The Military Situation in Syria’s Aleppo Province

December 30, 2015

By: Jennifer Cafarella, Genevieve Casagrande, and Jodi Brignola

Capturing Aleppo City remains a primary objective for both pro- and anti-regime military forces in Syria. While no key terrain in Aleppo changed hands in 2015, the aggregation of numerous pressures on rebel defensive lines could enable Syrian regime forces to finish the encirclement of Aleppo City in 2016. Pro-regime forces supported by Russian airstrikes have made important gains south of the city, but have failed to advance on key front lines to its north. Pro-regime forces have also advanced against the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) east of the city, notably securing the besieged Kuweiris military airbase on November 10, but largely remain focused on Syrian rebels despite Russian propaganda to the contrary.

Russian and ISIS military actions against rebels in the northern Aleppo countryside are nevertheless compounding pressures that threaten to undermine the rebel defense of the city itself. Russia increased its aerial bombardment of rebel-held areas in Aleppo following the downing of a Russian jet by Turkey on November 24, and continues to target rebel supply lines and key infrastructure necessary to support the continued defense of Aleppo City. ISIS continues to attack rebel forces supported by Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) in an effort to seize control of the border town of Azaz and the adjacent Bab al-Salam border crossing. Frequent skirmishes between Syrian rebels and JN against the Syrian Kurdish People’s Defense Units (YPG) in northwestern Aleppo Province further draw resources away from crucial front lines. This delicate military balance is unlikely to hold under current conditions, which could enable either or both the Syrian regime and ISIS to advance.

The following maps depict regime gains facilitated by Russian airstrikes in Northern Syria and the combination of military pressures that threaten to overwhelm rebel defenses in Aleppo City. 

This map shows gains made by pro-regime forces on two key front lines since Russian airstrikes began: Southern Aleppo Province and Northeastern Latakia Province. The map also depicts one rebel advance north of Hama City. Gains by pro-regime forces in Damascus and Dera’a Provinces are not depicted here, but are similar in scale.

This map depicts the military objectives of the Syrian regime and ISIS, areas frequently targeted by Russian airstrikes, and the key towns and military infrastructure in Aleppo Province in order to show the aggregation of pressures on Syrian rebel forces in Aleppo. 

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) released its own map of Aleppo Province in an effort to demonstrate the effectiveness of the Russian air campaign in bolstering regime operations. The maps contain disinformation that exaggerates the progress made by pro-regime forces with Russian support. The map appears to claim that the regime secured its positions in the southeastern countryside of Aleppo with Russian air support, although these areas have been held by the regime since November 2013. Furthermore, regime control lines in Eastern Aleppo, as portrayed by the Russian map below, are notably exaggerated as the regime has yet to clear the entirety of the supply route running from Aleppo City to Kuweires Airbase. Although the pressures on the opposition have increased, it is important not to overstate the territorial gains that pro-regime forces have made. The regime and Russia seek to undermine rebel will to continue to fight in order to achieve greater leverage at upcoming negotiations between the regime and select opposition members in Geneva on January 25.

This map, released by the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), exaggerates the gains made by pro-regime forces with Russian assistance in Aleppo Province. ISW added the yellow ovals and call out boxes to highlight the Russian overstatements. The other symbols and captions appeared on the MoD map. A zoomed out version of this map released by the Russian MoD map dates the interior control line as September 30, 2015, the start of the Russian aerial campaign in Syria. ISW reproduced the dates for the control lines on this map.

Russian Airstrikes in Syria: September 30 - October 12

By Genevieve Casagrande and Jodi Brignola

Key Takeaway: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continued to ramp up its aerial campaign in Syria, claiming to conduct 250 “combat sorties” from October 9-12. This spike in Russian military activity is a notable escalation compared to the 20 “combat sorties” flown on October 8. Most Russian airstrikes continued to concentrate in northwestern Hama province in support of a large-scale regime offensive in the area. In addition, Russian warplanes conducted numerous airstrikes in the western countryside of Aleppo against rebel and Jabhat al-Nusra positions. These airstrikes coincided with ISIS’s largest advance against rebels in northern Aleppo since August 2015, indicating that Russian airstrikes are not deterring ISIS from launching new offensives. Instead, rebels in Aleppo province are currently facing escalated threats from pro-regime airstrikes and ISIS simultaneously. The Russian MoD also claimed airstrikes in the vicinity of Kuweires Airbase east of Aleppo City, likely targeting ISIS, alongside Syrian regime operations near the airbase that led to the death of IRGC Brigadier General Hossein Hamedani on October 8. Kuweiris has been under siege by ISIS, such that providing relief to pro-regime ground forces there requires engaging ISIS directly. The Russian MoD also claimed airstrikes in ar-Raqqah, Homs, and Damascus, which would suggest additional strikes targeted a combination of ISIS and rebel positions; however, credible local reporting did not validate these claims.

The following graphic depicts ISW’s assessment of Russian airstrike locations based on reports from local Syrian activist networks, Syrian state-run media, and statements by Russian and Western officials.

High-Confidence reporting. ISW places high confidence in reports corroborated both by official government statements reported through credible channels and documentation from rebel factions or activist networks on the ground in Syria deemed to be credible.

Low-Confidence reporting. ISW places low confidence in secondary sources that have not been confirmed or sources deemed likely to contain disinformation.

 

Syrian Opposition Guide: October 7, 2015

By Jennifer Cafarella and Genevieve Casagrande

Read this update online here.

This reference guide provides a baseline for identifying Syrian opposition groups. The guide aims to permit researchers to track how groups realign as the Russians commence operations. It seeks to inform the development of policies that aim to protect Syrian rebels willing to cooperate with the U.S. in order to defeat ISIS and marginalize al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra.

The chart characterizes each group’s relative strength, its areas of operation, its participation in multi-group operations, and its sources of external financing (derived from other experts’ studies). The document carefully identifies those groups that are separable from Jabhat al-Nusra, drawing a sharp distinction between the al-Qaeda affiliate’s subcomponents and those groups that have a more transactional relationship. Whereas the Russian military actions will likely drive these groups together, diminishing the influence of al-Qaeda actually requires breaking the groups apart. Targeting rebel groups writ large through military strikes is therefore counterproductive and will lead to entrenchment of al-Qaeda in Syria. 

Russia's Impact on the Opposition

Russian air operations in Syria impose new pressures on Syrian rebel groups on the ground. Although the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian airstrikes focused on ISIS, local reports and the U.S. official statement indicate that the strikes have primarily targeted Syrian opposition groups in areas far from core ISIS-held terrain. Free Syrian Army (FSA)-affiliated rebel groups that receive support from the U.S. are among those that Russian warplanes have hit.

As Russian airstrikes intensify, Syrian opposition factions will likely seek the protection of a strong partner in the fight against the regime and its allies. The majority of the groups that may seek protection already cooperate militarily with Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra out of necessity, and this trend is likely to increase as rebels come under greater duress. The pressure of a reinvigorated air campaign in support of the Syrian regime may drive these groups closer to Jabhat al-Nusra and potentially hardline Islamist Ahrar al-Sham in the absence of alternative sources of robust military assistance from countries opposed to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. In fact, between October 2 and October 4, two rebel groups merged separately under Jabhat al-Nusra and Ahrar al-Sham in Hama and Aleppo provinces respectively. This trend damages not only the U.S. anti-ISIS mission, but also the implicit mission to counter al-Qaeda’s influence in Syria. It is therefore vital to observe changes in the behaviors and affiliations of Syrian rebels in response to ground events. 

Relationship to Jabhat al-Nusra

This guide also provides an assessment of rebel groups’ relationship to Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra. Groups that conduct military operations with Jabhat al-Nusra do not necessarily share its vision, end-state, or values. Many rebel groups cooperate out of military necessity, because Jabhat al-Nusra one of the most capable groups on the battlefield. The relationship between each group and Jabhat al-Nusra has been designated through the following definitions:

Component of Jabhat al-Nusra: Groups that have merged under Jabhat al-Nusra, or groups that ISW assesses to be a sub-unit of Jabhat al-Nusra

Allied: Rebel groups that share interim objectives with Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria in the near term; groups that are close ideological allies to Jabhat al-Nusra; and groups that are ideologically opposed to the Western countries’ influence in Syria or to the vision of Western secularism

Separable from Jabhat al-Nusra: Rebel groups that formally coordinate military operations with Jabhat al-Nusra among many other groups through joint military commands, largely out of military necessity. This also includes groups that participate in governance structures that also contain elements of Jabhat al-Nusra.

Independent: These rebel groups currently do not share interim or long term objectives and do not formally coordinate military operations with Jabhat al-Nusra through joint military commands.

Identifying Outside Funding

The following charts also reflect assessments of the sources of outside funding for each group as provided by the Carter Center and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace from September 2014 – February 2015.  There are three major sources of funding:

Joint Military Operations Command (MOC)

Two covert joint military operations commands (MOC) based in Turkey and Jordan reportedly provide funding and lethal aid to moderate and nationalist Islamist groups in northern and southern Syria. Members of both the Northern and Southern MOCs reportedly provide military assistance including TOW anti-tank missiles to a select set of Syrian rebel groups.

Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia provides direct support to Salafist and Islamist groups across all of Western Syria.

Turkey and Qatar

Turkey and Qatar support nationalist Syrian rebel groups, including Salafist and Islamist groups. The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, currently based in Turkey, facilitates the provision of money and weapons provided by Turkey and Qatar to Syrian armed opposition groups based in northern Syria.

Identifying Powerbrokers

The following charts indicates assessed powerbrokers in Syria in addition to groups that could become powerbrokers in the near term upon the receipt of sufficient outside support. These groups could provide a counter-weight to Jabhat al-Nusra, although the Russian military operations reduce the likelihood that they will be willing or able to split from the al-Qaeda affiliate.

Powerbroker: a group that disproportionately determines the success of military operations against either the Syrian regime or ISIS; is strategically located; and/or plays a leading role in governance.

Potential Powerbroker: a group that could achieve significant battlefield effects against Jabhat al-Nusra and/or ISIS in western Syria upon receipt of increased outside support, including securing direct military gains and cohering other smaller brigades into new coalitions.

Operations Rooms

The following charts organize opposition groups by their participation in operations rooms, in order to achieve particular, defined objectives. Operation rooms are joint structures limited to a particular geographical area, but they do not maintain a physical headquarters. Syrian opposition groups join “operations rooms” in order to coordinate their military campaigns jointly in an area without merging, thus preserving their status as separate fighting forces.  Each operations room is typically launched with an announcement conveying a specific, stated objective and a list of groups that have joined. 

Syria 90 - Day Strategic Forecast: Islamic State of Iraq and Al-Sham

By Jennifer Cafarella, Christopher Kozak, and Genevieve Casagrande

Grand Strategic Objectives:
• Rule all Muslims under an Islamic Caliphate
• Provoke and win an apocalyptic war with the West
Strategic Objectives in Syria:
• Preserve and expand territorial control in Syria
• Implement governance guided by Shari’a law and subjugate minorities within the caliphate
• Seize a historic caliphate capital and eliminate the Alawite regime
• Neutralize or absorb the Syrian armed opposition
• Neutralize or absorb Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra (JN or JAN)
• Stoke regional disorder through sectarian or religious conflict in Syria

Read the full report here.

Syria 90 - Day Forecast: Jabhat Al- Nusra (JN)

By ISW Syria Team

Grand strategic objective:

• Establish an Islamic Emirate in Syria that is a future component of the envisioned al-Qaeda Caliphate
• Unify the global jihadist movement

Strategic objectives:
• Destroy the Assad regime
• Transform Syrian society from secular nationalism to an Islamic theocracy
• Establish locally-accepted governance as a precursor to an eventual Islamic Emirate
• Build an army to protect the Islamic Emirate by partnering with Syrian rebel groups
• Resolve the fitna, or schism, with ISIS
• Counter U.S. influence in Syria

Read the full report here.

Forecasting the Syrian Civil War

By Christopher Kozak

The trajectory of the Syrian Civil War may fundamentally shift within the 90 day timeframe. Russia escalated its military assistance on behalf of the Syrian regime in early September 2015, deploying armored vehicles and hundreds of personnel to the Syrian Coast in preparation for the establishment of at least one forward air operations base. Rebel factions led by Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat alNusra (JN) continue to pressure the regime’s stronghold along the Alawite Coast following a several-month campaign to expel regime forces from Idlib Province. Turkey and the U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition intend to establish an “ISIS-free” zone in northern Syria along the Turkish border with the assistance of moderate rebel forces. There a number of ways that the actors driving conditions on the ground could respond to these events or generate new conditions. The interplay between these developments and their courses of action could create numerous different outcomes in Syria over the next 12 weeks. A number of these divergent pathways could generate negative effects that intensify the conflict, spread regional disorder, and threaten U.S. interests in Syria.

It is possible to forecast these trajectories to provide policy-makers and analysts with a key tool to anticipate the actions of adversaries such as ISIS and avert the potential pathways that could be most damaging to the U.S. or its allies. The following forecast applies the traditional techniques of intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) to actors and conditions in Syria. IPB is a process of analyzing enemy forces, terrain, weather, and civilian considerations in order to anticipate their effects upon friendly forces and their planned or ongoing operations. IPB involves analysis of the possible courses of action of the primary actors on the ground, given existing knowledge about their capabilities, tactics, and intent. Courses of action are ranked from most to least likely and evaluated for the dangers that they potentially pose to friendly force operations. The purpose of this course of action projection is to inform decision-makers with accurate forecasts that adequately account for a range of possibilities as well as the outside risk of most dangerous courses of action. Most dangerous courses of action are designated as such because they are not most likely, but they are nevertheless plausible. Illuminating them allows commanders to mitigate risk while planning in the context of most likely courses of action. 

The forecasts presented in this paper are undergirded by several fundamental assumptions. First, the recent deployment of Russian military forces to Syria will maintain a defensive posture to prevent the collapse of the Syrian regime rather than a direct offensive posture to seize territory from anti-regime actors. Second, the Iranian nuclear accord and its corresponding sanctions relief for the Iranian government will be implemented in full. Third, the U.S. and Turkey will succeed in organizing and launching some form of offensive by rebel forces on the ground in an attempt to implement an “ISIS-free” zone in northern Syria. Fourth, Turkey will not take hostile action against the Syrian Kurdish YPG due to pressure on both parties by the U.S. Fifth, neighboring states – particularly Lebanon – will remain relatively stable. Sixth, the Iraqi Security Forces will continue their current pace and scale of anti-ISIS operations in Iraq with a prioritization of Anbar Province. If one or more of these assumptions prove false over the 90 day timeframe, this forecast will need to be adjusted to account for a significant inflection in the Syrian Civil War. 

Based upon the assessed courses of action available to actors on the ground in Syria, ISW anticipates a spectrum of possible developments in the Syrian Civil War over the 90 day timeframe. 

These outcomes have been characterized through analysis of the most likely courses of action (MLCOAs) and most dangerous courses of action (MDCOAs) for three primary actors: ISIS, Jabhat al-Nusra, and the Syrian regime with its allies.

Read the rest of this report here.

UPDATED-ISIS Sanctuary Map: September 15, 2015

By ISW Research Team

Key Takeaway: ISW’s updated ISIS sanctuary map includes a new attack zone in Deraa, southwestern Syria and an expanded sanctuary zone in Idlib, northwestern Syria. ISIS claimed an attack against the Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) in Deraa on August 18, and also may be responsible for an ongoing assassination campaign against JN in Idlib. ISIS likely intends to target JN and Syrian opposition’s governance structures in preparation for future offensives in western Syria. ISIS’s increased attacks against JN also reflect an expansion of the rivalry between ISIS and JN for leadership of the global jihadist movement.  

Military Situation on the Syrian-Turkish Border: September 14, 2015

By ISW Syria Team

This map represents the military situation at the Syrian-Turkish border as of Sept. 11, 2015.  Particular attention is paid to border crossings, many of which are now closed or highly restricted and under the control of a variety of groups including the Syrian regime, ISIS, Kurds, the Al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra, and Syrian rebels.

Posture of Syrian Regime and Allies: September 14, 2015

By ISW Syria Team

Is Bashar al-Assad losing the Syrian Civil War?  Given recent reports of direct Russian military support for the Syrian regime as well as continued increases in the assistance provided by Iran and its proxies, this map details the known or assessed locations where Russia, Iran, and Iranian proxies have established headquarters or staging areas in support of the Syrian regime. The map also highlights the  locations of the remaining besieged or otherwise vulnerable positions occupied by the Syrian, whose vulnerability was highlighted on September 9 when rebel forces seized the isolated Abu Dhuhur Military Airbase in eastern Idlib Province. These positions are superimposed over an updated map depicting the areas controlled by the major factions in Syria as of September 14, 2015. -

Significant Offensives in Syria: June 6 - July 9, 2015

by: Christopher Kozak and Genevieve Casagrande

Download the full-sized version of this post as a PDF file here.

REBEL:

1. June 5 - 17: The JN-led Jaysh al-Fatah Operations Room launched an offensive on June 5 which successfully seized the town of Mahambel and seven other villages along the Latakia – Idlib Highway, largely eliminating the remaining regime-held salient in Idlib Province. Rebel forces with the Jaysh al-Fatah Operations Room have since experienced difficulty in seizing remaining regime positions south of Jisr al-Shughour in southwestern Idlib Province or along the al-Ghab Plain in northwestern Hama Province. 

2. June 9 - 12: A number of FSA-affiliated and Islamist rebel factions announced the “Battle of Retribution for the Martyrs” on June 9 and seized the regime-held Brigade 52 base in eastern Dera’a Province following heavy clashes with regime forces. The same rebel forces later announced the “Battle of Crush the Tyrants” targeting the Tha’lah Airbase in western Suwayda Province, making initial gains before being repulsed following the arrival of Druze reinforcements.

3. June 16 - 29: Four separate rebel coalitions, including the newly-formed JN-led Jaysh al-Fatah al-Mintaqa al-Janoubiyah and two distinct operations rooms led by elements of the FSA-affiliated Southern Front, launched offensives targeting regime military positions in northern Quneitra Province in the vicinity of Druze-inhabited Mount Hermon. The stated goals of the offensives included a desire to open supply lines leading to rebel forces in the Western Ghouta suburbs of Damascus. Nonetheless, the offensives ultimately achieved only limited gains in the area as rebel forces came under pressure from clashes against alleged ISIS-affiliated rebels in western Dera’a Province, the joint Hezbollah-regime offensive on Zabadani northwest of Damascus, and Israeli warnings of a possible military intervention in the event of an attack against the pro-regime Druze of Mount Hermon.

4. June 25 - 30: Rebel forces with the FSA-affiliated Southern Front announced the "Battle of Southern Storm" on June 25 directed at seizing Dera'a City as the next phase of an effort to consolidate control over southern Syria and set conditions for an eventual assault against the Syrian capital of Damascus. Although rebel forces initially made limited tactical gains within Dera'a City, the offensive largely quieted by June 30 due to a rumored operational reassessment following high casualties and poor coordination between rebel forces. Rebel commanders nonetheless continue to insist that the “Battle of Southern Storm” will not be called off. 

5. July 2 – 8: The Fatah Halab Operations Room announced the start of the “Battle of Fatah Halab” on July 2 to seize full control over regime-held portions of Aleppo City. Combined moderate and Islamist rebel forces later seized control of the regime-held Scientific Research Center on the western outskirts of Aleppo City on July 3 amidst ongoing clashes as rebels attempted to break into the New Aleppo and az-Zahraa neighborhoods of northwestern Aleppo City. Meanwhile, JN and a number of Salafi-jihadist rebel factions also announced the formation of the Ansar al-Sharia Operations Room on July 2 and launched a parallel offensive against regime positions in the az-Zahraa district which has included at least one JN suicide attack against regime forces.

REGIME:

6. June 20 - 23: The regime reportedly deployed reinforcements including the elite ‘Tiger Forces’ Special Forces unit to the western countryside of Palmyra, sparking clashes with ISIS west of the city as well as in the nearby Sha’er and Jazal Gas Fields. Although regime officials have messaged an intent to recapture the city of Palmyra from ISIS forces, no notable offensive action has yet occurred. 

7. July 2 - 7: Lebanese Hezbollah and Syrian regime forces announced the start of an offensive to seize the rebel-held town of Zabadani northwest of Damascus near the  Lebanese border on July 2. Zabadani occupies a key position near supply routes connecting Damascus to Hezbollah positions in Beirut and the Bekaa Valley. Clashes are currently ongoing as Hezbollah and regime forces attempt to enter the town from the west amidst clashes with JN, Ahrar al-Sham, and other rebel factions.  

YPG (KURDS):

8. June 6 - 23: Kurdish YPG forces supported by FSA-affiliated rebel factions and U.S.-led coalition airstrikes continued offensive operations to seize ISIS territory in northern Syria, seizing the ISIS-held border crossing of Tel Abyad on June 15 before moving south to capture the town of Ayn Issa and its associated Brigade 93 military base on June 22-23. These gains provided a ground link between the Kurdish Ayn al-Arab (Kobani) and Hasaka Province (Cizire) cantons while placing joint YPG-FSA forces thirty miles north of the ISIS stronghold of ar-Raqqa City. Nonetheless, the YPG advance also elevated tensions with Turkey, which deployed military forces to its border amidst heightened concerns over “border security”. 

ISIS:

9. June 24 – July 7: ISIS launched a major offensive against regime positions in Hasaka City on June 24, seizing several of the city’s southern districts after heavy clashes which included a series of SVBIED attacks against both regime and Kurdish security installations. Regime forces reportedly began to reverse ISIS gains by the end of June following the deployment of Republican Guard reinforcements from Deir ez-Zour City, the arrival of SAA and NDF reinforcements from Qamishli, and the limited assistance provided by YPG forces in the eastern neighborhoods of the city. Nonetheless, local reports indicate that ISIS has secured additional advances against the regime in southern Hasaka City following a renewed wave of SVBIED and VBIED attacks beginning on July 1.

10. June 25 - July 6: ISIS launched a number of counterattacks against Kurdish-held terrain following the YPG successes at Tel Abyad and Ayn Issa in early June. A group of ISIS infiltrators equipped with at least two SVBIEDs entered the town of Ayn al-Arab (Kobani) on June 25, sparking two days of clashes which left over two hundred civilians dead. ISIS militants launched similar infiltrator attacks against two towns on the east bank of the Euphrates River on June 26 and against the recently-seized town of Tel Abyad on June 30. ISIS later launched a counterattack against joint YPG-FSA forces in Ayn Issa north of ar-Raqqa City on July 5 which included at least two SVBIED detonations; clashes are ongoing. 

KEY TAKEAWAY: Syrian rebel factions have launched long-awaited offensives against the isolated provincial capitals of Dera’a and Aleppo Cities, located in southern and northern Syria respectively. These two cities represent key lynchpins in the regime's ‘army in all corners’ strategy which allows Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to claim control over all of Syria. The fall of either city to rebel forces including Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra would overturn the stalemate that has long characterized the Syrian Civil War, opening the door to further offensives against core regime terrain in Damascus and the Syrian Coast. Rebel forces have thus far achieved limited success in both cities, however, amidst reports of high casualties and poor coordination between rebel factions – in part due to friction between moderate Free Syrian Army (FSA)-affiliated rebel factions and more extreme groups led by Jabhat al-Nusra (JN). If the rebel campaigns to seize Aleppo and Dera’a Cities stall over the coming weeks, JN and other Salafi-jihadist groups could seize the opportunity to expand their leadership role within the Syrian opposition by emphasizing the gains previously achieved in Idlib Province when rebel factions united under JN’s leadership. Rebel efforts in Aleppo and Dera’a Provinces have also been handicapped by the need to respond to the threat posed by ISIS and ISIS-sympathetic rebel brigades, which have encroached upon opposition-held terrain in both the northern countryside of Aleppo City and the southwestern countryside of Dera’a Province.

The regime’s successful defense of Aleppo and Dera’a Cities thus far belies that fact that the continued dedication of valuable combat resources to outlying “corners” of Syria risks overextending the defensive capabilities of regime forces. The regime appears particularly vulnerable to an offensive by ISIS against the Syrian central corridor while regime forces are fixed in northern and southern Syria. Although ISIS has directed its main effort in Syria over the past month against Kurdish YPG forces in northern Syria in a likely effort to protect ar-Raqqa City, ISIS remains a critical threat to both the regime’s core territory and its remaining remote outposts in eastern Syria. ISIS continued to launch probing attacks against rebel forces in the Eastern Qalamoun Mountains and regime positions in eastern Hama and Homs Provinces in a likely bid to seek opportunities for further territorial advancement in the vicinity of against Homs, Hama, and Damascus Cities meant to balance losses in northern Syria and Iraq. Meanwhile, a major offensive by ISIS against Hasaka City in northeastern Syria forced the regime to deploy valuable elite Republican Guard units away from Deir ez-Zour City in a move possibly designed to weaken the regime's defenses there. The combined effects of these pressures taken in conjunction with ongoing rebel offensives could ultimately force the Syrian regime into an unwilling contraction, generating additional opportunities for ISIS to expand. 

The initiatives undertaken by the Syrian regime and its foreign backers during this reporting period suggest that the regime may be preparing for such an outcome. Regime forces have reportedly begun large-scale fortification efforts along the approaches to Damascus and Latakia in order to protect the regime’s core terrain in western Syria. Meanwhile, Hezbollah and regime forces have directed offensive operations to clear the remaining rebel presence in the Qalamoun Mountains along the Lebanese border – a necessary precondition for the formation of a loyalist rump state with connectivity to Hezbollah-dominated regions of Lebanon.  In light of these observations, the deployment of elite regime combat units to regions west of Palmyra in central Syria may also constitute a defensive maneuver to buffer the Syrian central corridor against further ISIS advances rather than a decisive effort to recapture the city as hinted by senior regime officials.  Overall, the limited offensive maneuvers conducted by the Syrian regime in recent months suggest that the regime’s capacity to set the terms of battle and dictate the trajectory of the Syrian Civil War may have been significantly degraded by the concurrent pressures of rebel and ISIS offensives.

Rebels Launch New Offensive in Southern Syria

by: Jennifer Cafarella

Rebel forces in Southern Syria have mobilized for what they hope will be the final phase of a major campaign to force the regime to withdraw from Southern Syria.  Should they succeed, they may achieve enough momentum to advance to Damascus and may force the Assad regime to contract from outlying areas, including southern, eastern, and northern Syria where the regime is also challenged. A successful operation by rebels in Southern Syria could therefore alter the stalemate of the Syrian war even though rebels across northern and southern Syria are not coordinated. Rebels in Southern Syria represent a strong potential partner for the U.S. not only to end the Syrian war, but also to limit the expansion of ISIS and al-Qaeda in Syria. The moderate rebel Southern Front coalition has played a leading role in Southern Syria since the summer of 2014, a distinction from other fronts on which moderate rebels play a minimal role. Islamists brigades have fought alongside them, however, and Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) has supported their effort, indicating that the influence of moderate rebels in Southern Syria is vulnerable. While their tactical cooperation may improve their chances of driving pro-regime forces from southern Dera’a province, it may also limit future opportunities for the U.S. to capitalize upon their success if moderate rebels are not empowered to remain in the lead through increased international support.

Syrian rebel forces in the moderate Southern Front Coalition declared“Battle of Southern Storm” in Dera’a Province on June 24, 2015. The objective of the Battle of Southern Storm appears to be to oust the regime from of Dera’a Province and to set conditions for an eventual assault on Damascus. After allowing one day for civilians to evacuate the city, rebels launched a “large scale” attack against pro-regime forces in Dera’a City on June 25. Rebels made initial advances, seizingthe Dera'a National Hospital and a regime-held checkpoint near the Bassel al-Assad Stadium in northern Dera'a City, significant because Dera’a city has not been an active frontline over the past year. Regime forces responded with a major increase in aerial bombardment including over 60 barrel bombs in Dera’a City and its outskirts on June 25 alone. Clashes remain ongoing as of July 2 with the participation of Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) and other hardline Islamist brigades, although it is unclear which side is currently gaining momentum. The initial JN and rebel gains in Dera’a City are a notable escalation, though they do not yet constitute a sufficient challenge to pro-regime forces in the city to prompt a regime withdrawal. The “Battle of Southern Storm” however will likely not be restricted to Dera’a city, but rather target the breadth of regime outposts remaining in Dera’a province.   

Primarily moderate rebel forces supported by JN and other Islamist rebels set the conditions for this offensive through a yearlong campaign to eliminate major regime-held military bases in the Dera’a and Quneitra countryside. This preparation of the battlefield reflects a long-term campaign design, of which the latest battle for Dera’a City is a recent component. Beginning in June 2014, combined anti-Assad forces successfully restricted the regime to an isolated salient that connects Damascus to Dera’a City. The spokesperson for the Battle of Southern Storm on June 24, 2015 designatedthis entire stretch of regime-held terrain as a military zone, indicating that the battle is not limited to Dera’a City, but rather is intended to “liberate” the entirety of Dera’a Province. The initial goal of the offensive is to force the regime to fall back to the regime stronghold of Izra’a, north of Dera’a City, according to the deputy commander of a prominent moderate brigade participating in the operation named the Yarmouk Army. If successful, this offensive could allow rebel forces to consolidate in southern Dera’a Province before advancing northward toward Damascus.

Moderate and Islamist Rebels Establish New Command-and-Control Structures

The list of participating rebel brigades in the Battle of Southern Storm is currently unclear. It is possible that negotiations are still ongoing between the Southern Front, JN, and Islamist brigades, which could account for the slow start to the offensive. According to a Southern Front representative, the offensive is coordinated through a “higher central operations room,” which appears to be a new structure established for the purposes of this offensive beginning in June 2015. According to the Yarmouk Army deputy commander, the Battle of Southern Storm involves seven geographically based operations rooms, the term that opposition forces use for headquarters that ensure unity of effort across different groups on the battlefield. The commander did not disclose the composition or location of these operations rooms, which likely include both moderate and Islamist brigades across multiple front lines in southern Syria.

Prior to the declaration of the Battle of Southern Storm, the Southern Front created a new coordinative body in an attempt to formalize its command and control of the more than 40 brigades within the Southern Front. The relationship between this new body and the Battle of Southern Storm operations room is unclear. The role of the Southern Front coalition in rebel military campaigns was previously limited to unifying the political programs and social media efforts of numerous brigades, many of which receive support from regional and Western backers through a Military Operations Command (MOC) center in Amman, Jordan. The Southern Front announced the establishment of a new Joint Military Command on May 15, 2015 under the leadership of Abu Osama al-Joulani from the First Army, a prominent rebel coalition folded under the umbrella of the Southern Front. The new joint command is intended to function as a formal military headquarters with support staff to coordinate the operations of the Southern Front’s component brigades. The command includes five subsidiary offices for operations, armament, logistics, relief, and management. It is unclear whether this joint military command will succeed in increasing the effectiveness of moderate rebel operations against the regime, and some Southern Front commanders have continued to report inefficiencies in the organization’s operations. Its formation is nonetheless a notable step forward that could increase the effectiveness of moderate rebel forces within the Battle of Southern Storm, and it may signal an increase in support provided to the Southern Front by outside backers in the MOC.

Islamist forces supported by JN also created new formal military alliances in the lead-up to the declaration of the Battle of Southern Storm.  JN, the Ahrar al-Sham Islamic Movement (HASI), and eight primarily Islamist brigades announced the formation of the Harmoun Army in northern Quneitra Province on June 16. Then, on June 20, JN, HASI, and seven other Islamist rebel groups announced the formation of the Jaysh al-Fatah [“Army of Conquest”] “southern sector” in order “to unify rebel ranks” to combat both “domestic and foreign challenges,” a likely reference to outside funding and military support  received by many Southern Front rebel brigades. Jaysh al-Fatah includes relatively small brigades that are loosely associated with the Southern Front in addition to the primarily Islamist Fatah al-Sham operations room. The exact relationship between the Harmoun Army and Jaysh al-Fatah is unclear, but the participation of JN and HASI in both structures indicates that there is likely substantial coordination between the two. Both groups also operate in close proximity to the moderate A'sifa al-Haqq Operations Room based in northwestern Dera’a Province and led by the moderate Southern Front’s First Army. The Harmoun Army, Jaysh al-Fatah, and A’sifa al-Haqq constitute lower echelon military structures that each coordinates the activities of numerous rebel brigades, and in the case of the Harmoun Army and Jaysh al-Fatah, their operations extend farther into southern Syria. Where their operations are co-located southwest of Damascus, it is possible these three smaller coalitions will achieve unity of effort against the regime through one local operations room within the Battle for Southern Storm despite their ideological differences. The question of JN’s increased influence or dominance over moderate rebel structures remains a concern given this potential development.

Rebel Attempts to Limit al-Qaeda Affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra

There are other causes of concern. The Jaysh al-Fatah southern sector is a repeat of a successful model for military operations established by JN and Islamist forces in Idlib Province. The creation of the original Jaysh al-Fatah operations room in Idlib Province enabled JN and Islamist forces to seize control of a majority of Idlib Province from pro-regime forces beginning in March 2015. JN established a second version of the Jaysh al-Fatah model in the Qalamoun region of the Damascus Countryside in April 2015, and has since called for the establishment of a Jaysh al-Fatah version in the Eastern Ghouta suburbs of Damascus. JN’s ability to export this model indicates its growing momentum in Syria and its continued significance as a military power in the fight against Assad. JN’s intent to leverage its influence within these structures to shape rebel governance structures and religious activity appears to have prompted some Islamist groups to pressure JN quietly to relinquish its al-Qaeda affiliation. JN’s leader Abu Mohammed al-Joulani rejected this proposal in a two-part interview with al-Jazeera in May and June through which he firmly reasserted JN’s allegiance to al-Qaeda. Islamist forces are likely to continue to accommodate JN’s al-Qaeda character as long as combined JN-Islamist operations against the regime continue to achieve success.

Moderate rebel forces seek to limit JN’s influence in a future post-Assad Syrian state. JN’s deepening role within Islamist structures counters this effort by ensuring JN’s staying power within the province. The Southern Front increased its rhetoric against JN in early 2015, likely prompted by JN’s increasingly overt links to al-Qaeda in public statements. In early April 2015, six rebel brigades released statements condemning JN’s transnational agenda. After the formation of Jaysh al-Fatah, the Southern Front released a statement distancing itself from the new operations room, accusing Jaysh al-Fatah of imposing its own “unnationalistic” agenda against the will of the Syrian people. A number of Southern Front affiliates also released independent statements confirming their refusal to cooperate with Jaysh al-Fatah, including the First Army, Seif al-Sham Brigades, and the 24^th Infantry Division. These statements reaffirm the commitment of Southern-Front affiliated brigades to establishing a secular and democratic post-Assad Syrian state in the face of growing JN prominence, possibly in order to satisfy outside supporters. The statements are likely also an attempt to encourage rebel brigades to refrain from deepening their cooperation with JN in Southern Syria by placing a stigma on military structures with overt JN participation.

There is nonetheless little indication that the Southern Front will actually terminate its military cooperation with JN in the near term. Statements by moderate rebel brigades have not resulted in observable changes on the battlefield, where JN, Islamist, and moderate rebel forces continue to operate in close proximity. The Jaysh al-Fatah operations room and the Southern front reportedly confirmed their cooperation prior to the declaration of the Battle of Southern Storm and may have actually formalized their relationship. The participation of JN and Islamist rebels in clashes in Dera’a City, as well as the inclusion of Southern Front-affiliated brigades in the Jaysh al-Fatah coalition, furthermore indicates that segregation between moderates and JN-allied Islamists is unlikely to emerge in Southern Syria. In fact, according to “informed” pro-rebel sources cited by the Syrian activist network Zaman al-Wasl, efforts are underway to “enhance” the coordination between the Southern Front, JN, and Islamist rebels. A rebel source claimed that there are 40 suicide bombers ready for deployment in the Battle of Southern Storm, likely confirming that JN will contribute directly to offensives led by primarily moderate brigades.

The trend in Southern Syria points toward deeper cross-spectrum integration of anti-Assad actors in the absence of direct outside intervention. Additional success against Assad will therefore likely come at the cost of the continued rise to influence of JN and its Islamist allies. Public statements by moderate rebel commanders reflect this reality. In interviews with Syrian activist networks, moderate rebel commanders have consistently deflected questions regarding how to navigate differences between Islamists and moderates in a post-Assad environment. While moderate rebels have become more willing to criticize JN’s vision, they continue to refrain from condemning the Islamist agenda held by other rebel groups such as HASI in favor of remaining united in the fight against Assad. This overall prioritization of the fall of the Assad regime above other long-term questions is a characteristic of Syrian rebel brigades across front lines from northern to southern Syria. Recognizing this reality is a necessary precondition of fruitful engagement with Syrian rebel forces in an effort to accelerate an end to the Syrian war.

Effect on the Regime

The Battle of Southern Storm nevertheless threatens the Assad regime at a particularly vulnerable time. The regime is facing challenges to its remaining outposts on multiple fronts, including Deir ez Zour and Hasaka in the east, Idlib and Hama in the north, and Homs and Qalamoun in central Syria. The seizure of Dera’a City by anti-Assad forces could be a sufficient turning point in the Syrian war to prompt a regime contraction out of Southern Syria toward the Syrian capital, despite the fact that anti-Assad actors in northern, eastern, and southern Syria are not coordinated. Alternately, it is possible that remaining pro-regime forces in Dera’a City are sufficiently capable to resist combined anti-Assad forces. There is reportedly a regime special operations headquarters at the Dera’a City municipal stadium that includes Iranian-sponsored forces. Iran may choose to increase its direct support to Assad in order to forestall regime defeat at Dera’a City. The defeat of the stronghold of Iranian-sponsored paramilitary forces in Busra al-Sham by combined JN, Islamist, and moderate rebels on March 24th indicates, however, that even additional Iranian support may be insufficient to retain Dera’a City.

The regime has substantial military fortifications north of Dera’a City on the Damascus-Dera’a Highway that it could choose to reinforce in the event of a loss at Dera’a City in order to blunt further rebel advances toward the capital. The regime likely does not possess sufficient manpower reserves, however, to do so, especially under growing strain from ISIS in Eastern Homs, Deir ez-Zour, and Hasaka Provinces. The regime is therefore unlikely to succeed in holding an interim defensive line near Izra’a and could choose to withdraw to a more defensible perimeter around Damascus if rebel forces begin to seize greater terrain. This would likely involve a full withdrawal from Dera’a and Suwayda Provinces, and possibly from remaining regime strongholds in northern Quneitra Province, or conversely a surge of pro-regime activity in Quneitra province, strategically positioned next to the Golan Heights. Such a contraction would cause a major shift in the Syrian war, likely requiring Assad to abandon his current strategic objective to maintain his claim to the entirety of Syria.

The regime has reportedly begun to increase its fortification of Damascus, potentially signaling that it intends to harden the capital against future rebel assault as a defensive priority. Existing military fortifications on the high ground on the southern outskirts of the capital, originally intended to blunt an Israeli armored advance from the Golan Heights, provide an existing line of defense that the regime could sufficiently consolidate by withdrawing forces from Dera’a. Regime forces began constructing nearly two kilometers of earthen berms along the Old Dera'a Highway and the Hawsh Belas Industrial Complex south of Damascus on June 23 in an effort to fortify the southern and southwestern entrances to the capital. In a worst-case scenario, the regime may even calculate that chemical weapons will be necessary to halt rebel gains or screen a withdrawal from southern Syria. A report citing U.S. intelligence officials, released on June 28, warned that the regime’s situation may be growing sufficiently dire to prompt the regime to use remaining vestiges of the its chemical weapons stockpile, which experts think Assad may possess.

There have been multiple indicators of the regime’s unease over its disposition in southern Syria. At least two separate groups of pro-regime soldiers have defected to rebel ranks since the beginning of 2015, highlighting declining morale. Iranian officers reportedly executedregime officers in the Dera’a City Municipal Stadium, likely in an attempt to deter further defections or punish perceived failings on the battlefield. Meanwhile, the regime continues to struggle to rally the minority Druze population of neighboring Suwayda Province to replenish pro-regime ranks. Druze residents have actively resisted attempts to implement forced conscription campaigns in Suwayda Province and Druze elders have articulated a policy of restrained self-defense and neutrality in the fighting between regime and rebel forces. Roughly 100 newly enlisted Druze soldiers fled their posts in Eastern Suwayda Province on June 24, allegedly in response to the regime’s intent to deploy them into Eastern Dera’a Province. If the regime contemplates a partition, it is likely that the Druze will prevent the regime from withdrawing its armor from Suwayda Province and opt for allegiance with Syrian rebels. Druze fighters have intervened twice since the beginning of 2015 to prevent the regime from deploying armored columns out of Suwayda Province, likely in order to ensure the Druze population has sufficient military resources to ensure its own protection.

Setting the Conditions for Damascus?

The desire to advance against Damascus in the long-term is a common objective that will likely continue to unite moderate, JN, and Islamist forces on an operational level. The Southern Front in particular has consistently messaged its operations in Dera’a and Quneitra Provinces as condition-setting efforts for a drive to Damascus. The inclusion of prominent Damascus-based rebel commanders into the Southern Front joint command could also indicate the active preparation for a future Damascus offensive. In addition to its five offices, the joint command includes a delegate from the Qalamoun region of the northern Damascus countryside, Bakkour al-Salim, the former leader of the FSA-affiliated Damascus Military Council. The Southern Front has historically included Qalamoun in its claimed area of operations, so the inclusion of Salim into the Southern Front joint command is not necessarily a departure that signals near-term intent to conduct major operations in Damascus. Nonetheless, the inclusion of prominent Damascus-based rebel commanders in the Southern Front joint command indicates that the Southern Front retains a strategic vision that involves leveraging advances in southern Syria into eventual gains in the Syrian capital.

More notable are reports of increasing negotiation between the Southern Front and prominent Islamist brigades based in Damascus. These talks with actors not historically associated with the Southern Front could indicate active efforts to cultivate a new Damascus front as a follow-on operation to the Battle of Southern Storm. Prominent Damascus based Islamist commander Zahran Alloush, the leader of Jaysh al-Islam, has allegedly decreased his direct oversight of rebel operations in the capital in order to participate in a series of meetings with regional actors. Abu Mohammad al-Fateh, the leader of another Damascus based Islamist group named the Ajnad al-Sham Islamic Union, has reportedly filled in as the leader of the Damascus rebel coalition the Eastern Ghouta Unified Command in Alloush’s absence. Alloush reportedly arrived in Turkey on April 17 for a series of undisclosed talks, including a meeting with members of HASI leadership. Then, on June 6, unconfirmed reports indicated that Alloush traveled to Amman, Jordan, in order to meet with foreign intelligence officials and Syrian rebel commanders. According to one report, this meeting focused on discussing options to counter both ISIS and al-Qaeda in Syria. Rumors circulating on Twitter meanwhile alleged that the intelligence officials asked Alloush to coordinate with the Southern Front against ISIS and JN in both Dera'a and Quneitra Provinces, and discussed the potential for replacing Jaysh al-Islam’s flag with the Syrian Revolutionary flag. Alloush has also begun to step back from his previously sectarian rhetoric, most notably during an interview with McClatchy DC in which Alloush referred to the Alawite sect as “part of the Syrian people”. This appears to confirm that outside supporters of Alloush, namely Saudi Arabia, and of the Southern Front broadly are actively exploring options to achieve unity of effort across previously disparate moderate and Islamist rebel ranks.

Implications for U.S. Policy

The emerging situation in Southern Syria provides a new opportunity for the U.S. to engage in Syria. The aggregate effects of the rebel campaign in Southern Syria, recent JN and rebel victories in Idlib Province, and continued pressure by ISIS on the Assad regime across multiple fronts may sufficiently disrupt the regime to render a feasible end to the Syrian war. A reevaluation of the scope of the U.S. train and assist program can generate meaningful ground partnerships if it accommodates a wider mission in Syria, namely helping rather than discouraging rebels from their primary effort to overthrow Assad. Especially given the recently confirmed defection of another vetted unit of Syrian rebels from the program, the program as it stands currently is not poised to have a positive impact upon either the Syrian war or the war against ISIS. The moderate rebel Southern Front on the other hand offers a compelling option for direct U.S. engagement under an altered policy framework. The Southern Front does not, however, present a full solution.

The U.S. could consider the possibility of leveraging select Islamist rebels as allies alongside the Southern Front. Even strong moderate rebels in Southern Syria are insufficient to defeat Assad or to ensure the establishment of a stable post-Assad Syrian state capable of addressing the threats of al-Qaeda and ISIS. The involvement of powerful Islamist rebel groups that are not committed to JN may therefore be critical for achieving success in Syria. A spectrum of Islamist brigades exists in Syria, ranging from hardline groups with close ideological affiliation with JN to more mainstream groups with a desire for Shari’a law to inform a post-Assad Syrian state. The U.S. has the option to engage with the latter category, namely mainstream independent Islamist groups that are fighting alongside moderate forces. Attempts by the moderate Southern Front to negotiate constructive relationships with Islamist brigades, possibly including some Damascus-based Islamists, signal an opportunity for the U.S. and regional partners to capitalize on existing options for cross-spectrum rebel coordination that does not cater directly to al-Qaeda’s interests. This engagement must extend to northern Syria, where moderates and Islamists continue to work in close coordination against the regime, but also where moderates are operating at a relative disadvantage.

 

A carefully tailored engagement with some Syrian Islamist groups could enable the U.S to take action to contain and diminish JN’s influence in Syria. It is critical that the U.S. take action to reverse the formalized coordination between JN and Islamist forces that translated into joint JN and Islamist governance structures within Idlib City after seizing the City in March 2015. A similar development in Southern Syria may become likely if the Battle of Southern Storm succeeds, in which the Southern Front is compelled to accept the involvement of JN and Islamist actors in post-Assad institutions. Over the long term, this embedded JN presence is a strategic threat for the U.S. because of the staying power and access to resources it provides to al-Qaeda in Syria. The U.S. could leverage increased support to both moderate and select Islamist forces to appeal to more hardline Islamist groups such as HASI to abandon their allegiance to JN. HASI’s participation in cross-spectrum rebel efforts to establish a united political program, notably through the Syrian Revolutionary Command Council based in Turkey, indicates that the U.S. could likely succeed in this effort. The U.S. should nonetheless be prepared for JN to attempt to rally its rebel allies to resist the U.S. and fight U.S.-supported rebels. With sufficient U.S. commitment, however, JN will be unable to sustain this narrative in the long term.

A defeat of the regime in southern Syria will likely produce escalating violence in the absence of intervention to mitigate potential risks. Rebel advances will likely provoke the regime to resort to desperate tactics such as the use of residual chemical weapons capability in order to forestall defeat in Southern Syria or facilitate a regime contraction. In the absence of overt support by the U.S. or regional actors to Syrian rebels, the regime may calculate that it can act with impunity and continue its escalation against civilians. Further atrocity by the Syrian regime could prompt retributive attacks by Syrian rebel groups against pro-regime populations, such as those in remaining besieged enclaves north of Aleppo City and northeast of Idlib City. JN will likely capitalize on escalating violence in order to propagate its sectarian narrative, and possibly generate support for a campaign against the coastal Alawite heartland. This increased destabilization within the Syrian Civil War will provide opportunities for ISIS to expand, potentially encouraging ISIS to launch a major spectacular attack against a major regime target such as Homs City.

Furthermore, the narrow focus of the U.S. on a counter-ISIS mission despite these realities risks encouraging regional actors to undertake unilateral action, which could actually provoke further instability and spillover of the Syrian war. Unconfirmed reports have emerged that indicate Turkey, Israel, and Jordan are independently contemplating the establishment of no-fly zones or humanitarian corridors along their respective borders. For Turkey, the focus is negating the ability of Syrian Kurds to declare an independent state along the Turkish border, in addition to likely Turkish desire to resettle Syrian refugees on the Syrian side of the border. For Israel, the calculation appears to focus on the security of the Golan Heights border. For Jordan, the consideration of a humanitarian corridor appears to reflect a desire to prevent JN from ascending further, as it did in Idlib Province. The vocal reports of the consideration of unilateral measures by these governments likely signals increasing pressure on the U.S. to intervene in Syria. If the U.S. continues to ignore their calls for American leadership, it is a dangerous but likely scenario that the U.S. will ultimately have to provide that leadership in the future under worse circumstances.

The U.S. must therefore carefully consider the options for intervention in Syria while recognizing the likely cost of refraining to act. In mid-2015, a large and sustained engagement with a spectrum of Syrian rebels as a component of a comprehensive strategy to end the Syrian war offers the opportunity for the U.S. to accomplish three strategic objectives in the region: to mitigate the humanitarian disaster in Syria, to contain and diminish al-Qaeda’s influence, and to set the conditions to defeat ISIS. Conversely, limited means of intervention, such as no fly zones, train and assistance only of vetted rebels, or targeted airstrikes against ISIS and al-Qaeda, incur greater risk of atrocity and violent extremism if they are not pursued as components of a strategy to the Syrian war. The forms of limited intervention proposed by neighboring states meanwhile leave the growing strength of JN in Syria entirely untouched, presenting a long term and strategic threat in the form of a highly capable and resilient al-Qaeda affiliate. While the realistic options for successful intervention are costly, they must nonetheless be considered in accordance with the likely outcomes of the Syrian Civil War in order to ensure U.S. national security and stability in the region.