Russian Airstrikes in Syria: January 8 - 14, 2016

By Jodi Brignola and Genevieve Casagrande 

Key Takeaway: The Russian air campaign enabled additional battlefield gains by the Syrian regime from January 8 to January 14, providing increased leverage to the regime ahead of negotiations between pro- and anti-Assad elements on January 25. Pro-regime forces seized the town of Salma in Northeastern Latakia Province with the support of as many as 200 Russian airstrikes on January 12. Salma has been consistently targeted by Russian airstrikes over the past three months, which began hitting the town as early as October 6. The seizure of Salma will enable further clearing operations against the armed opposition in Northeastern Latakia as pro-regime forces continue efforts to buffer the regime’s coastal stronghold. Pro-regime forces will likely take additional measures to degrade the capability of the armed opposition ahead of negotiations by intensifying advances on core opposition-held terrain in Idlib, Northern Homs, and Damascus, in addition to expanding and securing regime strongholds. The regime tightened its siege on the opposition-held pocket in Northern Homs Province on January 12, seizing the village of Jarjisah northwest of Rastan amidst heavy Russian airstrikes on opposition positions in the area. The seizure of Jarjisah reportedly severed the last opposition supply route into the area, completing the besiegement of roughly 250,000 civilians that currently reside there. 

Russia released the text of the August 26 agreement between Russian and Syrian officials that transferred control of the Bassel al-Assad airbase to Russia. The released text indicates that the agreement transferred control of Bassel al-Assad airport indefinitely and can only be officially terminated one year after a written request is submitted by either party. Russia’s publication of the text of this agreement clearly signals its intent to maintain military presence in Syria over the medium term regardless of the outcome of the January 25 negotiations. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) also published footage of Russian and Syrian warplanes carrying out their first joint mission over Syria on January 14, a clear show of force for the Syrian opposition. The joint mission also demonstrates growing coordinative capabilities between the Syrian and Russian air forces, likely signaling deepened cooperation to come.  

The following graphic depicts ISW’s assessment of Russian airstrike locations based on reports from local Syrian activist networks, Syrian state-run media, and statements by Russian and Western officials. This map represents locations targeted by Russia’s air campaign, rather than the number of individual strikes or sorties. 

 

High-Confidence reporting. ISW places high confidence in reports corroborated both by official government statements reported through credible channels and documentation from rebel factions or activist networks on the ground in Syria deemed to be credible. 

Low-Confidence reporting. ISW places low confidence in secondary sources that have not been confirmed or sources deemed likely to contain disinformation.

Russian Airstrikes in Syria: January 4 - 11, 2016

By Genevieve Casagrande and Jodi Brignola 

Key Takeaway: Russia expanded efforts to portray itself as a neutral actor in Syria ahead of the next round of negotiations by claiming to support tailored elements of the Syrian armed opposition. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reiterated during a press briefing on January 11 that “only joint efforts” by the Syrian regime and select Syrian opposition groups will “achieve victory over terrorism” in Syria, despite Russia’s continued targeting of armed opposition factions. The Russian MoD claimed that Russian warplanes are currently conducting strikes supporting ground operations of 11 opposition factions, which the Russian MoD described as “Syrian patriotic forces.” Alleged recipients of Russian air support primarily consist of groups supported by the U.S. such TOW anti-tank missile recipient Jaysh Asoud al-Sharqiya, an anti-Assad opposition faction that has previously accused Russia of targeting their headquarters in the Damascus countryside. Russia claimed to conduct strikes “in the interest of” Jordanian-backed opposition group Jaysh Ahrar al-Asha’er in the villages of al-Taf and Khosh Hammad in Dera’a Province, areas where the group is currently clashing with ISIS. Local reporting, however, did not verify Russian strikes in the area. The Russian MoD also reported strikes supporting U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces’ anti-ISIS ground operations near Ayn Issa north of ar-Raqqa City. Local reporting indicated a limited number of Russian airstrikes occurred in the area, although it remains unclear if the Syrian Democratic Forces benefitted from these strikes. Russia is overstating and, in some cases, fabricating its efforts to support armed opposition groups in Syria. Russia aims to use this disinformation to obfuscate its position as the regime’s guarantor against the armed opposition and present itself as a legitimate mediating actor ahead of negotiations. Russia also seeks to demonstrate that it does discriminate between opposition groups in order to position itself as an authority in determining which parties are able to participate in negotiations. In tandem with airstrikes against other armed opposition groups, these efforts also ultimately aim to disrupt the U.S.’s partnerships inside Syria.

Russia continues to target critical infrastructure and inflict heavy civilian casualties in Syria. French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius demanded the cessation of Russian and Syrian airstrikes on civilian locations on January 11, calling any such strike “inadmissible.” Russian strikes in Idlib Province resulted in 81 casualties, at least 22 of which were civilians, in a January 9 attack against a Jabhat al-Nusra prison in the town of Ma’aret al-Nouman. Local sources also reported that Russian strikes targeting three schools in the town of Anjara in Western Aleppo on January 11 killed as many as 35 civilians, including 17 children. Russian warplanes reportedly also targeted both a hospital and a relief warehouse in the Jebel Turkman Mountains of Northwestern Syria. The Syrian opposition demanded further confidence building measures from the regime ahead of negotiations to include the cessation of Russian airstrikes in Syria, stating that talks are not feasible while “there are foreign forces bombing the Syrian people.” The regime, however, remains unlikely to grant any such concession as Russian air operations have ensured the preservation of the regime and its superior position on the battlefield.

The following graphic depicts ISW’s assessment of Russian airstrike locations based on reports from local Syrian activist networks, Syrian state-run media, and statements by Russian and Western officials. This map represents locations targeted by Russia’s air campaign, rather than the number of individual strikes or sorties. 

High-Confidence reporting. ISW places high confidence in reports corroborated both by official government statements reported through credible channels and documentation from rebel factions or activist networks on the ground in Syria deemed to be credible. 

Low-Confidence reporting. ISW places low confidence in secondary sources that have not been confirmed or sources deemed likely to contain disinformation.

Russian Airstrikes in Syria: December 28, 2015 - January 7, 2016

By Genevieve Casagrande and Jodi Brignola 

Key Takeaway: The tempo of Russian air operations slowed considerably from January 4 - 7.  ISW was only able to confirm 17 locations of Russian airstrikes during the reporting period, the lowest volume of Russian strikes since early October 2015. The cause of this decrease currently remains unclear; as the lull may have been caused by changing weather conditions, shifts in Russian posturing inside Syria, or deferred maintenance activities following several weeks of heavy Russian airstrikes.  

The following graphic depicts ISW’s assessment of Russian airstrike locations based on reports from local Syrian activist networks, Syrian state-run media, and statements by Russian and Western officials. This map represents locations targeted by Russia’s air campaign, rather than the number of individual strikes or sorties. 

High-Confidence reporting. ISW places high confidence in reports corroborated both by official government statements reported through credible channels and documentation from rebel factions or activist networks on the ground in Syria deemed to be credible. 

Low-Confidence reporting. ISW places low confidence in secondary sources that have not been confirmed or sources deemed likely to contain disinformation.

Turkey Shoots Down Russian Jet Supporting Syrian Regime Offensive

By Jennifer Cafarella with Christopher Kozak, Hugo Spaulding, and Genevieve Casagrande

Two Turkish F-16 planes shot down a Russian SU-24 jet on November 24 that Turkey claimed was in Turkish airspace and ignored repeated warnings. Two Russian pilots ejected from the plane, which reportedly crashed in the Turkmen village of Yamadi in Syria near the Turkish border. A minor Syrian rebel group affiliated with the Free Syrian Army named Brigade 10 released footage alleging to show a deceased Russian pilot. One additional pilot survived and is in hands of Turkmen forces in Syria according to unconfirmed reports. Turkish President Recep Erdogan called an emergency security meeting. NATO is also expected to hold an immediate meeting.  

Russia condemned the downing of the jet and warned of future consequences. The Russian Ministry of Defense confirmed the downing of the jet, but denied it had violated  Turkish airspace. Russian President Vladmir Putin called the downing of the plane a "stab in the back" and promised “serious consequences...for Russian-Turkish relations.” Putin called the Turkish military the "accomplices of terrorists." He said at the end of his statement: “Do they want to make NATO serve ISIS? I understand that every state has its own regional interests and we’ve always respected that, but we will never allow the kind of crime that happened to today to take place.” Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov canceled his scheduled to visit Turkey for bilateral talks on November 25.

The downing of the Russian jet followed Turkish warnings about its willingness to intervene to halt a renewed pro-regime offensive against a majority Turkmen area in Northeastern Latakia Province. Pro-regime forces supported by Hezbollah, Iranian-backed militias, and Russian airstrikes, and Russian artillery attacked rebel positions in the Mount Turkman region of Northeastern Latakia Province near the Turkish border on November 19.  Fifteen hundred Turkmen refugees fled to the Turkish border by November 23, according to the governor of Turkey’s Hatay province, Ercan Topaca, who also claimed that the regime attack targeted 15 villages populated by a total of 35,000 civilians. Local activists immediately decried the attack, calling it the “Mount Turkman Massacre,” and the main Syrian political opposition group, the Syrian National Coalition, called for immediate rebel reinforcements to the area.

Pro-regime forces have seized at least five villages and a number of hilltops in the Mount Turkman area amidst these ongoing clashes. Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra is supporting Syrian rebel groups, including Syrian Turkmen, to defend against the regime’s attack. The complex mix of anti-regime groups in the Mount Turkman area helps legitimize Russia’s claim to be assisting pro-regime forces eliminate “terrorists” in Syria despite the fact that Russia and pro-regime forces are intentionally targeting civilian areas. The commander of a new Turkmen rebel group named the Sultan Abd al-Hamid Brigade, established in January 2015, denied the scale of the regime’s advance, claiming that rebel forces continue to control major strategic positions throughout the area.

Turkey formally protested these developments and stated that it would not tolerate a worsening situation in the Mount Turkman area. Turkey summoned the Russian Ambassador on November 20 to demand an end to the military operation, warning that Russian airstrikes against civilian Syrian Turkmen villages “could lead to serious consequences.” Turkish political and security officials met two days later in a security summit to discuss the regime’s offensive. Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu announced Turkey will "not hesitate" to take necessary action to protect Turkmen populations on Syrian soil, and added that Turkish security forces “have been instructed to retaliate against any development that would threaten Turkey’s border security.” Davutoglu added that “If there is an attack that would lead to an intense influx of refugees to Turkey, required measures would be taken both inside Syria and Turkey.”  Turkish Foreign Minister Sinirlioglu contacted U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and sent a letter to Britain, which holds the UNSC presidency, calling for a U.N. Security Council meeting to address the issue.

Turkey has longstanding relations with Syrian Turkmen communities and provides military support to at least one Syrian Turkmen rebel brigade. Turkish Prime Minister Davutoglu nonetheless downplayed Turkey’s special treatment of Turkmen in Syria, stating, “We have reacted to all the attacks aimed at civilians close to our border without making any discrimination in regards to whether they have been Turkmen, Arab or Kurdish, not only because they have been Turkmen.” 

Turkey’s reaction could constrain Russia near the Syrian-Turkish border, but Russia is unlikely to downgrade its operations in Syria. Russia continues to prioritize projecting power onto NATO’s southern flank, and will likely escalate its air campaign in Syria on other fronts in a show of force. The Russian Ministry of Defense summoned the Turkish defense attaché in Moscow to discuss the incident, and stated that it is “designing a complex of measures directed to respond such incidents.” The participation of al-Qaeda in the clashes near the Syrian-Turkish border will continue to provide Russia with the ability to justify its airstrikes in the guise of a counter-terror mission. NATO is unlikely to pursue further escalation, but could take a more aggressive stance against Russia’s intervention in Syria.|

The incident could affect prospects for a successful negotiated settlement in Syria, at minimum. Turkey is a major supporter of Syrian armed opposition groups to include both Turkmen and Arab groups. Turkey continues to call for the removal of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad from power, which Russia is maneuvering to prevent through the framework of the Vienna negotiations. Continued Russian support to pro-regime offensives targeting Syrian territory of concern to Turkey may disincentivize Turkey from agreeing to halt the violence in Syria.

Joint Syrian-Iranian-Russian Offensive Achieves Only Limited Initial Gains

by: Christopher Kozak

Key Takeaway: The Syrian regime has not gained much terrain in the first week of its large-scale ground offensive against rebel forces, despite support from intensified Russian airstrikes and hundreds of Iranian proxy reinforcements. Operations against the Syrian opposition will likely prove harder and slower than anticipated by either Russia or Iran, protracting the conflict and exacerbating extremism.

The Syrian regime achieved only limited tactical gains in the week after it announced the start of a “vast offensive” that aimed to “defeat terrorist groups and liberate areas and villages that have suffered from terrorism” in northwestern Syria. The offensive reportedly included reinforcements in the form of “hundreds” of Iranian troops and proxy fighters, including members of Lebanese Hezbollah and Iraqi Shi’a militias. Unverified images on social media indicated that Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) – Quds Force commander Maj. Gen. Qassem Suleimani personally oversaw operations in Latakia Province along the Syrian Coast. Meanwhile, pro-regime forces also received direct assistance from Russia in the form of airstrikes “synchronized” with the ground operations as well as artillery support from howitzer and multiple rocket launch systems (MRLS) on the ground. Senior rebel sources also alleged that Russian personnel participated in the clashes and directly supervised the operation via a joint Russian-Iranian operations room. The location and targeting of these operations underscore that Russia and Iran intend to bolster the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad rather than defeat ISIS.

Nonetheless, the Syrian regime and its allies have thus far failed to achieve significant gains. They are fighting against rebel forces along the three primary fronts in northern Hama Province, the al-Ghab Plain, and northeastern Latakia Province, creating a front line roughly 120 kilometers long. Confirmed reports indicate that pro-regime fighters have seized only six villages and towns, while rebel forces repelled heavy attacks against several key positions. At the same time, regime forces suffered heavy losses in manpower and materiel in the face of heavy rebel resistance. Free Syrian Army (FSA)-affiliated rebels forces claimed to destroy at least twenty tanks and armored vehicles as well as a helicopter gunship in a “tank massacre” on the first day of the offensive.  Meanwhile, pro-regime ground forces suffered several high-profile casualties with the deaths of two Hezbollah commanders including senior leader Hassan Hossein al-Hajj as well two Iranian veterans who had formerly commanded IRGC brigades. Continued heavy casualties may leave pro-regime forces vulnerable to a counterattack by Syrian rebels; the Idlib-based Jaysh al-Fatah Operations Room later released a statement on October 13 calling for a major rebel counteroffensive against Hama City.

Operations against the Syrian opposition will likely prove harder and slower than anticipated by either Russia or Iran. On October 2, head of the Russian Duma's Foreign Affairs Committee Alexei Pushkov predicted that Russian operations in Syria would only last "three or four months" although he noted that there is "always a risk of getting bogged down.” Russian President Vladimir Putin has also suggested that Russian air support will be sufficient to "stabilize the legitimate authorities and create conditions for finding a political compromise” in Syria. Meanwhile, Iranian National Security and Foreign Policy Committee chairman Alaeddin Boroujerdi insisted during a visit to Damascus on October 14 that cooperation between Syria, Iraq, Iran and Russia has already been “positive and successful.” The stiff defense mounted by rebel forces thus far belies this wishful thinking. The foreign allies of the Syrian regime may be forced to expend further financial and military resources in order to preserve their initial gains. The expanded interventions of both Russia and Iran will likely incentivize the Syrian regime to prioritize a military solution to the Syrian Civil War, protracting the conflict and leading to further bloodshed rather than movement towards a political solution. The heightened pressure being brought to bear upon the Syrian opposition may also drive moderate rebel factions towards closer relationships with Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) and other malign Salafi-jihadist groups, further constraining U.S. policy options in the country.

Russian Air and Missile Strikes in Syria: September 30 - October 7, 2015

By Genevieve Casagrande and Jodi Brignola

Key Takeaway:  The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that four Russian warships in the Caspian Sea fired twenty-six Kalibr-NK cruise missiles against alleged ISIS-held positions in Aleppo, Idlib, and ar-Raqqa Provinces on October 7. The Russian MoD released a video depicting the cruise missiles traveling over the airspace of Iraq and Iran in order to primarily strike targets in rebel-held areas of northwestern Syria. U.S. officials later reported that at least four of the cruise missiles had crash-landed in northwestern Iran, although both the Russian and Iranian Ministries of Defense denied these reports as “psychological warfare” by the West. The use of cruise missiles despite the presence of a functional Russian airbase in Latakia Province likely represents an overt show of force intended to project Russian military strength to both the Syrian opposition and members of the U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition.

Russian airstrikes entered a new phase of operations after the Syrian regime and allied proxy forces launched a large-scale ground offensive in northwestern Syria with Russian air support. The offensive targeted rebel positions in northern Hama and southern Idlib Provinces, highlighting Russian intent to bolster the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad rather than confront ISIS. In addition, Russian warplanes conducted airstrikes in the Qalamoun Mountains east of Damascus on October 6, targeting the headquarters of a Free Syrian Army (FSA)-affiliated rebel group that receives funding and lethal aid from the U.S. and other members of a covert joint military operations command (MOC) based in Jordan. The Russian MoD also claimed strikes in Idlib, Deir ez-Zour, and Latakia Provinces.

The following graphic depicts ISW’s assessment of Russian airstrike and cruise missile strike locations based on reports from local Syrian activist networks, Syrian state-run media, and statements by Russian and Western officials.

High-Confidence reporting. ISW places high confidence in reports corroborated both by official government statements reported through credible channels and documentation from rebel factions or activist networks on the ground in Syria deemed to be credible.

Low-Confidence reporting. ISW places low confidence in secondary sources that have not been confirmed or sources deemed likely to contain disinformation.

**ISW was only able to assess four missile strikes with high confidence through photographic evidence and only one missile strike with low confidence due to a lack of distinction in reporting from local Syrian sources.

Warning Update: Russia Expanding Facilities at Tartus Naval Base

By Christopher Kozak with Hugo Spaulding and Daniel Urchick

Recent indicators suggest that Russia intends to upgrade its naval facility in the Port of Tartus along the Syrian Coast in tandem with its ongoing air operations based out of Bassel al-Assad International Airport in neighboring Latakia Province.  On September 28, Russian media sources reported the deployment of at least two repair and supply vessels to Tartus with an onboard escort of “anti-terror group” Naval Infantry personnel. The deployment of these vessels comes in ostensible support of recently-announced naval exercises in the eastern Mediterranean Sea involving several warships from the Russian Black Sea Fleet, including the guided missile cruiser Moskva, the destroyer Smetlivy, and the tank landing ship Saratov. Nonetheless, the two repair vessels are designed to equip military ports by installing mooring buoys, breakwaters, and floating landing stages or docks – making them valuable assets in efforts to modernize the base at Tartus.

The timing of this mobilization coincides with a report in the leading Russian business newspaper Kommersant on September 21 reporting that the naval installation at Tartus currently hosts 1700 Russian military “specialists” and security personnel working to “equip and secure” the base and “rebuild the dock.” If confirmed, these numbers would reflect a major increase in activity at the facility after it had reportedly been largely abandoned by Russian forces in 2013. A source from the Russian Ministry of Defense confirmed ongoing work to modernize the Russian facility in order to hold destroyers and large landing ships but claimed that this effort had no connection to a “prepared military intervention” in Syria. However, the start of Russian air operations in northwestern Syria on September 30 belies this statement as likely disinformation. The naval facility at Tartus has served as a historic logistical hub for Russian military equipment and personnel entering Syria, and received several tank landing ships and cargo vessels over the past month transporting vehicles and supplies destined for the Bassel al-Assad International Airport.

The expansion of the naval facility at Tartus bears several implications for future Russian military activity in Syria. The base constitutes the only Russian naval base outside of the former Soviet Union and provides Russia with strategic access to the Mediterranean, although its capacity to host large, modern vessels remains limited. Russian officials have discussed potential upgrades to the base for several years without significant action, although Syrian President Bashar al-Assad stated in March 2015 that Syria would welcome “any widening of the Russian presence” in Tartus. The decision to undertake this modernization program at this time suggests a decision by Russian leadership to prepare for further support over the long-term to the Syrian regime by allowing the provision of further military equipment or the deployment of a full contingent of troops by sea. The expansion of the naval facility at Tartus also reflects Russian intent to secure permanent strategic basing in Syria in line with its establishment of an airbase at Bassel al-Assad International Airport. At minimum, recent Russian activity in Tartus indicates that Russia views its military intervention in Syria as a long-term commitment rather than a short-term limited operation.

Additional background on the Russian naval facility in Tartus from ISW senior naval analyst Christopher Harmer can be found here.

Sources consulted include: Western news outlets including AP and Reuters as well as Russian news agencies such as TASS, Interfax, Lenta, and Kommersant.

Syria 90 - Day Strategic Forecast: The Regime and Allies

By Christopher Kozak

Grand Strategic Objectives: 

• [Syrian Regime] Preserve the rule of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in a post-war Syria encompassing the entire pre-war Syrian state
• [Iran] Preserve a viable Syrian regime led by Syrian President Bashar al-Assad as a key member of the ‘Axis of Resistance’; achieve strategic positioning against Israel
• [Russia] Preserve the Syrian state – not necessarily Syrian President Bashar al-Assad – as a key foothold in the Middle East and an ally against terrorism
• [Hezbollah] Prevent the spread of the Syrian Civil War into Lebanese core terrain

Strategic Objectives:
• [Syrian Regime] Maintain Syrian territorial integrity through an ‘army in all corners’; consolidate Syrian civilian population in regime-held areas; bolster international and domestic legitimacy as ruler of Syria.
• [Iran] Position against Israel in southern Syria along the Golan Heights; preserve access to supply lines from Syria to Hezbollah in Lebanon; develop network of Syrian proxies to maintain Iranian influence if regime falls
• [Iran/Russia] Enable Syrian regime to defend core terrain along Syrian central corridor
• [Hezbollah] Secure Lebanese border region against incursion by militant groups

Read the full report here.

Syrian Rebel Forces Pressure Regime Heartland

by Christopher Kozak

Pro-regime populations in Tartus City, Latakia City, and the Shia-majority Sayyida Zeinab suburb of Damascus held rare street protests over the past eleven days which likely reflect a stream of latent dissatisfaction with the recent battlefield performance of the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. The demonstrations primarily called upon regime forces to relieve several besieged pro-regime enclaves scattered throughout northern Syria, and any major split between Syrian Alawites and the Syrian regime remains highly unlikely. Nonetheless, the Alawite population of the Syrian Coast faces mounting security concerns which likely drove this wave of public dissent. In recent weeks, heavy clashes between regime and rebel forces moved onto the strategic al-Ghab Plain of northwestern Hama Province, presenting a threat both to the borders of Latakia Province in general and the regional command-and-control node for both the Syrian Arab Army and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps located in the town of Joureen. Several rebel factions participating in the fighting on the al-Ghab Plain, including Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra and hardline Islamist group Ahrar al-Sham, have repeatedly messaged their intent to strike deep into the Alawite heartland and overrun the Assad family hometown of Qardaha. These threats likely resonate with Syrian Alawites due to previous failed rebel offensives into Latakia Province in 2013 and 2014 which reportedly included mass killings and deportations of minority populations. In this context, the inability of pro-regime forces to achieve decisive victory in the al-Ghab Plain or prevent recent volleys of rebel shelling targeting Latakia City, Qardaha, and other prominent towns have likely further eroded public confidence in the long-term protection provided by the Syrian regime.