Prime Minister Maliki Seeks to Create Momentum as Opponents Regroup

By ISW Iraq Team 

Several notable political developments took place over the last week. For the Iraqi Shi’a political groups, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law Alliance (SLA) formally nominated Maliki for a third term. The SLA’s primary strategy has also consisted of increasing its momentum by enlisting the support of political groups that in most cases have historically supported Maliki. This is intended to bolster Maliki’s chances for a third term. The Sadrists continue with their anti-Maliki stance while offering an alternative form to Maliki’s “majority government” approach. Instead of a majority government, the Sadrists are offering a “national unity” model. The Sadrists’ success is certainly not guaranteed and will depend on their capability to cobble together a consistent anti-Maliki front. Meanwhile, the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) is maintaining a neutral posture while building influence through high-level engagements led by its leader, Ammar al-Hakim. 

For the Iraqi Sunni political groups, there are consistent complaints with regards to the accuracy of the results of the elections in the crucial provinces of Anbar and Kirkuk. The most prominent Iraqi Sunni group, Mutahidun, continues to reject a third term for Maliki while indicating that another candidate from the pan-Shi’a National Alliance (NA) would be acceptable. 

For the Iraqi Kurds, Iraqi Kurdistan President and leader of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), Masoud Barzani, stated that the Iraqi Kurds still have strong objections to a third Maliki term and that they will seek to find a “real partner” in the upcoming government in Baghdad. This statement underlines Barzani’s continued tensions with Maliki and may become a consistent negotiating position for the Iraqi Kurds especially in light of last week’s sale of oil from Iraqi Kurdistan to international buyers. Barzani also raised the possibility of a public referendum to determine a “new pattern” of relations with Baghdad if Maliki becomes Prime Minister. This escalating rhetoric is meant to raise the level of demands by the Iraqi Kurds prior to the commencement of full-fledged government-formation negotiations. 

It is too early to tell if Maliki can secure a third term as his opponents are regrouping after the announcement of the results. At any rate, these dynamics indicate that government-formation will likely be a protracted process after the final results are certified.

Iraqi Shi’a Political Groups:

Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and the State of Law Alliance (SLA)

Theme: Formally nominate Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki for a third term while attempting to maintain Iraqi Shi’a unity. Importantly, the SLA seeks to amplify momentum by announcing alliances with long-standing SLA-leaning groups.     

Statements:

MAY 23: The components of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law Alliance held a meeting and nominated PM Maliki for the premiership in the coming government. (Al Mada Press) MAY 23: Member of the State of Law Alliance (SLA) of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, Mohammed al-Saihud, stated that the alliance sent its program pertaining to the next government to the political blocs. Regarding current SLA efforts in government-formation, he stated that the alliance is working on restructuring the pan-Shi’a National Alliance (NA) and “being [open]” to other political groups to form a “majority government.” (Shafaq News)

MAY 25: A delegation from the Efficiencies and Masses bloc that won 3 seats in the parliamentary elections visited Prime Minister Maliki and announced their joining the SLA in addition to supporting a third Maliki term. The delegation included Haitham al-Juburi, Ihsan al-Awadi, and former Minister of Interior Jawad al-Bolani. (Al-Sumaria News)

MAY 25-26: The Maliki-leaning Solidarity bloc- which has one seat- in Dhi Qar province joined the SLA and agreed to nominate PM Maliki for a third term. Furthermore, governor of Najaf and leader of the Loyalty to Iraq bloc, Adnan al-Zurfi, announced that his bloc joined the SLA and supports PM Maliki for a third term. Loyalty to Iraq won two seats in Najaf. (Al-Sumaria News, Al-Sumaria News)

MAY 26: Member of Salah ad-Din National Alliance and Maliki supporter Minister of Sports and Youth Jassim Mohammed Jaafar announced that four incoming members of the Council of Representatives from Ninewa and Salah ad-Din have joined the SLA and will support a third term for Prime Minister Maliki. All four members have established ties with the SLA. (Al-Sumaria News)

Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI)

Theme: Exhibit neutrality while aiming to build influence through high-level engagements.    

Statements:

MAY 24-26: Leader of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) Ammar al-Hakim met in his office in Baghdad with the leader of the Arabiyya Alliance, Saleh al-Mutlaq. On May 24, Hakim met with the leader of Mutahidun Alliance and Speaker of the Council of Representatives Osama al-Nujaifi. According to statements released by Hakim’s office, the discussions focused on political developments and elections results, in addition to “regional and global” issues. (Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq)

The Sadrist Trend

Theme: Continued anti-Maliki position and countering SLA majoritarian approach by proposing national unity government.  

Statements:

MAY 25: Hakim al-Zamili, a member in the Sadrist Ahrar bloc, stated that the bloc will enter the opposition should PM Maliki be given a third term, because it does not want to participate in another “weak government.” Zamili continued by stating that the bloc is negotiating with other political formations in order to form a “partnership government.” He stated that the bloc is waiting until the ratification of election results to announce its alliances. (Al-Sumaria News)

MAY 26: According to Jawad al-Juburi, a member in the Sadrist Ahrar bloc, the bloc will not accept a third term for Prime Minister Maliki due to the performance of the government during his tenure. Juburi stated that the bloc will negotiate with all blocs, parties, and alliances in order to form a government. (Al-Sumaria News)

Iraqi Sunni Political Groups:

Speaker Osama al-Nujaifi’s Mutahidun Alliance

Theme: Accepting Prime Minister from Iraqi Shi’a National Alliance but rejecting third Maliki term.    

26 MAY: Leader in the Mutahidun Alliance Mohammed al-Khalidi stated that Mutahidun has been conducting ongoing talks with political blocs in order to form a government.  Khalidi added that discussions have taken place to form an alliance between the Wataniyya List, the Arabiyya Alliance, the Kurdistani Alliance, the Mowatin bloc (ISCI), and the Sadrist Ahrar bloc, as well as others, excluding the SLA. He added that the alliance will be announced once election results are ratified and the alliance reaches 200 CoR members. Khalidi added that Mutahidun refuses a third term for PM Maliki and expressed willingness to accept “any” other nominee from the NA. (Al-Sumaria News)

The Iraqi Kurds:

Theme: Anti-Maliki in light of recent Iraqi Kurdistan oil sales to international buyers. 

MAY 27: President of Iraqi Kurdistan and leader of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), Masoud Barazani stated that the Iraqi Kurds will conduct a popular poll in Iraqi Kurdistan in order to determine the relationship with the central government if PM Maliki won a third term. (Sharq al-Awsat Newspaper)

Provincial Complaints:

Theme: Iraqi Sunni groups in crucial provinces question the accuracy of the results.

19 MAY: The head of the Coalition of Kirkuk Arabs, Omar al-Juburi, stated in an interview that the coalition will challenge the election results because the coalition believes that the results are inaccurate. Juburi continued by saying that election monitors in the south and west of Kirkuk noticed high turnout and were surprised that the coalition did not receive more seats in the Council of Representatives (CoR). (Al Mada Press)

25 MAY: A number of political groups in Anbar questioned the turnout rates in the province citing it as a sign of fraud. According to the head of the Loyalty to Anbar bloc, Qassim al-Fahdawi, the province had a 20% voter turnout and reports giving other numbers are untrue. He continued by stating that voter turnout did not exceed 10% in precincts for displaced persons. Member of the Arabiyya Alliance Rafi Abdul Karim also stated that voter turnout was not greater than 22% in the province. He stated that there was a 9% voter turnout rate in voting centers for displaced persons and that the votes in these centers were rigged by the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) in Anbar in favor of an “influential bloc” in the province. A member of Unity of Iraq’s Sons, Taha Abdul Ghani, also stated that widespread fraud occurred and that IHEC favored one particular bloc in the province. (Al-Sumaria News)

Initial Negotiating Positions of Iraqi Political Parties: Pre- and Post-Elections Results

By Iraq Team

The dominant reaction to the results is expression of dissatisfaction by the various groups with some alleging “fraud” but without presenting strong evidence. Even Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH) is complaining about results and falls within that fold. Maliki’s State of Law Alliance (SLA) and the Kurdish Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) are very satisfied with the results, having performed well. 

In most cases, groups say they expected more seats but show indications that they are ready to move on. For example, the Sadrists initiated what they described as talks with other political groups to form the government. This development, however, will likely change and is only part of the negotiations. Various groups have registered appeals, but that process will likely not change the results a great deal. In total, discrediting the elections results can lead to damaging the legitimacy of the elections. 

A notable development to highlight is that a new political alliance was formed by the Iraqi Sunnis groups that is titled Etihad (Union). The alliance is possibly game-changing because it shows major Iraqi Sunni groups unifying and is composed of Mutahidun, Arabiyya, Iraq List, Unity of Iraq’s Sons, and Loyalty to Anbar. 

In conclusion, there is discontentment with the results for some blocs, but no major negotiating position changes yet since prior to the results. 

Iraqi Shi’a Political Groups:

National Alliance:

Theme: The office of the Prime Minister should go to the National Alliance

Statements:

PRE-ELECTION RESULTS 12 MAY: The leader of the National Alliance (NA), Ibrahim al-Jafari, stated that a meeting took place between the components of the alliance and was attended by Prime Minister Maliki. According to the statement, the political commission of the alliance formed a commission of eight members to “reevaluate” the structure of the NA. Also, the attendees discussed the budget and the importance of its approval by the Council of Representatives (CoR). Maliki briefed the attendees on the security situation. Member of the Sadrist Ahrar bloc Jawad al-Juburi stated that the attendees agreed that the office of the Prime Minister  should go to the National Alliance, without discussing who would fill that role. (Shafaq News, Al Mada Press, Al-Sumaria News)

Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and the State of Law Alliance (SLA)

Theme: Satisifed with the results, stating that the National Alliance will nominate the Prime Minister candidate from the “biggest component” of the NA.

Statements:

POST-ELECTION RESULTS 19 MAY: PM Maliki held a press conference in Baghdad after the results were announced and stated that the National Alliance (NA) will form the government adding that the “biggest component” of the NA will nominate the PM. (Al Mada Press)

PRE-ELECTION RESULTS 12 MAY: Prime Minister Maliki attended the National Alliance meeting described above.

Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH):

Theme: Critical of IHEC, citing inaccurate results and that Independent High Election Commission (IHEC) was influenced to minimize AAH votes.

Statements:

POST-ELECTION RESULTS 20 MAY: Director of the political office of AAH Adnan Faihan held a press conference at AAH headquarters in Jadiriyha, central Baghdad. Faihan criticized IHEC stating that the results were not accurate and that IHEC was influenced by domestic and external bodies to minimize AAH votes and prevent “Sadiqun, the political representation of the Islamic Resistance from being in the CoR.” (All Iraq News)

Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI)

Theme: Alleged election fraud that was meant to maximize the votes for the SLA and minimize those of ISCI.

Statements:

POST-ELECTION RESULTS 19 MAY: Spokesperson of the Mowatin Citizens Alliance of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), Baligh Abu Galal along with other leaders in Mowatin held a press conference and presented “evidence” of fraud that took place in the elections that was meant to maximize the votes for the SLA and minimize those of ISCI. Abu Galal highlighted: alleged vote buying by distributing real estate and by promising IHEC staff permanent employment; discarded ballots marked in favor of ISCI; manipulation of voter turnout figures; and locks from ballots boxes that were allegedly found discarded in the streets showing tampering with ballot boxes. (Al-Mada Press)

PRE-ELECTION RESULTS 13 MAY: The Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) released a statement indicating that its leader, Ammar al-Hakim, and a delegation from ISCI composed of Mowatin Speaker Baligh Abu Galal, Humam Hamudi, Ahmed al-Chalabi, and Mohammed al-Assadi visited PM Maliki at his residence. The statement added that the meeting was also attended by PM Maliki’s advisor, Abdul-Halim al-Zuhairi; a leader in the Da‘wa Party, Tariq Najim; and a leader in the State of Law Alliance (SLA), Yassin Majid. The attendees agreed on continuing the dialogue between ISCI and the SLA and to “activate the role of the NA.” Hakim stressed the need for a [partnership between the strong sides] in forming a “strong team” from within the NA to lead the country. (Al-Sumaria News, Shafaq News)

15 MAY: Abd al-Hussein al-Abtan, a leader  in the Mowatin Alliance of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) commented on the “threat” of a “decisive response” issued on May 14 by the leader of ISCI, Ammar al-Hakim, if the results of the elections are “illogical.” According to Abtan, the statement reflects ISCI’s concern regarding the delay in announcing the results. He added that IHEC answered many “legitimate complaints” submitted by ISCI after it found a group of discarded ballots in the street that had been marked for the Mowatin Alliance. (Al Mada Press)

The Sadrist Trend

Theme: Alleged electoral fraud and voting irregularities in favor of the SLA.

Statements:

POST-ELECTION RESULTS 20 MAY: Kinani held a press conference and stated that the Sadrist Ahrar bloc initiated talks with other political groups to form the government.  He added that the next Prime Minister (PM) should be from the National Alliance while being accepted by other political actors noting that the process of selecting the PM will be “very long.”  (Shafaq News)

PRE-ELECTION RESULTS 13 MAY: A spokesperson of the Sadrist Ahrar bloc Jawad al-Juburi stated that the eight-member committee that was formed as a result of the National Alliance (NA) meeting that took place on 12 May will serve to restructure the NA. He added that the NA will be “the fundamental power” that the prime minister would consult instead of a unilateral policy. (Al-Sumaria News)

18 MAY: Member of the Sadrist Ahrar bloc, Amir al-Kinani held a press conference at the Council of Representatives (CoR) and presented documents described as evidence of fraud and violation in the national elections that benefited the State of Law Alliance (SLA) of Prime Minster (PM) Nouri al-Maliki.  Among other charges, Kinani cited: alleged coercion against IHEC staff members to ensure they voted for the SLA; votes improperly given to the SLA as well as votes taken away from smaller parties; questionable turnout figures in areas around Baghdad; and alleged data manipulation by IHEC staff loyal to the SLA. Kinani stated that the above complaints will be submitted to the judiciary if IHEC’s Board of Commissioners does not address them. (Assafir News)

Iraqi Sunni Political Groups:

Deputy Prime Minister Saleh al-Mutlaq’s Arabiyya Alliance

Theme: Alleged electoral violations and called on investigations by external organizations.

  

Statements:

POST-ELECTION RESULTS 19 MAY:  Saleh al-Mutlaq stated that a meeting took place with the political representation of the six (representation of Iraqi Sunnis in Baghdad, Diyala, Anbar, Salah ad-Din, Ninewa, and Kirkuk) provinces and that the attendees agreed that the electoral process was violated “on purpose” by a major political party. The statement called for the “immediate intervention” of the U.N and other external bodies to launch an investigation on the “purposeful violations” of the elections. (Assafir News)

PRE-ELECTION RESULTS 15 MAY: Deputy PM and the leader of the Arabiyya Alliance, Salih al-Mutlaq met with the leader of ISCI, Ammar al-Hakim and a delegation from ISCI. Mutlaq stated that both sides agree on forming a government that serves that Iraqi people. Hakim described the meeting as one of national motives that aim to make positive changes. Also, Hakim stated that the ISCI has strong relations with the Arabiyya Alliance, and that this relationship with the alliance along with other parties will answer the will of the people. (Al-Sumaria News)

Speaker Osama al-Nujaifi’s Mutahidun Alliance

Theme: Not “satisfied” with election results and claimed that military operations and other destabilizing factors contributed to low voter turnout, particularly in Anbar.

Statements:

POST-ELECTION RESULTS 20 MAY: Member of the Mutahidun Alliance Mohammed Iqbal stated that the alliance is not “satisfied” with the results of the elections citing the military operations in Anbar and other destabilizing factors in the Baghdad belts as obstacles that prevented voters from voting. He added that the Alliance will appeal the results. (All Iraq News)

PRE-ELECTION RESULTS 12 MAY: The Office of the Speaker of the Council of Representatives (CoR) released a statement indicating that Speaker Osama al-Nujaifi met with the Commander of U.S Central Command (CENTCOM), General Lloyd Austin. Speaker Nujaifi is the leader of the Mutahidun Alliance. According to the statement, Nujaifi stressed the need for political solutions over the “overt” use of force in combating ISIS and al-Qaeda. Regarding the elections, Nujaifi highlighted the negative effects the floods had on turnout in areas around Baghdad in addition to similar effects created by military operations in Anbar in preventing voters from participating in the elections. (Al-Sumaria News)

14 MAY: The Mutahidun Alliance released a statement indicating that its leader, Osama al-Nujaifi, met with the leader of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), Ammar al-Hakim. The statement added that the two sides agreed on an expeditious release of elections results and government formation. According to the statement, both sides also agreed that the next prime minister should be approved “internally, regionally, and globally.” Also, a committee was formed in order to follow up and craft policies for the “next level.” The leaders further agreed that the current strategy based on force used in Anbar will negatively affect the Iraqi society. They discussed reforms and ways to mitigate the negative effects of some of the problems that faced the elections.  (Al-Sumaria News)

The Iraqi Kurds:

Themes - PUK: Cited an increase in seats won by the PUK and reiterated that the presidency should come from the PUK.

KDP: Expressed concern that they did not win more seats, calling for an investigation of votes cast in Erbil.

Statements:

POST-ELECTION RESULTS 20 MAY: According to an official in the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), Khosro Goran, the KDP believes that the final vote tally “betrayed the votes of the party’s electors and it is an injustice to them.” The KDP believed that it would receive more seats in Ninewa; eight seats in Erbil, rather than seven; and that it would get one seat in Diyala. The KDP expected to receive 28 seats, but received 25 seats. He added that we “demand a comparison of the forms that have been counted in Erbil and those sent to Baghdad.” (Shafaq News)

20 MAY: Member of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) Ala al-Talabani described the number of seats won by the PUK in the elections as a significant increase from the last elections. Talabani added that the “Kurdistani blocs” formed a commission in order to conduct talks with other winning blocs.  She also reiterated the demand for the position of the presidency in the coming government without nominating a candidate. (All Iraq News)

PRE-ELECTION RESULTS 13 MAY: Iraqi Kurdistan President and leader of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), Masoud Barazani expressed his discontent regarding the relationship between Baghdad and Erbil stating that he is not willing to “go through the same experience again,” and describing the rule of PM Maliki as “totalitarian” and stating that Maliki has “changed” since he became the Prime Minister.  Barazani denied that a partnership took place with Baghdad during the rule of Maliki. He added that all options are possible to include boycotting “everything” that has to do with the federal government. Regarding the demands of Iraqi Kurdish representation in the next government and ways to ensure that they are met, Barazani stated that he “would be seeking more than paper guarantees.”  President Barazani stressed that a decision was made to “sell oil independently” and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) will continue to “produce, pump, and sell oil.” Barazani described the way the government acted in Anbar as one meant to achieve political gains. (Reuters via Trust.org)

Iraqi Government Formation Negotiations Begin

By Ahmed Ali

Iraq’s government formation process has begun even before official results are released. Political groups are posturing and sending early signals about their positions and ambitions. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki continues to float the idea of a “political majority” government. His ambition will be tested by the results and his political opponents’ strong desire to weaken him. Even though Iraq’s election day was largely peaceful, the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) disrupted voting in several predominantly Iraqi Sunni areas, increasing the risks of marginalization of Iraq’s Sunni population as elections results come in and coalitions are formed. 

Iraq held its national elections on April 30. Election day was free from major security breaches, likely because the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) increased security measures implemented prior to the vote. The al-Qaeda-linked Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) also likely chose to avoid engaging the highly alert and widely deployed ISF units. Given the ISF’s temporary tightened measures, attackers would have been dealt serious setbacks were they to attempt directly engaging the security force. ISIS is still a major threat to Iraq’s security despite its inability or tactical decision not to launch major attacks on elections day. Importantly, ISIS was able to disrupt the electoral process before the elections took place. ISIS’ control of Fallujah since January 2014 and its subsequent anti-elections campaign had an adverse impact on voting, particularly for the Iraqi Sunnis. 

Security in the Provinces

In Anbar, poor security excluded fifteen areas from voting, and displaced residents of those areas were obligated to vote in other areas of the country. In Babil’s Jurf al-Sakhar area, which ISIS has used as a support-zone, voting was not held for security reasons. On election day, ISIS reportedly sent threatening text messages to Jurf al-Sakhar’s tribal leaders warning them not to participate in elections. As a result, IHEC allowed Jurf al-Sakhar’s residents the opportunity to vote in the nearby Mussayeb area. However, it is not yet clear to what extent turnout among Jurf al-Sakhar’s voters was affected. Participation was likely depressed due to security threats and Mussayeb’s distance from Jurf al-Sakhar (approximately 15 miles). 

In Ninewa, Noura al-Bachari, a candidate of the Iraqi Sunni group Mutahidun, stated that 130 voting centers were closed due to lack of employees of the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC). Bachari added that there was no voting in the Jazeera area due to ISIS threats. The lack of IHEC employees at voting centers was also reported in Kirkuk. If Bachari’s statements are confirmed, this prospect will deal a significant blow to the perceived legitimacy of the voting process. Such claims are bound to lead to the rejection of the results by groups affected by lowered turnout. 

The Beginning of Political Posturing

According to IHEC, the overall turnout for the general elections was 60%, an encouraging sign even though this figure is two points lower compared to the 2010 national elections. The southern and northern provinces registered higher levels of participation due to better security conditions when compared to western Iraq and Ninewa province. For example, Basra in the south had a 77% turnout rate, possibly indicative of voters’ political engagement in this crucial election. However, claims disputing these turnout figures are already circulating. Senior Sadrist leader Amer al-Kanani stated that the 91% participation rate announced for ISF members is likely 10% lower and that this difference is going to be manipulated in order to alter the results. Kanani attributed his observation to local and international elections monitors’ estimates. These allegations have thus far only come from the Sadrists and have not been corroborated by the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI). They serve to place IHEC under scrutiny as the vote-counting process continues. If these allegations are supported, they would provide another mechanism by which the results could be disputed by less successful parties. 

IHEC has indicated that the final results will be announced by the end of May. However, political groups have been leaking results based on either their own observations or anonymous IHEC sources. Many claim to have taken the lead in voting. Some of these claims may be accurate, but it will be important to wait for the official IHEC results. In 2010, the final results by IHEC presented surprises as former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi’s Iraqiyya party garnered the highest number of seats and votes. In those elections too, political groups pre-empted the announcement of the final results with inaccurate claims that they were in the lead.  

Initial Negotiating Positions of Iraqi Political Parties
May 4, 2014- May 9, 2014

Iraqi Shi’a Political Groups:

Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and the State of Law Alliance (SLA)

Theme: Calls for majority government and attacks Mutahidun Leader Osama al-Nujaifi

Statements:

MAY 08: Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki strongly criticized the performance of the committees of the Council of Representatives (CoR) and its presidency. PM Maliki added that he hopes for a new presidency instead of the current arrangement, describing it as “failure.” (Al-Sumaria News)

MAY 08: PM Maliki stated that a government of political majority will not be based on “ethnic or sectarian” bases. Instead, it would be based on “principles” and “high values” under the constitution. PM Maliki added that the political majority would not exclude a “component, sect, or religion.” (Al-Sumaria News)

MAY 08: A member of PM Maliki’s State of Law Alliance (SLA), Ihsan Awadi, stated that the SLA aims to prevent the leader of Mutahidun, Osama al-Nujaifi from holding “any position,” citing the “failing experience” the alliance had with Nujaifi in the past. He added that Mutahidun does not represent a “specific component,” therefore its exclusion does not mean the exclusion of that component [likely referring to Iraqi Sunnis]. (Assafir News)

Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI)

Theme: Takes anti-Maliki position but acts as bridge-builder among Shi’a groups

Statements:

MAY 05: The Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq’s (ISCI) parliamentary bloc leader Baqir al-Zubaidi (also known as Bayan Jabr) stated that the next Iraqi Prime Minister will be nominated by ISCI’s Citizen’s (Mowatin) Bloc, the Sadrist Ahrar, and the State of Law Alliance (SLA) of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. He added that the decision will be made “according to a bilateral or trilateral agreement.” (Shafaq News)

MAY 06: ISCI leader Adel Abdul-Mahdi stated that ISCI does not support efforts to isolate the SLA in forming the new government describing such isolation as “not wise and harming, exactly like the demand for a third term [for Maliki].” (Shafaq News)

MAY 09: Spokesperson of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq Baligh Abu Galal described the possibility of securing a third term for the PM as “very difficult” adding that the PM cannot secure the majority of seats to form a government. (Assafir News)

The Sadrist Trend

Theme: Takes Extreme Anti-Maliki Position

Statements:

MAY 07: Member of the Sadrist Ahrar bloc Hussein al-Sharifi stated that it is “not possible” to form the National Alliance with the participation of the State of Law Alliance (SLA). He added that the SLA will not be able to form the alliance by itself. Sharifi attributed his statement to the negative performance of the government. (All Iraq News)

MAY 09: Member of the Sadrist Ahrar bloc, Hussein al-Sharifi, stated that the “Sadrist Trend” aims to prevent the PM from securing a third term. (Al Mada Press)

Iraqi Sunni Political Groups:

Deputy Prime Minister Saleh al-Mutlaq’s Arabiyya Alliance

Theme: Take an anti-Maliki position while opening options for negotiation

  

Statements:

MAY 06 : Member of deputy Prime Minister Saleh al-Mutlaq’s Arabiyya Alliance, Talal al-Zobaie, stated that the alliance would not support PM Maliki for a third term, adding that the alliance is in support for a non-sectarian, non-ethnicity-based “political majority government.” (Al Mada Press)

Speaker Osama al-Nujaifi’s Mutahidun Alliance

Statements:

MAY 08: Mutahidun Alliance announced in a statement that a meeting took place between the leaders of the alliance. The statement added that a delegation was formed in order to conduct negotiations with other political parties for government-formation purposes. Meanwhile, leader in the alliance Jabr al-Jabri stated that Mutahidun “has no red lines” regarding the formation of alliances “if our demands are met,” adding that no agreement took place with the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq [ISCI] or the Sadrist Ahrar bloc. (All Iraq News, Al-Sumaria News)

MAY 08: Member of Mutahidun Hamza al-Girtani stated that the alliance aims to “withdraw” the premiership position from PM Maliki. Girtani added that the alliance aims to form a majority government citing the local government of Baghdad that was formed by ISCI, the Sadrist Ahrar, and Mutahidun. (Al-Sumaria News)

The Iraqi Kurds:

Theme: Reject the political majority government and demand presidency

MAY 04: The Office of the Presidency of Iraqi Kurdistan Region announced that the Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Parliament must approve the nominee for the Presidency of Iraq, arguing that the position is reserved for the Iraqi Kurds “by right.” (Kurdistan Region Presidency)

May 07: Member of the Kurdistani Alliance [KA], Mahdi Haji criticized calls to form a political majority government, adding that a government “cannot be formed without the Kurds.”  According to Haji, the Iraqi Kurds are not a “political party” but rather a “major ethnicity.” (All Iraq News)

A number of these post-elections statements shed light on possible initial strategies and negotiating positions for government formation. The Iraqi Kurds, for example, are seeking to maintain the position of the presidency in the federal government. Iraqi Kurdish Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) leader Jalal Talabani has been the president of Iraq for the last eight years and, according to the Iraqi Kurds, the presidency is their “right.” The Iraqi Kurdish position faced criticism from Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s ally Mohammed al-Saihud, who stated that it is not a constitutional mandate to have an Iraqi Kurdish president. In addition to this challenge from Maliki’s State of Law Alliance, the issue of the presidency will be contentious among Iraqi Kurdish parties, with the PUK facing challenges from both the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Gorran (Change) Movement challenge the PUK for the presidency. In addition to the Iraqi Kurds, Iraqi Sunni figures are likely to vie for the position of president in the federal government as well. 

Beyond statements by figures in the different political organizations, actions by the Federal Supreme Court are also likely to affect the upcoming period of post-elections bargaining. The court issued a decision not to accept a lawsuit from Maliki against the speaker of the Council of Representatives (CoR), Osama al-Nujaifi, challenging the CoR’s inability to pass the budget. The ruling to dismiss this case was likely intended to project an image of independence for the court given its past pro-Maliki history. The court also, however, issued a decision postponing the case brought by the SLA challenging the legality of the Baghdad Provincial Council until June, after the elections results are announced. The court’s decision here means that the anti-Maliki Baghdad Provincial Council and local political positions will become a bargaining chip. The continuation of the case until June will allow the SLA to trade dropping their legal challenge to the Baghdad Council’s formation in exchange for cooperation in coalition-formation. 

Conclusions 

Political groups are currently testing the waters for their future alliances as they wait for the official results to be released. The groups anticipate a long government-formation period and are posturing to maintain their political flexibility. However, the development of an anti-Maliki front is likely to materialize, modeled after the anti-Maliki local governments that formed in Baghdad and Diyala after the 2013 provincial elections. 

Prime Minister Maliki’s plan will likely continue to be floating the concept of a majority government and assessing which groups he can play against one another. Additionally, he will likely continue to attack speaker Osama al-Nujaifi, Mutahidun, and the Sadrists. Maliki will enjoy an advantage as he will be a caretaker Prime Minister with full authority. It will be particularly important to watch if Maliki will use the security forces to his own advantage. The current major operation to re-take Fallujah from ISIS may be an example of precisely this, seeking to demonstrate his strength as a Prime Minister. 

Lack of elections in Fallujah and Jurf al-Sakhar can further increase sentiments of marginalization among the Iraqi Sunni population. To mitigate the consequences of these sentiments, the vote-counting that is underway must be transparent and occur without any alteration of results. Importantly, all political groups should work towards producing a government that is representative and inclusive. 

Ahmed Ali is a Senior Iraq Research Analyst and Iraq Team Lead at Institute for the Study of War.

Iraq Update 2014 #13: Sadrists Challenge Prime Minister Maliki before Iraqi Elections

By Iraq Team and Ahmed Ali

Tensions have increased between Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and the Sadrists. As the Sadrist Trend experiences restructuring in the wake of Moqtada al-Sadr’s decision to withdraw from politics, Maliki has identified it as his main Iraqi Shi’a electoral opponent and scathingly criticized its leader. Sadrists have mobilized against Prime Minister Maliki by holding mass protesting and showcasing their grassroots power. Moving ahead, Maliki faces a difficult calculation in whether to escalate militarily against the Sadrists, weighing the rapidly approaching elections and the country’s security environment.

Background

The Sadrist Trend has been active in the run-up to national elections in April. On February 15, its leader Moqtada al-Sadr abruptly announced his decision to withdraw from politics. Sadr has done so before, but eventually reversed his decision after displays of loyalty and allegiance by his supporters. This recent decision appears to have been similar, and Sadr is still effectively involved in the political affairs of his movement. However, the timing of the decision sets this instance apart. Firstly, it coincides with the approach of the national elections at a critical juncture for Sadr to mobilize his base. The decision therefore seems to be intended to rally the Sadrists. Secondly, this decision was issued after the Iraqi Council of Representatives (CoR) passed a law that grants retirement privileges to its members and other senior officials. The public was very critical of the law and perceived it as granting benefits to politicians at the expense of the public good. The full list of who voted for the law is not confirmed but reports indicated that Sadrist CoR members had voted in favor of the law. The presence of these reports is harmful to Sadrist public posture which is based on delivering services to the public. Thus, Sadr’s decision was intended to show to the public that he was dissatisfied with Sadrist CoR members. In effect, the decision is Sadr’s method of maintaining the Sadrist populist image. Thirdly, as the elections approach, this was Sadr’s method of enforcing discipline within his movement and subsequent restructuring of the Sadrist Trend has taken place. The changes included creating a “Board of Trustees” and the removal of CoR member Baha al-Araji as the head of the Sadrist Ahrar parliamentary bloc. The new Board of Trustees is empowered to administer the political affairs of the group.   

As these developments are taking place, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has strongly critiqued the Sadrists in general and Sadr himself in particular. On March 8, Maliki criticized the political acumen of Sadr, stating that Sadr is not familiar with politics and is unaware of “the rules of the political process.” Maliki’s statement came in response to a question about Sadr’s recent criticism of Maliki in which he described the Prime Minister as a “dictator.” On March 10, the “Board of Trustees” released a statement criticizing Maliki and calling for protest in response to his statements.

For Maliki, this was likely a calculated move to take advantage of Sadr’s decision to show him as an incapable political leader. Furthermore, the Sadrists, through their alliances in the aftermath of the provincial elections, have shown a strategy intended to compete for Maliki’s position in the national elections. Maliki realizes the Sadrist threat and is focused on weakening it. The Sadrists have clearly identified this as a vital contest going into the elections and have mobilized themselves to counter it.  

Sadrists Mobilize Against Maliki

Between March 10-12, hundreds of Sadr supporters took to the streets of Baghdad, Najaf, Karbala, Basra, Kirkuk, Maysan, Dhi Qar, Babil, Wasit, and Diyala. The demonstrators carried anti-PM Maliki banners, tore down a number of Maliki posters, and chanted anti-Maliki slogans describing him as a “dictator” and comparing him to Saddam Hussein. The demonstrations were attended by Sadrist government officials and members of the Council of Representatives. The appearance of these Sadrist officials at the protest was important as a display of their loyalty to him after his decision to withdraw from politics.

Importantly, pictures of the demonstrations posted by Sadrist social media accounts showed members of the Iraqi Army and Iraqi Federal Police in their military attire taking part in the demonstrations. These photos are evidence that Sadrists are still part of the security forces and they posted online to demonstrate that the movement has broader support.

March 10, Members of the Iraqi Army and Federal Police express their support to Sadr during the demonstrations.

Politically, supporters of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) also took out to streets in Basra, demonstrating against PM Maliki and in support of Sadr. ISCI leader Hakim al-Mayahi stated that his group stands with the Sadrist Trend. He also commented that recent statements by Maliki criticizing Sadr negatively affect Iraqi Shi’a unity in Iraq. The Sadrist-ISCI solidarity is a continuation of their cooperation against Maliki in the aftermath of the provincial elections.

Tensions have run high before the elections, and the political infrastructure of Maliki’s Dawa party has come under physical attack. On March 10, reports indicated that demonstrators attacked the office of Maliki’s Dawa Party in Najaf. Officials from both the Dawa Party and the Sadrist Trend quickly denied the reports, attributing the acts to individuals who were not part of the demonstrations. Moreover, a Sadrist delegation visited the office and apologized. These actions were likely taken likely to control the crowds and prevent acts of violence especially before the elections. On March 11, Sadr’s Office released a statement in appreciation of the demonstration thanking the demonstrators and highlighting that their stance was “enough.” This statement was also likely intended to contain any fallout from the demonstrations. The statement also tracks with Sadr’s stated position that Sadrists should not resort to violence. On March 12, unconfirmed reports indicated that armed confrontations took place between members of Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) and members of the Iraqi Army as members of JAM attacked offices of the Dawa Party in Sadr City. While the reports were unconfirmed and rejected by Sadrist-leaning social media, they still serve as way to discredit the movement for using violence.

Nevertheless, demonstrations continued and more attacks were reported on Dawa offices. On March 11, two “sound bombs” were detonated in the headquarters of a pro-PM Maliki party in Maysan, the State of Social Justice Bloc, with reports indicating that the office was set on fire. In Basra, Iraqi Security Forces, including troops from the Quick Response Forces, were reportedly deployed around the offices of the Dawa Party and blocked the road leading to the headquarters of PM Maliki’s State of Law Alliance in the city. Meanwhile, an unknown gunman attacked an office of the Dawa Party with a grenade in the area of Hashmiyah, southern Babil with no reported causalities. The attack was clearly meant to be a means of intimidation and sending a message instead of causing casualties.

 Supporters of Sadr taking down poster of PM Maliki in Najaf 

      Sadr supporters holding a banner comparing PM Maliki to Sadddam Hussein

Sadrist “Day of the Oppressed” Demonstration as a Show of Force

The Sadrist camp has not shied away from mass mobilization to demonstrate their power. Although scheduled in advance of the tensions described above, the group used its annual “Day of the Oppressed” demonstration to mobilize its supporters en masse. Even though Sadr described the demonstration as a day for all to stand against oppression, the vast majority of the rally attendees were Sadrists and the event is an annual Sadrist show of force.

On March 15 and three days after the anti-Maliki demonstrations, Sadrists gathered in the southern city of Nasriyah in Dhi Qar province. The occurrence of the “Day of the Oppressed” march might explain why the anti-Maliki demonstrations did not last longer since organizers and participants started to head toward Nasriyah on March 14. Logistical preparations were reported as early as February 15. While logistics of the rally were organized by Sadr offices in various provinces, to include providing transportation to participants from other provinces, Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) imposed a vehicular curfew in order to provide security for the participants after receiving information that they may be targeted. It is notable that the ISF provided security to the march given the recent tensions between Maliki and the Sadrists, but it is also indicative of de-escalation steps by Maliki who may have chosen,  for now, to avoid a major crisis with the Sadrists before the elections.

The rally was attended by thousands of Sadrist supporters. The rally was also attended by the leader of the Mendaeen [a religious group in Iraq] in Dhi Qar, Samer Handhal. The inclusion of Handhal is meant to portray a nationalist and inclusive nature of the event instead of appearing to be an exclusively Shi’a event.

Notably, Sadrist-leaning social media outlets posted a picture of Abu Deraa, or Ismail Hafidh al-Lami, a former leader in the Mahdi Army who is known as the “Shi’a Zarqawi” due to a history of brutality resembling that of the al-Qaeda leader in Iraq, Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi. Abu Deraa had previously split from the Sadrist Trend and eventually ran his own group that was based in Sadr City and operated death squads in Baghdad that kidnapped and killed thousands of civilians between 2004 and 2006, before moving to Iran to escape capture by U.S. Forces. However, Abu Deraa remained engaged in directing his own group in Sadr city until at least 2012.

As Abu Deraa’s future role with the Sadrists crystalizes, his potential full return to the Sadrist fold will boost Sadr’s credential as a defender of the Iraqi Shi’a and in particular as he competes with the Iraqi Shi’a militia of Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH). AAH has been messaging that it is protecting the Iraqi Shi’a in face of attacks by the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), formerly known as al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). Both groups are currently competing for the same constituency of voters from the Sadrist trend. Abu Deraa’s full return will be crucial in mobilizing the Mahdi Army before elections. For undecided Sadrist voters, Abu Deraa’s return and future role will represent a message from Sadr that he takes the defense of the Iraqi Shi’a against attacks by the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham seriously and that is why he has recruited Abu Deraa. Moving forward, it will be important to watch the role Abu Deraa plays and whether he will be operationalized by Sadr.

Abu Deraa reportedly participating in the “Day of the Oppressed” demonstration

Sadr returned from Iran to Iraq the day before the rally, although he did not appear at the march and instead a speech was delivered on his behalf. Despite not participating in the march, Sadr’s return from Iran indicates to his followers that he is still involved in political affairs for his movement. The statement portrayed Sadr as a national non-sectarian figure by calling for unity between Shi’a and Sunnis and all other Iraqis “especially our Christian brothers who have been, and are still oppressed.” Sadr called for people to widely participate in the upcoming elections in order to “seize the new political stage” and to protect the country from the “thieves and sectarians” who wage wars before the elections to stay in power. These themes touch on the pervasive corruption that currently exists in Iraq and that has become a major campaign theme for anti-Maliki political groups. Last year, Sadr addressed the demonstrators through a large screen in the rally that took place in Kut, Wasit. In 2012, the demonstration took place in Basra and like this year, a speech was read on Sadr’s behalf.

Conclusions

The Sadrists demonstrated their pre-elections grassroots power by organizing protests against Maliki along with the “Day of the Oppressed” march. Within days, thousands of Moqtada al-Sadr supporters demonstrated in various areas of Iraq. These marches serve the dual purposes of demonstrating loyalty to Sadr and showcasing their electoral and grassroots power before the elections. For now, the march appears to have achieved both objectives.

The Maliki-Sadrist tensions will continue for the foreseeable future. The tensions will include rising wars of words and possible arrests of Sadrist figures. At this point, the tension has included disqualification of Sadrist candidates from the upcoming national elections on April 30, 2014 and critique by Maliki that Sadrists were major perpetrators of violence during Iraq’s civil war. With these statements, Maliki wants to negatively portray the Sadrists and remind the public that he is the “law and order” man who targeted the Sadrist Mahdi Army in 2008. This rhetoric against the Sadrists plays a role in his electoral strategy, as Maliki has been dealing with an increasingly deteriorating security situation.

As a counterpoint, Sadrists have highlighted Maliki’s consolidation of power and his governance style as reasons for not allowing him a third term. If Maliki decides to move against the Sadrists, he will likely tolerate the mobilization of AAH against them particularly in Baghdad. Furthermore, anti-Sadrist mobilization of AAH by Maliki will partially countervail the Sadrist street presence. Even with AAH mobilization, it will be difficult to rival Sadrist street power, but Maliki will want to utilize all instruments available to him in order to weaken the Sadrists. The Sadrists, for their part, may choose to avoid a military confrontation with Maliki before the elections in order not to divert their resources from the elections and the political space.

Political weakening of the Sadrists is a priority for Maliki and that process can be carried out through disqualification of Sadrist candidates from elections and using access to state resources to out-campaign them. Reports indicate that Quds Force Commander, Qassem Soleimani, traveled to Baghdad to mediate tensions between the Sadrists, Maliki, and other Iraqi Shi’a factions. This development, coupled with Sadr’s trip to Iran, indicates that temporary de-escalation may take place. Additionally, a potential Maliki decision to move militarily against the Sadrists will be constrained by the Iraqi Security Forces’ ongoing military operations in Anbar, Ninewa, and Salah ad-Din and also possibly restrained by the Iranian government’s mediatory efforts. However, limited skirmishes or at least high-profile arrests of Sadrist military commanders could become part of Maliki’s calculation to bolster his credentials as an anti-militia figure. At any rate, if Maliki decides to confront the Sadrists military at this moment, it will be a risky step given the approach of the elections and the ISF’s imperative mission to contain the resurgent al-Qaeda in Iraq.

Ahmed Ali is a Senior Iraq Research Analyst and the Iraq Team Lead at the Institute for the Study of War.