Massoud Barzani Extended as President of Iraqi Kurdistan: 2013 Iraq Update #27

By Stephen Wicken

The parliament of Iraqi Kurdistan has voted to extend Kurdistan Regional President Massoud Barzani’s tenure for two years amid intense political arguments over the structure of power in the region. The announcement comes at a critical time for the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), as the development of an oil pipeline to Turkey offers the real prospect of exporting significant amounts of oil in a manner beyond Baghdad’s control. Dissent among the region’s political parties, however, particularly in the ongoing absence of Barzani’s coalition partner, Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, risks hindering both the region’s security and its representatives’ strength in Iraqi politics.

The parliament of the Kurdistan region of Iraq voted on June 30 to postpone the region’s presidential elections for two years. President Massoud Barzani of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) will be allowed to stay in his post until 2015, although parliamentary and provincial council elections will take place in September 2013 as scheduled. The motion, pushed through parliament by the KDP and its coalition partner the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) on the basis of an earlier agreementbetween the two, drew the ire of opposition parties, promptingfistfights and the throwing of water bottles in the parliamentary chamber. The developments highlight the KDP’s continued dominance of the federal region’s politics under Barzani, but also demonstrate the extent of opposition to Barzani’s rule.

The official reason given for the postponement of presidential elections was the need to amend the Kurdistan region’s constitution, passed by the regional parliament in 2009 but never ratified. Opponents to Barzani’s continued rule have protestedthat the draft constitution was forced through parliament by the KDP-PUK alliance during a period of caretaker government, and that it was subsequently edited by the ruling parties while a significant number of parliamentarians were absent. The electoral delay was proposed to allow political parties to air their views on the region’s draft constitution and to produce a new elections law.

The political dispute concerns the basic arrangement of executive political power in Iraqi Kurdistan: how the president is elected. Massoud Barzani was elected by the parliament of Iraqi Kurdistan in 2005. In 2009, however, the draft constitution amended the law to allow direct election of the president by popular vote, diminishing parliament’s power at the expense of the presidency. It also declared that the president “may be re-elected for a second term as of the date this constitution enters into force.” The same year, however, saw the splintering of the Gorran (Change) Movement from the PUK, adding a new and unknown element of the region’s politics and diminishing the established party’s hold on its traditional areas of influence. The two developments in tandem allowed Barzani to consolidate power to an extensive degree.

Opposition parties, principally Gorran, argue that the constitution must be amended once more to return the right to elect the president to parliamentarians, increasing parliamentary oversight of the executive. They demand that the constitution be returned to parliament for vote, and that such a vote take place before presidential elections can be held. Three opposition groups – Gorran, the Kurdistan Islamic Union (KIU), and the Kurdistan Islamic Group (KIG) – have also opposed President Barzani’s attempts to take control of the constitution-consultation process, rejecting Barzani’s request that all political parties in the region be involved in the discussing the draft constitution, whether or not they are currently represented in parliament. Barzani’s KDP, by contrast, has advocated a popular referendum on the constitution, counting on its leverage over patronage networks and Barzani’s popularity to ensure victory.

The PUK’s acquiescence is further evidence of its increasingly junior role within the Kurdistan Alliance. The party has been without its leader, Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, since December 2012, when Talabani suffered a stroke and was removed to Germany for treatment. President Talabani, who formed the PUK upon breaking with the KDP in the 1970s, has been the party’s secretary-general since 1975, and power has long been consolidated around his inner circle. With Talabani unlikely to return to full strength after numerous health scares, however, challenges to Talabani’s rule have been emerging. Talabani’s wife, Hero Ibrahim Ahmed, is a key player, with strong relations with Baghdad, with the KDP, and with neighboring Iran.  She has nevertheless insisted that she is not interested in replacing her husband in Suleimaniyah or in Baghdad. Talabani’s son Qubad, formerly the KRG's representative in Washington, DC, was recalled in 2012 to take up a strategic planning position within the prime minister’s office – a move that was seen as intended to introduce him to the region’s public and groom him for a future leadership role.

Former KRG Prime Minister Barham Salih and PUK co-founder Kosrat Rasul Ali, formerly prime minister of the PUK’s Suleimaniyah-based administration prior to the region’s reunification, head factions within the PUK and are key candidates to succeed Talabani. Salih is popular with key international interlocutors, particularly the US and UK as well as Iran, but faces opposition from Hero Ibrahim. Kosrat Rasul gained popular legitimacy among PUK supporters as a former commander of the PUK’s Peshmerga forces, but is knownto be in poor health. Salih recently led a push to force Hero Ibrahim and the Talabani family to share power within the party, threateningto resign unless Salih and his supporters were given a greater say in the party’s strategic and financial decision-making. The threats are thought to have related in particular to control of the party’s funding streams for the parliamentary elections, suggesting that Salih is seeking to build his own patronage networks within the party to establish himself as the main candidate to succeed Talabani as its head.

As inter-party rivalries continue to hamper the PUK, the party is losing influence both to its larger coalition partner and to its own splinter, Gorran. The party’s power base in Suleimaniyah was diminished significantly by the Gorran split in 2009, and its continued floundering in Talabani’s absence renders it vulnerable to further losses. The PUK is caught between the need to balance Massoud Barzani’s power and the need to fend off the challenge within its traditional area of influence from Gorran, which paints the PUK as a partner in a corrupt and nepotistic government.

The question of Barzani’s presidential extension is an example of such difficulties for the PUK. In fact, since Barzani was elected president directly by the voters and not by the legislature, parliamentarians have no authority to grant him an extended tenure. The September timeframe announced for elections, however, forced parties to take a public position. Advocates of a strong KDP-PUK alliance demand that the PUK support Barzani’s presidency, fearing that without the protection of the larger party, the PUK will lose further supporters to Gorran. A strong current of dissent within the PUK, however, emerged in 2011 from the demands of demonstrators protesting in Suleimaniyah against government autocracy and corruption.  The dissenting faction has opposed the constitution as drafted, arguing that it will further strengthen the KDP. This faction was strong enough to encourage Talabani to agree with his former lieutenant Nawshirwan Mustafa of Gorran to push for the resubmission of the draft constitution to parliament in September 2012 and to call for the president once more to be elected by parliament – an initiative that stalled when Talabani was taken ill. As a result, and seeking to gloss over its own internal factional struggles, the PUK has called officially for consensus between political parties on the constitution question.

The struggle over the presidency comes at an important time for the Kurdistan region, and particularly for its president. Economic relations with Turkey are reported to be nearing an inflection: a converted natural gas pipeline through Dohuk province is nearing the Turkey border at Fishkhabour, offering a method of exporting oil from the Kurdistan region to Turkey independently of Baghdad’s control. Barzani has pushed hard to win over the Turks, improving Ankara-Erbil relations significantly at the expense of each side’s relations with Baghdad. Meanwhile, Barzani recently heldan emergency meeting with representatives of Syrian Kurdish parties following clashes between the People’s Protection Units (YPG), under the control of the Democratic Union Party (PYD), and protesters in the Syrian city of Amude. Barzani brokered a deal between the PYD and the Kurdish National Council (KNC) – which Barzani supports – in July 2012. He has invested himself heavily in a leadership role over the Syrian Kurds, and while the vote over extending his presidency was taking place, Barzani himself was in Paris discussing Syria with French President François Hollande.

Tensions between Kurdish parties within the Kurdistan region, moreover, risk diminishing the strength of the Kurdistan Alliance in Baghdad and on federal Iraq’s recently elected provincial councils. Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki performed less strongly than expected across Iraq at these elections, as did his key Sunni Arab opponent, Parliamentary Speaker Osama al-Nujaifi. The Kurdish Brotherhood and Coexistence List, meanwhile, performed well in Ninewa, where it gained 11 of the province’s 39 seats. Nujaifi’s brother Atheel al-Nujaifi, the governor of Ninewa and provincial head of the brothers’ Mutahidun list, looks likely to ally with smaller Sunni Arab parties in order to prevent a return to the Kurdish government that the province saw in 2005.  He nevertheless will be reluctant, and possibly unable, to sideline the Kurdish list to the extent that his Al-Hadbaa party did in 2009, having since reached rapprochement with the Kurds that has had benefits in national level politics.

With Maliki’s attempts to fashion a political majority among Arab parties in Baghdad hindered by the underwhelming performance of his State of Law Alliance and his Sunni ally Saleh al-Mutlak’s Arab Iraqiyya, there may be an opportunity for the Kurdistan Alliance to play a greater role in Iraq’s political process. Internal divisions, however, will hamper the Kurds on both front, and will make it easier for Maliki to use Arabism as a pole around which to unite against the Kurds, as he did in passing the 2013 federal budget. Gorran MP Latif Mustafa highlighted this disunity, appealing on July 5 for the Iraqi federal government or parliament to intervene in the Kurdistan parliament’s decision in order to prevent the extension of Barzani’s term which, he argued, “will defame Iraq.” Maliki’s visit to Erbil in June, while symbolic in itself, does not appear to have produced any tangible results. Maliki has since warned Russian oil company Gazprom that it should not consider buying stakes in oil fields in Iraqi Kurdistan until a federal oil law is passed – a project that has been stalled since 2007 and shows little sign of progress. Deputy Prime Minister for Energy Affairs Hussein al-Shahristani insisted following the Erbil trip that key issues of contention, such as oil exports and payments to oil companies working in Iraqi Kurdistan, were not even discussed. With Barzani’s position likely secure at least for another two years, he is likely to continue to push for enhanced economic ties with Turkey. 

Barzani’s control of the key issues for the future of Iraqi Kurdistan is entrenched, and it is highly unlikely that he will allow opposition groups to force him from the presidency in 2015. Instead, the KDP is likely to push for the adoption of a draft constitution and electoral law that will allow Barzani to run for at least one further term, allowing him to continue to oversee Iraqi Kurdistan’s continued emergence from Baghdad’s control. In so doing, however, he faces growing opposition from the region’s Islamic parties, who accuse the KDP of attempting to “secularize” the region’s laws, and Gorran, who view Barzani as a “dictator”. Unconfirmed reports of large anti-Barzani protests in Suleimaniyah following the announcement of Barzani’s presidential extension highlight the risk that the KDP’s continued consolidation of power could prompt a repeat of the 2011 protests, and with it unrest in the Kurdish region. Opposition MPs have already warned of the prospect of unrest, threatening that those “who do not respect democracy” will be “removed from their posts in the same way as in the Arab countries.” With Syrian Kurds engaged in fighting with Sunni militants across the border, and violence rising along Iraq’s disputed internal boundaries, the security that Iraqi Kurdistan has advertised in order to attract international oil companies is by no means assured for the future.

Stephen Wicken is a research analyst at the Institute for the Study of War.

         

2013 Iraq Update #20: Presidency and Protests Turn Attention to Negotiation

By Stephen Wicken

Iraq’s prosecutor-general has requested legal action regarding to the ongoing absence of President Jalal Talabani. Debate over the unclear stipulations of the constitution may make the presidency a political bargaining chip as political blocs negotiate over governing coalitions following the provincial elections. Meanwhile, a renewed call for negotiations between moderate Sunni Arab protest representatives and the Maliki government has won some support, although significant obstacles remain in the forms of internal division and calls to insurgency.

Prosecutor-general reopens presidency question

The issue of executive power in Iraq was renewed this week when Iraqi Prosecutor-General Ghadanfar Hammud al-Jassim sent a letter to Parliamentary Speaker Osama al-Nujaifi asking Nujaifi to take legal action regarding President Jalal Talabani’s extended absence from Iraq. The prosecutor-general cited Article 72 of the Iraqi constitution, which states that if the presidency “becomes vacant for any reason, a new president shall be elected to complete the remaining period of the president’s term.” Talabani has been receiving medical treatment in Germany following a reported stroke on December 17, during which time he has not submitted his resignation. No previous attempt has been made to replace him even in an acting capacity, despite the stipulation in Article 75 of the constitution that the vice president should replace the president “in his absence.” To justify the question of its authority to pursue the matter, the prosecution referred to Article 1 of the law of the 1977 Law on Public Prosecution, which charges the state prosecution service with protecting “the system of the state, its security and its institutions, and to guarantee democracy and the higher interests of the people.” The implication of the reference to this law was that the extended absence of a working president threatens the functions of state; no suggestion was made as to why Talabani’s absence should be addressed now, nearly five months after his departure for Europe.

The letter immediately drew criticism from across Iraq’s political spectrum, and particularly from Talabani’s Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) party. PUK member Khalid Shwani, the chairman of the parliamentary legal committee, announced that his committee had reviewed the request and deemed it “unconstitutional and illegal.” Shwani questioned the prosecutor-general’s right to make the request, since Article 72 of the constitution refers to a presidential ‘vacancy’ rather than ‘absence.’ This highlights a central ambiguity on the issue: Article 72 refers to the presidency becoming “vacant;” Article 75 refers both to the president’s “absence” and “vacancy,” and stipulates that that the vice president should take over in either case. Shwani’s deputy, Sadrist Amir al-Kanani, agreed that the prosecution had no constitutional authority over the matter, while State of Law Alliance parliamentarian Khalid al-Attiyah called the prosecution’s request “premature.”

Mohsen Saadoun, vice president of the Kurdistan Alliance and a parliamentarian belonging to Iraqi Kurdistan President Massoud Barzani’s Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), also dismissed the prosecutor’s authority over the question. Saadoun argued that neither the prosecution nor the judiciary, which published the letter on its website, implying its support, possessed legislative or executive powers under the constitution, and therefore neither had authority over the question of the presidency. Iraqiyya MP Wahida al-Jumaili called the request “unconstitutional,” although she added that it was “essential” for parliament to install a president given the number of vacant positions in the Iraqi government. Jumaili’s colleague Talal al-Zobaie also pointed to the “urgent necessity” of installing a “safety valve” and mediator to “protect the constitution.” Only Muqtada al-Sadr unequivocally endorsed the prosecutor-general’s suggestion, insisting that “it makes no sense in our present time to have an Iraq without a president.”

The timing of the prosecutor-general’s request to replace Talabani reinforces the suggestion of PUK spokesperson Azad Jundiani that “we should look for the smell of politics in this request.” The Kurdistan Alliance, in which the PUK is a partner, only recently returned to the cabinet and parliament after a boycott over the passage of the 2013 budget law. President Barzani, Talabani’s sometime partner, sometime rival in the Kurdistan region, is under pressure over his intent to run for another term, a prospect for which the PUK has shown little enthusiasm. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki performed less strongly in the recent provincial elections than he likely anticipated: his State of Law Alliance lost more than 30 per cent of its seats nationwide, including its majorities in Baghdad and Basra. Saleh al-Mutlak, who Maliki appeared to identify as a key Sunni Arab partner in the majority government for which the prime minister has called repeatedly, also fared poorly in comparison with Osama al-Nujaifi’s Mutahidun coalition. Mutlak’s demonstrated lack of popularity among Sunni Arabs makes him a less appealing ally, encouraging Maliki to look for alternative partners in government, such as the Kurds. Facing maneuvers among his Shi‘a rivals to sideline his State of Law Alliance in provincial governments and without an overwhelming victory to demonstrate a clear mandate for a third term in 2014, Maliki’s political leverage has been diminished. The Hawija incident halted what momentum he had begun to develop through his concessions to Sunni Arabs, and Mutlak’s poor showing at the provincial elections suggests that their outreach initiative on de-Baathification may have cost them.

With Maliki and Barzani each facing opposition at home over their pursuit of further terms in office, an improved working relationship between the two would ease a long-standing source of tension and allow them to turn their respective attentions to other problems. Given Maliki’s documented influence over Iraq’s judiciary, however, it is possible that he prompted the prosecution to reopen the question of the presidency with a view to installing a KDP member and ensuring the maintenance of a working relationship with the Iraqi Kurds. Meanwhile, the relative success of the pan-Shi‘a coalition in Diyala’s provincial election, where both the Shi‘a coalition and Sunni Arab parties gained 12 seats each, has put the Kurds in the position of kingmaker, giving Maliki another reason to reach a deal. Indeed, Kurdish opposition parties have cast aspersions about the possibility of unannounced agreements made during negotiations for the Kurdish return to Baghdad. Equally, it is possible that Maliki seeks to elevate Vice President Khudair al-Khuzaie to the presidency, thus ensuring a long-time ally at the top. Khuzaie, like Talabani, has a strong relationship with Iran and could play an important role should 2014 see a repeat of the 2010 government formation negotiations, in which Iran was forced to broker a deal with the Sadrists for a second Maliki term.

The issue of the presidency will not be resolved with any immediacy, with parliamentarians showing little enthusiasm for replacing Talabani and parliament adjourned until June 18. As political blocs jockey to form governing coalitions in 12 provinces, the presidency may become another bargaining chip in negotiations for the upper hand in Iraq’s political balance.

Sunni Arab cleric’s negotiation initiative wins some support

Abd al-Malik al-Saadi, the senior Sunni cleric who positioned himself as the spiritual leader of anti-government protesters in Sunni Arab-majority provinces in January, announcedon May 13 the formation of a ‘Commission of Goodwill’ to begin dialogue with the Maliki government on behalf of protesters in six provinces. Saadi was the leading proponent of negotiation with the government prior to the Hawija attack, after which he appeared briefly to countenance confrontation with security forces, only to clarify quickly that only self-defense was justified. In early May, he was announcedas the choice of 40 Anbari tribal leaders to lead negotiations. He has rejected the role of politicians such as Saleh al-Mutlak in mediating between the protesters and the government, urgingparliamentarians to distance themselves from the demonstrations. This stance is likely to harden in light of Mutlak’s poor electoral performance and the fact that the political coalition closest to the protest movement, Nujaifi’s Mutahidun, failedto win the most seats in Salah ad-Din and Diyala.

Saadi’s renewed move towards negotiation received the backingof protesters in areas that have seen increasing support for insurgency. Dari al-Dulaimi, a leader of the Tikrit protest camp who declared jihad against the government in the aftermath of Hawija, welcomedSaadi’s initiative, insisting that protesters sought to avoid sedition and bloodshed. In Fallujah, where insurgent groups such as al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and Jaysh Rijal al-Tariq al-Naqshabandi (JRTN) have demonstrateda presence at the “Martyrs Square” site, protest media spokesman Mohammed al-Bejari announcedprotesters’ support for Saadi’s negotiation committee. Bejari stated that the protesters sought to “throw the ball in the government’s court,” expressing hope that the government would engage with the initiative “positively and seriously” in order to avoid “more painful” developments in the future.

Despite this enthusiasm for Saadi’s negotiation initiative from at least some sections of more militantly-inclined protests, the cleric faces stiff opposition. On May 16, Anbari tribal leader Ali Hatem al-Suleiman, who has long sought to boost his profile through inflammatory anti-government speeches calling for war, sent tribal forces to surround the headquarters of the Iraqi army in Ramadi after security forces raided his farm. Suleiman dismissed Saadi’s initiative, stating, “we will not accept any talks or negotiations with the government anymore.” Although he styles himself a prominent tribal leader, it is unclear how much support Suleiman actually has. At the same time, however, a wave of car bombings in Baghdad on May 15 that killed or wounded more than 130 people indicates that AQI continues to attempt to inflame sectarian tensions. Even at Ramadi, the symbolic center of the more moderate protest wing, there have been calls for violence against the government and even revolution. As ever, Maliki and the security forces will need to balance responses to genuine threats with patience and self-restraint to prevent another escalation.    

Iraq’s Sunni Arabs remain divided on fundamental questions, particularly whether to work within the political process and whether that work should move towards regional autonomy for Sunni Arab-majority areas. To capitalize on the support he has won from protest factions for negotiations as well as Maliki’s slight diminution in power among Shi‘a parties following the provincial elections, Abd al-Malik al-Saadi will need to bring to the dialogue with the government a set of proposals with which Maliki can engage without further weakening his position among Shi‘a Arabs. Similarly, Maliki will need to approach negotiations constructively, with a view to empowering legitimate Sunni Arab moderates rather than crushing the protest movement that has endured for nearly five months.

Stephen Wicken is a Research Analyst at the Institute for the Study of War.

2013 Iraq Weekly Update #11: Violence Threatens Electoral Campaign

March 15, 2013

By Ahmed Ali and Stephen Wicken

Violent attacks have targeted at least 10 candidates for the upcoming provincial elections since the candidate lists were announcedin January. The attacks bear the hallmarks of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), suggesting that the group is seeking to disrupt the electoral campaign and dissuade Sunni Arabs from political participation. Meanwhile, recently resigned Finance Minister Rafi al-Issawi defied an arrest warrant by appearing at an Anbar protest, demonstrating his determination to continue his vocal criticism of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. Iraqi Kurd ministers boycotted the cabinet meeting to protest the recent passage of the budget and they continue to examine their options with Baghdad.

Violence aims to disrupt politics and shake confidence   

Iraq’s Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) announced on January 4 that 8,275 candidates had been registered for the provincial elections scheduled for April 20. Since then, there have been at least 10 attacks on candidates, primarily in predominantly Sunni areas of northern and western Iraq. The majority of the victims have been candidates running on lists connected to the Sunni Iraqiyya coalition that contested the 2010 parliamentary elections. They have included candidates of Parliamentary Speaker Osama al-Nujaifi and former Finance Minister Rafi al-Issawi’s Uniters list; Deputy Prime Minister Saleh al-Mutlak’s Arab Iraqiyya list; the United Ninewa Coalition, led by prominent Ninewa tribal leader Abdullah al-Yawar; and the Justice and Construction Gathering, led by Dildar Zeibari who, like Yawar, ran on Ninewa Governor Atheel al-Nujaifi’s al-Hadbaa list in 2009. There have also been attacks on candidates belonging to the National Tribal Gathering of the Mother of Two Springs, a pro-Maliki party in Ninewa, and the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq’s (ISCI) Citizens’ Bloc. Although it is possible that some of the attacks may be the result of local or political rivalries, many of the attacks bear the hallmarks of Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). Historically it has opposed Sunni Arab participation in the political process. Seen in the context of the ongoing anti-government protests in predominantly Sunni areas of Iraq, the attacks may demonstrate renewed attempts on the part of AQI and other militant groups to disrupt the electoral process.

Meanwhile, on March 14, various reports indicate that about five suicide bombers attacked the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) and the nearby Foreign Ministry and Communications Institute in central Baghdad, killing 26 and wounding 63 including the attackers. Three suicide car bombs reportedly targeted the MoJ, and two suicide bombers dressed as security forces subsequently entered the ministry before being killed by the responding security forces or blowing themselves up inside the building. Baghdad Operations Command reported that responding Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) cordoned off the area and secured the building. Several MoJ employees reported a confused and disorganized response by the ISF. Maliki is reported to have visited the MoJ after the attack. In response, Iraqi politicians from across the spectrum condemned the attack while calling on the government to improve security measures and intelligence collection efforts.  

 

No groups have claimed responsibility for the attack, but the nature of the attack indicates a possible AQI operation. AQI likely launched the attack to manifest operational capability and send a message that it can still target fortified establishments. These spectacular attacks also seek to undermine the confidence of the Iraqis in their government’s ability to provide security. It remains to be seen if the MoJ was targeted due to its supervisory role of Iraqi prisons, where many AQI elements are held.   

Will the Shi‘a-Kurdish alliance survive?

The budget vote in the parliament generated a quick reaction from the Iraqi Kurds, who protested the decision as an attempt to marginalize them and an attack on the principles of the political process. On March 9, Iraqi Kurdistan President Massoud Barzani invited the representatives of the Iraqi Kurdish parties in Baghdad for a meeting in Arbil and a statement was subsequently issued criticizing Prime Minister Maliki and his State of Law Coalition (SLC). The statement also called on the National Alliance – of which the SLC is a member – to take action against Maliki’s policies. Furthermore, the Iraqi Kurds boycotted the cabinet meeting on March 12, presumably to protest the passage of the budget. It is not clear whether the two major Iraqi Kurdish parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), have a unified position on withdrawing from the cabinet and completely boycott the Baghdad government. 

Although the Iraqi Kurds were involved the discussions leading up to the vote, they remain surprised by the fact that their allies – the Iraqi Shi‘a parties – went ahead and voted on the budget without their presence. Overall, however, their response thus far has been measured. This can be attributed to the fact that their demands for oil company payments can be addressed through political agreements and executive decisions by Maliki. Additionally, toning down the anti-Maliki rhetoric may serve the Iraqi Kurds, depriving the premier of the opportunity to present himself as a defender of a unified Iraq confronting Iraqi Kurdish ambitions. Moving forward, the absence of President Jalal Talabani’s mediating role raises the possibility of increased tensions: both Maliki and the Iraqi Kurds will need a mediator if they are to ensure a continued Iraqi alliance between the Iraqi Shi’a and the Iraqi Kurds.

Renewed protests condemn local politicians

Protesters in Baghdad, Anbar, Ninewa, Kirkuk, Salah ad-Din, and Diyala took to the streets under protests titled “Friday of Supporting Imam Abu Hanifa.” The name refers to the Abu Hanifa mosque in Baghdad’s Adhamiyah area where prayers were disallowed last Friday. During today’s prayers, the mosque’s imam condemned last Friday’s shutdown. It is important to note the reported participation of parliament speaker Osama al-Nujaifi at the protest, in addition to cooperative security forces. In Anbar, protesters likened Maliki to Bashar al-Assad and the situation in Iraq to that of Syria. Moreover, they called on the protesters to withdraw from the political process. Recently resigned Finance Minister Rafi al-Issawi, the subject of an apparent arrest attempton March 12, was in attendance despite a reported arrest warrant against him. Finally, protesters in Kirkuk’s Hawija demanded their local politicians withdraw from the government.     

      

It is evident that protesters are continuing to focus their efforts and energy on condemning Maliki and his policies. Simultaneously, they are seeking to place pressure on Iraqiyya politicians to withdraw from the government in the aftermath of the resignation of both Issawi and Agriculture Minister Izz al-Din al-Dawla.         

  

2013 Weekly Iraq Update #3: Mapping the Iraq Protests- Week 4

January 12 – January 17, 2013

by Sam Wyer

A series of attacks this week targeted prominent Sunni leaders and Kurdish political offices as anti-government demonstrations continued in Iraq for a fourth week. While no group has thus far claimed responsibility, the attacks have the potential to escalate the political crisis in Iraq and may suggest a move by al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) to exacerbate already strained ethno-sectarian tensions. The targeting of Sunni officials will likely raise questions within the Sunni population regarding the possibility of the government of Iraq’s involvement and its inability to provide adequate security. AQI may also be attempting to ignite the military standoff between Iraqi and Peshmerga military forces in the north. Thus, the attacks add to the complexity of the ongoing political and security crises in Iraq.

Click map to enlarge.

The first attack took place on January 13^th when Iraqi Finance Minister Rafia al-Issawi’s convoy wastargeted by a roadside improvised explosive device (IED) near the city of Fallujah, just west of Baghdad. Issawi was traveling between Fallujah and Abu Ghraib when the IED detonated, hitting a vehicle in the convoy but resulting in no fatalities. While no group has claimed responsibility for the attack, it bears the hallmarks of AQI; however, Iraqiyya has blamed the Maliki government. Two days after the attack, Iraqiyya parliamentarian Muthar al-Janabi accused the Muthanna Brigade (also known as the 24^th Infantry Brigade of the Iraqi 6^th Army Division) of orchestrating the attack against Issawi. Janabi claimed that the Muthanna Brigade, which operates around Abu Ghraib, has a precedent of targeting or facilitating attacks against Maliki’s political opponents, citing two attempts against Deputy Prime Minister Saleh al-Mutlaq in the area over the last year, including an IED attack last August. Following the assassination attempt, the Iraqiyya bloc called for a full investigation, stating that it holds Maliki responsible for security lapses as commander-in-chief.

A day later, on January 14^th, unidentified gunmen assassinated tribal leader Mohammed Taher Abdul Rabbo al-Jubouri near his house outside the town of Badush in Ninewa province, northwest of Mosul. Rabbo was reportedly one of the main organizers of the ongoing anti-government demonstrations in Ninewa province. He also headed the Independent Elder Spears Bloc that is registered to participate in the upcoming provincial elections as part of the Iraqi Nakhweh Coalition in Ninewa province, a coalition consisting of tribal and religious groups in Ninewa. Atheel Nujaifi, the governor of Ninewa and a supporter of the anti-government demonstrations, and his first deputy attended Rabbo’s funeral on January 16^th.

Attacks also targeted senior Sunni Awakening leaders in Anbar. On January 15^th, a suicide bomber disguised as a construction worker assassinated Iraqiyya MP Ayfan Saadun al-Issawi near the town of Fallujah. The explosion killed Saadun and six others, including members of his security detail. Saadun was a prominent leader of the Awakening movement and a previous target of attacks by al-Qaeda in Iraq. He was not related to Rafia al-Issawi.In a separate incident, mortars targeted the home of Hamid al-Hayes on January 16^th, a prominent Anbar Awakening leader and the chairman of the Anbar Salvation Council, which is registered for the provincial elections in Anbar. Hamid al-Hayes has generally been politically aligned with Maliki; the Anbar Salvation Council backed his candidacy for premiership in 2010. AQI is likely using the current environment both to exacerbate sectarian tensions between Sunni protesters and Maliki’s Shi’ite government and to settle old scores with the Awakening.

Following this week’s attacks, however, numerous political parties and tribal groups have focused their blame on Maliki’s government for failing to provide adequate security against terrorist attacks. In a statement, the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) declared that the two recent assassinations “aim at hindering the calls for reformations and silencing the masses’ voice.” Others have accused Iran of playing a role in the attacks in order to deter anti-government demonstrations. Awakening leader Abu Risha blamed the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) for facilitating the assassinations under the guise of al-Qaeda in Iraq. Furthermore, tribal leader Ali Hatem al-Suleiman warned of the use of Iranian militias to break up protests. Despite the lack of evidence of Iranian involvement in the attacks, such statements demonstrate the growing sectarian framing of the conflict.

AQI may also be attempting to aggravate ethnic tensions as car bombs targeted Kurdish political offices on January 16^th in northern Iraq. In the disputed city of Kirkuk, a suicide truck bomb detonated outside the local office of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), the Kurdish political party led by President of the Kurdistan Regional Government Massoud Barzani. On the same day, a suicide car bomb targeted the offices of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) in Tuz Khurmatu, a city south of Kirkuk. Over the past few months, tension between Baghdad and Erbil has remained high as negotiations have failed to diffuse the military standoff around Kirkuk. Violent attacks, therefore, increase the danger of miscalculation.

AQI has a long history of targeting Sunni, Kurdish, and Shi’a government officials, and this week’s attacks may be an attempt by the terrorist group to take advantage of the heightened political crisis to exacerbate ethno-sectarian tensions. Even if AQI is responsible, Maliki’s government will likely be blamed for failing to provide security, and the continued targeting of Sunni officials may fuel greater Sunni discontent in Anbar, Salah ad-Din, and Ninewa. At the same time, Iraqi security forces continue to encircle the anti-government demonstrations in an effort to prevent their spread. The Iraq-Jordan border remains closed, despite pledges of its reopening. In the north, Iraq stated that it has closed the Rabia and Walid border crossings with Syria until January 20^th for unspecified security reasons. The Tigris Operations Command also announced plans to restrict protests in Hawija. Maliki has already warned demonstrators of terrorist plots in Fallujah and Ramadi, a move meant to deter protests. This week’s attacks may provide Maliki an excuse to further increase security cordons around the anti-government demonstrations, which could ultimately lead to miscalculation and confrontation with the protesters. Despite measures to contain the demonstrations, anti-government protests continue and preparations for this Friday’s rallies are well underway. AQI continued efforts to fuel the political crisis heighten the danger for escalation.