The Campaign for Mosul: January 24-31, 2017

Operations in Mosul paused since the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) recaptured eastern Mosul on January 24. The ISF is now preparing to retake the western side. Political conditions have changed, however. Increased pressure on Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi to keep his premiership and uncertain relations between the U.S. and Iraq may allow pro-Iranian groups to extract concessions from PM Abadi that run contrary to U.S. interests in Iraq.

The ISF recaptured the last ISIS-held neighborhood in eastern Mosul on January 24, nearly three months since operations in the city began on November 1, 2016. Preparations and troop movement are now underway for operations to break into western Mosul, though no official start date has been announced. Mosul Operations Commander Lt. Gen. Abdul Amir Yarallah announced that local Ninewa police and fighters, headed by the 16th Iraqi Army Division, will hold recaptured eastern neighborhoods while local Ninewa tribal militias will hold recaptured land outside of the city limits. The Federal Police stated on January 29 that their forces were moving towards western Mosul, suggesting that the three brigades which supported southeastern operations returned to their original position on the southern axis. 

PM Abadi is at increased risk of losing his premiership. Former PM Nouri al-Maliki is maneuvering to reclaim the position by appealing to Iranian interests and courting the pro-Iranian support base away from PM Abadi. PM Abadi, who has been receptive to and supported by the U.S., may need to make concession to the pro-Iranian political base in order to ensure his position, especially if U.S.-Iraq relations strain. PM Abadi compromised on the appointment of a Badr Organization member as the Minister of Interior on January 30, despite previous reservations. He may also need to appease political parties by allowing their affiliated militias greater latitude in anti-ISIS operations.

PM Abadi may have conceded Tel Afar to the Popular Mobilization, who have long lobbied to own the operation. Popular Mobilization media stated on January 27 that Lt. Gen. Yarallah announced that the Popular Mobilization were assigned to recapture Tel Afar with Iraqi air support. Pro-Iranian militias, including the Badr Organization, Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH), and Kata’ib Hezbollah, a U.S.-designated terrorist organization, have been building up in the vicinity of Tel Afar, rather than moving west towards the Syrian border as they had previously intended. In previous urban operations, such as Fallujah, the Popular Mobilization has entered urban terrain behind a more experienced ISF frontline. The militias are likely seeking to coordinate with the ISF to bolster their limited urban warfare capabilities and generate Coalition air support. Badr Organization leader Hadi al-Amiri met with Iraqi Army Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Uthman al-Ghanimi on January 26 to discuss northern operations, indicating that this effort is underway. 

Pro-Iranian militias may also try to establish a presence in Mosul, though will likely remain far from the frontline. Badr Organization media claimed that a small Badr unit found a VBIED factory in the industrial neighborhood in eastern Mosul on January 18 however the unit was also sited in the countryside southeast of Mosul around the same time, making it unclear if the unit actually entered the city. Coalition ground forces commander Gen. Joe Martin stated on January 25 that he is unaware of any militias present in the city. This is the first report of militias operating east of the Tigris River, however, and it could be an early indicator that the militias will use PM Abadi’s vulnerable position and lack of a political support base to maneuver without check from the Iraqi Government. 

Iran Positions for Reset in Iraq after Recapture of Mosul

By Emily Anagnostos

The recapture of Mosul can reset the balance of power between Iran and the U.S. in Iraq and in the region. Iran has tolerated U.S. presence in Iraq because the U.S. provided sufficient airpower and training to combat ISIS. It has also backed Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi because his premiership was a condition of U.S. support and because PM Abadi is too weak to resist Iranian control. Pro-Iranian groups in Iraq will likely consider the recapture of Mosul as the end of major anti-ISIS operations in Iraq and continued U.S. presence unnecessary and unwelcomed. Recent U.S. statements suggest that the U.S. may increase, not decrease, its involvement in Iraq after Mosul, which is likely accelerating Iran’s efforts to expel the U.S. from the region. Iran has started to consolidate its proxies in Iraq, including a reconciliation between Sadrist Trend leader Muqtada al-Sadr and senior pro-Iranian officials, in order to both increase pressure on PM Abadi against further Western support and establish Iraq as a base from which it can project regional influence. Iran’s support for PM Abadi’s premiership could also waver, especially if a more pro-Iranian candidate emerges.

Former PM Nouri al-Maliki will aim to convince Iran that he, as prime minister, would support the power shift from the U.S. to Iran in order to secure Iran’s political support for 2018 parliamentary elections. Maliki has begun to court Iranian proxies and officials and is continuing to weaken PM Abadi’s authority, including by resuming efforts to dismiss key Abadi allies. More dangerously, he may move to retake the premiership in the upcoming month. The Council of Representatives (CoR) scheduled a questioning session with PM Abadi on February 11, alongside ten other government officials over the coming month. The questioning could be a prerequisite for a no-confidence vote. At the very least, the questioning will be a show of strength for Maliki and could undermine PM Abadi’s legitimacy.

The Situation

The recapture of Mosul is a given. 

• The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) recaptured eastern Mosul on January 24. Operations to retake western Mosul will begin in the coming days, with heavy support from the U.S. and the anti-ISIS Coalition to ensure the city’s complete recapture.

Context and Implications

Iran was tolerant of continued U.S. presence in Iraq in order to defeat ISIS, but now that Mosul’s capture is certain it will seek to expel the U.S. from the region.

• Iranian grand strategic objectives converged with the U.S. in the near term over the shared objective to defeat the Salafi-Jihadi threat. In the long term, however, Iran aims to expel the U.S. from the Middle East.
• The U.S. and Iran both supported PM Abadi’s premiership in 2014 over Maliki in the interest of re-stabilizing Iraq and defeating ISIS. They both prevented Maliki from ousting PM Abadi in the midst of political turmoil in April 2016.
• The U.S. provided anti-ISIS support, including critical airpower, on the condition that Maliki would not bid for a third term in 2014 elections. The U.S. supported PM Abadi as a candidate receptive to U.S. interests. Iran supported him because he was a weak candidate it can control.
• The longevity of PM Abadi’s premiership, therefore, is linked to the necessity of U.S. military support to defeat ISIS, which Iran’s military capacity was and still is unable to duplicate, and Iran’s confidence that it controls the premiership.

U.S. involvement in Iraq may increase, not decrease, after Mosul’s recapture.

• PM Abadi stated during a press conference that U.S. President Donald Trump assured Iraq of his support “at all levels” and that the Trump Administration promised to “double U.S. support for Iraq, not just continue it.”
• U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Douglas Silliman stated on January 22 that the U.S. will continue the 2008 Strategic Framework Agreement (SFA), which governs bilateral relations, including in the fields of military and economic. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs discussed the SFA further on January 26, its activation, implementation, and ways to “increase the volume of cooperation” between the U.S. and Iraq “in all fields.”

Going Forward

Iran is consolidating its proxies to challenge the U.S.’s continued presence in Iraq

• Sadrist Trend leader Muqtada al-Sadr reconciled with major Iranian proxy militia leaders, including Badr Organization leader Hadi al-Amiri, Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH) leader Qais al-Khazali, and Popular Mobilization Deputy Chairman Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, in Najaf on October 18, 2016. Sadr’s interests in Iraq have long been distinct from, and often at odds with, Iranian interests and he, his militia, and political party rarely operate in coordination with pro-Iranian groups. (Do not enter: jawabna.com) Bringing Sadr back under Iran’s fold consolidates the major Shi’a groups in Iraq and creates a unified proxy through which Iran can act.
• The passing of the Popular Mobilization Act on November 26, 2016 further institutionalized Iranian proxy militias in the Iraqi state, but they continue to operate under Iran’s command and control.
• Popular Mobilization participation in anti-ISIS operations will cement Iranian presence in northern Iraq and the Popular Mobilization as a legitimate security force.

Iran is also pursuing its objective to supplant the U.S. in the Middle East by using Iraq as a regional proxy.

• Muqtada al-Sadr visited Beirut on January 20 where he met with Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of Iranian proxy Hezbollah, to discuss both Hezbollah and Iraqi Shi’a militias’ influence in the region.
• On January 24, Sadr stated that the transfer of the U.S. Embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem would be a “declaration of war against Islam” and he called for a formation of a “special division to liberate Jerusalem.” Sadr’s statement falls in line with the Iranian grand strategic objectives to eliminate the state of Israel and to expel the U.S from the region.
• Iran named IRGC Brig. Gen. Iraj Masjedi as Iranian Ambassador to Iraq on January 11. Masjedi is IRGC-Quds Force Commander Qassem Suleimani’s senior advisor. Previous ambassadors have also served in the Quds Force, but Masjedi’s relation with Qassem Suleimani, a U.S. designated terrorist, will likely strengthen Iran’s efforts to convert the Iraqi Government and its institutions into proxy forces.

Iran may no longer value PM Abadi’s premiership as it did in 2014, when Abadi was necessary to ensure U.S. support, opening an opportunity for former PM Nouri al Maliki to bid for the premiership.

• Iran may consider it more preferable to have an Iraqi Prime Minister that actively pursues pro-Iranian interests, rather than a premiership that is receptive to the U.S. and merely too weak to resist Iran.
• Maliki, since he lost the premiership in 2014, has sought to return to the office by undermining PM Abadi’s office. Iran previously mitigated these ambitions through direct intervention.

Maliki is courting Iranian proxy groups as an electoral base, likely on the promise to expel the U.S. from Iraq after Mosul’s recapture and shift the balance of power to Iran. 

• A report on January 25 alleged that Maliki will contest PM Abadi’s reelection in 2018 by building an alliance of Shi’a militias, naming mid-level Iranian proxy militias as allies.
• Maliki chaired a meeting of the State of Law Alliance (SLA), his political bloc, on January 24, at which PM Abadi was not present. Iranian representatives were allegedly in attendance.
• Maliki conducted a four-day visit to Tehran from December 31, 2016 to January 3, 2017, meeting with senior Iranian officials, including Supreme Leader Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, during which he discussed elections and the Popular Mobilization’s involvement in the region.

PM Abadi faces a questioning by the Council of Representatives (COR) on February 11. 

• The CoR released a list on January 24 of eleven ministers, independent commission chairmen, and senior government officials that will be questioned over the next month.
• PM Abadi is the fifth of the eleven officials to be questioned. The list also includes three of the five technocratic ministers that PM Abadi succeeded in appointing during his Cabinet reshuffle in August 2016, including the Oil Minister, Water Minister, and Transportation Minister.
• PM Abadi’s questioning will reportedly be about recent security breaches in Baghdad and vacant ministerial positions. Protests, including those led by the Sadrist Trend, have occurred in response to continued ISIS attacks in the capital.
• Pro-Maliki CoR members will lead the majority of the questioning sessions, as they did during sessions to dismiss Finance Minister Hoshyar Zebari on September 21, 2016 and Defense Minister Khalid al-Obeidi on August 25, 2016. A member of Gorran, a Kurdish opposition party, will question PM Abadi, however.
• The Iraqi Constitution (Article 7.A-C) lists two types of questioning sessions: one of which is for the sake of inquiry into a subject and one of which is the first step in a no-confidence vote. The latter requires a petition of 25 CoR members to launch the questioning session. It is unclear if these questionings were petitioned. Nevertheless, the dismissal of both the Finance and Defense Ministers did not follow constitutional procedure, underscoring the danger that the questioning, even if it is framed as a basic inquiry, may be considered the first step of a no-confidence vote.

Maliki’s efforts to replace PM Abadi and the lack of Iranian support may place PM Abadi’s position in double jeopardy. PM Abadi’s questioning on February 11 may set the stage for a no-confidence process. But Maliki will need to ensure that he has the needed votes and backing to become prime minister. He continues to hold wide support within the Shi’a National Alliance, but far from a majority in the CoR. Indicators of whether the questioning will lead to a no-confidence vote will include how Kurdish and Sunni parties throw their weight. Maliki courted Kurdish parties, primarily the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and Gorran, in April and May 2016, but he has made limited outreach to these parties in the past months. If Maliki does not have the votes, he may instead choose to use PM Abadi’s session as a rallying call for further support, continue efforts to weaken PM Abadi’s authority, and build an electoral support base over the next year.

Iraq Situation Report: January 12-24, 2017

The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) pushed ISIS out of eastern Mosul on January 24, but will need to continue efforts to expel ISIS from historic support zones in Diyala and Anbar. With the support of Coalition advisors, the ISF recaptured the last ISIS-held neighborhood in eastern Mosul on January 24 and is preparing to launch operations into western Mosul. ISIS continues to demonstrate, however, that it has set conditions to retain its capabilities and networks in order to survive the loss of Mosul in Iraq. The group remains active in recaptured areas in which it, and its predecessor al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), had extensive networks. Ongoing low-level attacks in the Euphrates River Valley and in Diyala Province underscore that ISIS is reconstituting its abilities and returning to traditional style terror tactics outside of its efforts to govern and hold cities. The ISF and Coalition will need to continue anti-ISIS operations beyond the recapture of Mosul and may need to reopen clearing operations in previously recaptured areas in order to eliminate ISIS in Iraq.

The Campaign of Mosul: January 19-23, 2017

By Emily Anagnostos and the ISW Iraq Team

The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) stormed the last neighborhood in eastern Mosul on January 23, nearing the end of a nearly three month long battle to clear the eastern half of the city. The ISF is preparing to enter the smaller, but denser and heavily populated, western half within the coming days.

The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) continued its momentum in northern Mosul from January 19 to 23, as the Iraqi Army (IA) pushed into the last ISIS-held neighborhood in east Mosul, Rashidiyah, on January 23. The complete recapture of the city east of the Tigris River is expected within a day. Units from the 9th IA Armored Division and 1st IA Division, previously operating in now-recaptured southeastern Mosul, deployed to and recaptured Tel Kayyaf District on January 19, then extended the ISF’s northern control to encompass the main Dohuk-Mosul road. Units from the 16th Iraqi Army Division had isolated but bypassed Tel Kayyaf in late October 2016 in order to keep apace with other axes already nearing the city limits. Meanwhile, the Counter Terrorism Service (CTS) expanded control along the Tigris River in central Mosul, gaining control of all five bridges on the eastern side on January 19. The recent gain in momentum follows increased Coalition and ISF efforts to reinforce and synchronize ground efforts across the city and block ISIS’s cross-city mobility. 

Both the ISF and ISIS are preparing for operations in western Mosul. Sources reported on January 22 that engineering units had begun to assemble five pontoon bridges, provided by the Coalition to replace the destroyed bridges, in order to cross the Tigris River into western Mosul. ISIS, meanwhile, destroyed the landmark Mosul Hotel, situated on the river bank near the northernmost Third Bridge, in order to deny the ISF a strategic base. ISIS will likely use the density of western Mosul to attrite the ISF in an urban fight and limit the ISF’s ability to call in air support or heavy artillery. 

The ISF will also need to prepare to operate around an estimated 750,000 civilians remaining in western Mosul. Evacuating residents from western Mosul will be challenging, whether the ISF directs Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) to cross first into eastern Mosul towards the camps east of the city, against the grain of current advances, or towards camps west of the Tigris River. Evacuating residents will place an added burden on the ISF to police the IDPs flows. The ISF could elect, then, to operate while residents remain in place, as they largely did in eastern Mosul though it slowed its advances, and import humanitarian aid rather than take responsibility for IDPs flows. Any option will complicate urban operations.

Correction: Previous maps incorrectly showed Mosul’s city limits as encompassing two villages in northern Mosul west of Rashidiyah. These villages are suburbs and are not within the city limits, making Rashidiyah the last ISIS-held area in Mosul.

The Campaign for Mosul: January 10-18, 2017

By Emily Anagnostos and the ISW Iraq Team

The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) is rapidly consolidating control over eastern Mosul following a major push from January 10 to 18. The ISF has extended its control along the Tigris River and recaptured the University of Mosul, once ISIS’s major logistical hub in the city.

The ISF is nearing the end of operations in eastern Mosul after a major push from January 10 to 18 to recapture several remaining neighborhoods and the University of Mosul. The Counter Terrorism Service (CTS), the ISF’s elite urban warfare units, advanced two efforts to clear the University of Mosul and to extend the ISF’s control of the Tigris River. The CTS officially announced control over the university on January 15, after storming it two days prior, and continued to advance north along the river bank, seizing two additional bridges and key government buildings on January 13.

Meanwhile, the Iraqi Army (IA) and Federal Police are consolidating gains in northern and southeastern Iraq. The Iraqi Army is advancing west along Mosul’s northern city limit towards the remaining ISIS-held areas in eastern Mosul. Federal Police and Iraqi Army units announced on January 14 full control of southeastern Mosul with the recapture of Yarmjah and the southeastern countryside with the recapture of Qiz Fakhri, the last ISIS-held village on the eastern bank. The Federal Police announced the same day the completion of its mission in southeastern Mosul and that its units will return to the southern axis in order to resume efforts to break into the Mosul airport and southern military base. This effort will likely occur in synchronization as the ISF cross the Tigris River into western Mosul, though no timeline has yet been given.

Recent reinforcements and increased Coalition advisors enabled these quick advances, though it is also likely that ISIS did not resist the ISF to the same extent as in the early stages of the city battle. The destruction of the five bridges spanning the Tigris River by Coalition airstrikes has likely limited ISIS’s mobility between east and west Mosul, hurting its ability to reinforce and resupply its fighters in the east. Pentagon spokesman Capt. Jeff Davis stated on January 9 that ISIS has resorted to makeshift means, including planks and cranes, to move people and equipment into eastern Mosul. The ISF is therefore facing an enemy incapable of regenerating its ranks as it takes losses. ISIS may have already withdrawn the majority of its fighters from eastern Mosul, as well, in order to limit its casualties in the face of growing ISF momentum.

ISF operations in western Mosul will require a change in tactic. The block-by-block method of clearing eastern Mosul will not be effective in the west because its infrastructure is not laid out by city blocks. ISIS will use western Mosul’s narrow and winding streets to challenge less-experienced ISF units, such as the Iraqi Army. The group may rely more on the city’s infrastructure for static defenses, as it did in Ramadi, in order to stave of its imminent loss of the city. Lessons learned from eastern Mosul, however, such as the need for cross-axis coordination, will help the ISF rebuff ISIS’s defenses and ensure that operations in western Mosul are smoother than the stop-and-go progress that protracted operations in the east.

Iraq Situation Report: January 6-11, 2017

By Emily Anagnostos and the ISW Iraq Team

ISIS continued to demonstrate its ability to carry out spectacular attacks inside Baghdad from January 6 to 11, following weeks of increasing activity in the capital in response to its losses in Mosul. These attacks indicate that ISIS retains the freedom to maneuver in and around the capital. Residents from Sadr City, which witnessed several major attacks in the past weeks, staged a protest in central Baghdad on January 9 and 10 demanding better security. Meanwhile, foiled attacks in northern Wasit, Diyala, and Ramadi, and an attack near Tikrit, underscore that ISIS is capable of reviving networks in historical support zones which have been recaptured by the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). 

ISIS historically uses its attacks in Baghdad to drive doubts in the Iraqi Government, in particular the Abadi administration, over its ability to protect the capital. In May 2016, major ISIS attacks in Sadr City led to a local but organized demonstration storming the Green Zone. The protest revealed the degree of frustration with Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi and his administration and undermined its legitimacy. ISIS carried out similar attacks in Sadr City this week that also provoked a local but organized protest, a possible indication that recent ISIS attacks in the capital are accomplishing the group’s intent to undermine the Abadi government. ISIS is likely also trying to draw the security forces away from or prevent them from going to Mosul in order to protect the capital, limiting the possible reinforcements for the Mosul operation. Meanwhile, the political situation remains uneasy as the Council of Representatives resumed this week and will return to contentious issues, such appointments for vacant ministries, which put PM Abadi’s premiership in the crosshairs in early 2016 when he attempted a Cabinet reshuffle. If ISIS continues to successfully attack Baghdad, and if those attacks coincide with political upheaval as they did in 2016, mass protests and discontent could further weaken PM Abadi’s authority or, in the most dangerous scenario, lead to his dismissal.  

The Campaign for Mosul: January 4-9, 2017

The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) reached the Tigris River on January 8 after recapturing several of the remaining neighborhoods in southeast Mosul. In the north, the ISF pushed into central Mosul from the north and east from January 4 to 9, nearing the University of Mosul.

The ISF pushed towards key infrastructure for ISIS in Mosul after making significant progress in the northern and southeastern neighborhoods from January 4 to 9. The rapid gains follow new accelerants added to the operation from December 29 to January 3, with the arrival of ISF reinforcements and increased Coalition trainers. Newly deployed Federal Police units, working alongside the existing Iraqi Army units, are consolidating control of southeastern Mosul. Meanwhile, the Counter Terrorism Service (CTS) reached the Tigris River after securing the eastern bank around the southernmost Fourth Bridge on January 8. The CTS, however, is unlikely to make any advance by ground into western Mosul in the near term because the bridge is inoperable due to previous Coalition airstrikes that destroyed the bridge in an effort to prevent ISIS movement into eastern Mosul. Coalition advisors on the ground will likely assist the ISF in rebuilding the bridge, or creating a new one, as they did in Qayyarah in July 2016. The ISF will likely pause before an operation launches to cross the river in order to regroup and plan for the likely stiff ISIS resistance on the western bank. It may also coordinate an advance into western Mosul with units remaining south of the city in order to retake the airport and military base.

The CTS is also leading a push from the north towards the University of Mosul, which had previously been a major logistical hub for ISIS in the city. The CTS entered the area after crossing the Khosr River, a tributary that feeds in the Tigris, during a night raid on January 6, shifting the focus from northeast to northern Mosul. Their effort was matched by units from the Iraqi Army breaching Mosul’s northern limits for the first time on January 6 as well. Their entrance into the city limits is likely the result of U.S. advisors embedding deeper in the ISF’s ranks, as the army units had struggled to advance beyond Mosul’s northern suburbs for weeks. The ISF will likely face significant resistance as it enters the university, though it is unclear if ISIS will actively fight for the campus. A CTS official reported on January 8 that ISIS had burned several buildings before withdrawing, corroborating earlier reports. ISIS may decide to heavily mine the buildings and crater the roads instead of fighting in order to slow the ISF’s advance and leave it vulnerable to counterattacks but limit the risk of its own casualties.

Iraq Situation Report: December 21, 2016 - January 5, 2017

By Emily Anagnostos and the ISW Iraq Team

ISIS launched waves of counteroffensives and spectacular attacks across Iraq after operations in eastern Mosul resumed on December 29. The attacks were widespread and hit highly secured areas, including Baghdad and the shrine cities of Najaf and Samarra. ISIS also attempted to sever the main highway running from Mosul to Baghdad by attacking locations north of Baiji. The attack pattern is similar to ISIS’s attacks in the week after the Mosul operation launched on October 17, when ISIS struck targets in Kirkuk, Sinjar, Rutba, and Samarra, and in the week after the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) breached Mosul’s city limits on November 1, when ISIS launched major attacks in Tikrit, al-Alam, Samarra, and Shirqat. The most recent attacks from December 29 to January 5 underscore that ISIS will react to major phase changes in Mosul by launching wide-spread attacks with the intent to spread the ISF thin, force it to reallocate units away from northern operations, and undermine political legitimacy in Baghdad. The attacks demonstrate that, despite its losses in Mosul, ISIS is capable of reopening old fronts, such as in Sinjar which it lost in November 2015; penetrating deep behind the frontlines, such as Kirkuk City; and retaining access into highly secured areas, such as Baghdad and Samarra. Continued minor attacks in the Euphrates River Valley also suggest that ISIS may be reviving networks in historical support zones. The ISF and Coalition can reasonably expect that ISIS will launch a similar wave of attacks across Iraq when the ISF reaches and crosses the Tigris River in Mosul.  

The Campaign for Mosul: December 20, 2016 - January 3, 2017

By Emily Anagnostos and the ISW Iraq Team

The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) launched the second phase of operations in Mosul on December 29, 2016, after weeks of limited gains and heavy casualties. The Coalition and ISF introduced new accelerants that revived the push, including advisors embedded at a lower-level and increased ISF deployments, allowing the ISF to make significant gains in eastern Mosul from December 29 to January 3, 2017.

The ISF announced the “second phase” of operations in Mosul’s city limits, now in its second month, on December 29 after operations paused for a week from December 21 to 28 to allow ISF units to regroup and remobilize. Since December 29, the ISF recaptured five major neighborhoods along Mosul’s main east-west highway and pushed further towards the eastern bank of the Tigris River. The advances inward have put the Mosul Airport and adjacent military base in range of ISF artillery.

New accelerants from the ISF and Coalition made this revived push successful. Three brigades of Federal Police and units from the Emergency Response Division, an elite unit in the Ministry of Interior, redeployed from the southern axis and began operating in the southeast alongside units from the 9^th Iraqi Army Armored Division. The introduction of the Federal Police into Mosul is a risk if the units are especially compromised by or comprised of pro-Iranian militias, which has historically resulted in sectarian violence, although the Coalition has previously cooperated with at least one of the three brigades in Ramadi. These reinforcements bolstered Iraqi Army efforts to retake several southeast neighborhoods from December 29 to January 3 and relieved the Counter Terrorism Service (CTS), which has shouldered the bulk of the urban warfare, the burden to both hold territory and support less-experienced ISF units.

The Coalition also accelerated the advance by embedding deeper with Iraqi units. The Coalition announced on December 24 that it would embed at a lower-level in the ISF, including alongside formations, such as the Federal Police, with which the Coalition has not embedded in the past. U.S. Defense Secretary Ash Carter had announced in July, after the ISF retook the Qayyarah Airbase, that embedding U.S. advisors at brigade- and battalion- levels was one of four accelerants it would deploy as the ISF set final conditions for Mosul, however advisors continued to remain primarily at the division level. U.S. advisors are now particularly focused on supporting the northern axis, where Iraqi Army units have not yet breached the city, though the advisors are also operating alongside the CTS and other ISF units. The ISF may also begin relying on increased Coalition airstrikes to counter ISIS targets, rather than door-to-door operations; this raises the risk of civilian casualties but can stave off further attrition.

ISIS launched a series of spectacular attacks from December 31 to January 2 in the shrine cities Najaf and Samarra and in Baghdad in response to the renewed push. ISIS will try to increase the pressure on provinces and political leaders to draw back forward deployed ISF units from Mosul operations, reducing reinforcements. It has also attempted to sever the ISF’s supply routes by attacking the Baghdad-Mosul highway around Shirqat District on January 2, though Iraqi forces later reopened the road. ISIS’s ability to continue attacks in the shrine cities and capital and to create a protracted battle in Mosul will put increasing pressure on an already vulnerable Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi, who had pledged that the operation would be over before 2017 but now states it will take another three months.

Iraq Situation Report: December 7-20, 2016

By Emily Anagnostos and the ISW Iraq Team

Local and regional actors are maneuvering to secure their position in 2017 and for a post-ISIS Mosul. Former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki travelled to the southern provinces on December 9 and 10 to attend several tribal conferences where he has typically looked to secure electoral support, suggesting the he is positioning for upcoming 2017 provincial and 2018 parliamentary elections with an eye on the premiership. Large anti-Maliki protests, which were likely Sadrist, however, forced him to cut his visits short, indicating that Maliki may be facing stronger competition from other Shi’a parties in southern Iraq than before. Meanwhile, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) is moving to extend its boundaries while anti-ISIS operations in the region are ongoing and before the complete recapture of Mosul cements the current control of terrain. The KRG used operations around Mosul, including those prior to October 17 when the operation launched, to claim territory that will remain under its jurisdiction after operations end. The KRG will do so similarly around Sinjar. The U.S. and Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) separately warned on December 15 that the continued presence of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a U.S.-designated terrorist group, in Sinjar is a detriment to the area’s stability and resettlement. The PKK recaptured western Sinjar during anti-ISIS operations in November 2015; the KRG occupies the eastern half. The KRG will move to expel the PKK from Sinjar while the power dynamics are still shifting lest the PKK gain a permanent presence in northern Iraq, contrary to the KRG’s interests.  ISIS, however, is also positioning for the upcoming year and for the possible loss of Mosul. The group is reconstituting networks and capabilities in recaptured areas, such as Fallujah despite its recapture by the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) in June 2016, from where it can continue to launch attacks, particularly into Baghdad and the southern belts. ISIS’s position in the Euphrates River Valley could also maintain a connection with its affiliates in Syria which can provide support as ISIS reconstitutes in Iraq.

The Campaign for Mosul: December 13-19, 2016

Operations in eastern Mosul largely paused from December 13 to 19 likely in order to stem the growing casualties taken by the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and to regroup before pushing into central Mosul. Meanwhile, the Popular Mobilization continued its push west, connecting its parallel lines of effort when it recaptured the north-south road between the Tel Afar Airbase and the southern town of Ashwa on December 13.

Operations in eastern Mosul largely paused from December 13 to 19. The Counter Terrorism Service (CTS), which is bearing the brunt of the operation, is facing a degree of attrition that risks the successful completion of anti-ISIS operations in Mosul. Senior U.S. military officials reported that the U.S.-trained Golden Brigade, the first of three brigades of the CTS, is facing a 50% casualty rate and could be rendered combat ineffective in a month if the rate remains constant. The CTS has deliberately slowed operations in eastern Mosul in order to reduce the rate of attrition, and the ISF announced it will begin to rely more on artillery and precision airstrikes to target ISIS militants in response. These new tactics, however, will likely increase civilian casualties because ISIS militants continue to use Mosul’s civilian population as human shields. The ISF will either be forced to heavily deploy its assets from other areas of the country to match the capability of the elite CTS forces or to call up non-acceptable partners, such as the Popular Mobilization, to complete the current operation in Mosul.

The pause in eastern Mosul may also align with a need to regroup before the ISF pushes into central Mosul. Operations in northeastern Mosul, under the efforts of the CTS, have reached the Khosr River, a tributary river that feeds into the Tigris and bisects northeastern Mosul. The CTS will need to regroup before bridging the river in order to resolve the logistics of the crossing, notably for heavy equipment. The CTS will also need to plan for how to approach these new neighborhoods, especially the University of Mosul, a logistical hub for ISIS. Unconfirmed sources report that ISIS destroyed the campus and withdrew, however the “scorched earth” tactic, if true, will still slow the ISF’s advance and leave it open to ISIS counterattacks. ISIS will resist the CTS’s advance further into central Mosul and towards the government center. The CTS will need to carefully assess how to secure this area in light of its reduced numbers and limited ability to call in reinforcements.

Shi’a militias operating in the western Ninewa desert connected their northern and southern lines of effort by retaking the Tel Afar-Ashwa road on December 13. The militias have been operating on two separate axes, the first stretching west from Tel Afar along the Sinjar highway, in the northern desert, and the second stemming west from Qayyarah, moving through key villages of Ain al-Jahush, Tel Abtah, and Ashwa in the southern desert. Units connected these lines of effort on December 13 when they cleared the road stretching between Tel Afar and Ashwa, giving the operations a greater ability to move forces and equipment as they continue to progress west. 

Iraq Control of Terrain: December 15, 2016

By Staley Smith, Michael Momayezi, and the ISW Iraq Team

The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) continued operations to retake Mosul and its environs, consolidating gains along its five axes before breaching the city limits on November 1. The ISF continued to advance north from Qayyarah towards southwestern Mosul, but have yet to breach the city limits there; south from Kurdish-held territory towards northern Mosul, besieging Tel Kayyaf; and in the countryside southeast of Mosul, from where they entered the city itself. The Counter Terrorism Service has retaken upwards of twenty neighborhoods from ISIS in the northeast quarter over the past six weeks, but the Iraqi Army has struggled to advance in Mosul’s southeast quarter. The ISF and Peshmerga also consolidated gains around Makhmur in late October. The Peshmerga, meanwhile, advanced from Bashiqa Mountain to retake Bashiqa, northeast of Mosul, on November 7. Peshmerga involvement in the operation has since largely concluded, while the ISF continues its lines of effort inside Mosul itself and at remaining ISIS-held areas, including the southern axis. ISW is thus changing the respective areas to ISF-, Peshmerga-, and joint ISF and Peshmerga-control. 

Meanwhile, the Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs) launched operations into the western desert, west of Mosul, on October 29. The militias recaptured the Tel Afar airbase on November 16 but Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi called for the ISF, not the PMUs, to recapture the city itself. The PMUs have since expanded west beyond Tel Afar, aiming for ISIS-held Baaj, south of Sinjar, and the Syrian border. ISW is thus changing this area to a control zone where Shi’a militias are the primary security force. 

The ISF launched a minor operation to recapture the eastern bank of the Tigris River across from Shirqat on November 29 in order to counter ISIS’s ability to attack recaptured areas. The ISF deployed the Baghdad-based 60th Brigade of the 17th Iraqi Army (IA) Division alongside tribal forces and an armored battalion to lead the operation, which launched south from Makhmur, making minimal gains. ISW is thus expanding the area of ISF and tribal fighter control to include recent gains from the operation.

The Campaign for Mosul: December 6-12, 2016

The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) made significant gains in northeastern Mosul from December 6 to 12, but struggled to advance in the southeast. The ISF ordered a change in tactic on December 4 in order to address the lopsided eastern offensive, attempting to make rapid advances in the southeast rather than grind through neighborhood-by-neighborhood clearing operations. The shift, however, failed drastically when the rapid gains left the ISF open to ISIS counterattacks, resulting in heavy casualties on December 6 and 7. In response, the ISF moved units previously allocated to breach Mosul’s southwestern neighborhoods to reinforce efforts in the southeast on December 10.

The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) pushed to accelerate and complete operations in eastern Mosul from December 6 to 12 in order to reach the Tigris River and launch an offensive into western Mosul as the second month of the operation comes to an end. Efforts in the southeast, largely under the command of the Iraqi Army, however, have struggled to match efforts in the northeast, led by the elite Counter Terrorism Forces (CTS). 

The CTS, with the support the 16^th Iraqi Army Division entering from the north, made significant gains in northeastern Mosul from December 6 to 12. These gains have been the result of weeks of intensive and difficult block-by-block clearing operations. The CTS used this tactic in operations in Ramadi and Fallujah; it is not having the same level of effectiveness in Mosul as it did before, largely due to the dense civilian population remaining in the city whom ISIS has used as human shields. As a result the CTS requires additional time to advance, but it is still able to make gains against ISIS because of its superior skills and experience in urban warfare.

In the southeast quarter, the less experienced Iraqi Army has not been able to overcome ISIS’s resistance by grinding through block-by-block. As a solution, the ISF ordered a change in tactic on December 4, calling for “surprise” operations that would seek rapid extensions into ISIS-held areas. The tactic was put to the test on December 6, when a unit from the 9th Iraqi Army Armored Division made a quick offshoot west in order to retake the Salaam Hospital, near the bank of the Tigris River. The move, however, left the ISF open to ISIS counterattacks and ISIS, hidden in the area, launched a massive ambush on the unit on December 6 and 7. The failure required a Coalition airstrike and a rescue by the CTS to extract the unit on December 7, which reported one hundred casualties.

The ISF and Coalition are now focusing efforts in the southeast in order to accelerate the entire eastern operation. The ISF moved three brigades from the 5th Federal Police Division, or roughly 4,000 men, from the southern axis to reinforce the ISF in the southeast on December 10. These forces, previously allocated to spearhead operations into the Mosul airport and military base, will reportedly operate in the same neighborhood of the failed hospital offensive. They are currently mobilizing in Hamdaniya, southeast of Mosul, before they move into the city itself. Additionally, sources reported that a Coalition airstrike targeted the fifth and final bridge connecting east and west Mosul. The destruction of the bridge will reduce ISIS’s ability to transport equipment and people into eastern Mosul and will help anti-ISIS forces box in remaining ISIS militants in order to advance west. If the ISF can succeed in pushing ISIS out of southeastern Mosul, forces in the southeast may move to breach Mosul’s airport and military base from the east where it could establish a forward operating base for further operations into western Mosul.