The city of Mosul has witnessed an increased effort by extremist groups, likely al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) but possibly the Ba’athist group Jaysh Rijal al-Tariqah al-Naqshabandia (JRTN), to seize control of the city. Reporting from Mosul is severely limited at this time, not because violence has been reduced, but instead because journalists were targeted in late 2013, effectively placing the city under a media blackout. A campaign of intimidation is underway, suppressing reporting and masking all but the most spectacular attacks. Attacks upon local government figures and Mosul University students indicate that security conditions in the city center are very dangerous at this time. ISF operations in Anbar do not reduce threats to other urban capitals in Iraq, especially Mosul, where the militant organizations AQI and JRTN have both been active.
Journalists
In a likely effort to isolate the city, armed groups launched a campaign on October 2013 against media reporters and journalists. Reports indicate that journalists received threats via e-mails and text messages. After killing 5journalists, around 40 others departed the city to safer areas. Half of them moved to Kurdistan and others left to Turkey. Reportedly, there was a hit list of 40 journalists. It is unclear who issued the hit list but according to a survey conducted by the Journalist Freedoms Observatory, the threats were likely issued by “terrorist” organizations, security forces, or influential political parties. It is not possible to assess confidently whether the threats were issued by AQI or by JRTN. The survey’s implication of the local government is noteworthy. The local government has not visibly worked to overcome this condition, either because they have also suffered intimidation, or because they do not want to provoke ISF mobilization in Ninewa. Targeting of journalists is likely part of a larger campaign, to keep the city isolated and closed off from international visibility.
As a result, there is a limited quantity of reporting on violent events in Mosul. This requires a different lens through which to view violent events that are reported in news media. The following violent events are indicators of an orchestrated campaign to control local institutions within the city center.
Targeting of Local Government Employees
In an effort to paralyze the local government in Mosul, armed groups targeted the employees of the local government. According to anonymous employees of the local government, around 80 employees were killed by unidentified gunmen between November and December of 2013. The targeting of employees forced the government to stop providing bus transportation for employees, as bus stops and bus routes were highly vulnerable.
Wide targeting of Mokhtars [neighborhood governmental representatives] in Mosul took place on September 29, 2013. A Mokhtar is a person who has lived in an area for a long time and therefore possesses great deal of information on that area. Mokhtars in Mosul therefore likely support the ISF with local intelligence. In one day, five Mokhtars were killed while five others survived because they left their homes before they were stormed by unidentified gunmen. This targeting caused 18 others to resign, while the rest suspended their activities. Mosul’s mayor, Hussein Ali Hachim criticized the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) for not providing adequate protection for the Mokhtars. According to Hachim, ISF escorted Mokhtars to ISF headquarters and back in military vehicles, increasing their signature, and therefore making them visible targets. Hachim himself survivedan assassination attempt on December 11, 2013 when unidentified gunmen opened fire on his motorcade in the area of Tel Kayef, northern Mosul. The attack resulted in the injury of the mayor along with several of his bodyguards.
Meanwhile, Commander of the 3rd Division of the Federal Police General Mahdi al-Gharawi, issued an opposite accusation. Gharawi stated on January 19, 2014 that most of the Mokhtars were used by the “terrorist” groups and were killed by the same groups after they were not useful anymore. Mokhtars likely faced pressure by both the ISF and armed groups in the province to provide information and influence. Their intimidation and targeted assassination has likely left a void of social structure within Mosul that increases the overall threat to the population and to the security forces.
Students
Other targeted groups in Mosul have included Mosul University students. Around 14 students were killed by unidentified gunmen in the second half of 2013 which made other non-local students depart the city. A student who survived the attacks stated that the killings were done indiscriminately. The attacks were carried out in the well-fortified Hadaba Street, close to the university and students’ shared living quarters which, suggesting that non-local students had been the deliberate target. In a separate campaign of attacks in November 2013, a number of Yazidi students were killed. Yazidis are a non-Muslim, ethnic minority. On November 28, 2013 unidentified gunmen opened fire on bus drivers on whom Yazidi students relied to commute from their homes in northern Mosul. This incident, along with othersstopped more than 2000 Yazidi students from attending the University of Mosul by December 23, 2013.
The crisis in the University of Mosul was confirmed by official accounts. Universities in Iraqi Kurdistan offered Yazidi students the opportunity to transfer their enrollment, and Minister of Higher Education and Scientific Research, Ali al-Adib approved of a request submitted by 14 students from Baghdad to transfer to universities in the capital.
These incidents are indicators that AQI or JRTN may be establishing control of neighborhoods within Mosul. They are also grave signs that the Iraqi Security Forces do not control the city. While all eyes are focused on Anbar, it is essential to observe warning signs of AQI’s next campaign objective, which elements of AQI outside of Anbar have a prime opportunity to pursue. If these incidents are indeed perpetrated by AQI, we can discern that its campaign objectives lie beyond controlling Fallujah, and indeed that the organization has scoped a wider path to restoring an Islamic state in Iraq.
Iraqi Sunni tribes in Anbar are key players in the current crisis in Fallujah. The Iraqi government will not succeed in defeating al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) in Anbar without the full support of tribal leaders. Some of these tribes are part of what is known as the Sahwa or Awakening Councils and have sided with the government in its military operations in Anbar. Other tribes have decided to fight against the government and in some cases also against AQI by joining a new military council that is likely affiliated with the Ba’athist Jaysh Rijal al-Tariqah al-Naqshabandia (JRTN). Some are still deciding. As of now, it appears that Maliki has agreed to let the tribes of Fallujah clear AQI without the involvement of the Iraqi Army. This compliance, along with other conditions, will determine if the tribes of Fallujah will remain aligned with Iraqi Security Forces.
Pro-Government Tribes and Tribal Figures
There are currently a number of tribal figures supporting the government:
Ahmed Abu Risha: At the moment Abu Risha appears to be the main backer of the Iraqi government among tribal figures in Anbar. Abu Risha’s position with regards to the government has changed, becoming more accommodating in the wake of the provincial elections. He is the brother of one of the founders of the Awakening (Sahwa) Councils in 2006, Abdul Satar Abu Risha. Abdul Satar was killed by al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) in September 2007, and Ahmed Abu Risha became the leader of the Awakening Councils. Since then, he has been working totransform the Sahwas into a political power. As a respected Sunni leader that rejects AQI, he has become that group’s public enemy number one. A recent statement by an AQI spokesman placed a bountyon his head, calling him out by name.
Ahmed Abu Risha was influential in the appointment of the governor and local officials in the aftermath of the 2009 provincial elections. When the Iraqi Sunni anti-government protest movement began, Abu Risha became a criticof the government and was one of the speakers at the protest site. As a result, the Iraqi government officiallyreplaced him as the leader of the Sahwas in February of 2013. His successor, Wisam al-Hardan, is unlikely to have inherited all of Abu Risha’s supporters. However, since the end of the 2013 provincial elections, Abu Risha has been reengaging with Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. The rapprochement may have been the result of promises and financial support to Abu Risha by the Iraqi government and Maliki. Abu Risha calledon the people and tribes of Anbar on January 1, 2014 to fight AQI after AQI members emerged in the major cities of Ramadi and Fallujah. His governmental re-elevation to the position of Sahwa leader has caused disagreement among Sahwa forces, including with Wisam al-Hardan. The Abu Risha tribe, particularly Ahmed and his nephew Mohammed Khamis, are currently the target of tribal anger in Anbar because many view them as traitors to the protest movement. This pertains especially to Mohammed Khamis who was a leader in the protest movement and the subject of an arrest warrant. Anti-government Iraqi Sunni social media outlets published a photo of him wearing a mask while reportedly working with the commander of the Iraqi Special Forces Golden Division Commander, Fadhil Barwari. The veracity of the photo is unconfirmed, but after the photo appeared, however, reports emerged that Mohammed Khamis had turned himself in to the military and is currently cooperating with security forces. The emergence of the surrender report is an indicator that Mohammed Khamis may currently be working with the government.
Hamid al-Hayes: Al-Hayes was also a cofounder of the Awakening Councils in 2006-2007 and became one of the government’s main backers and allies in Anbar in 2013. Since January 1, 2014, Hayes has called for the Sahwa to fight AQI and for the deploymentof the Iraqi military into the cities, a demand which the people of Fallujah have resisted. Hayes has also been critical of other tribal figures in Anbar including Ali Hatem al-Suleiman, whom he describedas a “rat” that has to be brought to justice. Additionally, Hayes’s brother, Mohammed, the leaderof the Sons of Iraq Foundational Council, also appears to be dominant among the pro-government tribal leaders. On December 27, Hayes metwith a number of tribes, indicating that he had the support of those tribes.
Governor Ahmed Khalaf al-Dulaimi: Dulaimi is the current governor of Anbar and supported the shutdown of the protest sites in the province. He has also been calling for the army to redeployto Fallujah. His tribe, the Albu Dhiab, is supporting the government likely due to their affiliation with Dulaimi and his position within the government. Prior to becoming governor, he was a protest backer and a respected figure among anti-government protesters. After his election, Dulaimi reversed his position and became more supportive of the government, evidence of the fluid nature of Anbari tribal politics. He may have switched sides because Ahmed Abu Risha did so. On January 6, Dulaimi denied that AQI had kidnapped him as indicatedby earlier media reports. The reports of his capture may have been intended to demoralize anti-AQI fighters, while the denial attempts to prevent AQI from achieving the psychological advantage of claiming that two significant government backers are in its custody. This episode is also evidence of the ongoing propaganda war between anti-government and pro-government forces.
The Albu Fahad tribe is also supportive of the government. Its leader, Rafi Abu Al-Naja, was targeted by a car bomb attackthat bears the signature of AQI on January 3. This targeting is likely due to his cooperation with the government.
The Albu Bali tribe which lives in an area of Ramadi that bears their name is also supportiveof the government and was able to retake a police station from AQI on behalf of the government on January 2. The Albu Bali tribe has been a long-standing supporter of the government including announcing the formationof a force to “eliminate” AQI from Anbar in April 2013. This means the tribe is considered an enemy of AQI. The Albu Bali area has witnessed continuousfighting and shelling likely due to attempts to attack the tribe either by AQI or by other rivaling tribal elements. It is likely that the Albu Bali is facing a great deal of pressure due to cooperating with the government and is demanding government support in light of recent attacks.
Abu Risha (left) and governor Dulaimi (right) reportedly inspecting areas in Ramadi. Posted on Sahwa Twitter account, January 8.
Anti-government Tribal Forces
Anti-government tribes have generally kept a lower profile than their pro-government counterparts. These tribes include the Albu Nimr, al-Jmelat, al-Halbsa, and Albu Issa. There are indications that the anti-government effort is centered on Fallujah, generally the most radicalized city in Anbar. As opposed to Ramadi, Fallujah is not dominated by the tribes that formed the Sahwa councils in in 2006-2007, and its tribes have always stood apart from government security to a greater degree. The anti-government tribes are currently reported to be in the city’s outskirts and are concentrated on disrupting supplies going into Ramadi from Baghdad. But they are also reportedly active in the cities and quickly took control of buildings in Fallujah over the weekend of January 4.
Video from YouTube alleging anti-government tribal figures taking over an abandoned military post.
On January 3, a video wasposted on a YouTube channel that is affiliated with Jaysh Rijal al-Tariqah al-Naqshabandia (JRTN), a Ba’athist militant organization. The video alleged that Fallujah tribal elements attacked a military convoy on a highway. It is likely that JRTN is using the cover of tribal elements to conduct attacks and give the impression that tribes are engaged in the fight against the government to provide the effort more legitimacy and also to trigger more anti-government mobilization in other predominantly Iraqi Sunni areas. The video portrays clearly, however, tribal confrontation with the Iraqi government forces.
Another video was posted allegedly showing tribal elements taking over an abandoned military post in Fallujah on January 2. The attackers are masked and do not appear militarily sophisticated or organized as AQI fighters traditionally are. In this case, the video is of tribal militias from Anbar.
According to reports, AQI has established checkpoints inside the city of Fallujah. However, at this point AQI has avoided confrontationswith the tribes in the city. This decision is intended to avoid repeating mistakes from 2004-2007 when AQI lost the support of the tribes because the organization imposed harsh measures.
AQI is dominant in Fallujah because it has re-established its support system in the area extending southeast to northern Babil. The city is also known to be a center for Salafist conservative and religious thought in Iraq. There were likely AQI “sleeper cells” and sympathizers in Fallujah prior to the takeover of the city by gunmen.
The tribes in Fallujah have broadcast the message that AQI is not in control in the city. They have instead emphasized that they control the city in the context of anti-government sentiment. A two part video postedon January 6 showed masked gunmen with old-style Iraqi flags to indicate that they are not AQI, as other Iraqi groups, including JRTN, use the old flag. The gunmen claimed that they are sending a message from “the rebels of the tribes in Fallujah.” The message was directed to Abu Risha and governor Dulaimi, both pro-government tribal leaders. The speaker criticized them for mobilizing the youth in the sit-in site for an entire year and then selling them out when the fight against the government became real. The speaker claimed that by forming the Sahwas these leaders demonstrate their desire to betray the people of the city and added that if the Sahwas entered Fallujah, none of them will return. He then called on the Sahwa to repent. This direct criticism of Abu Risha illustrates the complex tribal dynamics in Anbar and that he and Dulaimi, who were supporters of the protest movement, took advantage of the phenomenon for their own benefits.
The speaker in the video stated that they are defending themselves against a “Persian” attack. This is a reference to the Iraqi government, which many Iraqi Sunnis perceive as an Iranian-backed government. The speaker also denied that all residents of Fallujah are members of AQI, responding to Iraqi government claims that Fallujah is controlled by AQI.
The tribes in Fallujah have also recently been heavily engaged in the internal political affairs of the city with the formationof a tribal council that includes the notables of the community. The council is led by Abed al-Rahman al-Zobaie, and is attempting to project an image that the situation is normal in Fallujah. The tribes have also combined their effortswith the scholars of the community and called on government employees to return to their jobs on January 7. In the current unclear picture in Fallujah, multiple tribal and social groups are likely competing, but none of them is in fact in in control. These groupings are likely setting up to be future influencers in the local government and civil affairs. It appears that their main purpose is to avert a military operation in the city. Questions remain about their future influence if Fallujah is peacefully re-controlled by the government.
Iraqi Sunni tribal mobilization in support of Anbari protesters has also spread to other provinces. On January 8, unidentified but unmasked tribal figures in Salah ad-Din gathered and sent a message to the Iraqi government and in solidarity with the protesters. In the statement, a tribal figure criticized the Iraqi government and ISF for attacking Anbar after it had protested peacefully for more than a year. He further criticized the government for working with the tribal leaders that it selected. The proliferation of this public mobilization in the future will be indicative of future anti-government sentiments.
The Tribal Revolutionary Military Councils
A fighter jacket emblazoned with JRTN logo. Photo from a Mosul TMC Facebook page.
The most significant tribal-military development to emerge from the recent tribal uprising in Anbar is the formation of the Tribal Military Councils (TMCs) in multiple Iraqi provinces. The group first emerged in Anbar under the name of the Military Council of the Anbar Tribal Revolutionaries in the beginning of January. On January 8, the Albu Nimr tribe joined a military council established in Fallujah, accordingto an Iraqi intelligence source. The Albu Nimr tribe resides on the outskirts of the city and if true, their step to join the TMCs indicates possible hardening of tribal defenses in the face of a possible military operation in Fallujah. Within days, Tribal Military Councils (TMCs) with similar names were announced in other provinces, all carrying the same logo in their release videos indicating their direct connection and common foundation. Thus far, there are at least seven councils in Anbar, Kirkuk, Baiji, Fallujah, Mosul, Baghdad, and Samarra. One of the first statements issued by the TMCs outlined the responsibilities and duties of the council. Below is a summary and translation of the Anbar TMC statement:
Authority
ANBAR TMC is the only authorized entity to issue statements, specify speakers, and make decisions.
On ISF
ANBAR TMC called for the ISF not to point their weapons at the people and to give their weapons and equipment to the rebels. In this case the rebels will not attack them. The rebels of the tribes warn them from deception and we remind them that they are the sons of Iraq not Maliki.
On Police
Anbar TMC called for the police not to roam using their vehicles so that all are safe.
On tribes in the south and other tribes
We call for tribes in the south and other areas to withdraw their sons from Anbar and the other areas to preserve Iraqi blood and unity. We will hit with an iron fist anybody who insists in being a servile follower to the government of the criminal Nouri al-Maliki
On Sahwas
We tell the Sahwas that they have a historic opportunity to return back to their tribes and to forget what the servants of Maliki who lead Maliki Sahwas have told them. Your continuation of killing your people in this dangerous condition will place you in the bracket of traitors, spies, and killers. If you abide by our call to serve your tribes and families then we promise you safety. Otherwise, you have been warned.
On SWAT, Army, and other forces currently in Anbar, and on their withdrawal from Anbar cities.
The governmental army and SWAT militias that were formed under illegitimate and unlawful conditions, and all the forces that Maliki brought to violate Anbar are to depart all of Anbar, not only to withdraw from the cities.
On politicians from Anbar
Anbari politicians are to withdraw from this criminal and evil political process. You know that you and your families gave Maliki permission to do his crimes, rape the women, torture, humiliate, and kill the men, old men, and children. Otherwise you will be severely punished. If you do withdraw, then your places among your people and families are preserved
On media coverage
All media outlets and reporters are to communicate with our authorized speakers. And we hope that caution is practiced by some of those who mean to fish in trouble waters and those who hate upon the revolution and the conspirators who may leak clips, pictures, and information that damages the revolution, its goals, and icons. We will provide all facilitations to professional media outlets with no exception
On general property
The council warns against assaulting general property and will hit with an iron fist anybody who attempts to assault the properties of the citizens. Let it be known that Maliki intelligence in cooperation with the local government were the ones who stole, burned, and violated some of the public properties.
The group established a Facebook page on January 2 that has 44,694 likes as of January 8. This rapid rate of growth suggests that the group had previously been organized and had an online presence. The group also has a YouTube channel. The rhetoric of the group is similar to JRTN’s rhetoric. The group also used the same name for Kirkuk as used by JRTN, Tamim. Furthermore, the group appeals to the same constituency as JRTN’s, and its current locations are areas where JRTN is prominent. In the announcements, the groups also demonstrate a level of professional military attire and organization that is not characteristic of tribal individuals. They show a great deal of respect to the former Iraqi military as is the standard for JRTN. Notably, the TMC’s Facebook in Mosul has a poster of a TMC member that is emblazoned with the JRTN logo. The TMCs also use the pre-2003 Iraqi flag that is used by JRTN. Their media production, however, is less sophisticated than JRTN’s and includes short videos normally filmed at night especially for their operations.
The TMCs are currently forming, and their real power has yet to be determined. They do not appear to have carried out major military operations yet. Anbari tribal leader, Ali Hatem al-Suleiman, announced a group with a similar name during a speech published on January 3 in which he threatened an uprising. If he is working with the TMCs, he is probably acting as a tribal figurehead rather than as a de facto leader or the group. Rather, the similarity of the TMCs’ rhetoric to JRTN’s suggests that JRTN is a major player, if not the biggest component of the group.
Conclusion
Sunni tribes have reacted to government actions in Anbar in widely different ways. Some have attempted to forge common cause in utilizing the Sahwa to clear AQI from the cities, and the government needs these forces to avoid a deployment of ISF into cities which could spark further bloodshed. Figures such as Abu Risha have popularity due to their previous support of the protest movement, but have drawn criticism for cooperating with the Maliki government. On the other hand, some tribes in Anbar and other provinces have begun to form Tribal Military Councils. These TMCs have made statements strongly similar to and indicating the presence of the Ba’athist militia JRTN, and they demand not just the withdrawal of ISF from the cities but from the entire province. These announcements will be provocative to the Iraqi government, but the present course is a fine line between accommodation and sparking an open uprising by anti-government tribes.
Ahmed Ali is a senior Iraq Research Analyst and the Iraq Team Lead at the Institute for the Study of War.
Anti-government demonstrations have been shrinking in size and receiving decreased media attention in recent weeks as violence has risen in Sunni Arab-majority areas. The developments in tandem suggest that Sunni Arabs are abandoning protests to form tribal militias or join established insurgent groups such as the neo-Baathist Jaysh Rijal al-Tariq al-Naqshabandia (JRTN). The insurgent groups are likely to absorb other protesters after the elections in Anbar and Ninewa on June 20. Given mounting evidence of Shi‘a militant mobilization in and around Baghdad in recent weeks, the threat of widening sectarian conflict in Iraq continues to grow.
Since December 2012, competitors to represent Iraq's Sunni Arabs have presented the Sunni population with the options of protest, federalism, or insurgency. Protests have diminished in size in recent weeks, however.Regional autonomy and outright rebellion have become the main poles around which protest sentiment has re-organized. The divisions have hardened between the pro-federalism camp, centered on Parliamentary Speaker Osama al-Nujaifi’s Mutahidun (United) political coalition and Sunni clerics such as Jordan-based Abd al-Malik al-Saadi, and the pro-insurgency camp, most strongly concentrated in Fallujah, Mosul, and Tikrit and linked to insurgent groups such as Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and JRTN.
The social media outlets that had helped organize and document the anti-government protests in Iraq have changed in character.In recent weeks, widely “liked” Facebook pages that since December 2012 have been devoted to disseminating information on the protests have been posting fewer and fewer images and videos of protests inside Iraq.[1]Where the pages do reference the ongoing protests, they seldom make reference to the number of attendees, and visual evidence shows that demonstrations are visibly diminished in size. Instead, the more popular pages – particularly that of the Iraqi Revolution – refer to the “heroic” activities of revolutionary “tribal rebels” (thuwar al-‘asha’ir) attacking Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), particularly the federal police. Although these rebels are not designated by group names, it is possible in many cases that they are representatives of the tribal militias formed in response to the Hawija incident in April.
Increasingly, these social media accounts are referring to three key indicators of growing sectarian conflict both in Iraq and beyond. Firstly, a number of spectacular attacks across Iraq in recent weeks point to growing efforts on the part of AQI to push Iraq back into sectarian fighting. Secondly, mounting evidence of the remobilization in Baghdad of Shi‘a militants, particularly Asa‘ib Ahl al-Haq (the League of the Righteous or AAH), both to conduct ethnic cleansing of Sunni-majority areas and to gain ground from the Sadrists, raises the threat of Sunni-Shi‘a violence spreading outwards from the capital. Thirdly, the Assad regime’s offensive against Al-Qusayr in May and early June 2013 demonstrated the heightened involvement of Lebanese Hezbollah and Iraqi Shi‘a militias in an increasingly sectarian conflict in Syria. This conflict has exacerbated the pull of sectarian identity politics across the region, prompting protests from Ramallah in the West Bank to the Qatari capital of Doha, whence Egyptian-born cleric Yusuf al-Qaradawi called for a “Day of Rage and Support” across the region in support of the Syrian rebels.
Qaradawi’s speech was immediately posted on a number of Iraqi Facebook pages that have served as social media platforms for the protests. Highlighting the link, on May 31, Said al-Lafi, the clerical student who has served as spokesman of the Ramadi-based Anbar Coordination Committee, spoke at a ‘Supporting the Syrian People’ conference in Doha organized by Qaradawi. Wearing a ‘Free Syria’ scarf, Lafi toldthe audience that “our revolution in Iraq is an extension of the one in Syria” in response to an Iranian “conspiracy against our religion.” Lafi called on his “Arab brothers” to be ready to intervene in Iraq, warning that as soon as Syria falls to the Free Syrian Army, “the next step will be Iraq.”
As the key spokesman identified with the ‘Pride and Dignity Square’ protest just north of the city of Ramadi, Lafi has been a leading protest figure since his emergence in January 2013. He established himself as the voice of the protesters in the demonstrations’ early weeks, issuing the formal list of 13 demands made by protesters in Anbar, Ninewa, and Salah ad-Din in January. Lafi is no stranger to extremist statements, having in the past issuedthreats to Iraqi security forces and warnedthat Sunni Arab Iraqis would attain their rights “whether by peaceful means or not.” This provided the Maliki government with an opportunity to attempt to marginalize an influential figure, issuing a warrant for his arrest on terrorism charges and attempting more than once to arrest Lafi.
Lafi’s Doha speech, however, which ended with the chant “Sunni blood is one!”, marked a significant escalation in rhetoric from a figure close both to Mutahidun’s political leaders and to the protest’s spiritual leader, Abd al-Malik al-Saadi. (Lafi was the target of an arrest attempt on April 30 while meeting with protest leaders at the home of Mutahidun leader and Anbari Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) chairman Ahmed al-Alwani.) Highlighting this connection to Qatar, Mutahidun spokesman Thafir al-Ani on June 13 announced that a number of members of the Renewal List (Tajdeed) – the splinter from the Iraqi Islamic Party formed by fugitive former Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi – had joined Mutahidun for the upcoming elections in Anbar and Ninewa. Hashemi has appearedrepeatedlyon Qatar’s Al-Jazeera in recent months making exaggerated claims about the need for a Sunni region in Iraq in order to avoid a sectarian civil war, and any connection to his list will only solidify the Mutahidun’s sectarian and federalist credentials at voting time.
In his speech, Lafi made reference to another key development that threatens to detonate Iraq’s sectarian tensions, claiming that “an entire Sunni generation is being demolished in Iraq at the hands of Shi‘a militias.” Mounting evidence points to the remobilization of these militias, AAH in Baghdad, where AAH has been implicated in an attack on senior Sadrist figure Hazem al-Araji. While AAH historically has been active in Baghdad and predominantly Shi‘a southern Iraq, the group established a political office in Tal Afar in Ninewa in September 2012 and has also sent delegations to Mosul.
This remobilization of Shi‘a militias and the growing regional weight of sectarianism has encouraged Mutahidun leaders to represent themselves to voters in Anbar and Ninewa as the protectors of Iraq’s Sunni Arabs. At an election rally in northern Mosul on June 9, Thafir al-Ani warned that if the people of Ninewa do not choose a “strong” bloc to govern the province, “Asa‘ib Ahl al-Haq and [Iraqi Hezbollah militia] the Army of the Chosen and [its leader Wathiq al-] Battat will enter the alleys of Mosul and kill those who worship.” It is not enough, claimed Ani, to participate strongly in the elections – voters must choose “owners of brave attitudes and principles.” Following Ani at the podium, Ninewa Governor Atheel al-Nujaifi – brother of bloc leader Parliamentary Speaker Osama al-Nujaifi – sought to bolster the bloc’s Sunni nationalist credentials, paying tribute to the province’s resistance to American occupation as well as to the “bullying” of the central government. The Mutahidun leaders’ use of Shi‘a militant threats and the history of Sunni resistance as campaign topic highlight both the coalition’s efforts to project strength and the increasing utility of using sectarian rhetoric to do so.
Protest leaders and spokesmen have also issued warnings of the threats posed by Shi‘a militias to Sunni Arab communities. On June 13, Abd al-Razzaq al-Shammari, spokesman for the Popular Committees tied to Lafi’s Coordination Committee, announced that the Ramadi protest on Friday, June 14 would take the name “You Are Higher,” explicitly intended to send “a clear message to our brothers and our families in Baghdad, Diyala, and other provinces that they are above the militias.” The organizing committee of the Fallujah protest went a step further, declaring the formation of popular committees to protect residential neighborhoods in the city from armed groups and militias. Ahmed al-Tai, a protest organizer in Fallujah, claimed that security forces would not protect Anbaris from militias paid by “political parties” to assassinate civilians. There is no clear evidence, however, that AAH has mobilized in Mosul or Tal Afar. Managing security in and around the city, a historic base for both AQI and JRTN, has long been a problem for the security forces, however. A number of provincial elections candidates were killed in Ninewa prior to the postponement of elections in March. More recently, three candidates were killed around Mosul in early June. Fadel al-Hadidi, a candidate for the Ninewa-based National Tribal Gathering of the Mother of Two Springs, was shot to death in central Mosul on June 8; Luay Abd al-Wahid Hussein Fathi, of the independent Good and Tender Iraq list, was killed by gunmen east of Mosul on June 12; and Muhannad Ghazi al-Murad of the Iraqi Republican Assembly affiliated with Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Saleh al-Mutlak's list, was gunned down after Friday prayers in the Zahra neighborhood on June 14. On June 13, a member of the office of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s Daawa Party, Khalil Dhiab Shehab al-Sumaidaie, was killed by gunmen while traveling north of Mosul. The latter attack was praised on social media by an account connected to Sunni cleric Taha al-Dulaimi, an outspoken proponent of Sunni federalism. Atheel al-Nujaifi, meanwhile, survived an assassination attempt on June 13, the thirdin two months, when his motorcade was targeted by a car bomb that killed two civilians nearby. MG Ahmad Hassan al-Jabouri, who transitioned from the role of Ninewa Police Chief to the Border Protection Forces last week, was also woundedin an IED attack on his motorcade south of Mosul on June 11.
The assassinations in Mosul constitute an interesting subset of a larger trend of increasing attacks, including a wave of 10 vehicle-borne explosive (VBIED) attacks that rippled across Iraq on June 10, 2013 in what was likely a coordinated AQI operation. Most were suicide attacks (SVBIEDs), an AQI signature, and the cumulative casualties exceeded 180. The wave consisted of two distinct efforts.
The first effort centered on Baghdad, exploiting traditional sectarian fault lines in the capital, Taji, and Diyala in order to continue AQI's apparent effort to mobilize Shi'a militias and fuel sectarian war. The highest casualties were inflicted by this effort, in the open markets of Tajiand Jadidat al-Shat and near the police station in Kadhmiyah. The SVBIED attack against the police station in Kadhmiyah occurred just one week after the assassination attempt on Hazem al-Araji, a leading Sadrist. The Araji event pointed to a rise in intra-Shi’a violence as former Mahdi Army elements wrestle to respond to the threat posed by AQI, especially since Baghdad has resurfaced as AQI's main effort, most visibly in the wave of SVBIED attacks on 20 and 27 May.
The second effort was concentrated in northern Iraq in Kirkukand Ninewaprovinces, and it uniformly targeted headquarters of Iraqi Army and Iraqi Federal Police. Examining the northern wave of SVBIED attacks more closely, they constitute a separate effort to combat Iraqi Security Forces in the provinces. These attacks are likely attributable to AQI since they are contemporary with continued attacks in Baghdad, as well as correlated with historicAQI VBIED attack patterns. They also illuminate additional threat streams that are present in the north. Ansar al-Islam has re-emerged in jihadist virtual forums to claim creditfor SVBIED attacks in Ninewa. Both AQI and Ansar al-Islam share a jihadist vision and communicatewithin the realm of al-Qaeda associates; however, Ansar al-Islam is traditionally considered to envision objectives within the geographic bounds of Iraq, whereas AQI is formally affiliated with al-Qaeda core and its transnational vision. As recently as November 2012, Ansar al-Islam credited AQI's front group in Iraq, the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) for its role in jointattacks; however, over recent months, the group has begun to complainbitterly of persecution by ISI. A report that ISI leader Ayad al-Ayesh was killedin Mosul at the hands of Ansar al-Islam also suggests in-fighting among jihadist organizations operating in the city.
It is possible that this infighting among Sunni extremist groups explains other attack patterns visible in Mosul in June 2013. There have been reports of unexplained targeted killings against individual civilians, for example. The majority of recent attacks in Mosul have instead been effective small arms fire attacks against army and federal police forces, executed with a degree of surgical precision indicative of ex-military forces, according to sources on the ground. This attack profile points more directly to JRTN, whose members include skilled former military personnel. The group retains a great deal of capacity, including in western Mosul. Its members are well-trained, drawing strongly from the ranks of the Baathist-era military, and continue to conduct organized attacks using automatic weapons and occasionally mortars. JRTN’s lethal activities, like those of Ansar al-Islam, are likely centered on Ninewa and Kirkuk provinces. The group is also careful to target the army and federal police, avoiding attacks on local police drawn from the communities within which it operates. Through its political arm the Free Iraq Uprising, JRTN has long had a strong presence at a number of protest sites, particularly in Fallujah, Mosul, and Tikrit, in addition to its key role at the Hawija site. JRTN has likely increased in membership and influence over the course of the anti-Maliki protest movement. Its rhetoric is revolutionary, callingfor the overthrow of the American-installed constitution and the “Safavid” government it produced. This makes JRTN the likeliest group behind an emerging threat against the ISF in the north.
The anti-Maliki protest movement has receded since the Hawija incident on 23 April 2013. The observed recession in protest activity, combined with reflections of emerging Sunni nationalist rhetoric and rising attack trends with and without AQI signatures, raises the concern that insurgent activity is replacing the protest movement as an accepted means of resisting the Maliki government. Small arms fire attacks and IED attacks against ISF targets are also historically attributable to Sunni insurgent or revolutionary groups, many of which are likely associated now with JRTN.
These attacks raise questions about the future of Sunni Arab disposition within Iraq. Clerical and tribal voices still call for the continuation of protests until protesters’ demands are met, but their influence appears to be waning. That the protests are shrinking in size and receiving diminishing coverage both in news and social media implies a change in strategy for Sunni Arabs seeking to address long-held grievances against the Maliki government.
A high turnout at the upcoming provincial elections may indicate continued interest in the political process, but as Iraq’s recent history has shown, politics and violence are by no means mutually exclusive. AQI opposes all political participation, and is likely behind the attacks on provincial election candidates, especially those who were former members of the anti-AQI Sahwa (Awakening) militias.
As an explicitly Sunni-oriented but Iraqi nationalist group, JRTN is better placed than AQIto gain widespread Sunni Arab support. Iraq’s Sunni Arabs turned away from AQI in huge numbers in 2007-2008, and the group’s commitment to targeting government forces and Shi‘a civilians in order to provoke renewed sectarian conflict, while apparently successful in encouraging Shi‘a militant remobilization, is not a promising strategy for winning widespread Sunni support. Although JRTN was known to attack Sahwa members while US forces were still in Iraq, AQI has targeted them continually, assassinating scores of popular and influential tribal figures who also played significant political roles.
Negotiation remains a possible avenue for easing Iraq’s growing crisis, but a slim one. Osama al-Nujaifi has sought to present himself as a mediator between the government and the protests, but has been rebuffed by protest spokesmen outside his own camp and forced to state his support for Abd al-Malik al-Saadi’s ‘goodwill’ initiative, which Saadi has insisted should have no involvement from politicians. Saadi’s negotiation campaign, however, has yet to advance beyond the announcement stage.
Instead, a preponderance of factors point to Sunni Arab mobilization, some of which has already occurred and more of which is likely in Iraq’s immediate future. AQI continues to conduct massive waves of spectacular attacks on the ISF, is likely behind assassinations of Sunni political figures, and has prompted the remobilization of Shi‘a militias in Baghdad. The fall of Al-Qusayr has prompted a growing use of sectarianism for political ends across the region, and its reflections inside Iraq are already heightening sectarian tensions. A surge in political campaigning as the provincial elections draw closer may focus Sunni Arab attention on the vote in the short term, but is also driving sectarian rhetoric. Rallies and voting centers, meanwhile, will constitute key targets for AQI, while security deployments in Anbar and Ninewa increase the likelihood of confrontation between the ISF and JRTN and between the ISF and tribal militias. While Sunni anti-government protests may be diminishing in size, sectarian tensions and violence trends are by no means following suit.Instead, levels of violence in predominantly Sunni Arab areas continue to point toward the likely re-emergence of a widespread Sunni Arab insurgency in Iraq.
Stephen Wicken is a research analyst at the Institute for the Study of War and Jessica Lewis is its research director.
[1] For example, the “Iraqi Revolution” Facebook page, established in February 2011 to cover Iraq in the context of the Arab Awakening, grew steadily in popularity in the early months of the protests, reaching more than 100,000 “likes” by early February. While its popularity has continued to grow, the rate has slowed dramatically in recent weeks. Where the page once featured multiple posts per hour on protests across Sunni Arab-majority Iraq, including photos and videos, it now features primarily images of militants and slogans about revolution.
