2013 Iraq Update #18: Maliki Continues to Target Protesters and Calls for Majority Rule

May 1, 2013

By Stephen Wicken

Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has declared a majoritarian government is the only political solution in Iraq. He has continued to send security forces to intimidate and harass Sunni Arab protest leaders, forcing them to negotiate to prevent or witness a repeat of last week’s violence in Hawija.

The situation in Iraq remains tense, one week after the attack by Iraqi Security Forces of a protest camp at Hawija. The Hawija incident sparked a wave of reactionary protests and violent incidents across Iraq’s Northern provinces, reflecting a mélange of sectarian, ethnic, and anti-government themes. Iraqi Security Forces under the control of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki have attempted repeatedly to arrest organizers of anti-government protests. Militant groups such as al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) continue to conduct attacks in order to ignite sectarian tensions, though elements of local Sunni Arab leadership appear to be trying to avoid stand-offs with Iraqi Security Forces that Maliki has sent their way. Maliki’s actions hold new significance in conjunction with Maliki’s renewed statement that “there is no solution to the political process in Iraq but to resort to the national political majority.” Rather than merely to contain a potential security crisis, Maliki may be able to capitalize upon the limited options that are left to Iraqi Sunni leaders to express grievances without igniting violence.

Threatening to repeat his actions in Hawija, Maliki deployed a significant security force to Ramadi on April 29. Ramadi protest spokesman Abd al-Razzaq al-Shammari announced that a military convoy comprising 120 vehicles was heading from Baghdad to Ramadi with the intention of storming the protest site that night. To deter an attack on the protest, said Shammari, a number of Anbari politicians and leaders, including former Finance Minister Rafia al-Issawi, tribal leader Ahmed Abu Risha, Anbari Iraqi Islamic Party MP Ahmed al-Alwani, and Anbar Provincial Council Chairman Jassim al-Halbusi, had decided to spend the night at the protest camp “in order to prevent a repeat of the Hawija scenario.” Anbar Provincial Council Vice Chairman Saadoun al-Shalan stated subsequently on April 30 that the provincial council and protest representatives had reached an agreement with Anbar Operations Command for local police to return to “protect the sit-in site” and “end all armed manifestations” at the camp. Under the agreement, police would be allowed to enter the protest site and arrest wanted individuals. The chairman of the provincial council’s security committee, Hikmat Edayeh, subsequently announced that local police had entered the protest site, accompanied by committee members. In contrast with the raid on the Hawija protest camp, the police found no weapons at Ramadi.

Deterred from raiding the Ramadi protest itself, Maliki then targeted a number of its key leaders at the home of Ahmed al-Alwani. On April 30, Anbar Operations Command offered a reward of 100 million dinars (more than $86,000) for the delivery of Ramadi protest spokesmen Said al-Lafi and Qusai al-Zain, and Ahmed Abu Risha’s nephew, Mohammed Khamis Abu Risha. The three were accused of involvement in the shooting of five soldiers near the Ramadi camp on April 27. A Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) team and police forces then attempted to storm the Alwani’s Ramadi residence – a common meeting place for Ramadi protest leaders – to arrest tribal leader Mohammed Abu Risha and Said al-Lafi. According to Alwani, the MP’s guards surrounded the house, forcing the security personnel to withdraw. Reports conflict on whether there was contact between security forces and guards. One source claimed that two SWAT team members were killed, although other sources stated that only warning shots were fired. The SWAT team ultimately withdrew without making arrests.

Salah ad-Din was also the site of a raid on protest leadership by security forces. On April 28, a SWAT team was redeployed from Diwaniyah to Tikrit to support the security effort in Salah ad-Din, where security forces were involved in a stand-off with gunmen on April 26. On April 30, security forces arrested Samarra protest leader and preacher Mohammed Taha Hamdoun on his way to the protest camp. Hamdoun was released after three hours and returned to the protest site, where he was greeted warmly.

The avoidance of repeated clashes between Sunni Arabs and the security forces is due in part to attempts by tribal and provincial leaders to cooperate with the army and police to isolate militants in Sunni-majority areas. Anbar Provincial Council has been playing a key role in defusing tensions at Ramadi. On April 30, Provincial Council Chairman Halbusi announced that Anbari tribes had handed over 16 suspected AQI members to the police, including “eight prominent members representing the al-Qaeda generation of the 2003-2005 period.” In Salah ad-Din, a tribal council with past ties to the Maliki government publicly rejected the formation of tribal militias. In Kirkuk province, moreover, tribal representatives from the Hawija area signed an agreement stipulating support for the security forces and prohibiting attacks on federal troops, a copy of which was to be sent to the government to demonstrate good faith. Such agreements demonstrate the desire of these tribal leaders to distance themselves from militants groups such as AQI and Jaysh Rijal al-Tariq al-Naqshabandi (JRTN), the latter of which has a historic base in the Kirkuk area and has been successful in drawing security forces into confrontation. Tribal leaders are not unanimously in favor of compromise, however – Anbari leader Ali Hatem al-Suleiman was reported to have vowed to respond with force if security forces stormed the Ramadi protest site.

A number of bombings targeting Shi‘a areas and attacks on members of the anti-AQI Awakening movement, however, suggest that AQI continues to seek to exacerbate sectarian tensions. On April 29, car bombs in the predominantly Shi‘a towns of Amarah (Maysan), Diwaniyah (Qadisiyah), and Karbala, as well as in the Shi‘a neighborhood of predominantly Sunni town of Mahmoudiyah, just south of Baghdad, killed at least 26 civilians and wounded dozens more. A bomb at a coffee shop in the mixed town of Muqdadiyah (Diyala), historically part of AQI’s area of operations, killed another civilian and wounded nine more, while another car bomb in the Shi‘a-majority Baghdad neighborhood of Husseiniyah killed four civilians. Meanwhile, on May 1, a suicide bomber assassinated 12 Awakening members at their barracks east of Fallujah; another Awakening member and two policemen were wounded by gunmen in an attack on a checkpoint at a village north of Baghdad. These events indicate that AQI will continue to target Iraqi Shi‘a and moderate Sunni in order to exacerbate sectarian tensions, hijack protests, and provoke responses from security forces and Shi‘a militant groups in mixed areas.

Responses to the week’s events in the national political realm suggest that the security crisis and Maliki’s recent actions will either to end in exclusion of significant Sunni participation in government or in negotiated settlement that legitimizes majoritarian rule. On April 29, Parliamentary Speaker Osama al-Nujaifi proposed a set of demands involving the resignation of the Maliki government and the dissolution of parliament, to be followed by new parliamentary elections. Nujaifi’s proposal echoes that of former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi, who made an identical call for Maliki to resign in January. Nujaifi’s suggestion may be regarded as an opening volley for negotiations, but is unlikely to meet with greater success than Allawi’s.

Deputy Prime Minister Saleh al-Mutlak, one of Maliki’s few Sunni allies in recent months, immediately rejected the possibility of early elections. Mutlak is in a difficult position, having gambled heavily on returning to Maliki’s government in March only for provisional provincial election results to demonstrate his lack of popularity among Sunni Arabs in Salah ad-Din, Diyala, and Baghdad. This, in turn, may limit his appeal as a partner in the “national political majority” government that Maliki once again called for on May 1.

The Kurdistan Alliance announced the same day that its ministers would return to cabinet sessions this week, and its MPs will return to parliament next week. The details of Maliki’s agreement with the Kurds to bring them back into government have yet to be released. The timing of the return, however, following closely upon the release of provisional provincial election results that suggest that Maliki will lose some provincial council seats compared to 2009, indicates that Maliki has discerned a renewed need for Kurdish support as he approaches a majority government. Saleh al-Mutlak, meanwhile, is now attempting to maneuver delicately, presenting himself once more as a legitimate Sunni Arab representative in announcing that excessive force was used against protesters at Hawija, while opposing early elections.  

The immediate aftermath of the Hawija incident demonstrated the depth and breadth of ethno-sectarian tension in northern and western Iraq. It also demonstrated Maliki’s willingness to deploy ISF into protest camps and to target influential Sunni personalities, as well as the willingness of many Sunni Arab leaders to negotiate in order to avoid clashes with ISF. Sunni Arab leaders are torn between the need to address longstanding popular grievances and systematic political marginalization and the need to prevent extended conflict with Maliki’s security forces. The latter desire may cause some Iraqi Sunni to tolerate a move by Maliki to cement a majoritarian government. It may also cause a vocal minority to identify with AQI and JRTN, such that protests diminish and attacks against civilian and government targets increase in the coming months.

Stephen Wicken is a Research Analyst at the Institute for the Study of War.                

2013 Iraq Update #17B: Iraq On The Edge

April 28, 2013

By Marisa Sullivan

Iraq continues its slide towards widespread violence. Over the weekend, the Iraqi government has issued an ultimatum to anti-government protesters following an attack in Anbar province that left five soldiers dead. In Kirkuk, the deployment of Kurdish forces into disputed areas threatens to broaden the conflict. Possible Iraqi government involvement in an airstrike in Syria may indicate the growing potential for regional spillover. As the crisis continues, political efforts to diffuse the tension have yet to bear fruit, though additional meetings are scheduled for this week.

 

More than 200 people have been killed in five days of clashes following the attack on protesters in Hawijah (click here for a detailed analysis of the incident and its immediate aftermath). The violence continued over the weekend when five Iraqi Army soldiers were killed outside a protest camp in Ramadi. Accounts of the incident vary. Anbar tribal leaders claimed that the soldiers were dressed in plainclothes and had run through two Sunni checkpoints and fired on a third. Government sources blamed Sunni gunmen for instigating the attack.

 

Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki vowed that his government would respond to the incident. Authorities issued a curfew in Anbar province. The head of the Anbar Operations Command demanded that protest organizers hand over those responsible for the attack within 24 hours. Sheik Ali Hatem al-Suleiman, a prominent Anbar tribal leader, stated that the protest organizers would find and turn over those responsible for the attack; Sheikh Ahmed Abu Risha alsoannounced the arrest of two individuals suspected of involvement. Their statements and actions may constitute an effort to avert further government reprisals by demonstrating tribal justice, although Sunni leaders have recently taken a more combative approach and have formed a tribal army to defend Anbar. Whether the government will follow through on its threat of a “firm response” to Saturday’s incident is unclear. On Sunday, Maliki took the ceremonious step of appearing at the funeral for the soldiers at the Ministry of Defense in Baghdad.

 

As the confrontation between Sunni Arabs and the government intensifies, there is also a growing danger that Arab-Kurd tensions along the Disputed Internal Boundaries may escalate into broader violence. In a provocative move, Kurdish officials announced on Saturday that Peshmerga forces would deploy to “to fill the vacuums in general, and especially around the city of Kirkuk.” This move would violate a local understanding between Kurdish and Iraqi Army forces, and potentially expand Kurdish control over disputed areas. Peshmerga forces said the move was taken to address the growing militant threat to Kurdish communities; however, Iraqi Army officials portrayed the move as a political maneuver and placed the security forces on alert. General Ali Ghaidan, the head of the Iraqi Ground Forces Command, said the Kurds were seeking to occupy Kirkuk’s oil fields.

 

While the Kurds may indeed be concerned about the increasing presence of Sunni insurgent groups, they may also be attempting to take advantage of the government’s preoccupation with the uprising to advance Kurdish interests along the disputed areas. At various points in recent years, Kurdish and Iraqi Army forces have narrowly averted armed confrontation over similar actions. The current crisis has already enhanced the potential for miscalculation between the two sides, making the announcement of Peshmerga deployments particularly destabilizing. Furthermore, it creates positive conditions for AQI and JRTN, which thrive on ethnic tension.

 

Prime Minister Maliki and Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani are scheduled tomeet in Baghdad on Monday. The issue of security force deployments is likely to be one of the many contentious issues that the two sides will discuss. Other issues will include the ongoing dispute over oil revenue sharing, as well as Maliki’s recent effort to remove Kurdish cabinet officials.

 

Maliki has struggled to calibrate his response, as the protests have turned violent in the wake of the Hawijah incident. The Prime Minister has appealed for calm and offered some concessions, but he has sought to contain the current violence and address the renewed Sunni insurgent threat. Maliki has warned of a return to sectarian civil war, and he has portrayed his actions as efforts to prevent this outcome. Yet Maliki’s own policies have marginalized the Sunni within the government, and sectarianism has been on the rise in Iraq since the 2010 parliamentary election that returned Maliki to power.

 

On Sunday, Iraqi officials announced the suspension of ten satellite channels, including Al-Jazeera, on grounds that they were inciting sectarian agendas. Nine of the ten stations are owned or operated by Sunni Arabs. All the stations have been critical of Maliki, and several, such as al-Jazeera, are linked to the Gulf States. This suspension may be a move by Maliki to combat what he believes is an effort by regional Sunni states to incite sectarian violence in Iraq and neighboring Syria. The announcement that the border with Jordan would be closed on Tuesday may be another step by Maliki to cut off support for the protesters. The move is likely to further anger Sunni Arabs, however, and exacerbate their feelings of persecution and marginalization in Maliki’s Iraq.

 

Maliki is expressing deep concern about spillover from Syria. In a speech on Saturday, the Iraqi prime ministerfingered the violence in Syria as the cause for the renewed sectarianism and recent unrest in Iraq. Maliki has frequently warned that the toppling of Assad in Syria may result in the spread of civil war to Iraq. An unusual incidenton Saturday may indicate the Iraqi government’s willingness to act more directly to forestall such an outcome. Activists in Syria’s eastern city of Deir ez-Zour reported that military aircraft flew into Syria from Iraq and carried out airstrikes. Syrian rebels blamed the Maliki government, but this accusation could not be confirmed.

 

Others have suggested that the plane was a Syrian MiG fighter that crossed into Iraqi airspace before turning back into Syria. This is plausible considering that Iraq has had difficulty controlling its airspace since the departure of U.S. forces in 2011. The Maliki government, however, has not commented on the airstrike or on the potential violation of Iraqi airspace. At the very least, this silence suggests Maliki’s support for the attack. If Iraqi planes were involved, it would be a significant escalation in the Maliki government’s support for Assad. 

 

Political efforts to resolve the crisis continue, but with little success thus far. Parliamentary Speaker Osama al-Nujaifi attempted to hold a parliamentary session to discuss the Hawijah incident, but he was forced to downgrade it to a “confidential consultative meeting” due to a lack of quorum. No Members of Parliament (MPs) from Maliki’s State of Law Alliance were present, and there were reports of a verbal altercation between Nujaifi and a Sadrist MP over the Hawijah attack. Nujaifi has called for another parliamentary session tomorrow. It will be difficult for any side to negotiate a political solution to the crisis as long as violent clashes persist.

 

The situation in Iraq is fast evolving. Various factors will determine whether and how Iraq’s security and politics will continue to unravel. Continued and increased clashes in Sunni areas might indicate whether Sunni Arabs will seek violent solutions to address their grievances and if Sunni insurgent groups like a-Qaeda in Iraq will capitalize on Sunni protests to perpetuate violence. It will also be important to watch if Maliki will exercise restraint or react more forcefully in response to continued clashes by closing protest camps, shutting the border, deploying Iraqi Security Forces, or broadening ISF arrests. For example, Iraqi security forces recently arrested a tribal leader in Mosul who had helped organized the protest movement. Maliki will likely react to the Kurdish Peshmerga deployment with similar movements of Iraqi Security Forces. On Saturday, a SWAT team was dispatched from Diwaniyah to Salah ad-Din in response to earlier violence in the province. Maliki may move additional troops into Kirkuk to check Kurdish expansion.

 

It will also be important to watch how the Shi’a respond to the crisis. It is possible that Iraqi Shi’a may mobilize in support of the Maliki government as they did in response to the early weeks of the Sunni protest movement. A demonstration was held recently in al-Amarah, Maysan province, where protestors voiced their support for Maliki and the Iraqi Security Force and denounced sectarianism. The Maysan demonstration was rather small. Rapid growth in the size and geographic scope of pro-government protests may indicate broader Shi’a mobilization. Attacks upon Shi’a communities and holy sites may also indicate a deliberate intent to incite a violent Shi’a sectarian response. The reaction of Shi’a political blocs to the crisis will also be important to watch. As politics become more polarized along sectarian lines, the Shi’a may decide to act in unison to boycott certain parliamentary meetings in order to stymie efforts by Sunni political leaders. The outcome of the current crisis is very much in doubt, but the events of the next week may offer important indicators on whether and how Iraq’s security and politics will continue to unravel.

 

Marisa Sullivan is a Fellow at the Institute for the Study of War.

2013 Iraq Update #17: Iraq’s Sunni Mobilize

April 27, 2013

The situation in Iraq has reached a perilous inflection. The continuous Sunni protests against the Maliki government since December 2012 had been, with one exception, peaceful. They remained so even through the provincial elections on April 20, which took place in 12 Iraqi provinces with the exception of Kirkuk, Anbar, and Ninewah. This week, after the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) opened fire on protesters in Hawija, Kirkuk, killing 20 and wounding over 100, a wider mobilization of Sunni tribes and militant groups has led to intensifying violence. This bloodshed has occurred especially along the Disputed Internal Boundaries between Arab and Kurdish Iraq, and has even Prime Minister Maliki offering concessions lest civil war erupt. Perhaps the most worrisome development, tribes in Anbar announced the formation of a tribal army to protect their communities against armed groups, including the Iraqi Army. The arming of Sunni tribes against the state sets conditions for future violence.

The circumstances surrounding the incident in Hawija are, of course, disputed among the Iraqi Security Forces and the protesters. The ISF had surrounded the protest site in Hawija, Kirkuk on April 19 after clashes between protesters and a nearby military post resulted in the death of one soldier and the injury of three others, according to the military. The ISF demanded that protesters hand over those alleged to have taken part in the attack. Protest organizers claimed, however, that those killed were protesters who were attacked by the nearby military units.  On April 23, Iraqi Security Forces from the Iraqi Army’s 12^th Division, including subordinate brigades, Rapid Response Forces, and Special Weapons And Tactics  (SWAT) teams, entered the sit-in location in Hawija. The violence began at about 5 AM on April 23, when according to the Ministry of Defense (MOD), the forces were attacked and fired back in return. The MoD added that 3 military personnel were killed and 9 were wounded. Further, 75 people were arrested and 45 weapons of various types were found during the operation. The MOD further stated that the Iraqi military did not intend to use lethal force but only sought to search the location.

The clashes and death of protesters triggered wide and violent reactions. The MoD reported that armed men attacked two military posts in the Rashad area of Kirkuk. Iraqi defense officials stated that 6 “terrorists” were killed by the ISF’s response. Thousands of tribe members in Kirkuk and Salah ad-Din reportedly mobilized and vowed to seek revenge for the death of the Hawija protesters. In Anbar, clashes between the ISF and unknown gunmen were also reported in Ramadi and Fallujah.

Anbar tribal leader Ahmed Abu Risha demanded that the Iraqi army withdraw from the “revolting towns” and hand over security responsibilities to the police. He warned of “dire consequences” if Maliki did not comply. Meanwhile, tribal leader Ali Hatem Al-Suleiman called on tribes to carry arms. He also gave ISF personnel not from Anbar the choice of either “leaving the province or to remain in their barracks.” On 26 April, federal police were reportedly withdrawn from Fallujah after they had clashed with unknown gunmen. On the same day, tribes in Anbar announced that they have formed the “Army of Pride and Dignity” to act as a community defense force from any possible attackers, including the Iraqi military. 

Almost immediately after the Hawija operation, security sources and witnesses reported that tens of “armed men” and ISF personnel were killed and wounded in clashes that erupted after an attack on a police station in the town of Suleiman Beg in Salah ad-Din Province. Gunmen were able to take control of Suleiman Beg just 24 hours after clashes the subsequent withdrawal of local ISF units. After a truce was brokered between tribal leaders and local officials on April 26, Iraqi military forces were able to regain the town. The other area that witnessed major clashes in the days following the Hawija incident was Qara Tapa in Diyala Province. Jaysh Rijal Al-Tariqah Al-Naqshabandia (JRTN), an insurgent group linked to the Ba‘ath Party, engaged in continuous clashes with the Iraqi military. The Iraqi military resorted to using its helicopters to repel the attack. Clashes have continued in Mosul and Fallujah.

At the national level, Speaker of Parliament Osama Al-Nujaifiannounced that he called Iraqi Shi‘a leaders Ammar Al-Hakim and Ibrahim Al-Jaafari, as well as President Masoud Barzani of Iraqi Kurdistan, to discuss the events in Hawija. Nujaifi revealed that a parliamentary delegation will be sent to Hawija to investigate the events, and that a delegation was sent to Kirkuk on April 26 to carry out a fact-finding mission. Nujaifi also called on the tribes to “cease fire” in order to calm the crisis. For his part, Barzaniissued a statement on the events in Hawija stating that “we condemn the use of the army to oppress unarmed protesters and we consider that a violation of the constitution and all laws.” His chief of staff, Fouad Hussein, announced that Barzani has ordered all hospitals in Iraqi Kurdistan to be ready to receive any casualties from the events in Hawija. Reflecting Iraqi Kurdish concerns about a cascading of events, Kurdistan Regional Government’s ministers of Interior and Peshmerga visited Kirkuk immediately after the Hawija operation to review security affairs with security officials in Kirkuk.

The U.S. Embassy in Baghdadissued a statement on the events in Hawija to “condemn the events that led to the death and injury of civilians and ISF members.” The statement also called on “both sides to immediately refrain from any provocative or violent acts,” and stated that, “American officials contacted senior Iraqi leaders to help in deescalating these political and sectarian tensions.” Martin Kobler, the top United Nations’ representative in Iraq, arrived in Kirkuk immediately after the Hawija operation. Kobler expressed his “regret and anger” over the events, which he thought could have been stopped.

     

Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki took steps to recover his miscalculation to besiege the protesters in Hawija. After gauging the reactions of other leaders, -Maliki’s office announced the formation of a committee to investigate the incidents. Deputy Prime Minister, Saleh Al-Mutlaq, was assigned to head the committee, which is tasked with “identifying the perpetrators and holding them accountable.” Maliki also ordered compensation to the victims and ordered the treatment of the wounded “inside and outside of Iraq if necessary.” The committee started its work by meeting with the security officials in Kirkuk from the Dijla (Tigris) Operations Command. It further announced that “all victims [of the Hawija operation are] martyrs who will enjoy all the rights and privileges” and that all who were arrested as a result of the events will be released. Maliki was thereby trying to calm the situation by making concessions that would appease tribal sentiments of vengeance.

Prime Minister Maliki has fared well in provincial elections this week, and would typically be negotiating from that position of strength to achieve further gains. He is nevertheless making concessions. Even he seems to recognize that situation is dangerous and that he is not necessarily able to manipulate it easily. Prime Minister Maliki also gave a speech on April 25 in which he attempted to decrease tensions by calling for dialogue and warning that a renewed civil war could have disastrous consequences for all Iraqis. Maliki also emphasized that it is imperative to respect the military. Other political and religious leaders have continued efforts to counter the inflammatory rhetoric and further escalation. During Friday’s prayers, a Sadrist preacher called on the military not to “assault the protesters” while calling on the protesters not to “provoke the army.” The reported withdrawal of police forces from Fallujah is also likely intended to placate protesters’ demands.        

Reactions in the first Friday protests since the Hawija operation are also telling. Protests took place in Anbar, Mosul, Baqubah, and Samarra in the “Friday of Burning the Demands,” referring to the list of concessions protesters have asked of Prime Minister Maliki since January. In all of them, protesters’ tone was defiant and indicated that they will continue protesting. In Mosul, protesters demanded that the Iraqi military withdraw.  In Anbar, thousandsjoined in protests to condemn the government and its actions and expressed distrust in Maliki and his government. Fallujah and Ramadi witnessed the largest sit-ins since the beginning of the anti-Maliki protest movement. Protesters in Ramadi had previously demonstrated a more moderate stance, willing to negotiate demands with Maliki.

These events have the potential to spiral out of control quickly. The actions of the Iraqi military and the deaths of the protesters only fuel the narrative of these groups that a Shi‘a-led government in Baghdad is not interested in treating the Iraqi Sunnis as equals. The aftermath represents a recruitment boon for both AQI and JRTN, and both groups will likely use Hawija as a rallying point for their future operations. Finally, it is likely that AQI and JRTN will seek to provoke the Iraqi military into more violent reactions in order to consolidate their positions.     

Iraq has proven resilient in the face of clashes and provocations because the memory of the calamities of 2006 and 2007 remains fresh. Fear of a return to the horrors of that period has repeatedly driven Iraqi political and tribal leaders, as well as common people, to de-escalate conflicts and return to the negotiating table. It is possible that this case will prove no different, that Maliki will make the necessary concessions to persuade both political and tribal leaders to pull back again from the brink of outright civil war. But the political context does not leave hope for much optimism. Maliki’s determined efforts to marginalize Sunni Arab political leaders have reduced their influence within their own communities while simultaneously feeding the narrative that an Iranian-backed government in Baghdad is seeking to establish a Shi’a dictatorship. 

The very determination of Sunni political leaders to find ways of remaining in the Iraqi political game have, unfortunately, also undermined their credibility in the eyes of many of their constituents, who see them as selling out. Tribal leaders such as Sheikh Ali Hatem and Ahmed Abu Risha find themselves in a very difficult place. Their road to greater influence with their angry people lies in taking more extreme stands than the political leaders—but they may precipitate the collapse of the political system entirely by going too far toward violence. 

There is also the question of when—and if—Sunni Arab communities will once again decide, independently of their representatives and tribal leaders, that they face an existential threat from Baghdad and decide to fight with such allies as are available to them, including AQI and JRTN.  Precisely such decisions by local communities led to the horrific communal strife that nearly ripped Iraq apart in 2006.  As much as memory of that horror is a deterrent to extremes and violence, memory of the fear that drove the communal violence in the first place may also accelerate the descent into its renewal. It is too early to say with certainty anything other than that the prospects for restoring peace and maintaining the preeminence of politics over violence in Iraq hang now by a slender thread.