Russian Airstrikes in Syria: June 29 - July 27, 2016

By Jonathan Mautner and Christopher Kozak

Russia enabled pro-regime forces to complete the physical encirclement of Aleppo City on July 28, isolating the primary nexus of the non-jihadist opposition in Northern Syria. These gains threaten the long-term survival of mainstream opposition groups that could serve as potential partners against ISIS and Syrian Al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra. Russian warplanes continued to concentrate airstrikes against opposition targets on the northern and western outskirts of Aleppo City from July 14 - 27, allowing pro-regime forces to seize positions along the Castello Highway that serves as the only major ground line of communication (GLOC) into opposition-held districts in the eastern half of the city. Russian Minister of Defense Sergey Shoygu announced on July 28 that Russian President Vladimir Putin would authorize a “large-scale humanitarian operation” around Aleppo City in order to “help civilians…taken hostage by terrorists” while pro-regime forces opened a number of evacuation routes for the estimated 250,000 civilians that remain in Eastern Aleppo City. On the same day, Assad issued an offer of general amnesty for any opposition fighters that surrender to the regime within the next three months. The proposals regarding humanitarian support and national reconciliation, however, coincided with continued airstrikes against critical infrastructure and densely-populated urban terrain within Aleppo City, suggesting that Russia likely aims to depopulate Aleppo City in preparation for concerted pro-regime ground operations to force the surrender of opposition groups within the city.

Russia also intensified its air operations in Eastern Homs Province in a likely attempt to preserve its legitimacy as a viable international partner in the Syrian Civil War. Russia concentrated its strikes on the eastern outskirts of Palmyra – a key crossroads town that provides the regime with a launching point for future operations into Eastern Syria. Russia invested significant resources into the operation to seize Palmyra in March 2016 and spun the victory as a triumph against terrorism that justified its narrative for intervention into the Syrian Civil War. Recent advances by ISIS near Palmyra have threatened to undermine this narrative. The Russian Ministry of Defense announced that it sortied six long-range strategic bombers from Russia to strike alleged ISIS targets near Palmyra on July 21, marking the second such sortie in the past month. The regime later deployed over 1,000 Iranian-backed Iraqi and Afghan Shi’a militia fighters to Palmyra on July 25 in order to reinforce the defenses of the city. Russia will likely continue to prioritize its campaign against ISIS in Eastern Homs Province in order to preempt its potential resurgence in the region and protect its claims to be a credible partner against violent extremism.

Russia continues to wage its air campaign in a manner aimed at shaping the terms of a potential end-state to the Syrian Civil War in accordance with its strategic objectives. Putin has leveraged his role in the conflict in order to attract the U.S. into a one-sided partnership that will ultimately benefit Assad. On July 26, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry stated that talks regarding potential cooperation with Russia in Syria against ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra had been “making progress” and noted that final details could be announced as early as August 2016. The continued consideration of a bilateral deal despite the looming siege of Aleppo City will likely encourage Russia to continue its operations unchecked against large swaths of the mainstream opposition under the guise of counter-terrorism. Continued attacks against mainstream opposition groups will fuel further radicalization and consolidation under the leadership of jihadist groups. At the same time, Russia continued to promote itself as a constructive diplomatic actor by participating in a trilateral meeting with the U.S. and UN Special Envoy to Syria Staffan de Mistura on July 26 that urged a resumption of political negotiations. Russia will use its military influence to set conditions on the ground that force the U.S. into tacit acceptance of the long-term preservation of the regime.

The following graphic depicts ISW’s assessment of Russian airstrike locations based on reports from local Syrian activist networks, statements by Russian and Western officials, and documentation of Russian airstrikes through social media. This map represents locations targeted by Russia’s air campaign, rather than the number of individual strikes or sorties. 

High-Confidence reporting. ISW places high confidence in reports corroborated by documentation from opposition factions and activist networks on the ground in Syria deemed to be credible that demonstrate a number of key indicators of Russian airstrikes.

Low-Confidence reporting. ISW places low confidence in reports corroborated only by multiple secondary sources, including from local Syrian activist networks deemed credible or Syrian state-run media.

Russian Military Activity in Syria: March 15 – April 18, 2016

By Jodi Brignola and Genevieve Casagrande

Russia remains a decisive actor in Syria despite announcing its limited drawdown on March 14. It has since reshaped the nature of its deployment and military operations in ways that continue to bolster the Assad regime’s position on the ground as well as at the negotiating table, while allowing Russia to maintain its strategic military foothold along the Eastern Mediterranean. Russian military contributions continue to shape the battlefield momentum of pro-regime operations through the deployment of alternative assets to theater such as advanced rotary wing attack aircraft. Russia retains the capacity to escalate its fixed-wing strikes to support pro-regime operations, as shown in operations against ISIS in Palmyra in late March and more recently against armed opposition forces in Aleppo.

Russian air operations pivoted once again to Aleppo as of April 6, following weeks of strikes primarily carried out in support of pro-regime ground operations against ISIS in central Homs Province. Pro-regime forces supported by Russian and regime airstrikes have resumed operations to encircle and besiege armed opposition forces in Aleppo City. Russian air operations have regularly targeted opposition-held terrain in Aleppo province throughout its air campaign in Syria, beginning condition-setting efforts for pro-regime operations to encircle and besiege Aleppo City as early as October 2015. Russian air support has been a pivotal component of pro-regime operations to encircle Aleppo City, bringing regime forces within five kilometers of besieging opposition forces inside the city as of February 2016.

Russian airstrikes have both repelled opposition efforts to reverse gains made by regime forces south of the city and propelled regime advances in the city’s northern industrial outskirts. Russia resumed regular strikes in the vicinity of Aleppo City on April 6 in response to an opposition offensive. This new wave of strikes in Aleppo, although not yet at the levels seen in the first five months of the Russian air campaign, ultimately places the already tenuous “cessation of hostilities” agreement at risk of collapse. The escalation of both Russian airstrikes and pro-regime operations appears to be driving additional upticks of violence elsewhere in northwestern Syria, particularly on key regime frontlines in northeastern Latakia and northwestern Hama Provinces on April 18. Renewed opposition operations in this area apply additional pressure to the regime’s heartland on the Syrian coast.

Russia has changed the shape of its deployment to meet the needs of the Syrian regime rather than scaling back its operations in theater. Russia has deployed additional installments of advanced attack helicopters in the past month, allowing Russia to carry out dynamic strikes and provide close air support in accordance with ongoing pro-regime ground operations. Activist sources reported that Russia has deployed additional rotary-wing attack aircraft to Bassel al-Assad International Airport in Latakia as well as the Shayrat, and T4 Airbases in central Homs, including installments of advanced Mi-28N ‘Havoc’ Helicopters. Advanced helicopters like the Mi-28N, which the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) confirmed on April 4 was in use in Syria, would be especially useful in clearing operations against the remaining ISIS-held areas of eastern Homs. Russia prioritized the regime’s front with ISIS in central Homs in March 2016, as demonstrated by the presence of Russian military advisers on the ground and the eventual deployment of de-mining personnel to clear Palmyra. While the operation achieved pro-regime objectives in securing terrain lost to ISIS in May 2015, it also allowed Russia to forward the narrative that it acts as a constructive international arbiter to the Syrian conflict and is an effective partner in the fight against terrorism while it continues to target moderate elements of the opposition on other fronts. 

The following graphic depicts ISW's assessment of Russian airstrike locations based on reports from local Syrian activist networks, Syrian state-run media, and statements by Russian and Western officials. This map represents locations targeted by Russia's air campaign, rather than the number of individual strikes or sorties.  

High-Confidence reporting. ISW places high confidence in reports corroborated both by official government statements reported through credible channels and documentation from rebel factions or activist networks on the ground in Syria deemed to be credible.

Low-Confidence reporting. ISW places low confidence in secondary sources that have not been confirmed or sources deemed likely to contain disinformation.

Russian-Syrian-Iranian Coalition Seizes ISIS-Held Palmyra

By Christopher Kozak

Pro-regime forces seized Palmyra as well as the adjacent Palmyra Airbase in Eastern Homs Province on March 27 after ISIS withdrew from the city, completing an operation that began on March 7 with the aim of recapturing the strategic crossroads. The Syrian Arab Army and its auxiliary National Defense Forces conducted multiple offensives against ISIS in the western countryside of Palmyra in the eight months after its rapid fall to ISIS in May 2015, achieving limited tactical gains at a high cost in manpower and equipment. The latest offensive proceeded as a three-pronged frontal assault similar to previous regime-directed operations against Palmyra, displaying little-to-none of the sophisticated operational design that characterized the recent campaign in Aleppo Province. Instead, the regime relied upon large numbers of reinforcements from Russia, Iran, and other foreign backers as well as a lull in combat generated by a nationwide ‘cessation of hostilities’ that began on February 27 in order to generate sufficient combat power to overwhelm ISIS in Palmyra.

Russia played a major role in enabling the successful seizure of Palmyra following months of indecisive engagements. The Russian Armed Forces shifted the focus of its air campaign against Palmyra and its environs in March 2016 despite a drawdown announced by Russian President Vladimir Putin on March 14. The Russian Ministry of Defense claimed to conduct at least 41 sorties against 146 targets near Palmyra between March 22 and March 24 alone, while local activists reported that the constant aerial bombardment has destroyed up to fifty percent of the city. Russia paired its air campaign with a significant deployment of ground forces. ISIS claimed to kill up to five Russian Spetznaz personnel west of Palmyra on March 18 and posted images appearing to show one of the men standing in front of the symbol of the Russian Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU). Russia later confirmed that at least one special forces officer died near Palmyra while “directing airstrikes onto terrorist targets” near Palmyra.  Media reports also revealed the deployment of Russian TOS-1 and BM-30 ‘Smerch’ heavy multiple rocket launcher systems as well as Mi-24 ‘Hind’ helicopter gunships in support of operations to seize Palmyra.

The regime also received significant reinforcements on the ground in Eastern Homs Province in recent weeks, allegedly raising the total number of participants in the operation to over five thousand personnel. Activists noted that the offensive included hundreds of fighters from Lebanese Hezbollah, Iraqi Shi’a Militias, and the Afghan Shi’a Liwa al-Fatimiyoun. The death of a member of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps near Palmyra on March 16 suggests that Iran also deployed its own ground forces in order to oversee its coalition of proxy forces in the operation. Meanwhile, the regime deployed a convoy of up to one thousand Syrian Marines and pro-regime militiamen from the Syrian Coast to Eastern Homs Province on March 18. These redeployments were enabled in part by the ongoing ‘cessation of hostilities’ which allowed the regime and its allies to withdraw troops from its frontlines with opposition groups in Latakia, Aleppo, and Quneitra Provinces without major risk.

The fall of Palmyra represents a major victory on the international stage for both Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and Russian President Vladimir Putin. The new gains allow the Russian-Iranian-Syrian coalition to claim a significant win in the fight against ISIS, bolstering its narrative as the ideal partner in the anti-ISIS campaign. This message may stand to gain additional traction within Europe in the aftermath of a major terrorist attack by ISIS in Brussels, Belgium on March that killed thirty-one civilians and wounded several hundred others. The advance also bolsters the current position of strength held by Syrian President Bashar al-Assad amidst the ongoing Geneva III Talks to end the Syrian Civil War. The seizure of Palmyra curtails the ability of ISIS to project force into Western Syria from its safe haven along the Euphrates River Valley and provides a much-needed buffer for several critical regime-held oil and natural gas fields that provide electricity to Western Syria. The regime and its allies will likely leverage Palmyra and its military facilities as an optimal forward position for follow-on operations against ISIS in Ar-Raqqa and Deir ez-Zour Cities, complicating the position of the U.S.-led coalition in the region.

Russian Airstrikes in Syria: February 29 - March 15, 2016

By Genevieve Casagrande

Russia reportedly withdrew approximately fifteen of its airframes from the Bassel al Assad International Airport in Latakia Province from March 15 - 16, following Russian President Vladimir Putin’s announcement of a drawdown on March 14. Five Russian Su-34 bombers, four Su-25s, five Su-24s, and at least one Su-30 had left the airbase to return to Russia as of March 16, according to a Reuters investigation of Russian state media. Russian officials asserted that Russia would nonetheless continue its counterterrorism efforts, a term Russia has previously used to obfuscate its air campaign in support of President Bashar al Assad against mainstream elements of the Syrian opposition. Russia has yet to withdraw many of its other aircraft from the base, including numerous short- and medium-range bombers. Putin has messaged his determination to defend both the airfield at Bassel al Assad and Russia’s naval basing in Tartous as well as his intent to retain the S-400 air defense system in Latakia. Russia has therefore gained significant capabilities along the Eastern Mediterranean that it intends to secure. Russia will therefore continue to be able to rapidly deploy long- and medium-range air assets into the theater through its airbase in Latakia. As Russia’s air campaign had operated at decreased levels since the cessation of hostilities agreement on February 27 and had lowered its rate of airstrikes even further from March 14 – 15, Russia may be removing excess airframes from the base.  

Russian airstrikes in Syria have notably decreased since Putin’s announcement and partial drawdown. ISW was only able to confirm strikes in the vicinity of the ISIS-held town of Palmyra in central Homs Province with both high and low confidence from March 14 - 15. Pro-regime forces launched a renewed campaign to seize Palmyra in early March, backed heavily by Russian and regime fixed and rotary wing strikes. Russia will likely continue its air operations in support of the regime ground offensive against Palmyra, despite the drawdown. The combination of Russian airpower and likely Iranian reinforcement has brought Assad’s forces within four kilometers of Palmyra as of March 16. The current “cessation of hostilities,” which does not apply to ISIS targets and which has reduced overall levels of violence has likely allowed the regime to refocus efforts on clearing ISIS’s presence in central Homs. Russia will also use its air operations against ISIS as a means to further project itself as a provider of international security and to legitimize its continued presence inside Syria. Russia’s airstrikes against ISIS, however, come at a cost. Alleged videos and photos from Palmyra show the damage caused by the intensity of Russia’s air campaign in the area, while local sources continue to report civilian casualties, highlighting the continued indiscriminate nature of Russian airstrikes. The Russian air campaign and recovery of Palmyra may on the surface seem to support U.S. objectives against ISIS, but over the long term may exacerbate grievances and insurgency.

The following graphic depicts ISW’s assessment of Russian airstrike locations based on reports from local Syrian activist networks, Syrian state-run media, and statements by Russian and Western officials. This map represents locations targeted by Russia’s air campaign, rather than the number of individual strikes or sorties.  

High-Confidence reporting. ISW places high confidence in reports corroborated both by official government statements reported through credible channels and documentation from rebel factions or activist networks on the ground in Syria deemed to be credible.

Low-Confidence reporting. ISW places low confidence in secondary sources that have not been confirmed or sources deemed likely to contain disinformation.

Russian Airstrikes in Syria: February 27 - March 7, 2016

By Genevieve Casagrande

Russian airstrikes continue to target mainstream elements of the Syrian armed opposition, despite the ongoing cessation of hostilities agreement. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights reported that the level of violence in the country has decreased by ninety percent since the onset of the agreement on February 27. Pro-regime forces supported by Russian airstrikes nevertheless continued operations to clear opposition-held terrain in Latakia Province in an effort to buffer the regime’s coastal stronghold. Jaysh al-Nasr, a coalition of FSA-affiliated opposition factions that includes prominent U.S.-backed TOW anti-tank missile recipients, reported Russian airstrikes near the opposition’s frontlines with the regime in the al-Ghab Plain, which lies on Latakia’s eastern border. Russian warplanes also conducted limited strikes against the armed opposition in other areas of western Syria from February 29 - March 7, including the first reported Russian airstrikes in Damascus Province since the cessation of hostilities agreement began. The likely continuation of limited Russian airstrikes against mainstream elements of the opposition ultimately threatens the sustainability of any ceasefire agreement and the outcome of upcoming negotiations between the regime and the opposition in Geneva, currently scheduled to resume on March 14. The opposition High Negotiations Committee (HNC) continues to report Russian and regime violations of the cessation of hostilities agreement, which included a total of 90 airstrikes carried out by Russian and regime warplanes as of March 4. The HNC has yet to make a decision regarding its attendance of the talks. Prominent HNC member Riad Nassan Agha stated on March 8 that their “inclination is to go,” but remains dependent upon the degree to which the regime and its allies maintain the cessation of hostilities.  

Russia’s decrease in airstrikes against the armed opposition in western Syria has likely allowed Russian air operations to increase support to the regime’s limited operations against ISIS. Russian air operations have notably decreased in areas such as Aleppo, where heavy strikes have been maintained for the first five months of Russia’s air campaign. Russian airstrikes concentrated against ISIS’s positions in and around Palmyra in central Homs Province amidst a concerted regime effort to breach the town on March 7. Regime ground operations in Palmyra were ultimately unsuccessful, highlighting the regime’s continued limitations in combating ISIS as the regime and its allies remain preoccupied with the defeat of the Syrian armed opposition.

The following graphic depicts ISW’s assessment of Russian airstrike locations based on reports from local Syrian activist networks, Syrian state-run media, and statements by Russian and Western officials. This map represents locations targeted by Russia’s air campaign, rather than the number of individual strikes or sorties.  

High-Confidence reporting. ISW places high confidence in reports corroborated both by official government statements reported through credible channels and documentation from rebel factions or activist networks on the ground in Syria deemed to be credible.

Low-Confidence reporting. ISW places low confidence in secondary sources that have not been confirmed or sources deemed likely to contain disinformation.

Russia Reportedly Expands Syria Footprint with New Air Base

By Dan Urchick and Christopher Kozak

Russia reportedly plans to bolster its military presence in central Syria by deploying fixed-wing aircraft and ground support personnel to the Shayrat Military Airbase, according to an anonymous U.S. official. Shayrat Airbase is located twenty-five kilometers southeast of Homs City. The deployment of Russian warplanes to Shayrat Airbase would mark the first deployment of Russian fixed-wing assets outside of its established airbase at the Bassel al-Assad International Airport in Latakia Province. Russia previously deployed helicopter gunships to the facility in early November in response to advances by ISIS which threatened the strategic M5 Highway connecting Damascus to Homs City. Unconfirmed reports indicate that Russian engineers at Shayrat Airbase are working to complete a secondary air strip at least three kilometers long in order to prevent hostile indirect fire from limiting air operations. Syrian activists had reported in late October that the Syrian regime redeployed all of its aircraft away from Shayrat Airbase in order to conduct repairs and rehabilitation on the runway. The same unconfirmed reports suggested that the current Russian military contingent in Syria could rise to over one hundred aircraft accompanied by an additional one thousand Russian troops to engage in “selective kinetic engagements” and protect the new base.

 

Russia likely intends to leverage its forces at Shayrat Airbase to support ongoing ground offensives by the Syrian regime which aim to recapture the ISIS-held cities of Qaryatayn and Palmyra in eastern Homs Province. ISIS seized both cities in mid-2015 as part of a westward advance which threatened core regime terrain along the Syrian ‘central corridor’. ISIS advanced westward from Quryatayn on November 1, seizing the nearby town of Mahin and threatening to sever the primary ground line of communication between Damascus and the Syrian Coast. Pro-regime forces supported by Hezbollah later recaptured Mahin on November 23 with Russian support. Televised Russian military briefings revealed that Russia deployed at least four Mi-24 ‘Hind’ helicopter gunships and six 152mm towed howitzers to Shayrat Airbase in support of the regime offensive. Meanwhile, pro-regime forces have also advanced to within four kilometers of Palmyra and its historic ruins. The forward deployment of fixed wing aircraft to Homs Province would position Russia to provide direct support to the ongoing offensive operations against Qaryatayn and Palmyra in the face of heavy ISIS resistance. The deployment would also enable Russian warplanes to respond immediately to any coordinated ISIS pressure against the strategic T4 (Tiyas) Airbase along the highway between Homs City and Palmyra. Russia ultimately aims to preserve the stability of the Syrian regime by bolstering its eastern flank against the threat posed by ISIS to Damascus and Homs City.

ISIS Control and Expected Offensives in Central Syria: May 29, 2015

by: Christopher Kozak and Jennifer Cafarella

Syria Situation Report: May 21-26, 2015

by: Christopher Kozak

Control of Terrain in Syria: May 22, 2015

by: ISW Syria Team

Control of Terrain in Syria: May 20, 2015

by: ISW Syria Team

Syria Situation Report: May 14-20, 2015

by: Jennifer Cafarella

New ISIS Offensives in the Syrian Civil War

By: Christopher Kozak

Key Takeaway: ISIS has neither been defeated nor relegated entirely to the defensive in Syria despite a string of losses to Kurdish forces assisted by U.S.-led coalition airstrikes. Instead, ISIS has launched two major offensives targeting Syrian military positions in central and eastern Syria since May 6, 2015, likely taking advantage of the Assad regime’s preoccupation with recent JN and rebel advances in Idlib Province. A consolidation of these gains would leave ISIS in position to contest and potentially seize the most important remaining military installations in eastern Syria, eliminating any potential roadblocks to further ISIS expansion into the Syrian central corridor.

ISIS dramatically escalated its efforts against the Assad regime in eastern Syria over the past week, initiating two major offensives targeting several towns and military positions in Deir ez-Zour and Homs Provinces. These operations demonstrate that ISIS has not lost its offensive capability in Syria despite a string of significant losses to Kurdish forces supported by U.S.-led coalition airstrikes in northeastern Syria. The size and scope of these offensives indicates that ISIS may have made the strategic decision to direct a large portion of its combat reserves and materiel resources away from Kurdish territory in eastern Aleppo and Hasaka Provinces towards central Syria. This shift is likely motivated by a desire to reassert ISIS’s ‘narrative of victory’ following recent setbacks in northern Syria and in Iraq which have slowed the group’s operational momentum. The perceived weakness of the Assad regime following major victories by JN and rebel forces in Idlib City and Jisr al-Shughour presents an inviting target for ISIS’s expansion. ISIS may also desire to reaffirm its status as a prominent anti-Assad actor in response to the JN successes in Idlib Province in order to bolster its recruitment efforts among the Syrian opposition.

ISIS’s escalation in eastern Syria began on May 6, 2015, when ISIS launched a wide-scale attack targeting the regime-held sections of eastern Deir ez-Zour city. Clashes centered around the southeastern neighborhoods of al-Sina’a, ar-Rusafa, and al-Omal, all located north of the regime-held Deir ez-Zour Military Airport. ISIS seized the al-Jumayn Checkpoint in the al-Sina’a District after conducting a tank-borne SVBIED against the position. ISIS also made additional advances in the al-Omal and Jubaylah Districts after detonating at least two tunnel bombs under regime positions. On May 13, ISIS claimed to seize Saker Island in the Euphrates River north of the Deir ez-Zour Military Airport following a week of heavy clashes. As of publication, ISIS forces have capitalized on their control of Saker Island to stage attacks into Harrabesh District and other areas along the northern perimeter of the Deir ez-Zour Military Airport.

104^thRepublican Guard Brigade commander Brig. Gen. Issam Zahreddine in Deir ez-Zour, late 2014

Photo Distributed by Al-Masdar News, September 5, 2014

ISIS’s advance in Deir ez-Zour has likely been enabled in part by the reported redeployment of regime Brigadier General Issam Zahreddine and his elite 104^th Republican Guard Brigade away from Deir ez-Zour to the Eastern Ghouta suburbs of Damascus in early May 2015. The 104^th Brigade played a key role in stabilizing frontlines between ISIS and the regime in Deir ez-Zour after its arrival to reinforce the SAA 137^thBrigade in Deir ez-Zour in early 2014. The defense of Deir ez-Zour represented a key component of Assad’s “army in all corners” strategy, which called for pro-regime forces to maintain far-flung combat outposts such as the Deir ez-Zour Military Airport in order to pin the bounds of a unified post-war Syrian state and reinforce Assad’s claim to political legitimacy. The withdrawal of the 104^th Brigade signifies a clear deprioritization of the Deir ez-Zour front by the Assad regime and suggests that recent rebel advances in western Syria may be forcing the regime to reevaluate the viability the “army in all corners” strategy.

ISIS applied additional pressure to the Assad regime on May 13, 2015, launching a second offensive targeting regime positions throughout eastern Homs Province. One element of the ISIS advance targeted al-Sukhna northeast of Palmyra, capturing the town after heavy clashes which killed nearly sixty combatants and left over one hundred wounded. On the same day, ISIS conducted a two-pronged offensive targeting the major regime strongpoint of Palmyra from the north and west, seizing the al-Amiriyah District north of the city and shelling the strategic Palmyra Military Airbase with Grad rockets. ISIS militants conducted raids targeting a large complex of weapon depots located northwest of Palmyra, while pro-ISIS social media accounts also claimed the seizure of several regime checkpoints surrounding the T3 Pumping Station east of the city. As of May 14, activists continued to report heavy clashes between ISIS and regime forces on the northern, western, and eastern outskirts of Palmyra.

ISIS Offensives in Central Syria, May 6 – May 14, 2015

The ISIS offensives targeting al-Sukhna and Palmyra differ dramatically from the previous pattern of ISIS attacks witnessed in eastern Homs Province. Previous ISIS operations in the region had emphasized rapid, mobile raids against isolated regime positions that were intended to inflict casualties and seize weapons while avoiding retaliatory airstrikes. In contrast, the recent offensives reveal that ISIS retains the desire and capability to secure and hold urban terrain. If ISIS can consolidate its gains, it will be in position to contest the Palmyra Military Airbase and simultaneously isolate the ground line of communication to the Deir ez-Zour Military Airport via the Homs-Palmyra-Deir ez-Zour Highway. ISIS’s advances in both Deir ez-Zour and eastern Homs Province threaten to undermine the remaining military installations in eastern Syria, eliminating any potential roadblocks to further encroachment by ISIS into the Syrian central corridor near Homs and Hama cities. The Assad regime suffers from long-standing manpower problems which force the regime to conduct a zero-sum balancing act across its many standing fronts and its forces have been further strained by recent opposition advances in both northern and southern Syria. This lack of a flexible combat reserve means that Assad will likely have to choose between devoting resources to face the emergent ISIS threat in central Syria or the advancing JN-rebel coalition in western Syria. In either scenario, Salafi-jihadist factions are set to make further territorial gains in Syria.