The Campaign for Mosul: December 13-19, 2016

Operations in eastern Mosul largely paused from December 13 to 19 likely in order to stem the growing casualties taken by the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and to regroup before pushing into central Mosul. Meanwhile, the Popular Mobilization continued its push west, connecting its parallel lines of effort when it recaptured the north-south road between the Tel Afar Airbase and the southern town of Ashwa on December 13.

Operations in eastern Mosul largely paused from December 13 to 19. The Counter Terrorism Service (CTS), which is bearing the brunt of the operation, is facing a degree of attrition that risks the successful completion of anti-ISIS operations in Mosul. Senior U.S. military officials reported that the U.S.-trained Golden Brigade, the first of three brigades of the CTS, is facing a 50% casualty rate and could be rendered combat ineffective in a month if the rate remains constant. The CTS has deliberately slowed operations in eastern Mosul in order to reduce the rate of attrition, and the ISF announced it will begin to rely more on artillery and precision airstrikes to target ISIS militants in response. These new tactics, however, will likely increase civilian casualties because ISIS militants continue to use Mosul’s civilian population as human shields. The ISF will either be forced to heavily deploy its assets from other areas of the country to match the capability of the elite CTS forces or to call up non-acceptable partners, such as the Popular Mobilization, to complete the current operation in Mosul.

The pause in eastern Mosul may also align with a need to regroup before the ISF pushes into central Mosul. Operations in northeastern Mosul, under the efforts of the CTS, have reached the Khosr River, a tributary river that feeds into the Tigris and bisects northeastern Mosul. The CTS will need to regroup before bridging the river in order to resolve the logistics of the crossing, notably for heavy equipment. The CTS will also need to plan for how to approach these new neighborhoods, especially the University of Mosul, a logistical hub for ISIS. Unconfirmed sources report that ISIS destroyed the campus and withdrew, however the “scorched earth” tactic, if true, will still slow the ISF’s advance and leave it open to ISIS counterattacks. ISIS will resist the CTS’s advance further into central Mosul and towards the government center. The CTS will need to carefully assess how to secure this area in light of its reduced numbers and limited ability to call in reinforcements.

Shi’a militias operating in the western Ninewa desert connected their northern and southern lines of effort by retaking the Tel Afar-Ashwa road on December 13. The militias have been operating on two separate axes, the first stretching west from Tel Afar along the Sinjar highway, in the northern desert, and the second stemming west from Qayyarah, moving through key villages of Ain al-Jahush, Tel Abtah, and Ashwa in the southern desert. Units connected these lines of effort on December 13 when they cleared the road stretching between Tel Afar and Ashwa, giving the operations a greater ability to move forces and equipment as they continue to progress west. 

Iraq Control of Terrain: December 15, 2016

By Staley Smith, Michael Momayezi, and the ISW Iraq Team

The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) continued operations to retake Mosul and its environs, consolidating gains along its five axes before breaching the city limits on November 1. The ISF continued to advance north from Qayyarah towards southwestern Mosul, but have yet to breach the city limits there; south from Kurdish-held territory towards northern Mosul, besieging Tel Kayyaf; and in the countryside southeast of Mosul, from where they entered the city itself. The Counter Terrorism Service has retaken upwards of twenty neighborhoods from ISIS in the northeast quarter over the past six weeks, but the Iraqi Army has struggled to advance in Mosul’s southeast quarter. The ISF and Peshmerga also consolidated gains around Makhmur in late October. The Peshmerga, meanwhile, advanced from Bashiqa Mountain to retake Bashiqa, northeast of Mosul, on November 7. Peshmerga involvement in the operation has since largely concluded, while the ISF continues its lines of effort inside Mosul itself and at remaining ISIS-held areas, including the southern axis. ISW is thus changing the respective areas to ISF-, Peshmerga-, and joint ISF and Peshmerga-control. 

Meanwhile, the Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs) launched operations into the western desert, west of Mosul, on October 29. The militias recaptured the Tel Afar airbase on November 16 but Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi called for the ISF, not the PMUs, to recapture the city itself. The PMUs have since expanded west beyond Tel Afar, aiming for ISIS-held Baaj, south of Sinjar, and the Syrian border. ISW is thus changing this area to a control zone where Shi’a militias are the primary security force. 

The ISF launched a minor operation to recapture the eastern bank of the Tigris River across from Shirqat on November 29 in order to counter ISIS’s ability to attack recaptured areas. The ISF deployed the Baghdad-based 60th Brigade of the 17th Iraqi Army (IA) Division alongside tribal forces and an armored battalion to lead the operation, which launched south from Makhmur, making minimal gains. ISW is thus expanding the area of ISF and tribal fighter control to include recent gains from the operation.

The Campaign for Mosul: December 6-12, 2016

The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) made significant gains in northeastern Mosul from December 6 to 12, but struggled to advance in the southeast. The ISF ordered a change in tactic on December 4 in order to address the lopsided eastern offensive, attempting to make rapid advances in the southeast rather than grind through neighborhood-by-neighborhood clearing operations. The shift, however, failed drastically when the rapid gains left the ISF open to ISIS counterattacks, resulting in heavy casualties on December 6 and 7. In response, the ISF moved units previously allocated to breach Mosul’s southwestern neighborhoods to reinforce efforts in the southeast on December 10.

The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) pushed to accelerate and complete operations in eastern Mosul from December 6 to 12 in order to reach the Tigris River and launch an offensive into western Mosul as the second month of the operation comes to an end. Efforts in the southeast, largely under the command of the Iraqi Army, however, have struggled to match efforts in the northeast, led by the elite Counter Terrorism Forces (CTS). 

The CTS, with the support the 16^th Iraqi Army Division entering from the north, made significant gains in northeastern Mosul from December 6 to 12. These gains have been the result of weeks of intensive and difficult block-by-block clearing operations. The CTS used this tactic in operations in Ramadi and Fallujah; it is not having the same level of effectiveness in Mosul as it did before, largely due to the dense civilian population remaining in the city whom ISIS has used as human shields. As a result the CTS requires additional time to advance, but it is still able to make gains against ISIS because of its superior skills and experience in urban warfare.

In the southeast quarter, the less experienced Iraqi Army has not been able to overcome ISIS’s resistance by grinding through block-by-block. As a solution, the ISF ordered a change in tactic on December 4, calling for “surprise” operations that would seek rapid extensions into ISIS-held areas. The tactic was put to the test on December 6, when a unit from the 9th Iraqi Army Armored Division made a quick offshoot west in order to retake the Salaam Hospital, near the bank of the Tigris River. The move, however, left the ISF open to ISIS counterattacks and ISIS, hidden in the area, launched a massive ambush on the unit on December 6 and 7. The failure required a Coalition airstrike and a rescue by the CTS to extract the unit on December 7, which reported one hundred casualties.

The ISF and Coalition are now focusing efforts in the southeast in order to accelerate the entire eastern operation. The ISF moved three brigades from the 5th Federal Police Division, or roughly 4,000 men, from the southern axis to reinforce the ISF in the southeast on December 10. These forces, previously allocated to spearhead operations into the Mosul airport and military base, will reportedly operate in the same neighborhood of the failed hospital offensive. They are currently mobilizing in Hamdaniya, southeast of Mosul, before they move into the city itself. Additionally, sources reported that a Coalition airstrike targeted the fifth and final bridge connecting east and west Mosul. The destruction of the bridge will reduce ISIS’s ability to transport equipment and people into eastern Mosul and will help anti-ISIS forces box in remaining ISIS militants in order to advance west. If the ISF can succeed in pushing ISIS out of southeastern Mosul, forces in the southeast may move to breach Mosul’s airport and military base from the east where it could establish a forward operating base for further operations into western Mosul. 

Iraq Situation Report: November 18-30, 2016

By Michael Momayezi, Emily Anagnostos, and the ISW Iraq Team

The Iraqi Council of Representatives (CoR) passed a law on November 26 that solidifies the Popular Mobilization, the majority of which are Shi’a militias with a history of sectarian violence, as a permanent security institution in Iraq. The Popular Mobilization Act, passed primarily through the efforts of Shi’a and Kurdish parties, grants qualified Popular Mobilization Units the same rights and financial benefits as members of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). Sunni political leaders and parties, however, rejected the law as a serious blow against national reconciliation efforts and called for its reversal. The law’s current language does not address the structure of this new security institution or clarify which Popular Mobilization units, which includes several Sunni units, would be inducted into it. As it stands, the CoR will need to pass successive laws or amendments regarding the Popular Mobilization’s structure, raising a concern that the Shi’a parties’ dominance in the CoR will sway the structure to favor Shi’a militias. The law could benefit Sunnis if it legitimizes the use of local Sunni militias and tribal forces as security forces in majority Sunni provinces, thereby acting as an alternative to the National Guard Law, a key piece of legislation which Sunnis sought as reconciliation efforts but Shi’a parties blocked. National Alliance chairman Ammar al-Hakim and Sadrist Trend leader Muqtada al-Sadr both called for the form of the Popular Mobilization to be non-partisan and inclusive, but sectarian Iranian proxy militias, who already dominate both the PMUs’ leadership and the CoR, are positioned to benefit from the law the most. A legitimized Popular Mobilization will result in a sectarian security force funded by the Iraqi government but responsive to Iranian advisers, which will further alienate Sunnis from the Iraqi Government.

The Campaign for Mosul: November 22-28, 2016

By Emily Anagnostos and the ISW Iraq Team

The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) made limited gains in eastern Mosul from November 22 to 28 as it struggled to identify and target ISIS militants operating among the significant civilian population remaining in the city. Meanwhile, Iraqi Shi’a militias turned their offensive towards remaining ISIS-held cities in far western Ninewa province, as Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi announced that the Iraqi army and police would recapture Tel Afar.

Operations in Mosul remain concentrated in eastern neighborhoods as ISF units look to breach the city in other areas. To the southeast of Mosul, the Iraqi Army has nearly completed operations in the Ninewa Plains, positioning additional units to join efforts to clear ISIS. North and south of the city, Iraqi Army and Federal Police units have not yet moved to breach the city limits, respectively. Inside the city, the ISF reported that they gained control of three northern neighborhoods since November 22, but the ISF has failed to advance in southern neighborhoods. ISIS continues to use the significant civilian population as a primary line of defense, including attacking from positions within refugee flows, which is slowing the ISF’s advance inside the city. 

The Counter Terrorism Service (CTS), operating in eastern Mosul, called for a change in tactic for managing the remaining civilians in eastern Mosul. Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi urged civilians to stay in their homes as the ISF breached Mosul’s city limits in early November, forcing the CTS and Iraqi Army to adopt measures to reduce the risk of civilian casualties. The CTS now is asking for the Iraqi Government to encourage civilians to leave the area, which would allow the CTS to be more aggressive in anti-ISIS operations, including its use of airstrikes. The mass exodus of an estimated 1.5 million civilians from Mosul may overwhelm humanitarian efforts, however, allowing ISIS to take refuge in the refugee flow.

Prime Minister Abadi announced on November 23 that the Iraqi Army and police would recapture Tel Afar, a primarily Turkmen village west of Mosul and former Al Qaeda hot spot. Shi’a militias, including Iranian-backed proxies, had designated Tel Afar as its initial line of effort, raising international concerns that the militias, many of which are charged with human rights violations, may raise sectarian tensions in the area. PM Abadi’s designation of the ISF to retake Tel Afar relegates the Iraqi Shi’a militias to recapture remaining ISIS-held terrain in western Ninewa, including Baaj, Qayrawan, and Qahtaniya. The move will likely satisfy regional actors such as Turkey, which threatened undefined intervention on October 30 if the militias moved into Tel Afar. Instead, the militia units operating around the Tel Afar airbase moved west along the Sinjar highway, making contact with Peshmerga forces operating in eastern Sinjar District. Simultaneously, militia units advanced from Ain al-Jahush westward to Tel Abtah, from where they will approach Baaj from the south. The 15th Iraqi Army Division will take point for the operation into Tel Afar, where the Shi’a militias would have likely struggled to handle the dense urban terrain without taking on significant casualties.

The Campaign for Mosul: November 16-21, 2016

By Emily Anagnostos and Patrick Martin and the ISW Iraq Team

The campaign for Mosul entered its second month, with current momentum indicating that the operation will last into January 2017. The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) remained entrenched in eastern Mosul while facing fierce ISIS resistance from November 16 to 21, and Shi’a militias are on the outskirts of Tel Afar after seizing the nearby airbase on November 16.

The ISF has made little progress over the past week in eastern Mosul; they remain engaged in the same neighborhoods they have occupied since entering eastern Mosul on November 1.The Federal Police announced on November 19 that it had completed operations on Mosul’s southern axis and are positioning to breach the city’s southern border, where they will face an immediate fight over the airport and military base, both of which ISIS still occupies. The 16th Iraqi Army Division remains engaged in operations north of Mosul and has made no indication of a timeline to move into the city itself. Iraqi Shi’a militias advanced towards Tel Afar, west of Mosul, after retaking the nearby airbase on November 16. Ninewa Operations Commander Maj. Gen. Najm al-Juburi stated on November 19 that the 15th Iraqi Army Division advanced alongside the militias, likely in an effort to reduce possible backlash from multiple regional actors, including Turkey, that have rejected any Shi’a militia presence in the majority Turkmen town. The 15th Division’s training may also assist in the recapture of Tel Afar, as Shi’a militias have struggled to retake urban terrain without enduring heavy casualty.

The lack of progress in eastern Mosul may indicate that the Counter Terrorism Service (CTS) and Iraqi Army units have paused operationally in order to wait for ISF units nearing Mosul’s northern and southern limits. However, the CTS previously announced its pauses and has not done so now, even though the Joint Operations Command continues to issue daily operations reports. The CTS may also be deliberately slowing operations to ensure that it thoroughly clears neighborhoods before advancing or to wait for reinforcements to arrive.

More likely, the lack of progress may indicate that operations in eastern Mosul are not going as well as the Western or Iraqi media portrays. The CTS and Iraqi Army may be facing a high degree of attrition because of strong ISIS resistance slowing their advance inward. ISIS released a video on November 14 showing numerous, successful Suicide Vehicle-Borne IEDs (SVBIEDs) striking ISF units which tried and failed to stop the attack. The video also showed ISIS militants utilizing captured CTS vehicles. A field report from November 11 revealed that the CTS suffered high casualties in an effort to take al-Samah neighborhood on November 4 and could suggest that the CTS likely suffered similar casualties in following operations. The likely attrition of the CTS is extremely dangerous for the Mosul operation; the CTS is the most elite unit in the ISF and the only one with sufficient training in urban warfare. Moreover, the CTS’s participation in Mosul follows its involvement in Ramadi in January, Fallujah in June, and Qayyarah in August, giving the units limited time to regroup before tackling Mosul.

The ISF will face greater challenges as it moves into western Mosul. ISIS’s resistance in eastern Mosul was expected to be the easier fight as the majority of Mosul’s population is concentrated in the west, especially in the Old City where the maze-like, narrow streets will constrict ISF movement and vision. Several of the western neighborhoods were former areas of operation for al Qaeda, so these areas may have lasting insurgent networks capable of contesting ISF control and a population reluctant to trust government forces. The ISF’s struggle to clear eastern Mosul thus raises concern for its ability to overcome greater obstacles in the western half, especially as continued attrition will renders the force less effective. 

Other ISF units will move into the city to assist this main effort, but they may not provide the needed reinforcement for the CTS or a sufficient force to hold the city. The 9th and 16th Iraqi Army Divisions operating to the north and south of Mosul, respectively, are struggling to overcome ISIS obstacles outside of the city limits and are less effective than the CTS in urban warfare. The 9th Division, as the only armored division, is also likely to deploy to western Anbar after the ISF takes Mosul. The Federal Police, moving towards Mosul’s airport from the south, are compromised by Iranian-backed Shi’a militias and have limited training in urban warfare. The use of sectarian violence by some Federal Police units will also undermine security and civilians’ trust in the ISF. Some Coalition-trained units remain in western Anbar and Baghdad, however the Iraqi Government will likely elect to keep these units in western Anbar for the inevitable operation around al-Qa’im and in Baghdad out of wariness that ISIS will strike in the capital in response to losses in Mosul.

ISIS will take advantage of these limitations of the ISF and try to resurge in the city. The ISF’s difficulty in clearing and holding a limited number of neighborhoods now indicates that it will also struggle to hold the whole city. ISIS has already shown its ability to reinfiltrate cleared cities, such as several suicide attacks in Fallujah on November 14 and 17. The holding operation in Mosul will require significant resources and manpower to ensure the city remains secure and that Salafi-Jihadi groups cannot reestablish attack capabilities in the city.

Iraq Situation Report: November 9-17, 2016

By Kevin Cooper and Emily Anagnostos and the ISW Iraq Team

ISIS escalated its execution campaign in and around Mosul, targeting former Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) officers and civilians accused of collaborating with the ISF in order to maintain control and inflict fear as the ISF closes in. The UN, Human Rights Watch (HRW), and local sources reported that ISIS has executed hundreds of civilians on charges of collaborating with the ISF and has executed or kidnapped over 600 former ISF officers when it withdrew from terrain, including Hammam al-Alil and near Tel Afar. ISIS is using the execution campaign to demonstrate control over its population, deter the ISF from advancing lest ISIS retaliates with executions, and tamp down on possible internal resistance. It will likely increase this tactic as the ISF closes in on Mosul where the majority of the estimated 1.5 million civilians still remain, raising the likelihood of high human causalities during the operation to retake the city.  

ISIS reactivated networks in Anbar, allowing it to carry out suicide attacks in secured locations near Fallujah and Karbala. ISIS carried out successful suicide attacks near Karbala and at a checkpoint in Fallujah on November 14 and in Amiriyat al-Fallujah on November 17, targeting Shi’a pilgrims, security forces, and civilians. The attack in Fallujah marks the first attacks since the city’s recapture in June. The locations of the attacks suggest that ISIS has reestablished or consolidated networks in the area or found residents that remain either tolerant of ISIS’s ideology or opposed to the government enough to allow ISIS to infiltrate. ISIS will continue to exploit the gaps left in local security due to the large deployment of ISF and Popular Mobilization units away from Fallujah to northern Iraq in order to carry out attacks.

The Campaign for Mosul: November 8-15, 2016

By Emily Anagnostos and the ISW Iraq Team

As the fight between the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and ISIS in and around Mosul compresses, the high stakes of the operation and close-contact warfare are increasingly placing Mosul’s civilian population in the crossfire.

The ISF is consolidating gains to the north and south of Mosul as it continues to contest neighborhoods in eastern Mosul. The Federal Police continued its advances along the western Tigris River bank, looking to breach the city limits through the airport. On the eastern bank, the Iraqi Army and tribal fighters recaptured several villages north of the Great Zab River from November 8 to 15, including the ancient Assyrian city of Nimrud on November 13. ISIS destroyed much of the fabled ruins, which it deemed idolatrous, in the spring of 2015. Meanwhile, army units are positioning to enter Mosul from the north after retaking Bahwiza and its environs on November 8. Inside the city, units from the Counter Terrorism Service (CTS) and Iraqi Army are engaged in over a dozen neighborhoods in eastern Mosul, announcing recapture of three neighborhoods in northeastern Mosul on November 12 and 13.

The Popular Mobilization is moving to take the military base southwest of Tel Afar as a strategic stepping stone towards the city of Tel Afar, west of Mosul. The base could also serve as a launch pad for intended militia operations into Syria. The capture of the Tel Afar base would give the primarily Iranian-backed paramilitary force a major foothold in northern Iraq, adding to the Popular Mobilization legitimacy as an Iraqi security institution. The establishment of a formal Shi’a militia base in northern Iraq will likely increase the risk of sectarian violence and create conflict with both local Sunni Arab and Kurdish populations and with Turkey, the latter of which threatened on October 30 undisclosed action if the Shi’a militias “terrorized” the region.

ISIS’s resistance has become increasingly brutal over November 8 to 15 in response to the ISF’s advance towards Mosul’s city center. Its defensive mechanisms include the use of the high number of civilians still living in the neighborhoods as human shields to slow and deter the ISF. ISIS has deployed snipers to rooftops of still-inhabited houses, denying the ISF the ability to call in airstrikes lest striking the families inside. ISIS has also been pulling civilians into the city from surrounding villages to be used as shields while executing hundreds of civilians accused of collaborating with the ISF. Meanwhile, Human Rights Watch (HRW) confirmed on November 11 that ISIS used blistering agents against both civilians and security forces in Qayyarah in late August. The report,  following accounts of chlorine and mustard gas attacks in Bashiqa, northeast of Mosul, and the burning sulfur plant north of Qayyarah, underscores that ISIS will continue to use chemical weapons as part of its defense as well.

The ISF and Peshmerga have also been accused of human rights violations, which could undermine the mission to defeat and prevent the reconstitution of insurgent groups in Iraq. Amnesty International reported on November 10 that men in Federal Police uniforms had carried out extrajudicial killings of accused ISIS members in towns south of Mosul, while HRW accused in a November 15 report ISF members of mutilating ISIS corpses and executing surrendered militants, both of which constitute war crimes. HRW also issued a report on November 10 accusing both ISF and Peshmerga officials of unlawfully detaining or disappearing suspected ISIS militants at screening centers and camps around Mosul. Officials from the Iraqi and Kurdistan Regional Governments have denied the reports. Nevertheless, reports of human rights abuses underscore the high risk that the violations will increase as forces move into the dense urban terrain and the line between civilian and militant blurs. If the ISF fails to prove itself a better champion to Mosul’s population than ISIS was in 2014, it sets conditions for another insurgent group to exploit the seams between civilians and the government and resurge in ISIS’s wake.

Iraq Situation Report: November 2-8, 2016

By Emily Anagnostos, Staley Smith, Michael Momayezi, and the ISW Iraq Team

ISIS is attacking various locations and forces in Iraq in order to find and exploit a seam that can unravel the anti-ISIS Coalition. ISIS launched attacks in Tikrit and Samarra on November 6, targeting Shi’a civilians, including Iranians visiting for a Shi’a holiday. The attacks likely aim to provoke Shi’a militias to carry out reprisals on Sunni populations in order to marginalize Sunnis from the Iraqi Government. ISIS also detonated a Vehicle-Borne IED (VBIED) in Baghdad on November 8. ISIS may hope to unravel political seams that could undermine the legitimacy of the Abadi administration, like it did with the July 3 VBIED which led to the resignations of senior security officials. Some recent ISIS attacks have had success in exploiting these seams: ISIS’s attack on Kirkuk City on October 21 resulted in Kurdish security officials demolishing the homes of Sunni Arabs in response to the attacks, according to November 3 Human Rights Watch report. Although ISIS has hit on the Kurdish-Arab seam in Kirkuk, it has not been able to fracture the anti-ISIS alliance between the Peshmerga and the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), which continue to make significant gains in eastern Mosul and north and south of the city from November 2 to 8. ISIS will continue to try to exploit seams that can affect the progress of the anti-ISIS alliance in the short-term while hitting seams which keep Iraq’s Sunni population sufficiently disillusioned and victimized by the Iraqi Government in the long-term. Therefore, if ISIS needs to go to ground after it loses Mosul, there are conditions set for a renewed Sunni insurgency, off of which ISIS can rebound.

The Campaign for Mosul: November 4-7, 2016

By Emily Anagnostos and the ISW Iraq Team

The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) moved deeper into Mosul’s eastern neighborhoods as the ISF and Peshmerga made significant gains on Mosul’s eastern and southern axes in an effort to encircle the city.

The Counter Terrorism Service (CTS) and 9^th Iraqi Army (IA) Division advanced deeper into Mosul’s eastern neighborhoods, entering and encircling several neighborhoods from November 4 to 7. The pace of the ISF’s operations in eastern Mosul remains faster than expected, but the ISF still faces resistance from ISIS, which has deployed rooftop snipers, suicide attackers, and heavy artillery in order to slow the ISF’s advance. These tactics, as well as ISIS’s mining of homes and roads with IEDs, likely aim to slow down the ISF’s advance in order to buy ISIS time to fortify their defenses in the city center. Lingering ISIS attacks in eastern Mosul will also require forces to remain in the area. The CTS and Iraqi Army will therefore need to have a hold force in place to secure recaptured neighborhoods and fleeing civilians before they can advance further into Mosul’s center.

 

The ISF and Peshmerga advanced the objective to encircle the city, retaking major towns on Mosul’s northeastern and southern axes. The Peshmerga retook the ISIS-held town of Bashiqa, northeast of Mosul, on November 7, after besieging the city since October 23. ISIS attempted to repel the advance using chlorine and mustard gas, underscoring ISIS’s continued commitment to using chemical weapons during the counter-offensive. Bashiqa’s recapture frees up CTS forces to support ongoing operations in Mosul itself or bolster the 16^th IA Division’s line of effort north of the city. Meanwhile, the Federal Police and 15^th IA Division recaptured Hammam al-Alil, the last major ISIS-held town on Mosul’s southern axis, on November 5. The Federal Police continued its advance north, coming within five kilometers of the airport located in Mosul’s southern city limits on November 7. The airport could prove valuable terrain for the ISF and the Coalition as a staging ground for further operations to recapture the city center.

ISIS countered these gains by striking behind the front lines, demonstrating resurgent attack capabilities in recaptured territory. ISIS launched a major attack in Shirqat on November 4, infiltrating the town from ISIS-held terrain on the eastern bank of the Tigris River before security forces repelled the attack. ISIS also carried out twin suicide attacks in Tikrit and Samarra on November 6, striking far behind the Mosul frontline to target Shi’a pilgrimage routes in the lead up to Arbaeen, a major Shi’a holiday. The suicide attacks were accompanied by the detonation of two stationary IEDs near Tikrit, demonstrating that ISIS has re-established an attack presence in or near the city. These attacks foreshadow ISIS’s coming shift into a traditional-style insurgent group in the face of its loss of control over terrain. ISIS may try to increase spectacular attacks in areas like Samarra and Tikrit, where it can demonstrate its capacity to infiltrate highly-secure areas, and may try to infiltrate inner Baghdad neighborhoods next. ISIS may also refocus its efforts on re-establishing attack and support zones in recaptured parts of the country.

ISIS’s calculus for Mosul’s defense may also change now that the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) opened efforts to isolate ISIS-held Raqqa in Syria on November 6. ISIS may elect to shift assets from Mosul, which it likely assess it will lose, to Raqqa, which it likely calculates it stands a better chance of retaining by exploiting Kurdish-Turkish seams in the anti-ISIS alliance. ISIS may also calculate that it is better able to regroup in the desert in Deir ez Zour, where it can still maintain a connection with the ISIS-held town of al-Qa’im in western Iraq, more so than in Ninewa, where the Coalition is less susceptible to such seams. The U.S. will thus need to both ensure that the ISF continues anti-ISIS operations beyond Mosul, particularly in the upper Euphrates River Valley, and sufficiently bolster the Syrian operations to prevent ISIS from retaining safe havens in the region which could allow it to reconstitute even after losing its capital cities.

The Campaign for Mosul: November 1-3, 2016

By Michael Momayezi, Kevin Cooper, and Staley Smith

The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) began advancing into Mosul’s eastern and southeastern neighborhoods on November 1-3, marking the first time the ISF has had any presence in the city since ISIS captured it in mid-2014. The Counter Terrorism Service (CTS) stormed Gogjali, Mosul’s easternmost suburb, on November 1 and continued clearing operations on November 2. The CTS then breached Mosul’s eastern city limits, entering al-Karama on November 2 and retaking the neighborhood of Samah on November 3. Units from the 9^th Iraqi Army (IA) Division and the 1^st Rapid Intervention Division recaptured several villages southeast of Mosul before entering the southeastern neighborhoods of Judaya al-Mufti on November 1 and al-Intasar on November 3. The entry into the neighborhoods marks the start of a long operation to clear ISIS’s capital in Iraq block-by-block.

The ISF will face new challenges as it moves beyond ISIS’s outer defenses and into the city itself. ISIS successfully slowed the CTS advance on the eastern edge of the city, where security forces encountered IEDs, boulders obstructing roads, and snipers. ISIS militants had also set fire to oil trenches on the outskirts of the city in order to obscure targets from Coalition airstrikes and deter forces from advancing. Mosul’s urban terrain will further impede advances as the security forces approach the more compact neighborhoods of Mosul’s old city and industrial sectors, and ISIS’s resistance will likely increase and intensify. The risk of civilian casualty is also high, especially among those trapped inside by ISIS to use as human shields. The Iraqi Government has already begun efforts to mitigate this risk, as the Iraqi Ministry of Defense reported that the ISF opened a safe route for civilians to escape fighting on November 3, and some have been transported in Iraqi military vehicles and buses to an Internally-Displaces Persons (IDP) camp in Khazar.

Security forces have made progress recapturing terrain on Mosul’s western and southern axes. Iraqi Shi’a militias made quick gains moving northwest towards the city of Tel Afar, west of Mosul, recapturing many majority-Sunni villages along the southwestern axis from November 1-3. Iranian-backed proxy militias pushing towards Tel Afar, including the Badr Organization, Kata’ib Hezbollah and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH), are likely to engage in sectarian violence, though they have encountered few civilians during clearing operations thus far. Meanwhile, the ISF advanced north toward Hammam al-Alil, the last major city between the security forces and Mosul on the southern axis, reaching the city’s outskirts on November 2. From Hammam al-Alil, the ISF can advance to Mosul’s southern limits, where it will likely aim to recapture an airport and military base to use as staging grounds for further operations into the city.

ISW now assesses that the Peshmerga has recaptured Batnaya, a Christian town north of Mosul. Sources reported control of the city as early as October 20, but no official statement was made and sources continued to report movement into the city. The current movement of forces beyond Batnaya and video of Peshmerga forces celebrating inside the city, however, suggests that Batnaya is under Peshmerga control. The recapture of Batnaya pushes Coalition control closer to Mosul’s northern limits as the ISF and Peshmerga continue operations to retake Tel Kayyaf and Bashiqa, respectively.

Turkey deployed additional troops on November 2 to the Turkish town of Silopi on the Turkey-Iraq border. Turkish President Recep Erdogan’s announced the deployment on October 29, cautioning against Shi’a militia abuses against Turkmen populations in Tel Afar, west of Mosul. Other senior Turkish leaders also warned against the establishment of a Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) stronghold in Sinjar and called the build-up a “precaution,” not a threat. Turkey is unlikely to engage in a major operation in Iraq, particularly as it is heavily invested in Syria. However, it is possible that Turkey deploys small units into northern Iraq in order to counter any movement by the PKK or Shi’a militias which it deems hostile. Turkey may also use its build-up as leverage in discussions regarding Mosul’s post-ISIS administration. The Iraqi Government will respond to a deployment of any size as major violation of sovereignty, escalating tensions between Iraq and Turkey and undermining the anti-ISIS Coalition. 

Iraq Situation Report: October 26 - November 1, 2016

By Patrick Martin and the ISW Iraq Team

Key Take-Away: Iraqi security forces made significant gains in the Mosul campaign amid growing humanitarian concerns and fears of sectarian violence. Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) broke through ISIS defenses around Mosul, recapturing the ISIS-held town of Shura south of the city on October 29. The Counter-Terrorism Service (CTS) also recaptured a television station in eastern Mosul on October 31, marking the first time the ISF entered the city since ISIS captured it in June 2014. As security forces continue to advance into Mosul’s city limits, reports indicate that ISIS is corralling civilians near its positions to serve as human shields while intensifying its executions of non-compliant civilians and former ISF members. ISIS’s deliberate efforts to maximize civilian casualties indicate that operations to clear Mosul’s center will prove far more difficult than past operations in ISIS-held cities like Fallujah and Ramadi. Meanwhile, the Popular Mobilization launched operations to recapture Tal Afar, a majority Turkmen town west of Mosul, on October 29, as well as majority Sunni Arab villages in the Jazeera desert, southwest of Mosul. The advance consists of Shi’a Arab and Shi’a Turkmen militias spearheaded by Iranian proxy militias, whose participation in operations in majority-Sunni areas will increase the likelihood of sectarian violence. ISIS and Sunni insurgent groups will be able to exploit sectarian, ethnic, and tribal divisions to reestablish themselves in recaptured terrain and among disaffected Sunni populations. Tal Afar has a particularly bloody history of sectarian conflict between Sunni and Shi’a Turkmen and historically served as hub of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI); failure of the Iraqi forces to minimize sectarian and ethnic violence during clearing operations will increase the possibility that Sunni insurgent groups will once again resurge in the area, thus undermining the long-term stability of Ninewa Province and Iraq as a whole. 

The Campaign for Mosul: October 29-31, 2016

By Emily Anagnostos and the ISW Iraq Team

The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) reached Mosul’s eastern city limits on October 31 to begin the initial push into the city. Meanwhile, Iraqi Shi’a militias, including Iranian proxies and U.S.-designated terrorist groups, opened up a western axis on October 29 with the intention to retake Tel Afar, west of Mosul. 

The ISF has concentrated on the northern and eastern axes of the Mosul operation and is making progress towards Mosul’s eastern city limits. The Counter Terrorism Service (CTS) reached the border of Mosul’s city limits on October 31, where it clashed with ISIS. The CTS is currently operating around Gogjali, a village bordering Mosul’s eastern limits. The CTS has not yet breached Mosul’s city limits, despite local reports. Meanwhile, units from the 9th Iraqi Army (IA) Division are advancing towards Mosul from the southeast, moving beyond Hamdaniya, which the ISF recaptured on October 22. The 16th IA Division is approaching the city from the north, composing part of the third axis working on breaching Mosul’s eastern side. The 16th IA Division also continues the offensive around Tel Kayyaf, which it reportedly stormed on October 31.

The southern axis advanced after nearly a week of limited progress. The Federal Police recaptured Shura, the former Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) hub, on October 29. Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi visited the city on October 31 after a visit to the Qayyarah Airbase, which landed cargo planes on October 30 for the first time since 2014. The Federal Police now progress north towards Hamam al-Alil, the last major city on the southern axis before Mosul. 

Iraqi Shi’a militias launched an operation on Mosul’s western axis on October 29 in order to retake Tel Afar, a district with a significant Shi’a Turkmen population. The militias include Iranian-backed proxies such as the Badr Organization, Kata’ib Hezbollah, and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH), a U.S.-designated terrorist group. IRGC-Quds Force Commander Qassem Suleimani also appeared on the frontline on an unspecified date, indicating senior-level Iranian involvement in the planning and coordinating of the operation. The militias’ presence will complicate the Mosul operation and its success in defeating and preventing insurgent groups from resurging in recaptured territories. Many of the militias have a record of sectarian abuses against Sunni civilian populations and could carry out sectarian reprisals on the majority Sunni villages they pass through, as they did during their previous anti-ISIS operations in Fallujah and Tikrit. Sectarian attacks could drive Sunni populations to either seek a protectorate outside of the Iraqi government, including ISIS, or become a foothold for other insurgents, such as AQI, to resurge in Iraq. Tel Afar served as a Sunni insurgent and AQ stronghold in the early years of the Iraq War and could retain dormant AQI networks. Shi’a militia participation in greater Mosul operations also gives them a say in the post-ISIS governance of Mosul. Shi’a militias’ presence in Ninewa, combined with disputes with Kurds over the control of terrain, could marginalize Sunni Arab representation in the future provincial administration, exacerbating conditions for a renewed future Sunni insurgency after Mosul is recaptured.

Turkey may see the militias’ presence in Tel Afar, an ethnically Turkmen town, as grounds for greater intervention in northern Iraq. Turkish President Recep Erdogan stated on October 29 that Turkey would have a “different response” if Shi’a militias “unleash terror” on the city. Erdogan also announced that Turkey will be reinforcing its troops on the Iraqi border in the Turkish border town of Silopi. The town had reportedly already witnessed a military build-up when the Mosul operation began on October 17. The intervention of Shi’a militias into the Mosul operation could thus further ingrain Mosul as the convergence of regional and Iraqi actors, thereby undermining the sovereignty of the Iraqi government in northern Iraq.

The Campaign for Mosul: October 25-28, 2016

By Emily Anagnostos and the ISW Iraq Team

Operations to retake Mosul have made minimal progress since the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) announced an operational pause on October 25 in order for the five axes approaching Mosul to re-sync before advances into the city limits begin.

The northern and eastern axes are nearing Mosul’s city limits. The northern axis continues to focus on regaining the towns of Batnaya and Tel Kayyaf, north of Mosul, in order to position forces to breach Mosul’s northern city limits. The Peshmerga entered the Christian town of Batnaya on October 25, but are not assessed to be in control of the city. The Counter Terrorism Service (CTS) is poised to breach Mosul's outskirts from both the east and northeast but called for an operational pause on October 25 in order to wait for the southern axis to advance such that the encirclement of the city is evenly distributed.

The southern axis, however, has made limited progress during this pause. Operation Inherent Resolve Commander Lt. Gen. Steve Townsend described this area of ISIS’s defense as a “very hard external crust,” outside of Mosul’s hard core and a soft middle on October 26. The ISF has faced resistance from ISIS’s suicide attacks and is limited by a shortage in manpower. ISIS has also created a chemical barrier by igniting a sulfur plant on fire located near the confluence of the Tigris and Zab Rivers, north of Qayyarah, when they withdrew from the plant on October 20. The toxic plume of smoke will continue to halt forward movement until the sulfur fire is mitigated or MOPP suits are delivered, though the additional layers of clothing will likely further slow forward progress. 

The ISF finally breached Shura’s city limits, north of Qayyarah, on October 28, having encircled the city since October 19. The ISF will need to break through ISIS’s external crust and quickly make up progress towards Mosul, lest the axes grow out of sync. The southern axis may require additional reinforcements as it will face more attrition than the other axes due to its longer distance to travel towards Mosul.

New players are entering the operation. One thousand five hundred members of the Turkish-backed Ninewa Guard Force, based out of Zaylkan, are assessed to be operating alongside the 16th Iraqi Army Division around Tel Kayyaf. It is unclear if the group’s Turkish advisors are among the forces or if they remain at their base in Zaylkan, where another 1,500 members remain in reserve. All major Iraqi parties, especially the Shi’a militias, have rejected Turkey’s presence in northern Iraq; Turkish direct or indirect participation in the Mosul operation could escalate tensions between Turkey and Iraq. Shi’a militias have also stepped up their involvement in the Mosul operation and are working to open a western axis towards Tel Afar from their current position alongside the Federal Police near Qayyarah. Militia involvement could spark intra-Coalition tensions, especially if Kurdish, Turkish, ISF, and militia forces converge in an area with a proclivity for Sunni insurgency.