Lebanon Security Update: June 22-27, 2014

By Isabel Nassief 

Syria Update: June 21-24, 2014

by Isabel Nassief

Syria Update: June 15-20, 2014

By Isabel Nassief, Valerie Szybala, and Chris Harmer

Iraq continues to impact Syria. Rebel gains, particularly in Damascus and Qalamoun, may also suggest that Hezbollah recruitments to replenish the redeployed Iraqi Shi’a militants are either insufficient or not occurring quickly enough. There is no evidence that Syrian Air Force (SAF) is reducing air sorties in support of existing operations in order to reallocate sortie counts towards ISIS targets in central and eastern Syria.Continued movement of Iraqi Shi’a militia fighters

The return of Iraqi Shi’a militias from Syria to Iraq has continued to increase in response to ISIS operations in Iraq. The battlefield implications of this redeployment are most visible in Damascus where Iraqi Shi’a fighters played an important role. Opposition news site Zaman al-Wasl reported on June 19 that the majority of the Iraqi militias operating in Mleiha in the Eastern Ghouta suburb of Damascus have withdrawn from the battlefield and are returning to Iraq. The withdrawal of Iraqi Shi’a militants is having a direct impact on the regime’s forces composition. As rebels have made gains in the Eastern Ghouta suburbs over the last two weeks, the regime has failed to launch a successful counteroffensive. Rebel gains, particularly in Damascus and Qalamoun, may also suggest that Hezbollah recruitments to replenish the redeployed Iraqi Shi’a militants are either insufficient or not occurring quickly enough.

Regime airstrike reallocation

Reporting on kinetic activity in Syria by Sham News Network indicates an escalation in overall regime air raids throughout Syria in the last two weeks. Regime air strikes in eastern Syria against ISIS positions have continued to increase since ISIS began its attack on Mosul. It is likely that the expansion of regime airstrikes into eastern Syria will affect its ability to conduct airstrikes in key areas of contestation along the central corridor in western Syria. The regime’s reliance on airpower has also increased due to the manpower deficit caused by the redeployment of Iraqi Shi’a militias. To deal with this increased demand on airpower, the regime will likely commit standard ordnances to eastern Syria while concentrating rotary wing strikes and barrel bomb attacks along the central corridor in western Syria. This will allow the regime better precision targeting against ISIS in the east while enabling it to continue air strikes in key areas of contestation.

The Syrian Air Force (SAF) continues to show that it is capable of conducting targeted sorties at a distance from its operating bases. The increase in strikes targeting ISIS strongholds in central and eastern Syria, far from the Assad regime’s primary ground operations in and around Aleppo, Homs, Deraa, and Damascus, is evidence that the SAF is capable of fighting on two fronts simultaneously. It is clear that SAF continues to receive significant external, state based logistics and technical support resulting in adequate supplies of fuel, munitions, and spare parts enabling the SAF to operate over the entire stretch of Syrian airspace. There is no evidence that SAF is reducing air sorties in support of existing operations in order to reallocate sortie counts towards ISIS targets in central and eastern Syria. It appears that SAF has generated some additional “surge” capacity to service targets of opportunity in Syria that may be temporarily vulnerable due to increased ISIS operations in Iraq.

Rebels gains:

Recent rebel gains on fronts throughout Syria indicate that opposition forces may be capitalizing on both regime and ISIS vulnerabilities as a result of the escalation of violence in Iraq.

*Qalamoun: Rebels have continued to make gains in Qalamoun, seizing strategic hills near Hayrud and Hawsh al-Arab and ambushing the town of Rankous, reportedly killing 40 Hezbollah fighters.

*Deraa province: Opposition fighters have also made advances in Deraa province, taking a military base near the Tal al-Jumu’a hill. In response, the regime has escalated air raids in the southern province against rebel positions, including an camp for Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in the town of Shajara on the Syrian-Jordanian border.

*Damascus: Rebels have continued to make gains in Mleiha over the last two weeks, reportedly killing Captain Rudein Ali Issa, the NDF leader for Damascus’ Southern Front near Mleiha. In an attempt to undo recent rebel gains in the area, regime forces mounted an unsuccessful offensive on June 18 to retake the Dilati Mosque from Islamic Front (IF) forces in Mleiha. The following day the regime launched 23 airstrikes and nine surface-to-surface missiles on Mleiha amid ongoing clashes between rebel forces and the regime.

*Aleppo province: In northern Aleppo province, rebel groups including Jabhat al-Nusra continue targeting ISIS-controlled villages of al-Bab and al-Rai near the Turkish border as part of the Naharwan al-Sharq offensive. In the countryside south-west of Aleppo city, prominent rebel groups announced seizing the regime-held villages Buhayra, Mashfa, Qalaya, Dubagha, and Manashir. The seizure coincided with the announcement of a new operations room to coordinate the “Invasion of the Age of the Honest” offensive which began on June 11.

Changes in ISIS posture in Syria

In the past week ISIS in Syria has made several unusual moves that suggest the organization is adjusting its posture on the ground as a result of the crisis in Iraq.

*After a video appeared online on June 14 showing Abu Haf al-Masri, the ISIS emir of the northern border town of Jarablus, cruelly toying with an old man, the ISIS Wilayat of Aleppo released a statement that al-Masri had been reprimanded and removed from his responsibilities.

*On June 15 opposition reporting networks put out an alert that ISIS was removing its flags from its headquarters in several towns in northern Raqqa province including Tel Abyad, al-Sharakrak, and Saluk. ISIS had only weeks before raised a behemoth of a flag in Tel Abyad, which sits right on the border with Turkey. There are no indications that ISIS has withdrawn its presence or relinquished control in any of these locations.

*On June 18 aid was allowed to enter the city of Deir ez-Zour for the first time in weeks since ISIS took control of the rebels’ only supply route into the city and cut off access. The aid delivery was the result of negotiations between ISIS and opposition groups in the area and photos from the delivery clearly show vehicles from the Syrian Arab Red Crescent, but ISIS posted photos of the event claiming credit for having “saved” the city.

These incidents take place against the backdrop of events in Iraq, where on June 18 ISIS repealed the Medina decree which imposed harsh Sharia law in the city of Mosul. All together this cluster of ISIS actions suggests an internal strategic decision by ISIS leadership aimed at appearing slightly more moderate. It is not yet clear if ISIS is actually attempting an organizational shift to improve its relationship with civilians or if this is a temporary move intended to lower its profile and lessen backlash in Syria while it is directing resources and attention to the Iraqi theatre. Continuing reports from Syrians living in ISIS-controlled areas of Syria indicate that ISIS has not actually moderated its draconian methods, which means that this cluster of uncharacteristic moves by ISIS is likely just a temporary reaction to the increased international spotlight.

Syrian Repercussions from the Iraq Crisis

By Isabel Nassief 

Moving Pieces

ISIS operations in Iraq are having an impact in Syria. Opposition groups are capitalizing on the redeployment of pro-regime and ISIS forces to make gains in Qalamoun and Damascus and to launch offensive operations in Aleppo. ISIS uses eastern Syria as a ‘deep-rear’ for the Iraq campaign as well as to support operations inside of Syria. Since ISIS’s seizure of Mosul, the Syrian regime has escalated attacks against ISIS strong-points in Eastern Syria.

Indicators

Return of Shi’a Iraqi militia fighters from Syria to Iraq: As the Iraqi government and Shi’a militia groups attempt to mobilize and recruit fighters reports suggest that Iraqi Shi’a militia fighters, previously supporting the Syrian regime have begun to return to Iraq. The majority of these redeployments are likely occurring in Damascus, where Iraqi Shi’a militias have been heavily involved in fighting in Damascus’ southern suburbs near the Sayida Zeinab Shrine, and Aleppo province, where they have supported the regime’s offensive to besiege the rebel-held neighborhoods of eastern Aleppo city. A source close to Lebanese Hezbollah said the group has called for a general mobilization, announcing that 1,000 fighters are to be sent to Syria from Lebanon to defend the Sayida Zeinab Shrine in Damascus and replace Shi’a Iraqi militia troops, particularly from the Abu Fadl al-Abbas brigade who are returning to Iraq. This movement of troops could create a deficit in the regime’s forces, exacerbating its manpower challenge. Early indications of this include rebel gains in Mleiha, in the Damascus suburbs, and Rankous in the Qalamoun region.

Escalation in Syrian regime strikes in Eastern Syria: An increase in regime air strikes on ISIS positions in eastern Syria indicates a shift in the Syrian regime’s strategy. Eastern Syria is an economy of force mission for the Syrian regime, whose strategy has prioritized the central corridor between Damascus and Aleppo over other parts of the country. Since ISIS began its attack on Mosul on June 8 there have been five confirmed Syrian regime airstrikes against ISIS positions in ar-Raqqa, Deir ez-Zour, and Hasaka provinces, including strikes against ISIS HQs in ar-Raqqa city.

Rebel operations: As ISIS continues operations in Iraq and the Syrian regime extends farther east and Iraqi Shia militias return to Iraq, opposition forces in Syria have an opportunity to capitalize on these changes. In Aleppo province, rebels launched attacks against ISIS strongholds in the eastern Aleppo countryside, seizing the towns of Tel Sha’ir, Tel Bital, Tel Jijan, al-Khalifatli, Hawzan from ISIS. Rebel groups in northern Aleppo also announced a new military operations room called “Echo of Shahba” against the regime strongholds of Nebul and Zahra. Early indications of rebel operations against the regime in Aleppo, Damascus, and Qalamoun as well as against ISIS in Aleppo suggest that rebel groups are capitalizing on both ISIS and the regime’s shifting priorities.

Fallout in Lebanon: The Impact of Yabroud

By Geoffrey Daniels

The Syrian regime’s decisive victory over rebel forces in the Qalamoun stronghold of Yabroud, bolstered by support from Lebanese Hezbollah and Syrian National Defense Forces, has significant implications in the overall context of the three-year conflict. Yet also worth a careful examination is the impact of the fall of Yabroud on Syria’s fragile neighbor, Lebanon, whose own security situation remains fragile as the conflict continues to spill across the border. The ripple effects from Yabroud test the resilience of Lebanon, a country less than one decade removed from a 29-year Syrian military occupation, by flooding the border regions of Arsal and Wadi Khaled with militants, weapons, explosives, and refugees while threatening tenuous sectarian divisions.

Read more here.

The Fall of Yabroud and The Campaign for the Lebanese Border

by Isabel Nassief

The regime’s ongoing Qalamoun offensive and recent victory in Yabroud should be understood within the context of a larger campaign for the Lebanese border. In the last month, regime forces seized control of several towns and villages along Lebanon’s northern border with Homs province. For the regime, this campaign is significant as it demonstrates the regime’s strategic interests and priorities. It will be necessary for rebels to maintain access to resources and reinforcements along the Lebanese border in order to contest key terrain along the central corridor. Rebel positions along this border are also instrumental in maintaining logistical connections between areas of control in northern and southern Syria, which is crucial for any attempts by rebel groups to form national level command and control structures.

For more see here. 



Arsal: Lebanon’s Gateway to the Syrian Conflict

by Geoffrey Daniels

Following the victory of the Syrian regime and their Hezbollah counterparts at al-Qusayr in early June 2013, Sunni extremist groups began conducting escalatory reprisal attacks against Hezbollah in Lebanon. In the months since, the predominantly Sunni Lebanese border town of Arsal, located directly across the border from the Qalamoun area where most of the surviving rebel fighters from al-Qusayr fled, has functioned as the primary staging area and support zone for these attacks into Lebanon. As a result, nearby Hezbollah strongholds in the Bekaa Valley are on high alert for potential car bombs and cross-border rocket attacks originating from elements in Arsal, forcing Hezbollah on the defensive in Lebanon. The Lebanese Army, meanwhile, has taken concrete measures to mitigate the threat posed by Syria to Lebanon via Arsal.

Since the beginning of the Syrian conflict nearly three years ago, Lebanon’s Arsal, a lone enclave in the eastern Bekaa Valley for Sunnis sympathetic to the Syrian uprising, has served as a crucial logistical support network in the struggle against the Assad regime. Located in the northeastern corner of Lebanon on the border with Syria, the town lies nearly equidistant from Hezbollah’s Bekaa Valley strongholds of Baalbek and Hermel. In spite of its isolated position, the geostrategic relevance of Arsal lies in its close proximity across the border from the contested Qalamoun mountain range. Qalamoun is an opposition stronghold in western Syria between Homs and Damascus that is currently the site of an intense battle for control of key supply lines along the M5 highway.

Lebanese authorities have long neglected Arsal and the notoriously porous nature of the border region has made it a hub for smuggling people, weapons, and drugs across the border into Syria. The smuggling routes through the connecting mountains flow freely in both directions, as weapons and fighters flow from Arsal into Qalamoun while car bombs and refugees flow in the opposite direction. Since the start of the Syrian conflict, Arsal’s pre-war population of 40,000 has more than doubled as 60,000 Syrian refugees have fled to the town due to the nearby fighting, according to municipality figures.

In the past year, Arsal has become the primary staging area and support zone for Sunni extremist groups projecting violence into Lebanon.  Left in its current state, Arsal threatens the interests of Hezbollah, the Assad regime, and the Lebanese government. The primary, short-term interests of these three parties align, as Hezbollah and the Lebanese government are keen on shutting down the flow of weapons and explosives through the border, while the Syrian regime looks to control the strategic central supply routes that dissect the country. Therefore, each group has a vested stake in disrupting the networks that run through Arsal.

The Aftermath of al-Qusayr

In the beginning of June, the Syrian regime achieved a decisive military victory following a 17-day siege of and clearing operation in al-Qusayr. Al-Qusayr is an important town in Homs province located adjacent to the Lebanese border, not far from the route that connects Damascus to Homs, which in turn links the Syrian capital to the Alawite heartlands along the coast. Many of the surviving rebel fighters from the assault fled south to the nearby Qalamoun region. This important regime victory six months ago was made possible by the large-scale involvement of Hezbollah fighters, whose overt presence in Syria prompted a series of reprisal attacks in Lebanon during the summer months that were likely linked to the logistical support hub of Arsal.

In July and August, for example, Hezbollah’s Beirut stronghold of Dahiyeh came under attack on two separate occasions. The first, a car bombing in the Bir al-Abed area, injured at least 53. Caretaker Defense Minister Fayez Ghosn tied the attack to Arsal residents. The second incident, another car bombing, occurred in the Ruweiss district of Beirut, not far from Bir al-Abed, killing at least 25 while injuring over 200. Lebanese authorities linked this attack to many of the same suspects based in Arsal. Similarly, Ghosn attributed a spate of roadside bombings in June and July that targeted Hezbollah convoys en route to Damascus to elements in Arsal.

Escalatory Trends

As the summer months concluded, there was an escalation in two distinct trends of confrontation in Arsal, and neither shows signs of abating. First, the Syrian regime carried out a series of high-profile attacks against opposition targets inside Lebanese territory. On August 3^rd, a Syrian regime airstrike killed nine, and injured nine more, including women and children, in Khirbet Daoud, just east of Arsal. Two months later, on October 7^th, Syrian warplanes targeted an ambulance in the Wadi Hamid area of Arsal that was presumably transporting a wounded rebel fighter seeking refuge in Lebanon. Just a few days later, Omar al-Atrash, an Arsal resident and the suspected head of Jabhat al-Nusra’s Lebanese faction, was alleged to have been killed in a Syrian airstrike along with several others in Nehmat, near Arsal on October 11^th. Al-Atrash was reportedly responsible for the August 15^th Dahiyeh bombing.

On November 15^th, the Syrian regime, along with its Hezbollah counterparts, launched an operation aimed at retaking the Qalamoun area. As the tempo of the Syrian regime offensive on the rebels in Qalamoun continues to increase, so do the cross-border incidents. In mid-November, two Syrian gunships carried out a series of raids targeting the outskirts of Arsal in Wadi Atta and Hay al-Shamis striking several houses purported to be inhabited by opposition militants. In the following week, three more attacks targeted Arsal in a span of just ten days.

In a rare responsive measure, the Lebanese Army fired anti-aircraft missiles at Syrian planes flying over Arsal on December 30^th, reportedly responding to orders from the Lebanese Army Command to “fire on any warplane that violates Lebanese airspace.” These orders signify a departure from previous incidents, in which President Michel Suleiman condemned the violations but refrained from overt action to halt them. The reasoning behind the change in policy is unclear, but the timing of a change in the strategic perspective of the Lebanese government regarding Syrian airspace violations suggests that the Lebanese Armed Forces felt the need to display a more muscular response to a serious threat in the Bekaa Valley.

The other noticeably intensifying trend occurring in Arsal is the number of confrontations between the Lebanese Army and Syrian rebels smuggling arms and explosives. On September 29^th, the Army confiscated a truck from Arsal heading to Syria that contained two hundred 80mm mortar shells and an estimated 7,000 rounds of ammunition, which Lebanese officials ultimately determined was expired.

Two weeks later, on October 14^th, Lebanese Armed Forces defused a car bomb rigged with 50-kilograms of explosives in Beirut’s al-Maamoura district of the Hezbollah-controlled southern suburbs. Thirteen individuals, the majority of whom were from Arsal, were indicted for the plot and allegedly confessed to being a part of Jabhat al-Nusra (JN). The following week, a leaked security memo from the Beirut Airport alleged that JN rigged four vehicles with explosives and sent them through Arsal with forged documents, prepared for operations against Hezbollah strongholds.

In perhaps the most high-profile attempt to smuggle explosives into Lebanon to date, on November 22^nd, Lebanese Independence Day, security forces dismantled a car near Hezbollah’s Bekaa Valley stronghold Baalbek carrying 400-kilograms of explosives. For comparison’s sake, the explosives were nearly eight times heavier than the ones used in the Iranian Embassy suicide blasts in Beirut on November 19^th that killed over 20 and injured more than 150. Authorities were alerted to the vehicle after reports of a shootout, and found the car with its front windows smashed and tires burst. Reports indicate that Hezbollah had monitored the car upon its entry into Arsal before confronting it and apprehending the passengers when it reached an isolated stretch of road just north of Baalbek, allegedly aware of its presence through the use of Iranian-made UAVs. If true, this would illustrate the substantial length to which Hezbollah is prepared to go to mitigate the threat posed by Sunni extremists in Arsal.

Most recently, on December 17^th, Hezbollah fighters intercepted an explosives-laden vehicle heading for one of its military bases outside of Labweh, a town just 10 kilometers from Arsal. The targeted base in the town of Sbouba is reportedly a station used by the organization for rotating its fighters in Syria. It is clear that Hezbollah military assets in the Bekaa Valley are on high alert, and in this vein, the organization has increased security measures in Hermel to protect its interests against further attacks.

Notably, the U.S. and the U.K. have recognized the hazards posed by the porous, mountainous border with Syria, providing four-wheel drive vehicles with off-road capabilities and border-observation equipment and technology to the LAF. Similarly, the Lebanese Army itself has begun to take concrete measures to prevent the smuggling of weapons and explosives across the border. Army bulldozers constructed a 2.5-meter high, 25-kilometer long roadblock that stretches from Arsal to Ras Baalbek amidst reports of additional rockets and car bombs heading for Lebanese territory.

Looking Forward

Only a handful of Syrian rebel groups have used vehicle-borne IEDs, operate out of the Qalamoun region, and have the strategic resources and training to employ these devices. The recent announcement, therefore, from JN leader Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani about the formal presence of his organization in Lebanon, in conjunction with a Hezbollah ambush that killed 32 JN fighters near the outskirts of Nahle, just 30-kilometers away from Arsal, suggests that JN is the primary Syrian rebel group staging attacks from Arsal and its outskirts. Similarly, in mid-December, the organization jointly claimed rocket attacks on Hermel with the previously unknown Marwan Hadid Brigades. 

In retaliation for the increasingly public involvement of Hezbollah in the fighting in Syria, specifically right across the border in Qalamoun, it would not be out of the question to expect more frequent car bombings and cross-border rocket attacks against the organization’s interests in Lebanon, mirroring the trend witnessed after al-Qusayr. The southern suburbs of Beirut, Baalbek and Hermel in the Bekaa Valley, and towns in southern Lebanon like Nabi Sheet and Bint Jbeil are particularly vulnerable targets.

With refugees fleeing Syria to enter Lebanon’s Arsal at an unprecedented rate due to the intensity of fighting in nearby Qalamoun, the aforementioned trends, confrontations between the Lebanese Army and Syrian fighters smuggling weapons and explosives, in addition to airstrikes against Syrian opposition fighters in Lebanon and potential responses from the LAF, will continue, and likely occur at an accelerated pace. Over 200,000 people live in the Qalamoun area, and as fighting spreads to the towns of Nabak and Yabrud, further displacement is expected.

A potentially dangerous impact of Arsal’s refugee influx is implicit in Oxfam’s November 2013 report, Survey on the Livelihoods of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon. A prominent majority of the Syrian refugee population in Lebanon is under 30, living in squalid conditions while struggling to survive amidst harsh economic circumstances. Similar to the case of Lebanon’s Palestinian refugee camps, Arsal could become a major recruiting ground for Sunni extremists, if it has not already.

Hezbollah’s involvement in the Syrian conflict remains undeterred in spite of incurring increasing casualties, including high-profile battlefield commanders. The uptick in attacks against Hezbollah in Lebanon facilitated via Sunni extremists in Arsal is undoubtedly directly linked to the overt, and increased, presence of Hezbollah fighters across the border. But, in the face of a greater perceived threat from Arsal, Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah highlights the necessity for increased Hezbollah presence in Syria to mitigate the danger posed to Lebanon. 

With the Syrian war showing no signs of slowing and Hezbollah showing no sign of withdrawal, Arsal remains the primary staging and support zone through which JN and its allies will conduct attacks against Hezbollah in Lebanon. Should the Assad regime and Hezbollah’s operation in Qalamoun be successful, Arsal will effectively be cut off from its support line, leaving the some 60,000 Syrian refugees in the town surrounded by Hezbollah and regime soldiers. Whether the offensive is successful or not, given the demographic composition of Arsal, the town will continue to threaten the interests of the Syrian regime, Hezbollah, and the Lebanese government.     

Hezbollah And The Fight For Control in Qalamoun

by Isabel Nassief

Fighting between pro-regime and rebel forces has begun to concentrate on the Damascus-Homs supply route through the Qalamoun Mountains, which saw sporadic violence throughout the summer of 2013. This battle – which is crucial for both regime and rebel resupply – will focus on contested sections of the M5 highway.

Hezbollah will also focus on cutting off logistical connections between Arsal, Lebanon, and rebels in Qalamoun. Although Hezbollah and the regime share a common goal of the regime’s survival in Syria, the battle for Qalamoun illustrates the potential for disparity in their strategic priorities.

For more, see here.