Political Crisis in Iraqi Kurdistan Escalates into Violence

By: Patrick Martin

Key Take-Away: The political crisis in Iraqi Kurdistan caused by delayed Presidential elections descended into outright political violence on October 8. Regional President Masoud Barzani, the leader of the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), has continued to hold office even though his term expired on August 19 and no elections have occurred. Other Iraqi Kurdish political parties, particularly Gorran (Change), the KDP’s main political rival, tried to contest the extension of Barzani’s term and leverage concessions in return for his continuation in office. Popular protests against the government turned violent on October 9 after multi-party talks collapsed the day before. On October 11, the KDP ordered the speaker and other members of the Kurdish parliament from Gorran to leave the regional capital of Arbil, declaring that Gorran was no longer a part of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). Gunmen loyal to the KDP barred a Gorran convoy from entering Arbil. This dangerous maneuver by the KDP to solidify Barzani’s position as regional president has escalated tensions within the KRG and serious political violence may protract. Unless negotiations between the KDP and the opposition parties reaches a meaningful compromise in short order, the KRG could split or collapse as opposition leaders move their operations from the seat of government in Arbil to Suleimaniyah.

The Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Presidency Crisis: June 17 – August 19.

The crisis over the Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Presidency (henceforth “Regional Presidency”) has been long in the making. Regional President and leader of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) Masoud Barzani’s term expired on August 19. The Regional President is by far the most powerful government official in the KRG, and Barzani has held the position since June 2005. Other political parties, long unhappy with Barzani’s tenure,  have heatedly debated whether Barzani is permitted to hold office for another term, as he has technically served two-and-a-half terms and the legal debate over how many terms Barzani is permitted to serve is complex. The opposition, consisting of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), Gorran (Change), the Kurdistan Islamic Union (KIU), and the Islamic Group, attempted to leverage the expiration date to extract concessions from Barzani that would constrict Barzani’s powers and increase the powers of the regional parliament. In particular, the opposition sought to convert the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) system from a presidential system to a parliamentary one. This change would favor the opposition, which holds 58 seats out of 111 and a simple majority, whereas the KDP holds only 38 seats, bolstered by the 10 seats allotted to Turkmen and Christian parties who usually side with the KDP.

Barzani refused to relinquish power by making concessions. The head of the Kurdistan Independent High Electoral Commission (K-IHEC), KDP member Handrin Muhammad Saleh, announced on June 17 that the Iraqi Kurdistan region would not hold elections to select a new regional president, citing a lack of time to prepare and budgetary constraints. On the same day, Gorran presented a proposal to transform the government system, with the other opposition parties following suit on June 18. The opposition parties presented a series of compromises after August 4 and suggested that Barzani could hold office for an additional two years until the parliamentary elections in 2017 in exchange for converting to a parliamentary system and significantly reducing the regional presidency’s  powers, distributing some of them between deputy regional presidents and the parliament. Subsequent proposals by the opposition followed similar lines.

Discussions over how to address the crisis stalled. Barzani steadfastly refused to compromise, while the opposition refused to cave into Barzani. Mediation by Iranian officials, including the Assistant Secretary General of the Iranian National Security Council on July 29, made no impact. Even a visit by Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-Quds Force commander Qassim Suleimani on July 26 to the PUK, which has historically been close to Iran, did not sway the opposition, which insisted that the regional presidency crisis was a strictly Kurdish internal issue. Barzani leveraged  KDP control over the electoral commission to dissuade the opposition and gained a ruling in his favor from the KDP-dominated Shura Council, an advisory body within the Kurdish Justice Ministry tasked with resolving administrative disputes. The Shura Council stated on August 17 that Barzani should remain in office for two years while retaining his full powers. However, the Gorran speaker of parliament Yusuf Muhammad Sadiq promptly dismissed the decision, pointing out that the Shura Council’s ruling was not legally binding.

Mediation by the U.S. and British Ambassadors to Iraq and the UN Special Envoy to Iraq appeared to have laid the groundwork between the KDP and the four opposition parties to extend discussions beyond the August 19 expiration date. The parties also agreed to delay an emergency session of parliament scheduled for later that day to vote on an amendment to the law governing the powers of the regional presidency. However, Gorran calculated that it could use the opposition’s majority in the parliament to rush an amendment through the legislative process at the last minute. The Gorran speaker of parliament called the emergency session, citing that there had been no formal request to delay it. Gorran’s plan backfired badly, as the KDP boycotted the session and only 53 parliamentarians showed up for the vote, falling short of the 56 parliamentarians required for quorum; five members of the KIU refused to attend the session, with one member suspending his membership in parliament on the grounds that solving the crisis required a consensus agreement between all political parties, including the KDP.

The Crisis Turns Violent: October 8 – October 9.

The five parties, having failed to reach an agreement before the August 19 deadline, began a series of meetings to discuss how to resolve the regional presidency crisis. The ninth round of talks between the five parties broke down on October 8, prompting the PUK to call for the regional presidency crisis to be resolved in the parliament and not among the political parties, signaling the end of the opposition’s patience with negotiations.

The crisis escalated unexpectedly when a protest by teachers over delayed salaries and the ongoing political crisis turned violent in Qala Diza, in northern Suleimaniyah. On October 9, the demonstrators clashed with security forces, leaving two protesters dead and 18 wounded. Other towns in Suleimaniyah province, including Kalar, Halabja, Karmiyan, and Suleimaniyah city, as well as Koya in Arbil province, continued to witness large protests by teachers against delayed salaries.

Political Violence: October 9 – October 11.

Although most demonstrations have remained peaceful, some witnessed significant political violence. A series of attacks on political party interests across Iraqi Kurdistan demonstrate that the opposition has initiated violence itself or used party-affiliated thugs to coax peaceful demonstrators into initiating violence in order to escalate the crisis. Demonstrators in Sayid Sadiq in eastern Suleimaniyah province clashed with security forces on October 11, injuring an unknown number of demonstrators and KDP supporters. Demonstrators also attacked KDP headquarters buildings in Suleimaniyah. The KDP reported that two KDP members were killed and nine others wounded in the attack. KDP facilities in Kalar, Sharzur, Zarayin, Qala Diza, and Halabja were also attacked.

Both the KDP and the opposition have targeted media outlets in a bid to dominate the narrative of the demonstrations. Anonymous witnesses stated that an “armed group” first attacked the office of Rudaw network, a KDP-affiliated channel, in Suleimaniyah, firing on the office but causing no casualties. Unidentified assailants also severely beat journalists from at least five different media outlets covering the October 10 Suleimaniyah protests. The targeted violence indicates that opposition elements were present at the Suleimaniyah demonstration, hijacking the momentum of a largely-peaceful movement and attempting to maximize the chaos for political gain. KDP-dominated Asayish internal security forces closed the offices of the Gorran-affiliated KNN media outlet in Arbil, Soran, and Dohuk, and deported KNN and the independent NRT-TV media outlet employees to Suleimaniyah. NRT-TV claimed that security forces kidnapped its employees in Dohuk and Arbil, but they were later released, and its offices were reopened on October 12.

The KDP and Gorran have dramatically escalated their rhetorical attacks on each other. The outburst of violence and inter-party conflict prompted the PUK, the KIU, and Gorran to call for non-violence and for an emergency meeting of the political parties to prevent the situation from spiraling out of control. Although the KDP called for calm, it held Gorran leader Nechirvan Mustafa responsible for the unrest. The KDP also blamed the PUK for not protecting KDP headquarters sites, though the bulk of their ire has been directed at Gorran. The KDP stated that the demonstrations were not popular and spontaneous, and that attacks on its headquarters buildings “served the interests of the enemies of the Kurds.” Gorran in turn and accused the KDP of using “the language of the civil war years” and disrupting the work of the Kurdistan parliament. A Gorran Twitter account also stated that gunmen carrying KDP banners attacked the Gorran headquarters in Arbil with small arms and mortar fire. The Arbil police directorate denied the unconfirmed report and stated that the Gorran headquarters had never been attacked.

The KDP Kicks Gorran out of Government: October 11.

Amd numerous reports of attacks on KDP headquarters buildings, the KDP used its control over Arbil to oust Gorran physically from government. On October 11, the office of the speaker of parliament, a senior member of Gorran, announced that the five parties had agreed to suspend the October 12 parliamentary session scheduled to discuss the crisis. Shortly thereafter, Gorran stated that the political office of the KDP ordered Gorran parliamentarians, ministers and Gorran speaker Sadiq to leave Arbil and return to Suleimaniyah. Sadiq later claimed that a security force prevented Sadiq and Gorran parliamentarians from entering Arbil province at a checkpoint in Altun Kubri, a town on the border of Arbil and PUK-dominated Kirkuk provinces. A video from the encounter alleges that security forces loyal to the KDP harassed the Gorran convoy, breaking several windows of cars. The head of KDP External Relations and a member of the KDP leadership council, Hayman Hurami, also announced that Gorran ministers were no longer a part of the KRG.

The KDP’s expulsion of senior Gorran members from Arbil – a unilateral removal of the leadership of the KRG’s second largest electoral bloc –effectively removes the opposition’s ability to challenge the KDP in parliament by physically keeping the speaker of parliament out of the parliament building.  Gorran denounced the move as a coup and an attempt by the KDP to paralyze the work of the parliament; Gorran’s KIU allies denounced the move as a mistake that would cause “fear and chaos” while a senior PUK official mirrored Goran’s description of the move as a coup. At the time of writing, Sadiq, Gorran parliamentarians, and Gorran’s ministers were in Suleimaniyah.

Next Steps

If the political crisis protracts for much longer, it will exacerbate longstanding structural problems within the KRG. The Kurdish parliament has failed to pass reforms aimed at combating corruption and improving government performance, a priority for PM Haidar al-Abadi and the Council of Representatives (CoR). Falling oil prices and budget shortfalls are part of a larger state of economic malaise that will be harder to address without consensus in government, and the government employees who took to the streets on October 9 will continue demonstrating. With Gorran members physically barred from entering Arbil, an agreement has become increasingly unlikely.

There are several active drivers that could help push the KRG into returning to negotiations. For one, discontent with the Iraqi Kurdish political situation is widespread. Teachers, who are at the heart of the protest movement, have not been paid for three months, nor have many members of the Peshmerga and other government employees. While Suleimaniyah province is securely a PUK and Gorran electoral stronghold, demonstrators in Qala Diza, Rania, Binjawin, Kalar, Kifrin, and Halabja attacked party headquarters buildings for Gorran, the PUK, the KDP, the KIU, and the Kurdistan Communist Party, pelting the buildings with stones and forcing them to remove their party flags, hoisting the flag of the KRG instead. In addition, the Peshmerga have refused to partake in party conflict, as the Peshmerga Ministry called for calm and stated that it would not allow attacks on any party or government buildings. Finally, all parties have consistently urged demonstrators to avoid violence, while Gorran’s Suleimaniyah office director has suggested that it is still possible for Barzani and Gorran leader Mustafa to reach an agreement over their political differences.

Other parties that form a parliamentary majority have denounced the KDP’s move to exclude Gorran from the KRG. Yet it is not clear if the KDP will make any move to compromise over the regional presidency. Barzani will not allow the parliament speaker to return if he is convinced that the parliament will attempt to bypass his stalling tactics and pass legislation aimed at reducing the regional president’s powers. If every opposition parliamentarian shows up for the vote, then a boycott by the KDP and its allies would not prevent the law from passing. Sadiq has already suggested that the parliament can hold its session in any city to pass legislation.  However, the KDP is more likely to ignore the ruling and denounce it as illegitimate rather than obey the legislature’s ruling, considering that it has steadfastly refused to compromise on the regional presidency issue for months. The current political situation is untenable, with several opposition parties exasperated by the fractured nature of the KRG and the dominance of the KDP in particular. If the two sides fail to reach any sort of compromise, political unrest will continue, and the possibility of rival governments – the regional presidency based in Arbil and the parliament based in Suleimaniyah – will become increasingly likely.

Iraq Control of Terrain Map: September 11, 2015

By ISW Iraq Team

Iraq Situation Report: July 31 - August 3, 2015

by Sinan Adnan, Patrick Martin & ISW Iraq Team

Iraqi Government Formation Negotiations Begin

By Ahmed Ali

Iraq’s government formation process has begun even before official results are released. Political groups are posturing and sending early signals about their positions and ambitions. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki continues to float the idea of a “political majority” government. His ambition will be tested by the results and his political opponents’ strong desire to weaken him. Even though Iraq’s election day was largely peaceful, the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) disrupted voting in several predominantly Iraqi Sunni areas, increasing the risks of marginalization of Iraq’s Sunni population as elections results come in and coalitions are formed. 

Iraq held its national elections on April 30. Election day was free from major security breaches, likely because the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) increased security measures implemented prior to the vote. The al-Qaeda-linked Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) also likely chose to avoid engaging the highly alert and widely deployed ISF units. Given the ISF’s temporary tightened measures, attackers would have been dealt serious setbacks were they to attempt directly engaging the security force. ISIS is still a major threat to Iraq’s security despite its inability or tactical decision not to launch major attacks on elections day. Importantly, ISIS was able to disrupt the electoral process before the elections took place. ISIS’ control of Fallujah since January 2014 and its subsequent anti-elections campaign had an adverse impact on voting, particularly for the Iraqi Sunnis. 

Security in the Provinces

In Anbar, poor security excluded fifteen areas from voting, and displaced residents of those areas were obligated to vote in other areas of the country. In Babil’s Jurf al-Sakhar area, which ISIS has used as a support-zone, voting was not held for security reasons. On election day, ISIS reportedly sent threatening text messages to Jurf al-Sakhar’s tribal leaders warning them not to participate in elections. As a result, IHEC allowed Jurf al-Sakhar’s residents the opportunity to vote in the nearby Mussayeb area. However, it is not yet clear to what extent turnout among Jurf al-Sakhar’s voters was affected. Participation was likely depressed due to security threats and Mussayeb’s distance from Jurf al-Sakhar (approximately 15 miles). 

In Ninewa, Noura al-Bachari, a candidate of the Iraqi Sunni group Mutahidun, stated that 130 voting centers were closed due to lack of employees of the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC). Bachari added that there was no voting in the Jazeera area due to ISIS threats. The lack of IHEC employees at voting centers was also reported in Kirkuk. If Bachari’s statements are confirmed, this prospect will deal a significant blow to the perceived legitimacy of the voting process. Such claims are bound to lead to the rejection of the results by groups affected by lowered turnout. 

The Beginning of Political Posturing

According to IHEC, the overall turnout for the general elections was 60%, an encouraging sign even though this figure is two points lower compared to the 2010 national elections. The southern and northern provinces registered higher levels of participation due to better security conditions when compared to western Iraq and Ninewa province. For example, Basra in the south had a 77% turnout rate, possibly indicative of voters’ political engagement in this crucial election. However, claims disputing these turnout figures are already circulating. Senior Sadrist leader Amer al-Kanani stated that the 91% participation rate announced for ISF members is likely 10% lower and that this difference is going to be manipulated in order to alter the results. Kanani attributed his observation to local and international elections monitors’ estimates. These allegations have thus far only come from the Sadrists and have not been corroborated by the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI). They serve to place IHEC under scrutiny as the vote-counting process continues. If these allegations are supported, they would provide another mechanism by which the results could be disputed by less successful parties. 

IHEC has indicated that the final results will be announced by the end of May. However, political groups have been leaking results based on either their own observations or anonymous IHEC sources. Many claim to have taken the lead in voting. Some of these claims may be accurate, but it will be important to wait for the official IHEC results. In 2010, the final results by IHEC presented surprises as former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi’s Iraqiyya party garnered the highest number of seats and votes. In those elections too, political groups pre-empted the announcement of the final results with inaccurate claims that they were in the lead.  

Initial Negotiating Positions of Iraqi Political Parties
May 4, 2014- May 9, 2014

Iraqi Shi’a Political Groups:

Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and the State of Law Alliance (SLA)

Theme: Calls for majority government and attacks Mutahidun Leader Osama al-Nujaifi

Statements:

MAY 08: Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki strongly criticized the performance of the committees of the Council of Representatives (CoR) and its presidency. PM Maliki added that he hopes for a new presidency instead of the current arrangement, describing it as “failure.” (Al-Sumaria News)

MAY 08: PM Maliki stated that a government of political majority will not be based on “ethnic or sectarian” bases. Instead, it would be based on “principles” and “high values” under the constitution. PM Maliki added that the political majority would not exclude a “component, sect, or religion.” (Al-Sumaria News)

MAY 08: A member of PM Maliki’s State of Law Alliance (SLA), Ihsan Awadi, stated that the SLA aims to prevent the leader of Mutahidun, Osama al-Nujaifi from holding “any position,” citing the “failing experience” the alliance had with Nujaifi in the past. He added that Mutahidun does not represent a “specific component,” therefore its exclusion does not mean the exclusion of that component [likely referring to Iraqi Sunnis]. (Assafir News)

Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI)

Theme: Takes anti-Maliki position but acts as bridge-builder among Shi’a groups

Statements:

MAY 05: The Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq’s (ISCI) parliamentary bloc leader Baqir al-Zubaidi (also known as Bayan Jabr) stated that the next Iraqi Prime Minister will be nominated by ISCI’s Citizen’s (Mowatin) Bloc, the Sadrist Ahrar, and the State of Law Alliance (SLA) of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. He added that the decision will be made “according to a bilateral or trilateral agreement.” (Shafaq News)

MAY 06: ISCI leader Adel Abdul-Mahdi stated that ISCI does not support efforts to isolate the SLA in forming the new government describing such isolation as “not wise and harming, exactly like the demand for a third term [for Maliki].” (Shafaq News)

MAY 09: Spokesperson of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq Baligh Abu Galal described the possibility of securing a third term for the PM as “very difficult” adding that the PM cannot secure the majority of seats to form a government. (Assafir News)

The Sadrist Trend

Theme: Takes Extreme Anti-Maliki Position

Statements:

MAY 07: Member of the Sadrist Ahrar bloc Hussein al-Sharifi stated that it is “not possible” to form the National Alliance with the participation of the State of Law Alliance (SLA). He added that the SLA will not be able to form the alliance by itself. Sharifi attributed his statement to the negative performance of the government. (All Iraq News)

MAY 09: Member of the Sadrist Ahrar bloc, Hussein al-Sharifi, stated that the “Sadrist Trend” aims to prevent the PM from securing a third term. (Al Mada Press)

Iraqi Sunni Political Groups:

Deputy Prime Minister Saleh al-Mutlaq’s Arabiyya Alliance

Theme: Take an anti-Maliki position while opening options for negotiation

  

Statements:

MAY 06 : Member of deputy Prime Minister Saleh al-Mutlaq’s Arabiyya Alliance, Talal al-Zobaie, stated that the alliance would not support PM Maliki for a third term, adding that the alliance is in support for a non-sectarian, non-ethnicity-based “political majority government.” (Al Mada Press)

Speaker Osama al-Nujaifi’s Mutahidun Alliance

Statements:

MAY 08: Mutahidun Alliance announced in a statement that a meeting took place between the leaders of the alliance. The statement added that a delegation was formed in order to conduct negotiations with other political parties for government-formation purposes. Meanwhile, leader in the alliance Jabr al-Jabri stated that Mutahidun “has no red lines” regarding the formation of alliances “if our demands are met,” adding that no agreement took place with the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq [ISCI] or the Sadrist Ahrar bloc. (All Iraq News, Al-Sumaria News)

MAY 08: Member of Mutahidun Hamza al-Girtani stated that the alliance aims to “withdraw” the premiership position from PM Maliki. Girtani added that the alliance aims to form a majority government citing the local government of Baghdad that was formed by ISCI, the Sadrist Ahrar, and Mutahidun. (Al-Sumaria News)

The Iraqi Kurds:

Theme: Reject the political majority government and demand presidency

MAY 04: The Office of the Presidency of Iraqi Kurdistan Region announced that the Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Parliament must approve the nominee for the Presidency of Iraq, arguing that the position is reserved for the Iraqi Kurds “by right.” (Kurdistan Region Presidency)

May 07: Member of the Kurdistani Alliance [KA], Mahdi Haji criticized calls to form a political majority government, adding that a government “cannot be formed without the Kurds.”  According to Haji, the Iraqi Kurds are not a “political party” but rather a “major ethnicity.” (All Iraq News)

A number of these post-elections statements shed light on possible initial strategies and negotiating positions for government formation. The Iraqi Kurds, for example, are seeking to maintain the position of the presidency in the federal government. Iraqi Kurdish Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) leader Jalal Talabani has been the president of Iraq for the last eight years and, according to the Iraqi Kurds, the presidency is their “right.” The Iraqi Kurdish position faced criticism from Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s ally Mohammed al-Saihud, who stated that it is not a constitutional mandate to have an Iraqi Kurdish president. In addition to this challenge from Maliki’s State of Law Alliance, the issue of the presidency will be contentious among Iraqi Kurdish parties, with the PUK facing challenges from both the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Gorran (Change) Movement challenge the PUK for the presidency. In addition to the Iraqi Kurds, Iraqi Sunni figures are likely to vie for the position of president in the federal government as well. 

Beyond statements by figures in the different political organizations, actions by the Federal Supreme Court are also likely to affect the upcoming period of post-elections bargaining. The court issued a decision not to accept a lawsuit from Maliki against the speaker of the Council of Representatives (CoR), Osama al-Nujaifi, challenging the CoR’s inability to pass the budget. The ruling to dismiss this case was likely intended to project an image of independence for the court given its past pro-Maliki history. The court also, however, issued a decision postponing the case brought by the SLA challenging the legality of the Baghdad Provincial Council until June, after the elections results are announced. The court’s decision here means that the anti-Maliki Baghdad Provincial Council and local political positions will become a bargaining chip. The continuation of the case until June will allow the SLA to trade dropping their legal challenge to the Baghdad Council’s formation in exchange for cooperation in coalition-formation. 

Conclusions 

Political groups are currently testing the waters for their future alliances as they wait for the official results to be released. The groups anticipate a long government-formation period and are posturing to maintain their political flexibility. However, the development of an anti-Maliki front is likely to materialize, modeled after the anti-Maliki local governments that formed in Baghdad and Diyala after the 2013 provincial elections. 

Prime Minister Maliki’s plan will likely continue to be floating the concept of a majority government and assessing which groups he can play against one another. Additionally, he will likely continue to attack speaker Osama al-Nujaifi, Mutahidun, and the Sadrists. Maliki will enjoy an advantage as he will be a caretaker Prime Minister with full authority. It will be particularly important to watch if Maliki will use the security forces to his own advantage. The current major operation to re-take Fallujah from ISIS may be an example of precisely this, seeking to demonstrate his strength as a Prime Minister. 

Lack of elections in Fallujah and Jurf al-Sakhar can further increase sentiments of marginalization among the Iraqi Sunni population. To mitigate the consequences of these sentiments, the vote-counting that is underway must be transparent and occur without any alteration of results. Importantly, all political groups should work towards producing a government that is representative and inclusive. 

Ahmed Ali is a Senior Iraq Research Analyst and Iraq Team Lead at Institute for the Study of War.

Massoud Barzani Extended as President of Iraqi Kurdistan: 2013 Iraq Update #27

By Stephen Wicken

The parliament of Iraqi Kurdistan has voted to extend Kurdistan Regional President Massoud Barzani’s tenure for two years amid intense political arguments over the structure of power in the region. The announcement comes at a critical time for the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), as the development of an oil pipeline to Turkey offers the real prospect of exporting significant amounts of oil in a manner beyond Baghdad’s control. Dissent among the region’s political parties, however, particularly in the ongoing absence of Barzani’s coalition partner, Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, risks hindering both the region’s security and its representatives’ strength in Iraqi politics.

The parliament of the Kurdistan region of Iraq voted on June 30 to postpone the region’s presidential elections for two years. President Massoud Barzani of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) will be allowed to stay in his post until 2015, although parliamentary and provincial council elections will take place in September 2013 as scheduled. The motion, pushed through parliament by the KDP and its coalition partner the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) on the basis of an earlier agreementbetween the two, drew the ire of opposition parties, promptingfistfights and the throwing of water bottles in the parliamentary chamber. The developments highlight the KDP’s continued dominance of the federal region’s politics under Barzani, but also demonstrate the extent of opposition to Barzani’s rule.

The official reason given for the postponement of presidential elections was the need to amend the Kurdistan region’s constitution, passed by the regional parliament in 2009 but never ratified. Opponents to Barzani’s continued rule have protestedthat the draft constitution was forced through parliament by the KDP-PUK alliance during a period of caretaker government, and that it was subsequently edited by the ruling parties while a significant number of parliamentarians were absent. The electoral delay was proposed to allow political parties to air their views on the region’s draft constitution and to produce a new elections law.

The political dispute concerns the basic arrangement of executive political power in Iraqi Kurdistan: how the president is elected. Massoud Barzani was elected by the parliament of Iraqi Kurdistan in 2005. In 2009, however, the draft constitution amended the law to allow direct election of the president by popular vote, diminishing parliament’s power at the expense of the presidency. It also declared that the president “may be re-elected for a second term as of the date this constitution enters into force.” The same year, however, saw the splintering of the Gorran (Change) Movement from the PUK, adding a new and unknown element of the region’s politics and diminishing the established party’s hold on its traditional areas of influence. The two developments in tandem allowed Barzani to consolidate power to an extensive degree.

Opposition parties, principally Gorran, argue that the constitution must be amended once more to return the right to elect the president to parliamentarians, increasing parliamentary oversight of the executive. They demand that the constitution be returned to parliament for vote, and that such a vote take place before presidential elections can be held. Three opposition groups – Gorran, the Kurdistan Islamic Union (KIU), and the Kurdistan Islamic Group (KIG) – have also opposed President Barzani’s attempts to take control of the constitution-consultation process, rejecting Barzani’s request that all political parties in the region be involved in the discussing the draft constitution, whether or not they are currently represented in parliament. Barzani’s KDP, by contrast, has advocated a popular referendum on the constitution, counting on its leverage over patronage networks and Barzani’s popularity to ensure victory.

The PUK’s acquiescence is further evidence of its increasingly junior role within the Kurdistan Alliance. The party has been without its leader, Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, since December 2012, when Talabani suffered a stroke and was removed to Germany for treatment. President Talabani, who formed the PUK upon breaking with the KDP in the 1970s, has been the party’s secretary-general since 1975, and power has long been consolidated around his inner circle. With Talabani unlikely to return to full strength after numerous health scares, however, challenges to Talabani’s rule have been emerging. Talabani’s wife, Hero Ibrahim Ahmed, is a key player, with strong relations with Baghdad, with the KDP, and with neighboring Iran.  She has nevertheless insisted that she is not interested in replacing her husband in Suleimaniyah or in Baghdad. Talabani’s son Qubad, formerly the KRG's representative in Washington, DC, was recalled in 2012 to take up a strategic planning position within the prime minister’s office – a move that was seen as intended to introduce him to the region’s public and groom him for a future leadership role.

Former KRG Prime Minister Barham Salih and PUK co-founder Kosrat Rasul Ali, formerly prime minister of the PUK’s Suleimaniyah-based administration prior to the region’s reunification, head factions within the PUK and are key candidates to succeed Talabani. Salih is popular with key international interlocutors, particularly the US and UK as well as Iran, but faces opposition from Hero Ibrahim. Kosrat Rasul gained popular legitimacy among PUK supporters as a former commander of the PUK’s Peshmerga forces, but is knownto be in poor health. Salih recently led a push to force Hero Ibrahim and the Talabani family to share power within the party, threateningto resign unless Salih and his supporters were given a greater say in the party’s strategic and financial decision-making. The threats are thought to have related in particular to control of the party’s funding streams for the parliamentary elections, suggesting that Salih is seeking to build his own patronage networks within the party to establish himself as the main candidate to succeed Talabani as its head.

As inter-party rivalries continue to hamper the PUK, the party is losing influence both to its larger coalition partner and to its own splinter, Gorran. The party’s power base in Suleimaniyah was diminished significantly by the Gorran split in 2009, and its continued floundering in Talabani’s absence renders it vulnerable to further losses. The PUK is caught between the need to balance Massoud Barzani’s power and the need to fend off the challenge within its traditional area of influence from Gorran, which paints the PUK as a partner in a corrupt and nepotistic government.

The question of Barzani’s presidential extension is an example of such difficulties for the PUK. In fact, since Barzani was elected president directly by the voters and not by the legislature, parliamentarians have no authority to grant him an extended tenure. The September timeframe announced for elections, however, forced parties to take a public position. Advocates of a strong KDP-PUK alliance demand that the PUK support Barzani’s presidency, fearing that without the protection of the larger party, the PUK will lose further supporters to Gorran. A strong current of dissent within the PUK, however, emerged in 2011 from the demands of demonstrators protesting in Suleimaniyah against government autocracy and corruption.  The dissenting faction has opposed the constitution as drafted, arguing that it will further strengthen the KDP. This faction was strong enough to encourage Talabani to agree with his former lieutenant Nawshirwan Mustafa of Gorran to push for the resubmission of the draft constitution to parliament in September 2012 and to call for the president once more to be elected by parliament – an initiative that stalled when Talabani was taken ill. As a result, and seeking to gloss over its own internal factional struggles, the PUK has called officially for consensus between political parties on the constitution question.

The struggle over the presidency comes at an important time for the Kurdistan region, and particularly for its president. Economic relations with Turkey are reported to be nearing an inflection: a converted natural gas pipeline through Dohuk province is nearing the Turkey border at Fishkhabour, offering a method of exporting oil from the Kurdistan region to Turkey independently of Baghdad’s control. Barzani has pushed hard to win over the Turks, improving Ankara-Erbil relations significantly at the expense of each side’s relations with Baghdad. Meanwhile, Barzani recently heldan emergency meeting with representatives of Syrian Kurdish parties following clashes between the People’s Protection Units (YPG), under the control of the Democratic Union Party (PYD), and protesters in the Syrian city of Amude. Barzani brokered a deal between the PYD and the Kurdish National Council (KNC) – which Barzani supports – in July 2012. He has invested himself heavily in a leadership role over the Syrian Kurds, and while the vote over extending his presidency was taking place, Barzani himself was in Paris discussing Syria with French President François Hollande.

Tensions between Kurdish parties within the Kurdistan region, moreover, risk diminishing the strength of the Kurdistan Alliance in Baghdad and on federal Iraq’s recently elected provincial councils. Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki performed less strongly than expected across Iraq at these elections, as did his key Sunni Arab opponent, Parliamentary Speaker Osama al-Nujaifi. The Kurdish Brotherhood and Coexistence List, meanwhile, performed well in Ninewa, where it gained 11 of the province’s 39 seats. Nujaifi’s brother Atheel al-Nujaifi, the governor of Ninewa and provincial head of the brothers’ Mutahidun list, looks likely to ally with smaller Sunni Arab parties in order to prevent a return to the Kurdish government that the province saw in 2005.  He nevertheless will be reluctant, and possibly unable, to sideline the Kurdish list to the extent that his Al-Hadbaa party did in 2009, having since reached rapprochement with the Kurds that has had benefits in national level politics.

With Maliki’s attempts to fashion a political majority among Arab parties in Baghdad hindered by the underwhelming performance of his State of Law Alliance and his Sunni ally Saleh al-Mutlak’s Arab Iraqiyya, there may be an opportunity for the Kurdistan Alliance to play a greater role in Iraq’s political process. Internal divisions, however, will hamper the Kurds on both front, and will make it easier for Maliki to use Arabism as a pole around which to unite against the Kurds, as he did in passing the 2013 federal budget. Gorran MP Latif Mustafa highlighted this disunity, appealing on July 5 for the Iraqi federal government or parliament to intervene in the Kurdistan parliament’s decision in order to prevent the extension of Barzani’s term which, he argued, “will defame Iraq.” Maliki’s visit to Erbil in June, while symbolic in itself, does not appear to have produced any tangible results. Maliki has since warned Russian oil company Gazprom that it should not consider buying stakes in oil fields in Iraqi Kurdistan until a federal oil law is passed – a project that has been stalled since 2007 and shows little sign of progress. Deputy Prime Minister for Energy Affairs Hussein al-Shahristani insisted following the Erbil trip that key issues of contention, such as oil exports and payments to oil companies working in Iraqi Kurdistan, were not even discussed. With Barzani’s position likely secure at least for another two years, he is likely to continue to push for enhanced economic ties with Turkey. 

Barzani’s control of the key issues for the future of Iraqi Kurdistan is entrenched, and it is highly unlikely that he will allow opposition groups to force him from the presidency in 2015. Instead, the KDP is likely to push for the adoption of a draft constitution and electoral law that will allow Barzani to run for at least one further term, allowing him to continue to oversee Iraqi Kurdistan’s continued emergence from Baghdad’s control. In so doing, however, he faces growing opposition from the region’s Islamic parties, who accuse the KDP of attempting to “secularize” the region’s laws, and Gorran, who view Barzani as a “dictator”. Unconfirmed reports of large anti-Barzani protests in Suleimaniyah following the announcement of Barzani’s presidential extension highlight the risk that the KDP’s continued consolidation of power could prompt a repeat of the 2011 protests, and with it unrest in the Kurdish region. Opposition MPs have already warned of the prospect of unrest, threatening that those “who do not respect democracy” will be “removed from their posts in the same way as in the Arab countries.” With Syrian Kurds engaged in fighting with Sunni militants across the border, and violence rising along Iraq’s disputed internal boundaries, the security that Iraqi Kurdistan has advertised in order to attract international oil companies is by no means assured for the future.

Stephen Wicken is a research analyst at the Institute for the Study of War.