ISW Blog: Peshmerga

Wednesday, October 19, 2016

The Campaign for Mosul: October 19, 2016

By Emily Anagnostos and the ISW Iraq Team

The Coalition-led operation to secure Mosul from ISIS advanced towards the city from two directions in the first 72 hours as of October 19, 2016. U.S. Forces are participating in the operation as advisers and Joint Terminal Attack Controllers (JTACs). The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and Popular Mobilization units advanced from the south, while ISF and Peshmerga units advanced from the southeast. The ISF and Peshmerga recently opened a third offensive northeast of the city. The ISF have recaptured the city center of Hamdaniya, southeast of Mosul, but fighting is still underway.

The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) advanced north of Qayyarah towards Shura, a previous al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) hub south of Mosul, in a pincer move from the southwest and the southeast. Iraqi Army (IA) units moved in from the southeast, recapturing al-Hawd and al-Lazakah, directly north of Qayyarah on October 17. Civilians in al-Hawd had reportedly already risen up and killed many of the ISIS militants before the ISF arrived. Units from the Federal Police and Emergency Response Division (ERD) moved in towards Shura from the southwest and also moved west to recapture towns and oil wells west of the highway. Popular Mobilization units, including Iranian proxy militias, reportedly advanced alongside Federal Police units that are penetrated by members of the Badr Organization, a major Iranian proxy militia. Advancing security forces have yet to enter Shura, and the ISF ordered a two-day operational pause on October 19 in order to regroup. The pause was likely intended to allow the 15^th Iraqi Army Division to catch up, as it has advanced north at a slower pace than other units.

The ISF is also advancing southeast of Mosul on the Khazar-Gwer axis towards Hamdaniya, a majority Christian town southeast of Mosul. The Gwer-Hamdaniya line currently forms the seam between the areas of operation of the ISF and Peshmerga as of October 19. Armored Iraqi Army brigades led by Counter Terrorism Service (CTS) units advanced to Hamdaniya on October 18. The ISF recaptured the government complex but do not yet have control over the entire city due to resistance from remaining ISIS personnel, including heavy sniper fire, and because of a large presence of civilians. There is no indication that the Peshmerga is participating in Hamdaniya alongside the ISF or if it will join in, though the Peshmerga made advances from Khazar towards Mosul in villages north of Hamdaniya. Meanwhile, the Peshmerga began an offensive from their position on Mt. Bashiqa northeast of Mosul into the ISIS-held town of Bashiqa at the base of the mountain on October 18, but have not made significant progress. The CTS reported on October 19 that they would assist in the Peshmerga operation beginning October 20. The CTS’s positioning in Kurdish terrain is one of the results of a U.S.-brokered agreement between the Kurdistan Regional Government and Iraqi Government in August and will set the CTS up to breach Mosul’s city limits from the northeast.

ISIS demonstrated signs of resistance to the Coalition’s advances. ISIS launched suicide attacks against advancing forces in Hamdaniya and north of Qayyarah. ISIS has also attacked away from the frontlines, including in Sinjar on October 19, to distract from progress towards Mosul. In Mosul, the Pentagon stated that ISIS lighted tires and oil on fire in order to create black clouds to conceal their movements from Coalition aircraft. Reports also surfaced of ISIS using human shields in Mosul to avoid airstrikes.

The Pentagon confirmed that over 100 U.S. soldiers are on the ground with the Peshmerga and ISF in a report on October 18. The report stated that the forces, serving as advisors and Joint Terminal Attack Controllers (JTACs), are embedded with the ISF at the division level and with the Peshmerga in smaller units. The U.S. forces are expected to advance with the offensive.

Turkey remains a potential spoiler in northern operations. Prime Minister Binali Yildirim stated in a press conference on October 18 that Turkey’s air force was involved in Coalition airstrikes in Mosul, but later backtracked the statement, saying that Turkey participates “in principle.” The Pentagon likewise did not list Turkey as among the Coalition countries conducting airstrikes in Iraq. These statements come in the midst of a large-scale demonstration at the Turkish Embassy in Baghdad on the same day, directed by radical Shi’a cleric Muqtada al-Sadr. Turkey may escalate its rhetoric to military maneuvers in order to prove its importance in shaping the operation and post-ISIS conditions in Mosul.

Monday, October 17, 2016

Iraq Situation Report: October 12-17, 2016

By Emily Anagnostos and the ISW Iraq Team

Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi announced the launch of operations to retake Ninewa Province and Mosul from ISIS at dawn on October 17. PM Abadi named Deputy Army Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Abdul al-Amir Jarallah as commander of the operation. The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and Peshmerga began offensives on the Khazar-Gwer axis, southeast of Mosul, and moved north from the Qayyarah airbase, retaking several villages. ISIS offered minimal resistance to the joint forces’ advance and may elect to withdraw the bulk of its forces to Mosul to await the city offensive.

Security forces over the past several weeks have moved into position to begin a multi-axis offensive to encircle the city. Units from Counter Terrorism Service (CTS) and Iraqi Army moved to locations in Kurdish-held territory north and northeast of the city, where they have begun to work in parallel with Peshmerga forces around Khazar and Gwer. Units from the Peshmerga affiliated with the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) also moved into primarily Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) terrain around Khazar. Coordination between the KDP and PUK Peshmerga is rare and was likely the result of a still undisclosed agreement. Shi’a militias, including Iranian-backed groups, have deployed into the vicinity, primarily around Qayyarah and Shirqat, where they will likely shadow militia-friendly ISF units northwards. Turkey also responded to the launch of the Mosul operation, moving military forces along the Iraqi border as Turkish President Recep Erdogan maintained Turkey’s right to intervene in Iraq. Coordination between forces in Iraq remains high, although complications may ensue as these forces near the city itself and prospects for Mosul’s post-ISIS administration become more immediate.

Iraq Launches the Campaign for Mosul

By Emily Anagnostos, Patrick Martin and ISW Iraq Team

Iraqi and regional actors are preparing to assist with or spoil the Iraqi Security Forces’ (ISF) operation to retake Mosul and its environs from ISIS. Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi announced the start of operations to retake the city on October 17. The ISF began shelling ISIS-held villages south of Mosul, Iraqi Army armored units and Federal Police advanced towards Mosul near Gwer, southeast of Mosul, and Peshmerga units began advancing towards Mosul from Khazar, east of Mosul. The ISF’s operation against ISIS will require security forces to isolate Mosul before it can begin a block-by-block clearing operation in the city itself. The ISF recaptured Shirqat, the last major ISIS-held city on the Mosul-Baghdad highway, on September 22, thereby setting the operational conditions to launch operations for Mosul. The ISF will need to continue its line of effort up the highway while also encircling the city from the north and northeast. ISIS will seek to conduct attrition warfare against the ISF before it arrives in Mosul, leveraging its remaining lines of communication in Anbar, Ninewa, and Syria to shift people and supplies. ISIS will also use the sparsely populated areas on both the eastern and western sides of the Tigris River to launch attacks against recaptured areas and the ISF.

The ISF does not have the force size to take both the city and its environs on its own. Consequently, although the ISF will lead the operations into the city proper, they will need to cooperate with the Kurdish Peshmerga, who hold the majority of terrain surrounding the city. However, the Peshmerga participating in anti-ISIS operations will likely exploit the opportunity to take control of areas by displacing Sunni Arabs from their homes, as they did following operations in Sinjar in November 2015.

The shortage of manpower also leaves a gap for Iranian-backed Shi’a militias, which will likely follow the ISF as they clear the cities and remain as a part of the holding force, as they have already done in Shirqat. The Popular Mobilization reported on October 10 that militias are moving to the Ninewa provincial border to participate. Unnamed commanders from Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH) and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH), two Iranian proxies with a record of sectarian violence, reported on October 13 that more than 2,000 of their fighters withdrew from Syria, mostly from Aleppo, to redeploy to Mosul as well as Hawija. The deployments were followed by two high level meetings indicating heavy Iranian proxy participation in the operation. On October 15, PM Abadi received senior Iranian proxy militia commanders, including Badr Organization leader Hadi al-Amiri, AAH leader Qais al-Khazali, Harakat al-Nujaba leader Akram al-Kaabi, and Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada (KSAS) leader Abu Alaa to discuss Mosul and Hawija operations. A day later, images circulated of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force (IRGC-QF) commander Qassem Suleimani visiting an undisclosed location with Amiri and senior Popular Mobilization commander and U.S.-designated terrorist Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis (Unsafe link – do not visit). Iranian proxy involvement in the operation opens up the possibility of sectarian violence against the 1.2 to 1.5 million civilians estimated to flee the Mosul area.

Actors outside of Iraq are positioning themselves for the operation as well. Turkey has insisted that it reserves the right to intervene in northern Iraq if Mosul operations fail to go its way. There are Turkish forces inside Iraq already, and Turkish President Recep Erdogan has increased Turkish forces along the Iraqi border ostensibly to defend against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). Erdogan also announced that Turkey is actively participating in Mosul operations following PM Abadi’s announcement of operations, which could open up conflict with Iraqi Shi’a militias who vow to attack Turkish forces.

The operation to retake Mosul is resulting in a dangerous convergence of Shi’a, Turkish, and Kurdish actors as they jockey for influence in northern Iraq. Iranian proxy militias appear set to play a major role in the operation. A multi-party sectarian, ethnic, and international conflict will likely give opportunities to ISIS and other Sunni insurgent groups, such as the Baathist group Jaysh Rijal al-Tariqa al-Naqshbandia (JRTN), to reconstitute after areas have been cleared.

Thursday, August 25, 2016

Iraq Control of Terrain Map: August 25, 2016

By Emily Anagnostos and Iraq Team

The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and allied tribal fighters recaptured the Waleed Border Crossing on the Syrian-Iraqi Border on August 3. ISIS mounted a counterattack on August 8 - 9 against the Waleed Border Crossing as well as the Tanf Border Crossing in Syria, which is held by the U.S.-backed New Syrian Army. Both attacks were repelled. ISW is thus changing the status of Waleed Border Crossing to ISF Control.

Iraqi Peshmerga affiliated with the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) launched clearing operations southeast of Mosul on August 14 - 15, seizing at least twelve villages in the Ninewa Plains. The operation originated from positions near the Khazir Military Base between Mosul and Arbil, and progressed south towards the town of Gwer. ISW is thus changing the status of this area from contested to KDP Peshmerga Control.

The ISF recaptured the city of Qayyarah on August 25 following more than a month of operations to secure terrain on the southern and western outskirts of the city after security forces seized the Qayyarah Airbase on July 9. The ISF breached the city limits of Qayyarah on August 23, encountering limited resistance in the southern neighborhoods. The ISF secured the city center and government complex on August 24 and Joint Operations Command announced full control over the city on August 25. ISW is thus changing the status of Qayyarah to ISF Control.

Monday, December 21, 2015

Iraq Situation Report: December 15 - 21, 2015

By Patrick Martin and ISW Iraq Team

ISIS launched spoiling attacks across Iraq to relieve pressure by anti-ISIS forces on multiple fronts. ISIS’s attacks follow operations by the Coalition and ISF and Iraq and the Coalition-backed National Democratic Forces in Syria to constrain ISIS on both fronts. In a recent press conference, Operation Inherent Resolve spokesperson Col. Steve Warren cited ongoing anti-ISIS operations in Baiji, Makhoul, and Sinjar in northern Iraq as well as Hit and Ramadi in western Iraq, combined with operations in Shaddadi and Deir ez-Zour in southern Syria. ISIS responded with attacks involving a significant offensive east of Mosul, which was reportedly the largest ground attack since ISIS recaptured Ramadi in May 2015. ISIS also attempted to set back ISF efforts to prepare an assault on Ramadi. ISIS additionally attempted diversionary and probing attacks near Tikrit, Samarra and Fallujah, in order to forestall any upcoming anti-ISIS operations elsewhere in Iraq and force anti-ISIS forces shift resources to re-secure targeted areas ISIS remains on the defensive but maintains attack capabilities across northern and western Iraq. Meanwhile, heavy pressure on PM Abadi from pro-Iranian elements forced PM Abadi to reject Coalition support for the Ramadi operation. However, the Operation Inherent Resolve spokesperson stated that PM Abadi approved of a small U.S. SOF force to cut ISIS’s supply lines between Iraq and Syria. PM Abadi’s ability to accept increased Coalition support suffered further when a Coalition airstrike accidentally hit an Iraqi Army unit near Fallujah on December 18, causing an uproar among pro-Iranian and Iranian proxy actors.

Sunday, December 6, 2015

Turkey Unilaterally Deploys a Battalion near Mosul

By Patrick Martin

Key Take-Away: Turkey deployed an armored battalion northeast of Mosul, ostensibly as part of a training mission for Kurdish Peshmerga and a local anti-ISIS militia. Turkey’s forces bolster Masoud Barzani and his Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), a primary rival to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) active in Syria, Turkey, and parts of Iraq. Turkey will also maintain influence over any future operation to recapture Mosul and Ninewa from ISIS. Turkish military forces have been present in northern Iraq since 1997, but the size and composition of the new force, reports that Barzani has granted the Turks a permanent base outside of Mosul, and the expected deployment of U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) to Iraq have made Iraqi politicians extremely sensitive to the arrival of any foreign forces. The deployment has sparked a rhetorical backlash from Iraqi politicians that will likely outweigh any impact the Turkish force will have on the battlefield. The Turkish deployment will generate greater resistance from Shi’a political parties against the involvement of any foreign military force in Iraq and will make it even harder for Iraq’s Prime Minister Abadi to publicly support any additional Coalition deployment, such as the U.S. Special Operations forces that Defense Secretary Ashton Carter announced on December 1. The Iranian-backed militias have already threatened the Abadi government with a no-confidence vote if he accepts U.S. forces.

Turkey increased its influence over future developments in northern Iraq by deploying an armored battalion on December 4 to a camp in Mount Bashiqa, less than ten miles northeast of Mosul in Ninewa Province. Video footage showed Turkish forces transporting armored vehicles “towards Mosul.” Turkey’s announced that the force will replace a force that had been present at Mount Bashiqa in order to train Kurdish Peshmerga. Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu denied that Turkey had any intention of seizing territory and asserted that Turkey would assist its “Iraqi brothers” in fighting both ISIS and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), the Kurdish terrorist group that has waged an on-and-off insurgency against the Turkish state since 1984. Turkey may nonetheless seek to establish a permanent military base in Bashiqa, according to Turkish media. The deployment grants Turkey continued leverage to ensure that pro-Turkish elements ultimately control Mosul and its environs following any operation to recapture the city from ISIS.

The deployment of Turkish troops is not in itself a new development but rather is part of a longtime effort to secure Turkish influence in northern Iraq. Turkey has maintained a military presence in Dohuk Province along the Turkish border since 1997 as part of an agreement signed with Saddam Hussein in 1995 to monitor the outlawed PKK and prevent it from crossing into Turkey. This force remained in place throughout the U.S. occupation without any objections from former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. The Turkish trainers in Bashiqa had been present in Iraq for “more than two years,” according to Turkish army sources, but the new force is likely larger than its predecessor, consisting of “hundreds” of Turkish troops and up to 30 tanks and armored vehicles. Turkey has also launched periodic ground and air assaults against PKK targets in northern Iraq, including major incursions in October 2011 and in September 2015. These cross-border raids involve hundreds of ground troops and airstrikes against PKK targets as far east as the Qandil Mountains on the Iran-Iraq border, where the PKK maintains its headquarters.

The recent deployment into northern Iraq differs from past deployments in three ways. First, Turkey does not appear to have undertaken the action in order to contain the PKK directly, as there is no significant PKK activity in or around Bashiqa. The base is also located too far from other priority territory for the PKK, including Sinjar west of Mosul, to be used as an effective staging point for future operations against the PKK. Second, the Turkish battalion, deployed to an area within the Disputed Internal Boundaries (DIBs) – areas that have substantial Kurdish populations but remain outside of Iraqi Kurdistan. Turkey likely intends to support Barzani and the KDP in securing control over the DIBs while also positioning its own forces to better influence what forces participate in the future operation to recapture Mosul, formerly an ethnically diverse city including Arabs, Kurds, and Turkmen. Third, the Turkish deployment came only four days after Defense Secretary Ashton Carter announced that additional U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) would deploy to Iraq to conduct raids and intelligence-gathering in Iraq and Syria, an announcement that generated denunciations from the Shi’a political parties and threats of no-confidence votes against the Prime Minister, forcing PM Abadi to reject publicly the presence of foreign ground troops in Iraq. The Turkish troops thus deployed at a particularly sensitive time.

Turkey also maintains close connections with key players in northern Iraq. Turkey has cooperated with Kurdistan Regional President Masoud Barzani since 2013, particularly over crude oil exports through the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline. Barzani and Turkey share a mutual distrust of the PKK, and the KDP currently competes with the PKK for control over Sinjar district. Turkey also possesses close relations with former Ninewa Province governor Atheel al-Nujaifi, who maintains a camp of former local police and Arab fighters in Bashiqa called the “National Mobilization.” Turkish support was essential for Atheel al-Nujaifi’s elevation to the Ninewa governorship in 2009. Finally, Turkey has close relations Osama al-Nujaifi, Atheel’s brother and the leader of the Sunni Etihad bloc in the Council of Representatives (CoR). Turkey will likely leverage these connections in order to secure greater control over what armed and political actors participate in operations to recapture Mosul. In particular, Turkey will likely support the Nujaifis over Sunni Arabs with whom Turkey has not cultivated relations.

Turkey’s deployment of troops sparked strong rejection from the full spectrum of Iraqi political actors. Iraqi Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi and Iraqi President Fuad Masoum strongly condemned the deployment as a violation of Iraqi sovereignty and demanded that Turkey conduct an immediate withdrawal. All major Shi’a parties denounced the deployment as a violation of Iraqi sovereignty, with a leading Sadrist official calling for Iraqi airstrikes on the Turkish force if it did not depart the country. Another pro-Maliki CoR member suggesting that “a Russian force” could intervene to expel the Turkish battalion. The KDP’s primary political rival, Gorran, rejected the Turkish deployment as a violation of international law, though Gorran’s position more likely stems from its feud with Barzani over control of the KRG than any real concern for Iraqi sovereignty. A leading member of Sunni Etihad, Muhammad al-Karbouli, also rejected the Turkish deployment that came without an agreement with the Iraqi government. Etihad’s statement was nonetheless less vehement than any Shi’a political party’s rejection, and Karbouli also took the opportunity to denounce the corrosive effect of “outlaw militias” – referring to Iranian-backed proxy militias – on the ability of Iraq to resist foreign pressure.

Turkey remains unlikely to withdraw its forces from northern Iraq in the near-term, given the current lack of leverage its opponents currently possess to reverse its decision. Neither the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) nor the Iranian proxy militias realistically possess the ability to expel the Turkish force from Bashiqa. Both forces lack a meaningful presence in the region as well as the freedom of movement to deploy near Mosul. The Iraqi government thus remains limited to rhetorical condemnations and appeals to the U.S. to force a Turkish withdrawal. The U.S. will not likely press Turkey on the issue, as anonymous U.S. defense sources merely indicated that the U.S. was "aware" of Turkey’s intentions. Iranian proxy militias, however, could challenge Turkey elsewhere in the country. Iran likely ordered Iranian proxy militias to kidnap 18 Turkish construction workers on September 2 in order to pressure Turkey into ordering Turkish-backed rebels to cooperate with a ceasefire around the besieged Shi’a majority towns of Fu’ah and Kifriya in northern Syria. The kidnappings provided sufficient leverage against Turkey and the kidnapped workers were released after Syrian rebels enacted a local ceasefire. Iran could pursue similar actions against Turkish assets in Baghdad or in southern Iraq.

This situation may escalate further if Iran views the deployment as threatening its vital strategic objectives in Iraq or Syria. Iran rejects any foreign forces other than their own on Iraqi soil and backs the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), Barzani’s rival in Iraqi Kurdish politics trying to contest his control over the Kurdistan regional presidency. Iranian proxies also recently sparred violently with the Peshmerga in Tuz Khurmato in eastern Salah al-Din proxies on November 12. Iran has also angered Turkey by repeating false Russian rhetoric that Turkey purchases oil from ISIS, part of a disinformation campaign that followed Turkey’s downing of a Russian plane over Turkish airspace on November 24, while Turkey and Iran remain in a proxy contest over control of Aleppo in Syria. Should Iran decide to resist Turkey’s escalation in ways that the Prime Minister will not or cannot, the Prime Minister Abadi may face a vote of no-confidence, which the Iranian-backed militias have already threatened.

Shi’a parties will use the episode to pressure PM Abadi to strongly reject foreign intervention, particularly if reports that Turkey and Barzani signed an agreement to establish a permanent Turkish base in Bashiqa are correct. These calls could complicate U.S. plans to additional Special Operations Forces (SOF) to Iraq to as a “specialized expeditionary targeting force” that will conduct raids and intelligence-gathering in Iraq and Syria. The timing of the Turkish deployment will make it even harder for PM Abadi to approve of the U.S. SOF deployment announced on December 1. PM Abadi could also face further pressure to accept Russian assistance, an outcome that has become popular among Iranian proxies and the Sadrist Trend since Russia began launching airstrikes in Syria on September 30. Russian airstrikes would run counter to U.S. regional interests and interfere with the Coalition’s ability to conduct its own airstrikes as well as advise and assist operations in Iraq.

Wednesday, November 25, 2015

Iraq Control of Terrain Map: November 25, 2015

By Patrick Martin

Key Takeaway: Kurdish forces recaptured the Yazidi-majority district of Sinjar, west of Mosul from ISIS on November 13. Confrontations between the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) will grow increasingly likely as both seek to control Sinjar, while Kurdish control over the mixed-demographic district is already leading to heightened tensions between Yazidis and Sunni Arabs. Kurdish forces included Peshmerga affiliated with the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP); PKK-affiliated fighters from the Syrian People’s Protection Units (YPG); Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) forces; and local Yazidi militias. The city of Sinjar remains under mixed KDP Peshmerga and PKK control. Areas east of the Sinjar were recaptured primarily by the Peshmerga, with the exception of Tel Qasab, a village southeast of Sinjar, which was captured by a YPG-affiliated Yazidi militia. However, areas west of Sinjar reportedly involved few Peshmerga. These areas remain primarily under the control of the PKK, YPG, and PKK-affiliated local Yazidi militias. Villages north of Sinjar and Sinjar Mountain contain forces from all Kurdish fighting forces excluding Peshmerga affiliated with the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), and it is unclear as to what specific villages are controlled by which forces. Areas north of the mountain have been under mixed Peshmerga and PKK control since before the Sinjar operation, which ISW is retrospectively representing on this map. ISW has also retrospectively assessed that the KDP Peshmerga do not have control over the Kasak intersection area, northwest of Mosul, which is still held by ISIS. KDP Peshmerga control the town of Kasak itself, but not the surrounding roads. ISW has thus adjusted the depicted control of terrain in the Kasak area.

Read the update online here.

Thursday, November 19, 2015

Iraq Situation Report: November 10 - 19, 2015

By Patrick Martin and ISW Iraq Team

Key Take-Away: The combined Kurdish offensive against ISIS in Sinjar is less significant as a tactical gain against ISIS than as a symbolic victory for multiple Kurdish factions that will ultimately compete for dominance. Coalition airstrikes and advisers supported the KDP Peshmerga operation, while fighters from the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), the Syrian Women’s and People’s Protection Units (YPJ and YPG), and local Yazidi militias also participated. The competition between the KDP and the PKK will likely intensify during the ongoing political crisis in Iraqi Kurdistan over the KDP-held regional presidency. PKK and Peshmerga mobilization in Iraq, even when directed against ISIS, threatens local Arab populations who fear Kurdish occupation on both sides of the Iraq-Syria border. It also threatens Turkey, among other regional actors, who fear Kurdish autonomy and the potential for Kurdish forces to gain the upper hand in Mosul ultimately. The Kurdish victory at Sinjar therefore requires that the anti-ISIS coalition balance the interests of Kurds and Sunni Arabs in northern Iraq. Ethnic tensions were also exposed in Tuz Khurmato, where PUK Peshmerga clashed with ethnic Turkmen Iranian proxy militia members. The clash was violent enough to cause ISF, Peshmerga, and proxy militia forces to move forces to Tuz Khurmato to prevent escalation, while delegations of PUK, Iranian, Iranian proxy, and Iraqi government leaders and officials arrived to negotiate ceasefires between the combatants. This ethnic fault line challenges the interests of Iran as well as the U.S.-led coalition in a sector of northern Iraq’s Disputed Internal Boundaries (DIBs) where the ISF is less dominant than either Iranian proxies or forward-deployed PUK Peshmerga. Ethnic tension and intra-Kurdish competition both work to the detriment of northern Iraq’s security at a tenuous time for PM Abadi’s government.