suburbs of Damascus.

The regime nonetheless suffers from chronic shortages of manpower that render it unable to fully capitalize upon the expanded support provided by Russia and Iran. Rebel factions seized the town of Morek in Northern Hama Province on November 5, securing a strategic position directly north of Hama City. Regime forces have also struggled to repel repeated incursions by ISIS into Central Syria despite the presence of Russian airpower. ISIS temporarily severed the vulnerable regime ground line of communication to Aleppo City in October, disrupting ongoing operations in Southern Aleppo Province. ISIS also engaged in back-and-forth battles over the town of Mahin in the Eastern Qalamoun Mountains over the past two months, threatening to disrupt the M5 Highway between Damascus and Homs City. ISIS currently retains its position in Mahin despite the deployment of Russian helicopter gunships to the region.

Meanwhile, the U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition continued to enable further gains against ISIS in Northeastern Syria. The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) – a U.S.-backed force composed primarily of Syrian Kurds – seized control over Al-Hawl along the Syrian-Iraqi border on November 13. The operation occurred on the same day as the seizure of Sinjar in Northern Iraq, restricting ISIS’s freedom of movement between Mosul and ar-Raqqa City. The SDF are currently advancing towards the key ISIS-held crossroads town of Shaddadi in Southern Hasaka Province. Initial mobilizations have also been reported for future operations to seize the ISIS-controlled Tishreen Dam along the Euphrates River as well as the northern outskirts of ar-Raqqa City.

ISW also modified this map in order to highlight a new zone of control for ISIS in Southwestern Dera’a Province reflecting new confidence in reports that Liwa Shuhada al-Yarmouk constitutes an unofficial ISIS affiliate in Southern Syria. ISW also instituted minor changes to the zones of control along the M20 Highway between Palmyra and Deir ez-Zour City after assessing that ISIS previously seized several regime checkpoints in the region. Finally, ISW adjusted the borders of the Afrin Canton in Northwestern Aleppo Province in order to more accurately depict the territory controlled by the Syrian Kurdish YPG and its allies.

Regime and Iranian Forces Launch Multi-Pronged Offensive in Aleppo

By: Christopher Kozak

The Syrian regime and its allies launched a major, multi-pronged offensive in Aleppo Province on October 15 in order to bolster the regime's foothold in Aleppo City. Both Russia and Iran likely aim to enable Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to reassert control over Syria’s largest city given the heavy involvement of their military forces in these operations. Russia and Iran will not limit their support to reinforcing the regime's defenses in its heartland along the Syrian coast.  Regime forces supported by Iranian proxy fighters conducted an unsuccessful operation to complete the encirclement of rebel forces inside Aleppo City in February 2015. Expanded Russian and Iranian support could enable the Syrian regime to mount a renewed effort to besiege the city. 

The renewed ground operations aim at a minimum to relieve the long-standing sieges of pro-regime enclaves in Aleppo Province. Joint regime and Iranian forces began a push to relieve several hundred Syrian Army soldiers trapped in the Kuweires Airbase east of Aleppo City on October 15. ISIS forces have threatened to overrun the airbase at least twice over the past few months. Pro-regime forces may also ultimately seek to lift the siege on the Shi’a-majority towns of Nubl and Zahraa northwest of Aleppo City, which have been besieged by rebel forces since July 2012. Alawite populations along the Syrian Coast – a core support zone for the Syrian regime – organized several protests this summer criticizing the government for failing to relieve the siege of Nubl, Zahraa, and Kuweires Airbase. A successful operation to relieve the base would provide a powerful morale boost to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s base of popular support and tamper simmering discontent regarding his conduct of the Syrian Civil War.

Syrian forces also began the second prong of the offensive against rebel-held villages south of Aleppo City on October 15. The operation received support from both Russian airstrikes and up to 2,000 Iranian, Hezbollah, and Iraqi Shi’a militia fighters led by Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) – Quds Force commander Maj. Gen. Qassem Suleimani. Aleppo-based rebel factions reinforced their positions with hundreds of fighters drawn from Aleppo City and the northern Aleppo countryside. Several rebel factions also deployed TOW anti-tank missiles systems provided by a covert U.S.-backed Military Operations Command (MOC) based in Turkey. Pro-regime forces have thus far seized at least seven villages amidst heavy clashes which in turn destroyed at least fifteen regime tanks, bulldozers, and armored personnel carriers.

The maneuver south of Aleppo City likely aims to set conditions for an upcoming offensive to isolate rebel forces in Aleppo City. Regime and Iranian forces began conducting probing attacks along rebel frontlines throughout northwestern Syria after the Russian air campaign began on September 30. These localized offensives likely constitute components of a larger campaign designed to confuse and overextend rebel forces in advance of a decisive operation to penetrate into core rebel-held terrain. The decisive blow will likely target rebel positions north of Aleppo City. The attacks south of Aleppo City may thus constitute an attempt draw rebel reinforcements away from Aleppo City and fix them far from the northern Aleppo countryside. Any successful operation to seize or otherwise neutralize Aleppo City would deal a powerful symbolic and material blow to the Syrian opposition. Tightening control over Syria’s largest city would also place the Syrian regime and its allies in a position of strength before any negotiations regarding a political transition, an initial proposal for which the U.S. and eight other countries floated over the past few weeks. 

Russian Airstrikes in Syria: September 30 - October 18, 2015

By Genevieve Casagrande & Jodi Brignola

Key Takeaway: The Russian air campaign in Syria continues to bolster the Syrian regime’s fight against the opposition. Russian warplanes provided air support to regime ground offensives against rebels in Aleppo, Latakia, northern Hama, and Damascus Provinces from October 17-18. Russian airstrikes largely concentrated in the southern Aleppo countryside as regime forces, backed by Iranians, Hezbollah, Iraqi Shi’a militias, and other Iranian proxies, advanced south of Aleppo City. In addition, Russian warplanes heavily targeted rebel positions amidst ongoing regime ground offensives against the rebel-held pocket around the towns of Rastan and Talbiseh in the northern Homs countryside which has been besieged by regime forces since 2012, as well as against rebel forces in the Eastern Ghouta suburbs of Damascus. 

The following graphic depicts ISW’s assessment of Russian airstrike locations based on reports from local Syrian activist networks, Syrian state-run media, and statements by Russian and Western officials.

High-Confidence reporting. ISW places high confidence in reports corroborated both by official government statements reported through credible channels and documentation from rebel factions or activist networks on the ground in Syria deemed to be credible.

Low-Confidence reporting. ISW places low confidence in secondary sources that have not been confirmed or sources deemed likely to contain disinformation. 

Russian Airstrikes in Syria: September 30 - October 16, 2015

By Genevieve Casagrande, Kaitlynn Menoche, and Jodi Brignola

Key takeaway: The Syrian regime conducted multiple small-scale ground offensives with Russian air support across six Syrian provinces over the past 10 days, demonstrating a shift in regime campaign design that likely reflects both Russian and Iranian influence in operational planning. Regime probing attacks against rebel forces in northern Latakia, the al-Ghab Plain, northern Hama, southern Idlib, Homs, and Aleppo may serve to fix rebel forces along multiple fronts and obfuscate a major impending operation by pro-regime forces in Aleppo. Russian airstrikes continued to focus largely upon the same rebel-held areas, demonstrating Russian intent to bolster the Syrian regime in its fight against the opposition rather than to combat ISIS. 

The following graphic depicts ISW’s assessment of Russian airstrike locations based on reports from local Syrian activist networks, Syrian state-run media, and statements by Russian and Western officials.

High-Confidence reporting. ISW places high confidence in reports corroborated both by official government statements reported through credible channels and documentation from rebel factions or activist networks on the ground in Syria deemed to be credible.

Low-Confidence reporting. ISW places low confidence in secondary sources that have not been confirmed or sources deemed likely to contain disinformation. 

 

Russian Airstrikes in Syria: September 30 - October 14

By Genevieve Casagrande and Jodi Brignola

Key Takeaway:  Russia’s involvement in Syria is facilitating ISIS’s territorial gains, while also strengthening Assad. Russia is supporting the Syrian regime’s offensives in Latakia, the al-Ghab Plain, and northern Hama. Russia also intensified strikes on rebel-held northwestern Aleppo, likely to set conditions for an imminent Russian-Iranian-Syrian regime offensive in the area. U.S. defense officials and local Syrian activists reported the arrival of hundreds of Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)-Quds Force fighters and other Iranian proxy forces in Aleppo over the past few days. Russian strikes largely concentrated along the rebel-held supply route leading to the besieged regime enclaves of Nubl and Zahraa northwest of Aleppo City. If the regime can link with these enclaves, they will successfully sever the rebel-held supply route from Aleppo City to the Turkish border. Simultaneous regime offensives in both Hama and Aleppo Provinces will likely fix rebel forces along multiple fronts and prevent them from reinforcing their positions across northwestern Syria, resulting in a loss of terrain for the Syrian opposition.

 

ISIS is benefiting from Russia’s strikes on the Syrian opposition. On October 9, ISIS advanced 10 kilometers against rebels in northeastern Aleppo, the largest advance by ISIS in the province since August 2015. ISIS continued to conduct probing attacks against rebels northeast of Aleppo City from October 10-14. The Syrian regime and ISIS have historically leveraged one another’s offensives in order to advance against rebel forces in the northern Aleppo countryside. Both ISIS and the regime will likely capitalize on the effects of Russian airstrikes on rebels. Russian airstrikes have thus far failed to deter ISIS from launching new offensives and rather have facilitated ISIS’s seizure of new terrain. 

The following graphic depicts ISW’s assessment of Russian airstrike locations based on reports from local Syrian activist networks, Syrian state-run media, and statements by Russian and Western officials.

High-Confidence reporting. ISW places high confidence in reports corroborated both by official government statements reported through credible channels and documentation from rebel factions or activist networks on the ground in Syria deemed to be credible.

Low-Confidence reporting. ISW places low confidence in secondary sources that have not been confirmed or sources deemed likely to contain disinformation.

Joint Syrian-Iranian-Russian Offensive Achieves Only Limited Initial Gains

by: Christopher Kozak

Key Takeaway: The Syrian regime has not gained much terrain in the first week of its large-scale ground offensive against rebel forces, despite support from intensified Russian airstrikes and hundreds of Iranian proxy reinforcements. Operations against the Syrian opposition will likely prove harder and slower than anticipated by either Russia or Iran, protracting the conflict and exacerbating extremism.

The Syrian regime achieved only limited tactical gains in the week after it announced the start of a “vast offensive” that aimed to “defeat terrorist groups and liberate areas and villages that have suffered from terrorism” in northwestern Syria. The offensive reportedly included reinforcements in the form of “hundreds” of Iranian troops and proxy fighters, including members of Lebanese Hezbollah and Iraqi Shi’a militias. Unverified images on social media indicated that Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) – Quds Force commander Maj. Gen. Qassem Suleimani personally oversaw operations in Latakia Province along the Syrian Coast. Meanwhile, pro-regime forces also received direct assistance from Russia in the form of airstrikes “synchronized” with the ground operations as well as artillery support from howitzer and multiple rocket launch systems (MRLS) on the ground. Senior rebel sources also alleged that Russian personnel participated in the clashes and directly supervised the operation via a joint Russian-Iranian operations room. The location and targeting of these operations underscore that Russia and Iran intend to bolster the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad rather than defeat ISIS.

Nonetheless, the Syrian regime and its allies have thus far failed to achieve significant gains. They are fighting against rebel forces along the three primary fronts in northern Hama Province, the al-Ghab Plain, and northeastern Latakia Province, creating a front line roughly 120 kilometers long. Confirmed reports indicate that pro-regime fighters have seized only six villages and towns, while rebel forces repelled heavy attacks against several key positions. At the same time, regime forces suffered heavy losses in manpower and materiel in the face of heavy rebel resistance. Free Syrian Army (FSA)-affiliated rebels forces claimed to destroy at least twenty tanks and armored vehicles as well as a helicopter gunship in a “tank massacre” on the first day of the offensive.  Meanwhile, pro-regime ground forces suffered several high-profile casualties with the deaths of two Hezbollah commanders including senior leader Hassan Hossein al-Hajj as well two Iranian veterans who had formerly commanded IRGC brigades. Continued heavy casualties may leave pro-regime forces vulnerable to a counterattack by Syrian rebels; the Idlib-based Jaysh al-Fatah Operations Room later released a statement on October 13 calling for a major rebel counteroffensive against Hama City.

Operations against the Syrian opposition will likely prove harder and slower than anticipated by either Russia or Iran. On October 2, head of the Russian Duma's Foreign Affairs Committee Alexei Pushkov predicted that Russian operations in Syria would only last "three or four months" although he noted that there is "always a risk of getting bogged down.” Russian President Vladimir Putin has also suggested that Russian air support will be sufficient to "stabilize the legitimate authorities and create conditions for finding a political compromise” in Syria. Meanwhile, Iranian National Security and Foreign Policy Committee chairman Alaeddin Boroujerdi insisted during a visit to Damascus on October 14 that cooperation between Syria, Iraq, Iran and Russia has already been “positive and successful.” The stiff defense mounted by rebel forces thus far belies this wishful thinking. The foreign allies of the Syrian regime may be forced to expend further financial and military resources in order to preserve their initial gains. The expanded interventions of both Russia and Iran will likely incentivize the Syrian regime to prioritize a military solution to the Syrian Civil War, protracting the conflict and leading to further bloodshed rather than movement towards a political solution. The heightened pressure being brought to bear upon the Syrian opposition may also drive moderate rebel factions towards closer relationships with Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) and other malign Salafi-jihadist groups, further constraining U.S. policy options in the country.

Political Crisis in Iraqi Kurdistan Escalates into Violence

By: Patrick Martin

Key Take-Away: The political crisis in Iraqi Kurdistan caused by delayed Presidential elections descended into outright political violence on October 8. Regional President Masoud Barzani, the leader of the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), has continued to hold office even though his term expired on August 19 and no elections have occurred. Other Iraqi Kurdish political parties, particularly Gorran (Change), the KDP’s main political rival, tried to contest the extension of Barzani’s term and leverage concessions in return for his continuation in office. Popular protests against the government turned violent on October 9 after multi-party talks collapsed the day before. On October 11, the KDP ordered the speaker and other members of the Kurdish parliament from Gorran to leave the regional capital of Arbil, declaring that Gorran was no longer a part of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). Gunmen loyal to the KDP barred a Gorran convoy from entering Arbil. This dangerous maneuver by the KDP to solidify Barzani’s position as regional president has escalated tensions within the KRG and serious political violence may protract. Unless negotiations between the KDP and the opposition parties reaches a meaningful compromise in short order, the KRG could split or collapse as opposition leaders move their operations from the seat of government in Arbil to Suleimaniyah.

The Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Presidency Crisis: June 17 – August 19.

The crisis over the Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Presidency (henceforth “Regional Presidency”) has been long in the making. Regional President and leader of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) Masoud Barzani’s term expired on August 19. The Regional President is by far the most powerful government official in the KRG, and Barzani has held the position since June 2005. Other political parties, long unhappy with Barzani’s tenure,  have heatedly debated whether Barzani is permitted to hold office for another term, as he has technically served two-and-a-half terms and the legal debate over how many terms Barzani is permitted to serve is complex. The opposition, consisting of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), Gorran (Change), the Kurdistan Islamic Union (KIU), and the Islamic Group, attempted to leverage the expiration date to extract concessions from Barzani that would constrict Barzani’s powers and increase the powers of the regional parliament. In particular, the opposition sought to convert the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) system from a presidential system to a parliamentary one. This change would favor the opposition, which holds 58 seats out of 111 and a simple majority, whereas the KDP holds only 38 seats, bolstered by the 10 seats allotted to Turkmen and Christian parties who usually side with the KDP.

Barzani refused to relinquish power by making concessions. The head of the Kurdistan Independent High Electoral Commission (K-IHEC), KDP member Handrin Muhammad Saleh, announced on June 17 that the Iraqi Kurdistan region would not hold elections to select a new regional president, citing a lack of time to prepare and budgetary constraints. On the same day, Gorran presented a proposal to transform the government system, with the other opposition parties following suit on June 18. The opposition parties presented a series of compromises after August 4 and suggested that Barzani could hold office for an additional two years until the parliamentary elections in 2017 in exchange for converting to a parliamentary system and significantly reducing the regional presidency’s  powers, distributing some of them between deputy regional presidents and the parliament. Subsequent proposals by the opposition followed similar lines.

Discussions over how to address the crisis stalled. Barzani steadfastly refused to compromise, while the opposition refused to cave into Barzani. Mediation by Iranian officials, including the Assistant Secretary General of the Iranian National Security Council on July 29, made no impact. Even a visit by Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-Quds Force commander Qassim Suleimani on July 26 to the PUK, which has historically been close to Iran, did not sway the opposition, which insisted that the regional presidency crisis was a strictly Kurdish internal issue. Barzani leveraged  KDP control over the electoral commission to dissuade the opposition and gained a ruling in his favor from the KDP-dominated Shura Council, an advisory body within the Kurdish Justice Ministry tasked with resolving administrative disputes. The Shura Council stated on August 17 that Barzani should remain in office for two years while retaining his full powers. However, the Gorran speaker of parliament Yusuf Muhammad Sadiq promptly dismissed the decision, pointing out that the Shura Council’s ruling was not legally binding.

Mediation by the U.S. and British Ambassadors to Iraq and the UN Special Envoy to Iraq appeared to have laid the groundwork between the KDP and the four opposition parties to extend discussions beyond the August 19 expiration date. The parties also agreed to delay an emergency session of parliament scheduled for later that day to vote on an amendment to the law governing the powers of the regional presidency. However, Gorran calculated that it could use the opposition’s majority in the parliament to rush an amendment through the legislative process at the last minute. The Gorran speaker of parliament called the emergency session, citing that there had been no formal request to delay it. Gorran’s plan backfired badly, as the KDP boycotted the session and only 53 parliamentarians showed up for the vote, falling short of the 56 parliamentarians required for quorum; five members of the KIU refused to attend the session, with one member suspending his membership in parliament on the grounds that solving the crisis required a consensus agreement between all political parties, including the KDP.

The Crisis Turns Violent: October 8 – October 9.

The five parties, having failed to reach an agreement before the August 19 deadline, began a series of meetings to discuss how to resolve the regional presidency crisis. The ninth round of talks between the five parties broke down on October 8, prompting the PUK to call for the regional presidency crisis to be resolved in the parliament and not among the political parties, signaling the end of the opposition’s patience with negotiations.

The crisis escalated unexpectedly when a protest by teachers over delayed salaries and the ongoing political crisis turned violent in Qala Diza, in northern Suleimaniyah. On October 9, the demonstrators clashed with security forces, leaving two protesters dead and 18 wounded. Other towns in Suleimaniyah province, including Kalar, Halabja, Karmiyan, and Suleimaniyah city, as well as Koya in Arbil province, continued to witness large protests by teachers against delayed salaries.

Political Violence: October 9 – October 11.

Although most demonstrations have remained peaceful, some witnessed significant political violence. A series of attacks on political party interests across Iraqi Kurdistan demonstrate that the opposition has initiated violence itself or used party-affiliated thugs to coax peaceful demonstrators into initiating violence in order to escalate the crisis. Demonstrators in Sayid Sadiq in eastern Suleimaniyah province clashed with security forces on October 11, injuring an unknown number of demonstrators and KDP supporters. Demonstrators also attacked KDP headquarters buildings in Suleimaniyah. The KDP reported that two KDP members were killed and nine others wounded in the attack. KDP facilities in Kalar, Sharzur, Zarayin, Qala Diza, and Halabja were also attacked.

Both the KDP and the opposition have targeted media outlets in a bid to dominate the narrative of the demonstrations. Anonymous witnesses stated that an “armed group” first attacked the office of Rudaw network, a KDP-affiliated channel, in Suleimaniyah, firing on the office but causing no casualties. Unidentified assailants also severely beat journalists from at least five different media outlets covering the October 10 Suleimaniyah protests. The targeted violence indicates that opposition elements were present at the Suleimaniyah demonstration, hijacking the momentum of a largely-peaceful movement and attempting to maximize the chaos for political gain. KDP-dominated Asayish internal security forces closed the offices of the Gorran-affiliated KNN media outlet in Arbil, Soran, and Dohuk, and deported KNN and the independent NRT-TV media outlet employees to Suleimaniyah. NRT-TV claimed that security forces kidnapped its employees in Dohuk and Arbil, but they were later released, and its offices were reopened on October 12.

The KDP and Gorran have dramatically escalated their rhetorical attacks on each other. The outburst of violence and inter-party conflict prompted the PUK, the KIU, and Gorran to call for non-violence and for an emergency meeting of the political parties to prevent the situation from spiraling out of control. Although the KDP called for calm, it held Gorran leader Nechirvan Mustafa responsible for the unrest. The KDP also blamed the PUK for not protecting KDP headquarters sites, though the bulk of their ire has been directed at Gorran. The KDP stated that the demonstrations were not popular and spontaneous, and that attacks on its headquarters buildings “served the interests of the enemies of the Kurds.” Gorran in turn and accused the KDP of using “the language of the civil war years” and disrupting the work of the Kurdistan parliament. A Gorran Twitter account also stated that gunmen carrying KDP banners attacked the Gorran headquarters in Arbil with small arms and mortar fire. The Arbil police directorate denied the unconfirmed report and stated that the Gorran headquarters had never been attacked.

The KDP Kicks Gorran out of Government: October 11.

Amd numerous reports of attacks on KDP headquarters buildings, the KDP used its control over Arbil to oust Gorran physically from government. On October 11, the office of the speaker of parliament, a senior member of Gorran, announced that the five parties had agreed to suspend the October 12 parliamentary session scheduled to discuss the crisis. Shortly thereafter, Gorran stated that the political office of the KDP ordered Gorran parliamentarians, ministers and Gorran speaker Sadiq to leave Arbil and return to Suleimaniyah. Sadiq later claimed that a security force prevented Sadiq and Gorran parliamentarians from entering Arbil province at a checkpoint in Altun Kubri, a town on the border of Arbil and PUK-dominated Kirkuk provinces. A video from the encounter alleges that security forces loyal to the KDP harassed the Gorran convoy, breaking several windows of cars. The head of KDP External Relations and a member of the KDP leadership council, Hayman Hurami, also announced that Gorran ministers were no longer a part of the KRG.

The KDP’s expulsion of senior Gorran members from Arbil – a unilateral removal of the leadership of the KRG’s second largest electoral bloc –effectively removes the opposition’s ability to challenge the KDP in parliament by physically keeping the speaker of parliament out of the parliament building.  Gorran denounced the move as a coup and an attempt by the KDP to paralyze the work of the parliament; Gorran’s KIU allies denounced the move as a mistake that would cause “fear and chaos” while a senior PUK official mirrored Goran’s description of the move as a coup. At the time of writing, Sadiq, Gorran parliamentarians, and Gorran’s ministers were in Suleimaniyah.

Next Steps

If the political crisis protracts for much longer, it will exacerbate longstanding structural problems within the KRG. The Kurdish parliament has failed to pass reforms aimed at combating corruption and improving government performance, a priority for PM Haidar al-Abadi and the Council of Representatives (CoR). Falling oil prices and budget shortfalls are part of a larger state of economic malaise that will be harder to address without consensus in government, and the government employees who took to the streets on October 9 will continue demonstrating. With Gorran members physically barred from entering Arbil, an agreement has become increasingly unlikely.

There are several active drivers that could help push the KRG into returning to negotiations. For one, discontent with the Iraqi Kurdish political situation is widespread. Teachers, who are at the heart of the protest movement, have not been paid for three months, nor have many members of the Peshmerga and other government employees. While Suleimaniyah province is securely a PUK and Gorran electoral stronghold, demonstrators in Qala Diza, Rania, Binjawin, Kalar, Kifrin, and Halabja attacked party headquarters buildings for Gorran, the PUK, the KDP, the KIU, and the Kurdistan Communist Party, pelting the buildings with stones and forcing them to remove their party flags, hoisting the flag of the KRG instead. In addition, the Peshmerga have refused to partake in party conflict, as the Peshmerga Ministry called for calm and stated that it would not allow attacks on any party or government buildings. Finally, all parties have consistently urged demonstrators to avoid violence, while Gorran’s Suleimaniyah office director has suggested that it is still possible for Barzani and Gorran leader Mustafa to reach an agreement over their political differences.

Other parties that form a parliamentary majority have denounced the KDP’s move to exclude Gorran from the KRG. Yet it is not clear if the KDP will make any move to compromise over the regional presidency. Barzani will not allow the parliament speaker to return if he is convinced that the parliament will attempt to bypass his stalling tactics and pass legislation aimed at reducing the regional president’s powers. If every opposition parliamentarian shows up for the vote, then a boycott by the KDP and its allies would not prevent the law from passing. Sadiq has already suggested that the parliament can hold its session in any city to pass legislation.  However, the KDP is more likely to ignore the ruling and denounce it as illegitimate rather than obey the legislature’s ruling, considering that it has steadfastly refused to compromise on the regional presidency issue for months. The current political situation is untenable, with several opposition parties exasperated by the fractured nature of the KRG and the dominance of the KDP in particular. If the two sides fail to reach any sort of compromise, political unrest will continue, and the possibility of rival governments – the regional presidency based in Arbil and the parliament based in Suleimaniyah – will become increasingly likely.