The Military Situation in Syria’s Aleppo Province

December 30, 2015

By: Jennifer Cafarella, Genevieve Casagrande, and Jodi Brignola

Capturing Aleppo City remains a primary objective for both pro- and anti-regime military forces in Syria. While no key terrain in Aleppo changed hands in 2015, the aggregation of numerous pressures on rebel defensive lines could enable Syrian regime forces to finish the encirclement of Aleppo City in 2016. Pro-regime forces supported by Russian airstrikes have made important gains south of the city, but have failed to advance on key front lines to its north. Pro-regime forces have also advanced against the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) east of the city, notably securing the besieged Kuweiris military airbase on November 10, but largely remain focused on Syrian rebels despite Russian propaganda to the contrary.

Russian and ISIS military actions against rebels in the northern Aleppo countryside are nevertheless compounding pressures that threaten to undermine the rebel defense of the city itself. Russia increased its aerial bombardment of rebel-held areas in Aleppo following the downing of a Russian jet by Turkey on November 24, and continues to target rebel supply lines and key infrastructure necessary to support the continued defense of Aleppo City. ISIS continues to attack rebel forces supported by Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) in an effort to seize control of the border town of Azaz and the adjacent Bab al-Salam border crossing. Frequent skirmishes between Syrian rebels and JN against the Syrian Kurdish People’s Defense Units (YPG) in northwestern Aleppo Province further draw resources away from crucial front lines. This delicate military balance is unlikely to hold under current conditions, which could enable either or both the Syrian regime and ISIS to advance.

The following maps depict regime gains facilitated by Russian airstrikes in Northern Syria and the combination of military pressures that threaten to overwhelm rebel defenses in Aleppo City. 

This map shows gains made by pro-regime forces on two key front lines since Russian airstrikes began: Southern Aleppo Province and Northeastern Latakia Province. The map also depicts one rebel advance north of Hama City. Gains by pro-regime forces in Damascus and Dera’a Provinces are not depicted here, but are similar in scale.

This map depicts the military objectives of the Syrian regime and ISIS, areas frequently targeted by Russian airstrikes, and the key towns and military infrastructure in Aleppo Province in order to show the aggregation of pressures on Syrian rebel forces in Aleppo. 

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) released its own map of Aleppo Province in an effort to demonstrate the effectiveness of the Russian air campaign in bolstering regime operations. The maps contain disinformation that exaggerates the progress made by pro-regime forces with Russian support. The map appears to claim that the regime secured its positions in the southeastern countryside of Aleppo with Russian air support, although these areas have been held by the regime since November 2013. Furthermore, regime control lines in Eastern Aleppo, as portrayed by the Russian map below, are notably exaggerated as the regime has yet to clear the entirety of the supply route running from Aleppo City to Kuweires Airbase. Although the pressures on the opposition have increased, it is important not to overstate the territorial gains that pro-regime forces have made. The regime and Russia seek to undermine rebel will to continue to fight in order to achieve greater leverage at upcoming negotiations between the regime and select opposition members in Geneva on January 25.

This map, released by the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), exaggerates the gains made by pro-regime forces with Russian assistance in Aleppo Province. ISW added the yellow ovals and call out boxes to highlight the Russian overstatements. The other symbols and captions appeared on the MoD map. A zoomed out version of this map released by the Russian MoD map dates the interior control line as September 30, 2015, the start of the Russian aerial campaign in Syria. ISW reproduced the dates for the control lines on this map.

Control of Terrain in Syria: December 23, 2015

By: ISW Syria Team

The direct intervention of Russia into the Syrian Civil War has shifted battlefield momentum in favor of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad since ISW published its last Control of Terrain in Syria Map in mid-September. Russia began its air campaign in Syria on September 30, enabling the regime to mount renewed offensives against opposition-held terrain throughout Western Syria. In Aleppo Province, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and associated proxy forces launched a multipronged offensive on October 15 that has seized large swaths of rebel-held terrain in the southern countryside of Aleppo City, threatening to sever the strategic M5 Highway. Meanwhile, pro-regime forces relieved the besieged Kuweires Airbase in Eastern Aleppo Province on November 10 in a key symbolic victory that positioned the regime to exploit future U.S.-led coalition operations against ISIS along the Syrian-Turkish border. The regime also achieved tactical gains against the opposition in Northeastern Latakia Province and parts of Northern Hama Province as well as the Eastern Ghouta suburbs of Damascus.

The regime nonetheless suffers from chronic shortages of manpower that render it unable to fully capitalize upon the expanded support provided by Russia and Iran. Rebel factions seized the town of Morek in Northern Hama Province on November 5, securing a strategic position directly north of Hama City. Regime forces have also struggled to repel repeated incursions by ISIS into Central Syria despite the presence of Russian airpower. ISIS temporarily severed the vulnerable regime ground line of communication to Aleppo City in October, disrupting ongoing operations in Southern Aleppo Province. ISIS also engaged in back-and-forth battles over the town of Mahin in the Eastern Qalamoun Mountains over the past two months, threatening to disrupt the M5 Highway between Damascus and Homs City. ISIS currently retains its position in Mahin despite the deployment of Russian helicopter gunships to the region.

Meanwhile, the U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition continued to enable further gains against ISIS in Northeastern Syria. The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) – a U.S.-backed force composed primarily of Syrian Kurds – seized control over Al-Hawl along the Syrian-Iraqi border on November 13. The operation occurred on the same day as the seizure of Sinjar in Northern Iraq, restricting ISIS’s freedom of movement between Mosul and ar-Raqqa City. The SDF are currently advancing towards the key ISIS-held crossroads town of Shaddadi in Southern Hasaka Province. Initial mobilizations have also been reported for future operations to seize the ISIS-controlled Tishreen Dam along the Euphrates River as well as the northern outskirts of ar-Raqqa City.

ISW also modified this map in order to highlight a new zone of control for ISIS in Southwestern Dera’a Province reflecting new confidence in reports that Liwa Shuhada al-Yarmouk constitutes an unofficial ISIS affiliate in Southern Syria. ISW also instituted minor changes to the zones of control along the M20 Highway between Palmyra and Deir ez-Zour City after assessing that ISIS previously seized several regime checkpoints in the region. Finally, ISW adjusted the borders of the Afrin Canton in Northwestern Aleppo Province in order to more accurately depict the territory controlled by the Syrian Kurdish YPG and its allies.

UPDATED-ISIS Sanctuary Map: September 15, 2015

By ISW Research Team

Key Takeaway: ISW’s updated ISIS sanctuary map includes a new attack zone in Deraa, southwestern Syria and an expanded sanctuary zone in Idlib, northwestern Syria. ISIS claimed an attack against the Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) in Deraa on August 18, and also may be responsible for an ongoing assassination campaign against JN in Idlib. ISIS likely intends to target JN and Syrian opposition’s governance structures in preparation for future offensives in western Syria. ISIS’s increased attacks against JN also reflect an expansion of the rivalry between ISIS and JN for leadership of the global jihadist movement.  

Significant Offensives in Syria: June 6 - July 9, 2015

by: Christopher Kozak and Genevieve Casagrande

Download the full-sized version of this post as a PDF file here.

REBEL:

1. June 5 - 17: The JN-led Jaysh al-Fatah Operations Room launched an offensive on June 5 which successfully seized the town of Mahambel and seven other villages along the Latakia – Idlib Highway, largely eliminating the remaining regime-held salient in Idlib Province. Rebel forces with the Jaysh al-Fatah Operations Room have since experienced difficulty in seizing remaining regime positions south of Jisr al-Shughour in southwestern Idlib Province or along the al-Ghab Plain in northwestern Hama Province. 

2. June 9 - 12: A number of FSA-affiliated and Islamist rebel factions announced the “Battle of Retribution for the Martyrs” on June 9 and seized the regime-held Brigade 52 base in eastern Dera’a Province following heavy clashes with regime forces. The same rebel forces later announced the “Battle of Crush the Tyrants” targeting the Tha’lah Airbase in western Suwayda Province, making initial gains before being repulsed following the arrival of Druze reinforcements.

3. June 16 - 29: Four separate rebel coalitions, including the newly-formed JN-led Jaysh al-Fatah al-Mintaqa al-Janoubiyah and two distinct operations rooms led by elements of the FSA-affiliated Southern Front, launched offensives targeting regime military positions in northern Quneitra Province in the vicinity of Druze-inhabited Mount Hermon. The stated goals of the offensives included a desire to open supply lines leading to rebel forces in the Western Ghouta suburbs of Damascus. Nonetheless, the offensives ultimately achieved only limited gains in the area as rebel forces came under pressure from clashes against alleged ISIS-affiliated rebels in western Dera’a Province, the joint Hezbollah-regime offensive on Zabadani northwest of Damascus, and Israeli warnings of a possible military intervention in the event of an attack against the pro-regime Druze of Mount Hermon.

4. June 25 - 30: Rebel forces with the FSA-affiliated Southern Front announced the "Battle of Southern Storm" on June 25 directed at seizing Dera'a City as the next phase of an effort to consolidate control over southern Syria and set conditions for an eventual assault against the Syrian capital of Damascus. Although rebel forces initially made limited tactical gains within Dera'a City, the offensive largely quieted by June 30 due to a rumored operational reassessment following high casualties and poor coordination between rebel forces. Rebel commanders nonetheless continue to insist that the “Battle of Southern Storm” will not be called off. 

5. July 2 – 8: The Fatah Halab Operations Room announced the start of the “Battle of Fatah Halab” on July 2 to seize full control over regime-held portions of Aleppo City. Combined moderate and Islamist rebel forces later seized control of the regime-held Scientific Research Center on the western outskirts of Aleppo City on July 3 amidst ongoing clashes as rebels attempted to break into the New Aleppo and az-Zahraa neighborhoods of northwestern Aleppo City. Meanwhile, JN and a number of Salafi-jihadist rebel factions also announced the formation of the Ansar al-Sharia Operations Room on July 2 and launched a parallel offensive against regime positions in the az-Zahraa district which has included at least one JN suicide attack against regime forces.

REGIME:

6. June 20 - 23: The regime reportedly deployed reinforcements including the elite ‘Tiger Forces’ Special Forces unit to the western countryside of Palmyra, sparking clashes with ISIS west of the city as well as in the nearby Sha’er and Jazal Gas Fields. Although regime officials have messaged an intent to recapture the city of Palmyra from ISIS forces, no notable offensive action has yet occurred. 

7. July 2 - 7: Lebanese Hezbollah and Syrian regime forces announced the start of an offensive to seize the rebel-held town of Zabadani northwest of Damascus near the  Lebanese border on July 2. Zabadani occupies a key position near supply routes connecting Damascus to Hezbollah positions in Beirut and the Bekaa Valley. Clashes are currently ongoing as Hezbollah and regime forces attempt to enter the town from the west amidst clashes with JN, Ahrar al-Sham, and other rebel factions.  

YPG (KURDS):

8. June 6 - 23: Kurdish YPG forces supported by FSA-affiliated rebel factions and U.S.-led coalition airstrikes continued offensive operations to seize ISIS territory in northern Syria, seizing the ISIS-held border crossing of Tel Abyad on June 15 before moving south to capture the town of Ayn Issa and its associated Brigade 93 military base on June 22-23. These gains provided a ground link between the Kurdish Ayn al-Arab (Kobani) and Hasaka Province (Cizire) cantons while placing joint YPG-FSA forces thirty miles north of the ISIS stronghold of ar-Raqqa City. Nonetheless, the YPG advance also elevated tensions with Turkey, which deployed military forces to its border amidst heightened concerns over “border security”. 

ISIS:

9. June 24 – July 7: ISIS launched a major offensive against regime positions in Hasaka City on June 24, seizing several of the city’s southern districts after heavy clashes which included a series of SVBIED attacks against both regime and Kurdish security installations. Regime forces reportedly began to reverse ISIS gains by the end of June following the deployment of Republican Guard reinforcements from Deir ez-Zour City, the arrival of SAA and NDF reinforcements from Qamishli, and the limited assistance provided by YPG forces in the eastern neighborhoods of the city. Nonetheless, local reports indicate that ISIS has secured additional advances against the regime in southern Hasaka City following a renewed wave of SVBIED and VBIED attacks beginning on July 1.

10. June 25 - July 6: ISIS launched a number of counterattacks against Kurdish-held terrain following the YPG successes at Tel Abyad and Ayn Issa in early June. A group of ISIS infiltrators equipped with at least two SVBIEDs entered the town of Ayn al-Arab (Kobani) on June 25, sparking two days of clashes which left over two hundred civilians dead. ISIS militants launched similar infiltrator attacks against two towns on the east bank of the Euphrates River on June 26 and against the recently-seized town of Tel Abyad on June 30. ISIS later launched a counterattack against joint YPG-FSA forces in Ayn Issa north of ar-Raqqa City on July 5 which included at least two SVBIED detonations; clashes are ongoing. 

KEY TAKEAWAY: Syrian rebel factions have launched long-awaited offensives against the isolated provincial capitals of Dera’a and Aleppo Cities, located in southern and northern Syria respectively. These two cities represent key lynchpins in the regime's ‘army in all corners’ strategy which allows Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to claim control over all of Syria. The fall of either city to rebel forces including Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra would overturn the stalemate that has long characterized the Syrian Civil War, opening the door to further offensives against core regime terrain in Damascus and the Syrian Coast. Rebel forces have thus far achieved limited success in both cities, however, amidst reports of high casualties and poor coordination between rebel factions – in part due to friction between moderate Free Syrian Army (FSA)-affiliated rebel factions and more extreme groups led by Jabhat al-Nusra (JN). If the rebel campaigns to seize Aleppo and Dera’a Cities stall over the coming weeks, JN and other Salafi-jihadist groups could seize the opportunity to expand their leadership role within the Syrian opposition by emphasizing the gains previously achieved in Idlib Province when rebel factions united under JN’s leadership. Rebel efforts in Aleppo and Dera’a Provinces have also been handicapped by the need to respond to the threat posed by ISIS and ISIS-sympathetic rebel brigades, which have encroached upon opposition-held terrain in both the northern countryside of Aleppo City and the southwestern countryside of Dera’a Province.

The regime’s successful defense of Aleppo and Dera’a Cities thus far belies that fact that the continued dedication of valuable combat resources to outlying “corners” of Syria risks overextending the defensive capabilities of regime forces. The regime appears particularly vulnerable to an offensive by ISIS against the Syrian central corridor while regime forces are fixed in northern and southern Syria. Although ISIS has directed its main effort in Syria over the past month against Kurdish YPG forces in northern Syria in a likely effort to protect ar-Raqqa City, ISIS remains a critical threat to both the regime’s core territory and its remaining remote outposts in eastern Syria. ISIS continued to launch probing attacks against rebel forces in the Eastern Qalamoun Mountains and regime positions in eastern Hama and Homs Provinces in a likely bid to seek opportunities for further territorial advancement in the vicinity of against Homs, Hama, and Damascus Cities meant to balance losses in northern Syria and Iraq. Meanwhile, a major offensive by ISIS against Hasaka City in northeastern Syria forced the regime to deploy valuable elite Republican Guard units away from Deir ez-Zour City in a move possibly designed to weaken the regime's defenses there. The combined effects of these pressures taken in conjunction with ongoing rebel offensives could ultimately force the Syrian regime into an unwilling contraction, generating additional opportunities for ISIS to expand. 

The initiatives undertaken by the Syrian regime and its foreign backers during this reporting period suggest that the regime may be preparing for such an outcome. Regime forces have reportedly begun large-scale fortification efforts along the approaches to Damascus and Latakia in order to protect the regime’s core terrain in western Syria. Meanwhile, Hezbollah and regime forces have directed offensive operations to clear the remaining rebel presence in the Qalamoun Mountains along the Lebanese border – a necessary precondition for the formation of a loyalist rump state with connectivity to Hezbollah-dominated regions of Lebanon.  In light of these observations, the deployment of elite regime combat units to regions west of Palmyra in central Syria may also constitute a defensive maneuver to buffer the Syrian central corridor against further ISIS advances rather than a decisive effort to recapture the city as hinted by senior regime officials.  Overall, the limited offensive maneuvers conducted by the Syrian regime in recent months suggest that the regime’s capacity to set the terms of battle and dictate the trajectory of the Syrian Civil War may have been significantly degraded by the concurrent pressures of rebel and ISIS offensives.

ISIS Counterattacks in Northern Syria

by: Christopher Kozak with Jennifer Cafarella

ISIS launched a series of spectacular counterattacks on June 24-25 in a two-pronged line of effort targeting Kurdish and regime forces in northern Syria. ISIS conducteda wave of suicide attacks in Hasaka City in northeastern Syria on June 24, detonatingtwo SVBIEDs as well as three or four SVESTs targeting Kurdish internal security and regime-held checkpoints in a move likely intended to soften the city’s defenses. ISIS later launchedan offensive against Hasaka City on June 25, detonating at least one VBIED and seizingthe regime-held southwestern neighborhoods of the city. ISIS’s advance allegedly received supportfrom tribal fighters previously aligned with the Assad regime. Simultaneously, approximately thirty to forty ISIS fighters disguisedin Kurdish YPG and Free Syrian Army (FSA) rebel uniforms infiltratedthe Kurdish border town of Ayn al-Arab (Kobani) on June 25, detonating twoSVBIEDsat the border crossing to Turkey and clashing with YPG forces.

ISIS’s synchronized attacks in northern Syria likely represent part of an overarching campaign to contain its opponents in the area and set conditions for further advances in Syria. The attacks in Ayn al-Arab (Kobani) and Hasaka City appear designed to disrupt ongoing YPG-led anti-ISIS operations in northern ar-Raqqa Province in order to divert pressure away from core ISIS terrain in ar-Raqqa City. The scale of the ISIS offensive against Hasaka City also suggests that ISIS may intend to seize the city to offset recent losses to Kurdish and rebel forces along the Syrian-Turkish border at the border crossing of Tel Abyad as well as the town of Ayn Issa and its associated Brigade 93 base further south. At minimum, ISIS’s attacks in Ayn al-Arab and Hasaka City demonstrate that ISIS possesses sufficient resiliency to absorb losses in northern Syria without losing the capability to conduct military operations. Alternately, reports indicating that ISIS did not mount fierce resistance in either Tel Abyad or Ayn Issa suggest that ISIS may have accepted a degree of calculated risk north of ar-Raqqa City in order to conserve resources for new lines of effort targeting Hasaka City, central Syria, or other regions of the country. 

Control in Syria: June 19, 2015

by: ISW Syria Team

The YPG Campaign for Tel Abyad and Northern ar-Raqqa Province

by: Christopher Kozak and Genevieve Casagrande

Key Takeaway: YPG forces supported by FSA-affiliated rebel forces and U.S.-led coalition airstrikes seized the ISIS-held border crossing of Tel Abyad in northern ar-Raqqa Province on June 15, 2015, in a major victory for Syrian Kurds and the international anti-ISIS coalition. These gains successfully connect the Kurdish cantons of Kobani and Hasakah into one contiguous zone of YPG control along the Turkish border and optimally positioned joint YPG-FSA forces for an eventual advance south towards the ISIS stronghold of ar-Raqqa City. Kurdish forces cooperated with a coalition of Arab tribes, Assyrian paramilitary forces, and FSA-affiliated rebel factions to enable its rapid advance, although sustained accusations of ‘ethnic cleansing’ by the YPG of Arab civilians may disrupt wider coordination with the Syrian opposition. Recent YPG gains will also likely exacerbate tensions between Syrian Kurds, the Turkish government, and the Assad regime in a way which limits the options available to both the YPG and the U.S. in the fight against ISIS in northern and eastern Syria.

Syrian Kurdish YPG forces supported by FSA-affiliated rebel forces and U.S.-led international coalition airstrikes seized the ISIS-held border town of Tel Abyad in northern ar-Raqqa Province on June 15, 2015. This victory marks the culmination of a new YPG-led campaign to reverse ISIS’s gains against the three Kurdish cantons of northern Syria, including Hasakah, Kobani, and Afrin; to limit the flow of direct ISIS reinforcement through the Tel Abyad border crossing to ar-Raqqa City and eastern Syria; and to establish a contiguous Kurdish region stretching from Kobani to Hasakah Province. Tel Abyad is a border town on the Syrian-Turkish border between two Kurdish areas, Hasakah and Kobani that lies immediately north of ISIS-held Raqqa city. Tel Abyad and its surrounding villages represented a pocket of ISIS-held terrain which blocked transit between the Hasakah and Kobani cantons and simultaneously provided ISIS with direct supply lines for reinforcement and resupply between the Turkish border and the self-declared ISIS capital city of ar-Raqqa. Although ISIS steadily lost ground to joint Kurdish and rebel forces in eastern Aleppo Province in the immediate aftermath of the failure of its Kobani offensive in March 2015, ISIS forces managed to establish relatively stable defensive lines to protect Tel Abyad from the west. ISIS even achieved limited gains in Hasakah Province to the east, where Kurdish and regime forces maintain an informal alliance to cooperate in securing the province against ISIS advances.

The new YPG operation, announced on May 6 under the name Operation Martyr Rubar Qamishlo after a fallen YPG commander who died fighting ISIS, sought to reverse this dynamic and roll back the remaining ISIS presence in northern Syria. The operation began in Hasakah Province with a YPG push south from the Turkish border crossing at Ras al-Ayn east of Tel Abyad, directed tosecure numerous villages recently threatened by ISIS, including the crossroads town of Tel Tamir, the Assyrian villages of the Khabour River Valley, and the entirety of the Abdul Aziz mountain range west of Hasakah City. The YPG conducted this phase of the operation with the assistance of local Assyrian militia formations. Once the YPG had secured the western flank of Hasakah Province, YPG forces began the advance west towards Tel Abyad and seized the town of Mabrouka southwest of Ras al-Ayn on May 26 after receiving a “green light” from the U.S.-led air coalition to seize the entirely of the Kobani – Hasakah road along the Turkish border. This decision signaled U.S. support for some form of contiguous Kurdish autonomous region in northern Syria despite continuing Turkish reservations regarding the expansion of YPG influence on its southern border.

In response, ISIS launched an offensive against regime positions south of Hasakah City on May 30 in an apparent attempt to divert Kurdish resources and disrupt the ongoing YPG offensive. However, ISIS’s effort failed to draw significant numbers of Kurdish fighters towards Hasakah City, and YPG forces supported by FSA-affiliated rebels subsequently seized dozens of villages west and east of Tel Abyad in a consolidated effort to envelope the border city. These advances culminated in the seizure of the town of Suluk 20 kilometers southeast of Tel Abyad on June 14.  The next day, YPG and FSA forces penetrated Tel Abyad from the southeast and quickly overwhelmed the small, unreinforced ISIS force that remained in the town, prompting them to surrender to Turkish forces at the border or flee south towards Ayn Issa and ar-Raqqa City. YPG and rebel commanders have since messaged that the next phase of anti-ISIS operations will involve a joint YPG-FSA offensive south from Tel Abyad to seize Ayn Issa, sever interior ISIS lines of communication, and threaten ar-Raqqa City. This operation could potentially enable anti-ISIS forces to penetrate into ISIS’s core stronghold in Syria in a development which may produce positive ramifications for other anti-ISIS operations across Iraq and Syria.

Who is Involved?

The YPG leveraged a coalition of allied forces in order to buttress its offensives in northern Syria and promote its inclusiveness to non-Kurdish populations in the region. In Hasakah Province to the east, YPG forces resisting ISIS’s advances in Tel Tamir and the majority-Assyrian villages along the Khabour River Valley received assistance from a number of Assyrian paramilitary formations, including local residents enrolled in the ‘Khabour Guards’ as well as fighters from the greater Syriac Military Council (MFS). YPG units in Hasakah Province also cooperated closely with Jaysh al-Sanadid, an Arab tribal militia commanded by Sheikh Hamidi Daham al-Hadi of the historically pro-Kurdish Shammar tribe of northeastern Syria and northwestern Iraq. Although these groups remain driven largely by local concerns and have not played noticeable roles in the YPG offensive on Tel Abyad, their presence enables the YPG to deploy manpower towards offensive action without compromising security in its rear areas.

In Kobani canton to the west of Tel Abyad, the YPG operates alongside a number of FSA-aligned Syrian rebel factions organized under the umbrella of the Burkan al-Firat (Euphrates Volcano) Operations Room. The Euphrates Volcano Operations Room was founded on September 10, 2014, with the expressed intent of expelling ISIS from eastern Aleppo and ar-Raqqa Provinces. The majority of the groups participating in the operations room consist of local brigades seeking to reclaim their home regions following losses to ISIS which forced them to seek shelter in Kurdish-held areas. The presence of these rebel fighters thus provides YPG forces with added legitimacy in their efforts to seize and administer Tel Abyad and the surrounding villages of northern ar-Raqqa Province, which are populated primarily by Arab and Turkmen civilians sympathetic to ISIS.

Ethnic Cleansing?

Despite its inclusion of FSA-affiliated rebel factions and other local paramilitary forces, prominent opposition actors have accused YPG forces of perpetrating a number of abuses against Arab civilians during the advance into northern ar-Raqqa Province. These allegations largely center upon claimed YPG involvement in the forced displacement of Arab civilians and the burning of Arab homes in an “ethnic cleansing” campaign designed to lay the foundation for the establishment of an autonomous Kurdish region in northern Syria. On May 30, as YPG forces began the advance towards Tel Abyad, the exiled Syrian National Coalition (SNC) released a statement accusing the YPG of committing “violations” against the local civilian population in Hasakah Province which served to “encourage sectarian and ethnic extremism.” In early June, Syrian opposition figures reaffirmed their concern over reports of YPG civilian abuses against Arab and Turkmen populations in light of the imminent fall of Tel Abyad. Former Syrian Military Council (SMC) chief of staff Salim Idriss stated his concern regarding Kurdish abuses against civilians, while Ahrar al-Sham, Jaysh al-Islam, and thirteen other prominent rebel brigades released a joint statement demanding that the YPG be listed as a “terrorist organization” due to its “ethnic cleansing” of Arab areas. Independent media organizations have also reported these allegations, although no clear evidence has yet been presented. These accusations may threaten to disrupt the current cooperation between Kurdish forces and the Syrian opposition amidst preparations for a FSA-led offensive towards ar-Raqqa City.

Implications

The YPG capture of Tel Abyad marks a major strategic victory for Kurdish forces and their efforts to form the governance structures of a self-declared Kurdish autonomous region in northern Syria termed ‘Rojava.’ Kurdish control over Tel Abyad and its countryside provided a physical link between the Cizire (Hasakah) and Kobani (Ayn al-Arab) cantons for the first time, bolstering the YPG’s value to the international anti-ISIS coalition as well as Kurdish claims to self-governance. However, these gains also escalate tensions with two prominent actors: Turkey and the Assad regime. The Turkish government has repeatedly condemned the YPG as a “terrorist” group due to its connections with the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), and Turkish President Recep Erdogan warned on June 14 that the YPG seizure of Tel Abyad “could lead to the creation of a structure [i.e. Rojava] that threatens our borders”. These concerns could ultimately drive the Turkish government to curtail or otherwise limit its participation in the international anti-ISIS coalition.

Meanwhile, the Assad regime maintains an uneasy balance with YPG forces in Hasakah Province, particularly in the cities of Hasakah and Qamishli, and remains unwilling to allow a Kurdish separation from Syria. Similarly, Syrian Kurds harbor no sympathy for the Assad regime following years of systemic repression and the removal of the remaining regime presence in Hasakah Province forms a necessary precondition for the formation of a truly autonomous Rojava, Although regime and YPG forces continue to informally cooperate in Hasakah Province, this engrained antipathy has resulted in numerous minor clashes between regime and YPG forces in northeastern Syria. In one recent incident, YPG forces refused to provide support to regime forces during an early June 2015 ISIS offensive against regime positions south of Hasakah City, prompting the state-owned Al-Watan newspaper to publish a critique of the “American project” to establish an independent Kurdish entity. One day after the fall of Tel Abyad, YPG and regime forces engaged in clashes throughout Qamishli which the YPG blamed on regime “provocations”. These tensions will likely intensify as the YPG continues to gain ground in northern Syria and the regime suffers additional losses in western Syria.

The YPG and its local allies retain an optimal position to threaten ISIS control over ar-Raqqa City and its surrounding countryside in the aftermath of the battle for Tel Abyad. Rebel fighters in the Euphrates Volcano Operations Room have identified ar-Raqqa City as their next objective and the YPG defense chief for Kobani canton confirmed that “Tel Abyad is only the end of a phase…we will pursue what remains of ISIS, no matter where.” ISIS appears to view a joint YPG-rebel advance on ar-Raqqa as a viable threat and reportedly directed residents of the city to stockpile food supplies in preparation for a potential siege. Any such offensive would require an attack by YPG and Euphrates Volcano fighters against the ISIS-held town of Ayn Issa and its associated Brigade 93 base, located south of Tel Abyad along the highway to ar-Raqqa City. However, the extent to which the YPG remains willing to advance outside of the Kurdish-majority regions of its envisioned Rojava remains unclear and Syrian Kurds may alternatively prioritize efforts against remaining direct threats to their own borders, such as the enduring ISIS presence in Sarrin southwest of Kobani or the regime remnants in Hasakah Province. Nevertheless, the ascendance of the YPG and the position it maintains between Syrian rebels and the regime will continue to form a key factor in dictating the options available to the U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition in Syria.

Syria Situation Report: May 27-June 2, 2015

by: Christopher Kozak

ISIS Control and Expected Offensives in Central Syria: May 29, 2015

by: Christopher Kozak and Jennifer Cafarella

Syria Situation Report: May 21-26, 2015

by: Christopher Kozak

Control of Terrain in Syria: May 22, 2015

by: ISW Syria Team

Control of Terrain in Syria: May 20, 2015

by: ISW Syria Team

Syria Situation Report: May 14-20, 2015

by: Jennifer Cafarella

Syria Situation Report: April 20-28, 2015

By: Christopher Kozak

Syria Situation Report: April 14-21, 2015

by: Jennifer Cafarella

Syria Situation Report: April 7-14, 2015

by: Christopher Kozak, Jennifer Cafarella, and the ISW Syria Team

Syria Situation Report: April 1 - 8, 2015

by: Jennifer Cafarella

ISIS in Syria Campaign Update: March 31, 2015

by: Christopher Kozak, Jennifer Cafarella, and Nicolas Ball

KEY TAKEAWAY

A series of ISIS defeats in Iraq and northern Syria over the past three months have driven ISIS to shift the focus of its Syrian campaign into central and western Syria in order to reestablish an image of military strength. ISIS was required to seek an alternate focus for its war effort in Syria due to its inability to defeat YPG forces in Aleppo and Hasaka Provinces. ISIS appears to have decided to target the Syrian regime rather than escalate directly against JN or Syrian rebel groups, and will likely continue capitalizing on disruptions in the regime’s military campaign in Idlib and Dera’a in order to maximize the effect of its own attacks in central Syria. ISIS may conduct a major attack against critical regime terrain such as the Palmyra Military Airbase or the regime and Hezbollah stronghold of Qusayr near the Lebanese border. If ISIS forces begin to display the ability to hold overrun regime positions in eastern Homs and Hama Provinces, this would be an indicator of a near-term ISIS offensive in the Syrian central corridor.

ISIS must balance its expanding activities in central and western Syria with the requirements of its ongoing defensive operations in northern and eastern Syria. ISIS escalation in central Syria may invite opportunistic or retributive counterattacks against ISIS forces in northern and eastern Syria by either YPG or Syrian regime forces. ISIS must maintain stable defensive lines in order to protect core ISIS interests in both Syria and Iraq. These include cross-border smuggling routes into Turkey, ground lines of communication connecting ISIS in Syria to ISIS in northern and western Iraq, and ultimately the de facto ISIS capital city of ar-Raqqa. ISIS appears to calculate that it is possible to maintain this defense by leveraging rebel defections to ISIS to offset the resource requirements of expansion into the central corridor. ISIS therefore prioritizes changing the calculus of rebel groups to favor ISIS expansion, and does so by disrupting the existing security environment. ISIS will likely also leverage its operations against the regime to curry favor with rebel groups, who may opt to facilitate increased ISIS activity in western Syria if directed against the Syrian regime. This expansion into western Syria will present a challenge to the anti-ISIS coalition, as it will likely to be unwilling to or unable to target ISIS positions inside core Syrian terrain.

1: ISIS Consolidates Defensive Posture Near Ayn al-Arab

  

ISIS consolidated its defensive lines in eastern Aleppo Province following its retreat from Ayn al-Arab/Kobani in January 2015, as joint YPG-rebel forces operating under the Euphrates Volcano Operations Room and supported by U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition airstrikes pushed southwest to challenge ISIS terrain along the Euphrates River. ISIS destroyed the Shuyukh Fawqaniand Qarah Qawqazbridges in mid-March after withdrawing to the western bank of the Euphrates River, ceding control of several villages to YPG-led forces in order to leverage the Euphrates as a natural barrier to YPG expansion. The slowdown of the Kurdish advance outwards from Ayn al-Arab/Kobani likely reflects Kurdish inability to project force deeper into the southern Ayn al-Arab countryside in order to challenge ISIS-held terrain along the M4 highway. It is also likely that the YPG do not seek to attack deep into the ISIS-held interior, where there is a minimal Kurdish population. ISIS is therefore likely to maintain its now-fortified positions on the western bank of the Euphrates River, and is unlikely to be challenged in its southeastern Aleppo or Raqqa terrain in the near term.

2: ISIS Maintains Pressure on YPG Forces in Western Hasaka Province

  

ISIS has applied consistent offensive pressure against key YPG terrain along a frontline stretching from Ras al-Ayn on the Turkish border southeast through Tel Tamir and the Assyrian Christian villages of the Khabour Valley to Hasaka city. Taking advantage of the limited coalition air support provided to YPG forces in the province, ISIS launched an offensive against Ras al-Ayn on March 10, seizing Tel Khanzir and several other villages west and south of the town in clashes which included two separate Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED) attacks. Meanwhile, ISIS militants continue to combat joint YPG-Assyrian forces in the western countryside of Tel Tamir following a late February ISIS offensive which seized most of the western bank of the Khabour River. Since March 20, ISIS also conducted three Suicide VBIED (SVBIED) and VBIED attacks against Kurdish neighborhoods of Hasaka city in an apparent attempt to weaken the resolve of Kurdish populations to continue their campaign against ISIS. Although ISIS has not managed to make major gains in these offensives, the constant pressure applied to western Hasaka Province is likely sufficient to prevent further YPG advances that could challenge ISIS-held terrain along the Turkish border west of Ras al-Ayn.

3: ISIS Enhances Security Measures in Eastern Deir ez-Zour

  

ISIS has intensified internal security measures in eastern Deir ez-Zour Province in response to frequent attacks by unidentified militants against ISIS security patrols and checkpoints in the town of al-Mayadin in addition to persistent rumors of the establishment of anti-ISIS rebel sleeper cells in the region. ISIS continued its ongoing mass arrest campaign targeting former members of Jabhat al-Nusra and other rebel brigades. This campaign likely allows ISIS to address internal security fears through intimidation, to neutralize cells of potential resistance, and possibly to replenish depleted ISIS manpower reserves through conscription. Meanwhile, reports from March 27-28 indicated that ISIS fighters are reinforcing systems of interlocking trenches and berms around important ISIS urban terrain, suggesting that ISIS also fears an external challenge to its control over the Euphrates River Valley. ISIS first implemented this type of reinforcement in early January, digging a trench southwest of Abu Kamal, and has since expanded this fortification to almost fully encircle the border town in addition to constructing similar defenses surrounding al-Mayadin. ISIS likely perceives a continued threat from Deir ez-Zour tribes based in the eastern countryside of the province, who have previously resisted ISIS consolidation of power over the area. These fears may have been stoked in part by a regime raid against the ISIS-held T2 oil field west of Abu Kamal on March 4, which marked the first hostile incursion into eastern Deir ez-Zour Province since ISIS seized the area last year.

4: ISIS Assaults the Syrian Regime in Central Syria

  

ISIS appears to have designated a new main effort against the Assad regime in central Syria beginning in early March 2015. Over the past month, ISIS forces launched a series of successful hit-and-run attacks against regime checkpoints, military facilities, and oilinstallations throughout eastern Homs and Hama Provinces including recent assaults against an air defense battalion near the Tiyas (T4) Airbase east of Homs City on March 27 and the regime-held village of Mabouja east of Hama City on March 31. The nature of these offensives suggests that ISIS seeks to shape the conditions for future territorial gains in central and western Syria while bolstering ISIS morale with a new narrative of victory. ISIS has conducted executions of alleged regime collaborators, massacres of Alawite civilians, and publicized beheadings of regime fighters in an effort to establish a perception of dominance over the Syrian regime and likely to maximize the asymmetric effect of ISIS attacks through psychological warfare. Increasing the visibility of this campaign, ISIS reestablished its “Wilayat” [Province] in Hama Province on March 29, releasing a video branded with the Wilayat Hama logo after over a year of silence. The reestablishment of the ISIS Hama media office underscores the propaganda value that ISIS seeks to derive from its operations against the regime in this region, and may signal ISIS intent to formalize its governance activities in the area. However, ISIS forces in Homs and Hama Provinces do not appear able to conduct sustained operations or hold recently-seized terrain. Multiple reports of ISIS withdrawals following heavy regime aerial bombardment suggest that ISIS units in central Syria may not currently possess sufficient resources to decisively overcome the Assad regime’s military advantages. Nonetheless, by threatening key regime terrain such as the Palmyra Military Airbase, the supply routes to Aleppo and Deir ez-Zour cities, and the natural gas infrastructure which provides much of Syria’s electricity, ISIS may achieve asymmetric effects against the regime. This could include forcing the regime to redeploy additional reinforcements to the region, creating opportunities for ISIS expansion into the Syrian central corridor.

5: ISIS Builds Presence in the Damascus Countryside

  

ISIS cells in western Syria continue to infiltrate and subvert opposition-held terrain. ISIS persists in its effort to expand into rebel-held areas of Qalamoun and the southern and eastern countryside of Damascus, increasingly challenging rebel control of terrain and the unity of rebel ranks. This is likely in order to secure lines of communication that connect ISIS forces in the eastern Homs countryside to ISIS forces positioned along the Lebanese border and inside Damascus city. ISIS militants operating out of the Hajar al-Aswad neighborhood of southern Damascus are accused of conducting an escalating campaign of kidnappings and attempted assassinations of prominent opposition figures in the southern and eastern suburbs of the city in early March. This campaign is targeted to generate local disorder and rebel disunity that can create exploitable opportunities for ISIS expansion. ISIS has also worked to strengthen its direct governance in southern Damascus through public executions, including the March 20 beheadings of three men accused of colluding with the regime. However, ISIS expansion into Damascus Province is met with active hostility from JN, Jaysh al-Islam, and other opposition factions which will be difficult to overcome without additional investment of resources or manpower by ISIS in the near term.

6: ISIS Tests Rebel Unity in Aleppo

A stagnated front line persists between ISIS and rebel forces supported by JN north of Aleppo city. ISIS appears engaged in an effort to disrupt security in rebel and Kurdish-held areas of western Aleppo in order to create an opportunity for ISIS to advance. The objective of the stalled ISIS military offensive north of Aleppo city appears to be to seize control of the rebel supply line passing from the Bab al-Salama border crossing into the former ISIS stronghold of Azaz. Throughout March, ISIS demonstrated the ability to penetrate into Kurdish and rebel-held terrain through sleeper cell activity. Both the YPG and Ahrar al-Sham claimed to have arrested ISIS sleeper cells. An SVEST attack on March 25 targeting a rebel checkpoint west of Aleppo city appeared to further validate fears of ISIS infiltration into rebel terrain. ISIS complements these efforts through a propaganda campaign that attempts to justify ISIS aggression toward certain rebel groups under the guise of combating Western influence and secularism. ISIS has also increased its defensive fortifications north of Aleppo city, possibly in response to a recent increase in JN and rebel tactical victories against the regime in the area. ISIS forces are reportedly digging a network of trenches near Dabiq, building concrete rooms to protect ISIS forces from anti-ISIS coalition airstrikes, and ordering the evacuation of civilians, likely to enable increased fortification in the area. ISIS is likely to continue these two lines of effort in Aleppo in the near term rather than launching a direct offensive against JN and rebel forces.