Iraq Update 2014 #14: ISIS Condemns Elections, Posts Warnings in Kirkuk, Diyala, Ninewa, and Northern Baghdad

By Omar Abdullah, Jessica Lewis, Alex Bilger, and Iraq Team 

The Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), formerly known as al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), recently condemned Iraq’s upcoming national elections by disseminating official messages in Kirkuk, Diyala, Ninewa, and Northern Baghdad. ISIS conveyed these messages in March 2014 through leaflets in northern Baghdad and Twitter pages dedicated to its Wilayats (States) the ‘ISIS Wilayat Diyala,’ the ‘ISIS Wilayat Kirkuk,’ 'ISIS Wilayat Ninewa', and the ‘ISIS Wilayat Northern Baghdad.’ Until April 30, 2014, when Iraq’s national elections are scheduled to take place, ISIS should be considered a direct threat to electoral candidates, election centers, and voters in these locations. 

The threat to elections posed by ISIS is not without precedent. AQI also attempted to derail political process before national elections in 2010; however the present context is critical. The ability of ISIS to cause security conditions in multiple provinces to deteriorate to the point that elections centers cannot open, or that Iraqis cannot safely register for voter cards, has the potential to jeopardize electoral process. At an operational level, ISIS may intend to destabilize Iraq by disrupting elections. At a strategic level, ISIS may consider the failure of elections as a victory against democracy. Without free and fair elections, Iraq’s political institutions may not be able to withstand pressure from anti-government groups. Iraq’s stability therefore depends upon successful elections on April 30, 2014. Until that date, ISW will report on observed security threats to the elections. 

This report contains full translations of the March 3, 2014 statements condemning elections posted to the Twitter pages of ISIS Wilayat Diyala, ISIS Wilayat Kirkuk, and ISIS Wilayat Ninewa. Images of the distribution of anti-election leaflets distributed in Northern Baghdad are also included, as posted to the Twitter page of the ISIS Wilayat Northern Baghdad. The existence of these Twitter pages, as well as the consistency of their message content, confirms the intent of ISIS to establish alternate governance structures inside of Iraq. Wilayats are governorates within the broader construct of the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham (ISIS), and they also historically subdivided the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI). ISIS Wilayats have also been observed in Anbar, Salah ad Din, Ninewa, and the South, likely referring to northern Babel. ISIS Wilayats are also present in Syria. It is therefore important to note that ISIS is not operating solely as a military organization in Iraq. ISIS seeks to gain legitimacy relative to the government of Iraq through religious authority as well as hard power. 

ISIS Wilayat Kirkuk 

In Kirkuk province, a statement dated March 3, 2014 was released by the Sharia Commission of the Islamic State in Iraq and Sham [ISIS] in Wilayat Kirkuk regarding the participation and facilitation of the upcoming elections. The statement, along with other anti-elections leaflets, were distributed students in at least one school and to citizens elsewhere in Kirkuk. The statement claimed that participation in the elections is Kufr, or a concealment of Islamic truth, for replacing “God laws” with the laws of “infidels.” The statement also declared polling centers and centers used to distribute the Voter Card, (electronic cards planned to be used by voters on the day of the elections) as targets and warned “Sunni” citizens from going near them. 

An image and full translation of the official statement posted to the ISIS Wilayat Kirkuk Twitter page is provided below. 

In the name of god most merciful      

“Islamic State in Iraq and Sham”                                                       March 3rd 2014 

The Shari’a law committee 

In Kirkuk State 

All the glory and thanks to Allah who set the rules for his followers, the rules that should keep them living happily and peacefully in this life under the justice of just and fair rulers, in a perfect world where there should be no powerful-unjust men nor there are victims. May God also bless the spirit of his glory messenger to us, Mohammed [P(eace) B(e) U(pon) H(im)]. [Translator’s Note: In this section the letter quotes a verse from Quran (Shura 21) which implies that Muslims should not set laws that have no roots in Sharia law]. 

All Muslims know the following fact; participating in elections is severely prohibited in Islam, because this process replaces the laws of Shari’a, which are the laws of Allah, with laws that are manmade, furthermore, those laws are created by the infidels themselves. The Rafidhi government in Baghdad has forced our Muslim people to obtain the electoral-smart card by linking those smart cards to the food rations’ supplies for each family, which is a cowardly way that aims to swerve our people from the path of God. 

Because of the above; we warn the owners of the food rations’ centers in this state [Kirkuk] from processing any of those so called “the voter’s card” [same as the smart-card mentioned above] or else! 

We also ask our Sunni people in this glorious state [Kirkuk] to not fall victims to the plans of this Safavid and Rafidhi government. And as a friendly reminder; we have previously warned everyone that electoral-centers will be targeted during elections’ days. Thus, we again remind you to stay far as possible from those centers. 

God will always win, and his word should always be the truth

[Author’s Note: The photo above was posted to the ISIS Wilayat Kirkuk Twitter page to illustrate the distribution of leaflets condemning elections.] 

ISIS Wilayat Diyala 

Another statement was released by ISIS in Diyala on March, 2014, the same month. The statement again described the elections and the representation of citizens in the parliament as Kufr since they replace Gods laws. The statement added that selecting a candidate from any background is Kufr and that the candidates and the voters, are both equally Kafirs and “Infidels.” The statement warned the Sunni people from participating in the elections, declaring them as targets if they do participate. It also warned speakers of the mosques from garnering support for the elections. Finally, the statement warned that the electoral centers and locations used to distribute Voter Cards would be targeted. 

An image and full translation of the official statement posted to the ISIS Wilayat Diyala Twitter page is provided below.

In the name of god most merciful 

“Islamic State in Iraq and Sham”                                                         March 2014 

The Shari’a law committee 

In Diyala State 

Warning to Muslims from the plans of infidels 

All the glory and thanks to Allah who sat the rules for his followers. May God also bless the spirit of his glory messenger to us, Mohammed P(eace) B(e) U(pon) H(im). [Translator’s Note: Here the letter quotes a verse from Quran (Hud 113) which implies that Muslims should not listen to those who lost the path of the goodness]. 

After a long sequence of failures by those who adopt the electoral process in Iraq, and after Mujahideen have struck those who came with the deceiving “democracy,” the traitors and the small slaves of those in power within this government came up, inspired by the Satan himself, a well thought plan to force Muslims to participate in the upcoming elections. 

Oh Muslims, we want to steer your attention to the following; do you really think that it will be right to elect a non-cleric person with a suit and tie and give him the power to sit in the so called parliament to tell us all what is right and what is wrong without going back to Quran or Sharia law, all in the name of “constitution” and “political process?” 

The voter and the candidate are both equally against the Sharia of Allah, and therefore both the voter and the candidate will be equally targeted and punished. 

What brought people to this mess is their lack of education and information when it comes to Shari’a laws, and not following the clerics who have merit to be followed and have devoted their lives for this purpose, to be well informed so they can inform those who ask and seek knowledge. Muslims should not seek benefits of this life; they should seek the rewards and benefits of the eternal life after death. 

Maliki’s smart card is no doubt a smart one; it is designed to intimidate you! And you all have gained nothing from Maliki before but mass killing campaigns carried out against you by the dirty hands of his militias. We ask all of the teachers, Mosque Imams and everyone who have audience to warn his audience from participating in elections. Those who participate in elections are infidels, there will be no excuses, in case you did NOT know, you DO know after this warning! 

• Warning to the public: Electoral centers will be high-probability targets for our men. Stay as far as possible. 
• Warning to food rations’ centers’ owners and operators in addition to teachers: promoting the “voter’s card” or encouraging the public to obtain it is an act that is severely punishable by us. 

God will always win, and his word should always be the truth 

ISIS Wilayat Northern Baghdad 

An equivalent image of the statement released by the ISIS Wilayat Northern Baghdad was not posted to their Twitter page, though ISIS Wilayat Northern Baghdad released the following photo, illustrating the distribution of anti-election leaflets. 

[Authors’ Note: Pictures posted by ISIS’s Northern Baghdad State account on Twitter show gunmen distributing leaflets on the elections.]

ISIS Wilayat Ninewa 

A statement equivalent to the statement released by the ISIS Wilayat Kirkuk was released by ISIS Wilayat Ninewa. The statement was released on February 24, 2014 from the “media department of Mosul section.” 

Below is an image of the statement 

Conclusion 

Iraq’s national elections have already been jeopardized by the ongoing security crisis in Anbar province. On March 24, 2014, the Anbar local government informed IHEC that elections cannot be held in almost half of Anbar, especially in Fallujah and other surrounding areas since these areas are still mostly under control of ISIS. In addition to fighting, ISIS is now engaging the Sunni populations in Kirkuk, Diyala, Ninewa, and Northern Baghdad in an attempt to dissuade them from electoral participation before launching attacks. The delivery of the leaflets displayed in the images shown above indicates that ISIS is operating overtly in these areas of Iraq, which all have mixed populations. As of yet, the Twitter pages associated with the ISIS Wilayats in Anbar, Salah ad Din, and the South have not indicated involvement in this anti-election messaging campaign. This may indicate that ISIS is most organized and able to project influence in Kirkuk, Diyala, and Northern Baghdad. It may also indicate where ISIS perceives the greatest opportunity to stoke ethnic and sectarian rivalries and mutual violence ahead of elections. It will be important to consider how these messaging strategies relate to ISIS military operations in each area. This will be the subject of ongoing analysis.

Iraq Update 2014 #11: Maliki Proposes Four New Provinces in Iraq

By Ahmed Ali

Iraq’s election season has begun. In the midst of a security crisis in Anbar, the Iraqi government decided to form four new provinces. The decision represents the most significant administrative change in Iraq since the 1970s and has been welcomed by Iraqi Turkmens and Iraqi Christians. However, the decision is politically and legally controversial as it has been rejected by officials in Ninewa and Salah ad-Din. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s decision to form new provinces illustrates his strategy to reset the terms for the electoral campaign, divide his opponents, and shape the post-elections environment.      

  

Background

On January 21, the Iraqi government announcedthe decision to convert four administrative districts into provinces. The four administrative districts include Tuz Khurmatu, locally known as Duz, located in eastern Salah ad-Din province; the Ninewa Plains area to the northeast of Mosul in Ninewa province; and Fallujah, in Iraq’s western Anbar province. The announcement stated that this decision was made “in principle” and will be followed by the formation of a committee to establish “guidelines and established standards to convert a district to a province.” The committee will be headed by the Minister of State for Provincial Affairs Turhan Mufti and representatives from the Ministry of Justice, Municipality Ministry, and the General Secretariat of the Council of Ministers.

In addition to these three districts, Mufti announcedthat the Council of Minister also approved a proposal to convert Tal Afar district in Ninewa into a province. Mufti, an Iraqi Turkmen, added that the Tal Afar decision was made after a proposal by Minister of Youth and Sports, Jassim Mohammed Jaafar, a fellow Iraqi Turkmen and member of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law Alliance. The Iraqi government previously agreedto make the Iraqi Kurdish district of Halabja in Sulaymaniyah into a separate province on December 31 at the request of the Kurdistan Regional Government and the Iraqi Kurdish leadership. Halabja’s early conversion may have been a concession by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s to preempt the Iraqi Kurds before converting administrative districts that fall within the Disputed Internal Boundaries (DIBs).

All of these districts enjoy a special status. Tuz and Tal Afar are the most contentious. Tuz district is a mixed area that includes Iraqi Turkmens, Iraqi Arabs, and Iraqi Kurds. It is geographically significant as well, given that it lies on the highway connecting northern Iraq with Baghdad. The district is also included in Article 140 of the Iraqi constitution that is designed to address the issue of Disputed Internal Boundaries areas (DIBs) primarily between the federal government and the Kurdistan Regional Government. Since last year, the city has been the scene of sustained waves of violent attacks including Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIEDs). Those attacks were likely carried out al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), which has historically exploited ethno-sectarian tensions to exacerbate violence and ethno-sectarian confrontations. Those attacks have ledto calls by the sizeable Iraqi Turkmen population to increase efforts to establish local forces to provide protection.

Tuz was also the scene of a prolonged confrontation between the federal government Iraqi Security Forces and the Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga in December 2012. There have been prior calls by Iraqi Turkmen parties in Tuz to convert it into a province, with the latest coming in Julyand November2013. Iraqi Turkmen leader, Riyadh Sari Kahya, proposed that one name of the province should the “Bayat Province,” named after the most dominant tribe in the area, the Bayati Tribe. As a preemptive measure, the Kirkuk provincial council voted on December 3 toannex Tuz to Kirkuk province, where the district administratively belonged prior to a decision by the Saddam Hussein government to annex it to Salah ad-Din in the 1970s. In a sign of disapproval, the Iraqi Arabs and Iraqi Turkmen members of the Kirkuk council boycottedthe Tuz voting session in December.

Tal Afar is also significant, given that it falls within the DIBs and is another ethno-sectarian mixed area. Tal Afar also became a stronghold for AQI after 2003. The district was eventually pacified and stabilized by U.S. and Iraqi forces in 2005. Tal Afar includes Iraqi Shi’a Turkmens and Iraqi Sunni Turkmens. It is an area on which Iraqi Shi’a political parties and groups place a great deal of significance. In the predominantly Iraqi Sunni province of Ninewa, it is the only place with a sizeable Iraqi Shi’a population. This has led to an effort by various Iraqi Shi’a groups to compete and place resources during elections. Mohammed Taqi Mawla, who has been a proponentof converting the district into a province, is a senior figure in Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) and prominent in the district. Demonstrating the district’s significance to Iraqi Shi’a groups, Iraqi Shi’a militia group Asai’b Ahl al-Haq (AAH) openedan office in Tal Afar in September of 2012.

In contrast to Tuz and Tal Afar, the Ninewa Plains boundaries will be more complicated to define. While Tuz and Tal Afar are identified as administrative districts, Ninewa Plains is comprised of three geographic areas combining multiple administrative units. In general, the term Ninewa Plains refers to Tel Kayef, Hamdaniyah, and Shaikhan districts. Those areas are predominantly occupied by Iraqi Christians, but they also include other minority groups like Yazidis and the Shabak. Iraqi Christian political parties have had a long-standing demandto convert the area into a province, thus allowing them more freedom and authority.

Fallujah’s potential conversion into a province is more difficult to explain. The district represents the second biggest area in the sprawling province of Anbar. It is predominantly Iraqi Sunni and was the area where Iraq’s insurgency and AQI were the prevailing authorities from 2004-2008, until the establishment of the anti-AQI awakening movement in 2006. While Anbar has always enjoyed a unique status within Iraq due to its location and social tribal fabric, Fallujah is also unique within Anbar, as it is not dominated by a single tribe and has a conservative religious base. Since the beginning of the Anbar crisis in December 2013, Fallujah has been out of central government’s control, with various armed anti-government groups controllingthe city. Its inclusion in the government’s decision is likely intended to combat the appearance of ethno-sectarianism in the government’s overall decision. However, unlike the other administrative districts, there is no well-established historical demand for this decision in Anbar. The decision to include Fallujah in this decision was rejectedby the head of Anbar’s provincial council, Sabah Karhout on January 22. Prime Minister Maliki may be using it to divide the political leadership of Anbar ahead of national elections. The decision may alternately drive unity among Anbari leaders who would fundamentally oppose division of the province. In either case, the decision will create a new political opportunities for Maliki in Anbar.            

The Implementation of the Decision

Despite the issuance of the decision to create new provinces, there is no clear legal mechanism to implement it. The Iraqi constitution does not contain any articles pertaining to the formation of new provinces, and other legislation such as the 2008 Provincial Powers Law (PPL) and its subsequent amendmentsin June 2013 do not address the mechanism of the formation of new areas. Therefore, this is legally and constitutionally an ad hoc effort.

The Mufti Committee will play the crucial role in determining the status of these districts and their conversion into provinces. Notably for Tal Afar’s conversion, the Iraqi government’s decision has included areference to make the decision contingent on a vote in the Iraqi Council of Representatives (CoR). This indicates that the other conversions may include the CoR’s involvement as well. But these procedures can change since they are ad hoc.    

      

Reactions to the Decision

The reactions to the decision have varied. It has been generally welcomedby the Iraqi Turkmens and especially for the Iraqi Christians who have been advocating for an autonomous area in the Ninewa Plains.

On the other hand, the Ninewa and Salah ad-Din provincial governments have rejected the decision. On January 23, Governor of Ninewa Atheel al-Nujaifi statedthat the approval of the government to convert the Ninewa districts of Tal Afar and Ninewa Plains is a “preemptive measure” to prevent the formation of a “united region” in Ninewa. On the same day, member of Ninewa Provincial Council Hosam al-Din al-Ayar stated that a request was submittedto the CoR to announce the Region of Ninewa consisting of three provinces, although the new provinces are not specified. This request is likely intended to counteract the government’s decision with regards to Tal Afar and the Ninewa Plains. According to Ayar, the request was signed by more than one third of council members, which fulfills the legal requirements to submit a request for a federal region.

Ayar added that the request was sent to the CoR for a vote. Despite this statement, legally the decision to announce an autonomous region has to go through the Iraqi government first, and then a referendum is required in the province to ratify the decision. This is a long-term process, and it will not take place before parliamentary elections in April 2014. Thus, the request by Ninewa’s government is likely tactical. Member of Mutahidun Mohammed Iqbal, who is from Ninewa, attributedthe central government’s decision to create new provinces to electoral motives. Furthermore, Iqbal discounted the decision, stating that there is no legal basis for it.  

Iraqi Kurdish political reaction has also been extremely critical. This reaction is expected, since three of the proposed provinces border Iraqi Kurdistan’s boundaries and are areas where Iraqi Kurdish parties have spread their influence since 2003. Head of the CoR’s legal committee and Iraqi Kurdish CoR member Khalid Shwani describedthe decision as a “violation” of the laws and constitution. Shwani added that Tal Afar and Tuz are part of Article 140 and thus cannot be included until Article 140 is implemented. Furthermore, Shwani added that the decision is intended to achieve “political and electoral goals.”   

The reactions of the Iraqi Shi’a political parties have been different. Senior Sadrist member of the CoR Baha al-Araji statedthat the decision is “constitutional and legal,” but came under “conditions that were not legal.” Araji also added that the approach of the April 2014 national elections is a reason for the decision. ISCI, the other major Iraqi Shi’a political party was more sympatheticto the decision, particularly with regards to Tal Afar. In one of its media outlets, al-Forat, ISCI remindedreaders of previous demands by ISCI to convert Tal Afar to a province. This statement is another example of the significance of Tal Afar for the Iraqi Shi’a parties. Sadrist member of the CoR Jawad al-Juburi has further called to convertBaghdad’s Sadr City into a province. If Sadr City is converted into a province in the future, it will allow the Sadrists a greater degree of influence through the control of local security forces and the possibility of winning more seats in the national elections allocated to Sadr City directly.             

Other reactions have included calls by other groups in Ninewa to form a province. On January 23, the leader of the Yazidi Movement for Reform and Progress, Amin Farhan Jaju, announcedthat his movement had sent a request to the Council of Ministers to convert Sinjar district, where a sizeable Yazidi population resides, into a province. Jaju was also supportive of the decision by the government’s decision to convert districts in Ninewa into provinces.

Implications and Conclusions

The new provinces will not be formed before the elections. This is due to the lack of clarity about the legal and constitutional process to do so, the approach of the national elections, and the CoR’s few remaining sessions. Therefore, this decision is best viewed within the prism of the April 2014 elections and Prime Minister Maliki’s strategy to counter post-provincial elections developments that have limited the powers of the federal government.

As an electoral strategy, the decision allows Maliki to shift popular and government focus from security concerns and Maliki’s under-performance in provincial elections. The decision has already caused controversy and allowed Maliki to drive the electoral campaign agenda. The new dynamic may temporarily deflect attention from the security challenges that make Maliki appear weak. The focus on Tal Afar and Tuz allows Maliki to win some Iraqi Shi’a support and also increase his leverage with the Iraqi Kurds after the elections. Tal Afar’s inclusion will paint Maliki as the defender of the Iraqi Shi’a. Tuz’s inclusion can function as a bargaining chip after the elections, as Maliki can offer the cancelation of the decision as an incentive to the Iraqi Kurds in return for their support for his third term as Prime Minister.   

The decision also allows Maliki to weaken the leading Iraqi Sunni politicians in Ninewa, governor Nujaifi and his brother, speaker of the CoR Osama al-Nujaifi. Shortly after the formation of the new Ninewa provincial council, the Ninewa provincial council authorizedgovernor Nujaifi to sign contracts with oil companies in the province. Some of the fields are projected to be in the Ninewa Plains. Thus Maliki’s decision can hinder that plan even if temporarily, raising a concern for potential oil investors. Furthermore, the decision allows Maliki to contestthe newly-amended Provincial Powers Law that allowed the provinces more authorities. Additionally, turning Ninewa into three provinces will potentially deprive it of future petrodollars if the province becomes a major oil-producing area.     

The decision represents the most significant administrative change in Iraq’s history since the 1970s. Moving forward, it will be imperative to observe how other districts in Iraq will react to this decision. This is particularly true in contentious areas like Hawijah in Kirkuk, Nukhaib in Anbar, and Zubair in Basra. Maliki’s maneuver positions him well for now, but the possible unification of his political opponents may divert his momentum.

Ahmed Ali is a Senior Iraq Research Analyst and the Iraq Team Lead at the Institute for the Study of War.                              

Iraq Update 2014 #3: Update on Situation in Fallujah

by Ahmed Ali

ISW will continue to provide updates on the situation in Iraq as it unfolds.

The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) have announced preparations to retake Fallujah city. The Iraqi Army, SWAT, and the Iraqi Special Forces will likely participate in the operation. The operation calls for the evacuation of the city's population ahead of an assault scheduled to last a number of days. Since clashes in Anbar started, there has been a flight by the city’s residents to Ramadi, Baghdad, and Karbala. Evacuation measures by the ISF are unlikely to be effective, because an assault upon Fallujah by Shi'a-dominated security forces is itself a threat to the city's Sunni residents. The ISF operation in Fallujah will therefore result in civilian casualties and possibly invoke other violent tribal responses. It is too early to tell how effective the ISF will be against AQI in Fallujah, or what resources will be expended. Meanwhile, AQI may be well-positioned to attack in other provinces, such as Ninewa and Salah ad-Din.

U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry voiced support for the Iraqi government in countering AQI, but stated that this is Iraq's fight. Prime Minister Maliki has vowed to eliminate AQI from the province. While Maliki is likely aiming to achieve a significant military victory ahead of elections, it is important to recognize that AQI cannot be decisively defeated in Anbar. The ISF presence in Anbar is therefore likely to be long-term, which increases the opportunities for AQI to exert control elsewhere in Iraq, and also increases the threat of a Sunni backlash against the ISF. It also increases the likelihood that elections will not be held on time in April.

Meanwhile, clashes in Ramadi continue as tribal forces and Iraqi Army along with aerial support by Iraqi Army Aviation reportedly engaged AQI members in eastern Ramadi. According to reports, AQI members are reported to be positioned in southern Ramadi as well. The ISF based in eastern Fallujah can push to the city from the Baghdad flank, and there have been attacks to regain Fallujah from the direction of Ramadi to the west. If a new attack to retake Fallujah commences, it will likely follow the blueprint of such earlier attempts.

The government’s effort to counter AQI in Anbar is facing a further obstacle. Tribal divisions are beginning to emerge among prominent pro-government figures such as Sahwa Council (Awakening) leaders Ahmed Abu Risha and Wisam al-Hardan. Their recent disagreement resulted in suspending the tribal and local police fight against AQI in northern Ramadi. Due to personal differences, Hardan does not want to work with Abu Risha, who recently reengaged with the Iraqi government. As the preparations for the Fallujah battle continue, this potential rift will serve as an indicator of tribal reactions to the ISF operations. The ISF will not succeed in driving AQI out of Anbar province without the mobilization of the tribes against AQI.

It is imperative to watch for AQI attacks in other provinces, such as Ninewa and Salah ad-Din, while the ISF is concentrated in Anbar. It is also critical to watch the actions of other Iraqi insurgent groups that can attack the ISF. In Ninewa for example, the ISF arrested 12 individuals who called for jihad and attacks against the ISF using mosques’ loudspeakers on January 5 in Mosul. It is unclear if these 12 are members of AQI or other armed groups. Either way, these indicators point to a possible simultaneous front opening for the ISF in Ninewa. 

Provincial Election Outcomes: The Political Fragmentation of Iraqi Sunnis and Shi'a

By Ahmed Ali

Iraqi Arab Sunni fragmentation and low voter turnout for Ninewa provincial elections produced a victory for Iraqi Kurds. The decrease in representation by Mutahidun in the Nujaifi’s home province calls into question the direction of Sunni political leadership ahead of 2014 elections. Government formation in Diyala and Baghdad indicate that the political future of Iraqi Sunni will increasingly rely upon Iraqi Shi’a political antagonism to Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki.

On June 26, Iraq’s Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) announced the final results of the June 20 Ninewa and Anbar provincial elections. In Ninewa, the results could electorally revive the Iraqi Kurds and provide them with leverage in a strategic province. Iraqi Kurdish gains came as a result of the fragmentation in the Iraqi Arab vote. The results also present a dilemma to incumbent governor Atheel al-Nujaifi as his Kurdish opening appears to have backfired against his electoral bloc, Mutahidun. In Anbar, Mutahidun fared well against groups that have ties to Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, but these Maliki-affiliated groups also posted strong returns. Finally, the Sadrist’s leading role in forming governments in Diyala and Baghdad with Iraqi Sunnis produced results that point to the possible alliance-building dynamic ahead of 2014 elections.   

Ninewa and Anbar Results 

Twenty eight political groups competedfor Ninewa’s 39 provincial council seats, and 14 groups  securedseats in last week’s election. The Iraqi Kurdish coalition, the Brotherhood and Coexistence List, won 11 seats which translated to the loss of one seat from the 2009 elections for the Iraqi Kurds. Mutahidun (the United), which included Ninewa governor Atheel al-Nujaifi’s group, the Hadba Gathering, came in second, garnering 8 seats. Accordingto the head of the Iraqi Turkmen Front (ITF) Irshad al-Salhi, 4 of those seats were won by its candidates. Overall, this is a decline for Hadba which had won19 seats in 2009. Loyalty to Ninewa Alliance (LNA), which is headedby former Ninewa governor, Ghanim al-Baso, won 4 seats. The Unified Ninewa Alliance (UNA), which is backedby tribal leader Abdallah al-Yawer, won 3 seats. The Iraq Construction and Justice Gathering (ICJG), headedby incumbent Ninewa deputy provincial council head, Dildar Zebari, won 3 seats. The remaining 10 seats were won by 9 other groups with former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi’s, Unified National Iraqi Alliance (UNIA), being the most prominent among them, having won2 seats.       

These results are significant for several reasons. First, voter turnout in Ninewa was low, estimated at 37.5-38%. Voter turnout in 2009 had been 60%, and the precipitous decline raises concerns about future Iraqi Sunni Arab political participation especially given the possibilityof an armed movement. The low turnout, combined with the relative electoral success of the Iraqi Kurdish coalition and the decline of Mutahidun, mayindicate that Iraqi Kurdish turnout may have been higher than that of Iraqi Arabs. It may also indicate that the presence of multiple Iraqi Arab groups splintered the Iraqi Arab vote in favor of the Iraqi Kurds. It may also be explained by al-Nujaifi’s 2012 rapprochement with the Iraqi Kurds, which may have backfiredagainst him. The groups that are critical of the Iraqi Kurds, such as LNA, UNA, and ICJG, won a combined 10 seats, suggesting that al-Nujaifi lost Arab Sunni votes to them over the Kurdish issue. The 11 seats won by the Iraqi Kurds will provide them with increased leverage as the government formation process begins. This may elevate anti-Kurdish sentiments among the Arab Sunni in Ninewa. Likewise, Mutahidun’s poor performance in the Nujaifis’ home province represents a setback to Mutahidun, and to al-Nujaifi in particular.

Security events are also tied to the turnout rate in Ninewa. Violent actors wishing to deter popular participation in elections were expected to engage in attacks prior to June 20. According to media reporting, between June 10-20 there were a total of 34 violent incidents in the greater Mosul area that involved either Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) or Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIED). Notable attacks include the June 20 suicide bombing attack in the Hadhar district, south of Mosul, that killed tribal sheikh Younis al-Ramah. Al-Ramah was head of the Unified Iraq political group and was very likely targeted due to his political role and his reported ties to Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. Other attacks may have resonated with the voting population and deterred them from voting, including a wave of VBIED attacks on June 10 which included five VBIEDs in the greater Mosul area. Governor Nujaifi also survived twoassassination attempts that took place in early June and on June 13. Given the time proximity to the elections, these attacks likely kept voters away from the voting centers. A degraded security environment undermines incumbent parties, and therefore attacks may have also affected al-Nujaifi negatively.             

Anbar’s results also presented surprises. Seventeen political groups competedfor 30 seats. Mutahidun was able to securethe highest number of seats, winning 8, while incumbent governor Qassim al-Fahdawi’s alliance, Aabirun won only 5 seats. It was followed by Arab Iraqiyya, the strongest components of which are Deputy Prime Minister Saleh al-Mutlaq’s Iraqi Front for National Dialogue and Jamal al-Karbuli’s Hal movement. Arab Iraqiyya won4 seats. Meanwhile, Allawi’s UNIA won3 seats. Finally, the Anbar-based Anbar National Alliance garnered3 seats. 

The Anbar results show that figures close to the anti-government protest movement are still electorally viable despite the shrinkingprotest movement in the province. This primarily concerns Mutahidun, which includes in its ranks former finance minister Rafia al-Issawi, whose targeting by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki triggered the movement. At the same, it seems that Maliki’s policy to work with some allies in Anbar including governor Fahdawi, Mutlaq, and Karbuli is not entirely detrimental to them. Groups supported by these figures won 9 seats altogether. It is plausible from the results, however, that the Fahdawi, Mutlaq, and Karbuli groups could be shut out of government with an alliance formed by the other groups. 

The unique case of government-formation in Baghdad and Diyala 

The results in Ninewa and Anbar present a picture of intra-sect and ethno-sectarian political competition in Iraq. Government-formation in Baghdad and Diyala, on the other hand, opens the possibility of cross-sectarian cooperation. In both provinces, an Iraqi-Shi‘a/Iraqi Sunni alignment produced the governments. 

In Baghdad, the government was officiallyformed on June 15. An alliance was formed between the Iraqi Shi‘a groups comprising the Sadrists (11 seats out of 58), the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), which won 6 seats, and Mutahidun, which occupies 6 seats. Other groups in the council joined them and composed a bloc to form the government named“the Alliance for Baghdad.” Accordingly, Sadrist member of the Council of Representatives (CoR), Ali al-Tamimi, was elected governor, while Riyadh al-Adhadh, who is a member of the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) and ran with Mutahidun, was elected chairman of the provincial council. The other senior positions in Baghdad’s government were allocated to the other groups. The provincial council session that resulted in forming the government was boycotted by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law Alliance (SLA), which won 20 seats in Baghdad. The configuration of the new Baghdad government meant that the SLA was excluded from the senior positions. This is a complete reversal for the SLA which had controlledthe incumbent council. As a result of his assumption of office, al-Tamimi had to resign from his parliamentary seat. Al-Adhadh was deputy council chairman in the previous council and was arrestedin 2012 over terrorism charges and released after 10 months in custody. It will be important to watch whether his case is revived as part of a political retribution by the SLA. 

In Diyala, the Sadrists, who won 3 seats out of 29; Iraqiyat Diyala, which won 10 seats, including elements from Mutahidun; and the Iraqi Kurds formedthe government. This resulted in the June 19 reelection of incumbent governor Omar al-Hamiri from the IIP, and the election of Sadrist member of the council Mohammed Jawad Kadhim as chairman. Iraqi Kurdish council member Karim Mohammed Ali was elected as first deputy governor. Unlike Baghdad, the Sadrists in Diyala were the only Iraqi Shi‘a component to ally with the Iraqi Sunnis to form the government. The other Iraqi Shi‘a parties boycottedthe session that voted on the government. The major Iraqi Shi‘a parties participatedin the Diyala elections under the Diyala National Coalition (DNC) and won12 seats in the council, constituting a collective plurality. The formation of the DNC was intendedto signify Iraqi Shi‘a solidarity in Diyala, a province that was a major contest during Iraq’s civil war in 2006-2007. Therefore, the Sadrist decision broke the unity of Iraqi Shi‘a groups in Diyala and closed the other Shi‘a groups out of the government. For the Sadrists, leveraging three seats to secure the second important position in the provincial government is a major gain. It is also another indication of Sadrist strategy to gain leverage in light if the escalating intra-Shi‘a rivalry lately observedin Baghdad.  

These developments generated protests in Diyala before and after the election of Hamiri. On his election day, June 19, a protest took place that condemned Hamiri’s candidacy. A tribal sheikh who participated in the protest describedHamiri as “sectarian” and demanded the nomination of another candidate. On June 23, hundreds protestedin Diyala’s capital, Baqubah, and in Khanaqin and viewed the government-formation as “marginalization” of the DNC. Notably, an Iraqi Kurdish council memberindicated that newly-elected deputy governor Ali acted in a personal capacity by joining the government. This may indicate intra-Iraqi Kurdish fractures. 

Politically, the Sadrists came under attack by other Iraqi Shi‘a parties. SLA CoR member, Ali al-Shalah statedthat the Sadrists offered the governor position to Hamiri in order to receive Mutahidun’s vote for Baghdad’s governorship in return. Al-Shalah added that the new government led to the “absence of a whole component,” a reference to the Iraqi Shi‘a. ISCI on the other hand calledwhat happened in Diyala a “major strategic error” and called for reconsidering the government-formation.        

Conclusion 

The announcement of the Ninewa and Anbar election results signals the beginning of government-formation in both provinces. In Ninewa, the Iraqi Kurds are currently rejuvenated by the outcome. Mohsen Saadun, a senior Iraqi Kurdish politician, indicatedthe Iraqi Kurds’ willingness to work with the all groups to form a government. Although he specified that the groups have to “believe in the constitution and the federal system.” This is a clear swipe at the groups that hold anti-Kurdish views in the province. The current Iraqi Kurdish advantage favors al-Nujaifi, but also places him in a difficult spot with Arab Sunni. If he is reelected in Ninewa as a result of only Iraqi Kurdish backing, he will not maintain the same political maneuverability and will be perceived as weak governor. This potential dynamic will likely limit him and his brother, speaker of the CoR Osama al-Nujaifi, as they gear up for the 2014 national elections. 

In Anbar, coalition-building to form the government has begun. On June 28, Mutahidun and Arab Iraqiyya formedan alliance to form a government. This alliance has a reasonable chance of success because the groups combine to 12 seats and therefore only need four more seats to obtain the majority needed to form a government. It is unclear how they will secure these votes, but this uncertainty increases the potential leverage of the smaller political groups. Arab Iraqiyya includes Jamal al-Karbuli’s Hal movement; because Karbuli had acted as one of Maliki’s Iraqi Sunni allies, this is a significant development for politics in Anbar. 

The outcome of elections in Ninewa and Anbar should be viewed on balance with the outcome of government formation in Baghdad and Diyala. In Baghdad, parties clearly wanted to isolate Maliki and the SLA, which allowed Sunni parties greater political representation. Diyala’s government did also, and as a result, the provincial government will continue to face challenges and questions of legitimacy in the eyes of Iraqi Shi‘a, as the Sadrists are their only representation in that body.   

For Iraqi Sunnis, given great concern about the political future of this community, the results could have been much worse. They successfully avoided being sidelined in Baghdad and Diyala, where cross-sectarian cooperation in government formation is a positive result. However, fragmentation of Sunni parties demonstrates that there is still no consensus on the political leadership of the Sunni community. Iraqi Kurds benefitted from the fragmentation of Iraqi Sunni parties in Ninewa, positioning them as possible king-makers in government formation. For the Iraqi Shi‘a, disunity means a possible greater role for Iranian influence in the 2014 elections. Anti-Maliki forces saw the opportunity to sideline Maliki in Baghdad as a first electoral challenge to him as the leader of the Iraqi Shi‘a community. For all these groups, the conclusion of the provincial elections is only the prelude to the all-important 2014 elections.   

 Ahmed Ali is an Iraq Research Analyst at the Institute for the Study of War.