2013 Iraq Weekly Update #11: Violence Threatens Electoral Campaign

March 15, 2013

By Ahmed Ali and Stephen Wicken

Violent attacks have targeted at least 10 candidates for the upcoming provincial elections since the candidate lists were announcedin January. The attacks bear the hallmarks of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), suggesting that the group is seeking to disrupt the electoral campaign and dissuade Sunni Arabs from political participation. Meanwhile, recently resigned Finance Minister Rafi al-Issawi defied an arrest warrant by appearing at an Anbar protest, demonstrating his determination to continue his vocal criticism of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. Iraqi Kurd ministers boycotted the cabinet meeting to protest the recent passage of the budget and they continue to examine their options with Baghdad.

Violence aims to disrupt politics and shake confidence   

Iraq’s Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) announced on January 4 that 8,275 candidates had been registered for the provincial elections scheduled for April 20. Since then, there have been at least 10 attacks on candidates, primarily in predominantly Sunni areas of northern and western Iraq. The majority of the victims have been candidates running on lists connected to the Sunni Iraqiyya coalition that contested the 2010 parliamentary elections. They have included candidates of Parliamentary Speaker Osama al-Nujaifi and former Finance Minister Rafi al-Issawi’s Uniters list; Deputy Prime Minister Saleh al-Mutlak’s Arab Iraqiyya list; the United Ninewa Coalition, led by prominent Ninewa tribal leader Abdullah al-Yawar; and the Justice and Construction Gathering, led by Dildar Zeibari who, like Yawar, ran on Ninewa Governor Atheel al-Nujaifi’s al-Hadbaa list in 2009. There have also been attacks on candidates belonging to the National Tribal Gathering of the Mother of Two Springs, a pro-Maliki party in Ninewa, and the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq’s (ISCI) Citizens’ Bloc. Although it is possible that some of the attacks may be the result of local or political rivalries, many of the attacks bear the hallmarks of Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). Historically it has opposed Sunni Arab participation in the political process. Seen in the context of the ongoing anti-government protests in predominantly Sunni areas of Iraq, the attacks may demonstrate renewed attempts on the part of AQI and other militant groups to disrupt the electoral process.

Meanwhile, on March 14, various reports indicate that about five suicide bombers attacked the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) and the nearby Foreign Ministry and Communications Institute in central Baghdad, killing 26 and wounding 63 including the attackers. Three suicide car bombs reportedly targeted the MoJ, and two suicide bombers dressed as security forces subsequently entered the ministry before being killed by the responding security forces or blowing themselves up inside the building. Baghdad Operations Command reported that responding Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) cordoned off the area and secured the building. Several MoJ employees reported a confused and disorganized response by the ISF. Maliki is reported to have visited the MoJ after the attack. In response, Iraqi politicians from across the spectrum condemned the attack while calling on the government to improve security measures and intelligence collection efforts.  

 

No groups have claimed responsibility for the attack, but the nature of the attack indicates a possible AQI operation. AQI likely launched the attack to manifest operational capability and send a message that it can still target fortified establishments. These spectacular attacks also seek to undermine the confidence of the Iraqis in their government’s ability to provide security. It remains to be seen if the MoJ was targeted due to its supervisory role of Iraqi prisons, where many AQI elements are held.   

Will the Shi‘a-Kurdish alliance survive?

The budget vote in the parliament generated a quick reaction from the Iraqi Kurds, who protested the decision as an attempt to marginalize them and an attack on the principles of the political process. On March 9, Iraqi Kurdistan President Massoud Barzani invited the representatives of the Iraqi Kurdish parties in Baghdad for a meeting in Arbil and a statement was subsequently issued criticizing Prime Minister Maliki and his State of Law Coalition (SLC). The statement also called on the National Alliance – of which the SLC is a member – to take action against Maliki’s policies. Furthermore, the Iraqi Kurds boycotted the cabinet meeting on March 12, presumably to protest the passage of the budget. It is not clear whether the two major Iraqi Kurdish parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), have a unified position on withdrawing from the cabinet and completely boycott the Baghdad government. 

Although the Iraqi Kurds were involved the discussions leading up to the vote, they remain surprised by the fact that their allies – the Iraqi Shi‘a parties – went ahead and voted on the budget without their presence. Overall, however, their response thus far has been measured. This can be attributed to the fact that their demands for oil company payments can be addressed through political agreements and executive decisions by Maliki. Additionally, toning down the anti-Maliki rhetoric may serve the Iraqi Kurds, depriving the premier of the opportunity to present himself as a defender of a unified Iraq confronting Iraqi Kurdish ambitions. Moving forward, the absence of President Jalal Talabani’s mediating role raises the possibility of increased tensions: both Maliki and the Iraqi Kurds will need a mediator if they are to ensure a continued Iraqi alliance between the Iraqi Shi’a and the Iraqi Kurds.

Renewed protests condemn local politicians

Protesters in Baghdad, Anbar, Ninewa, Kirkuk, Salah ad-Din, and Diyala took to the streets under protests titled “Friday of Supporting Imam Abu Hanifa.” The name refers to the Abu Hanifa mosque in Baghdad’s Adhamiyah area where prayers were disallowed last Friday. During today’s prayers, the mosque’s imam condemned last Friday’s shutdown. It is important to note the reported participation of parliament speaker Osama al-Nujaifi at the protest, in addition to cooperative security forces. In Anbar, protesters likened Maliki to Bashar al-Assad and the situation in Iraq to that of Syria. Moreover, they called on the protesters to withdraw from the political process. Recently resigned Finance Minister Rafi al-Issawi, the subject of an apparent arrest attempton March 12, was in attendance despite a reported arrest warrant against him. Finally, protesters in Kirkuk’s Hawija demanded their local politicians withdraw from the government.     

      

It is evident that protesters are continuing to focus their efforts and energy on condemning Maliki and his policies. Simultaneously, they are seeking to place pressure on Iraqiyya politicians to withdraw from the government in the aftermath of the resignation of both Issawi and Agriculture Minister Izz al-Din al-Dawla.         

  

2013 Iraq Update #10a: Maliki Pursues Issawi – Again

March 13, 2013

By Stephen Wicken

Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has once more attempted to sideline recently resigned finance minister Rafia al-Issawi, one of Iraq’s most influential Sunni politicians and the premier’s most vocal critic. Issawi was the target of an apparent arrest attempton March 12 by Iraqi Security Forces.  Maliki’s move to intimidate or arrest Issawi makes clear that the prime minister intends to continue targeting his political opponents – particularly prominent Sunni leaders – through use of the security apparatus. In an atmosphere of rising sectarian tension, such incidents are likely to play well with each side’s political constituency, reinforcing disaffected Sunni Arabs’ sense of victimization and intent to oppose Maliki while drawing support from Shi‘a Arabs who support Maliki’s aggressive line on those they deem as supporters of terrorism.

The apparent arrest attempton March 12 occurred as Issawi was travelling to the funeral of Muthana Jarwan al-Kubaisi, who was the chairman of the district council of Rutba, a town in Anbar province near the Jordanian border. Kubaisi had been a candidate for the upcoming provincial elections running on Issawi’s list until he was assassinatednear Rutba on March 11. Issawi said that he was travelling to the funeral when his convoy was “intercepted” by a “heavily armed military force backed by helicopters.” It does not appear, however, that Issawi’s convoy was stopped, raising the likelihood that the move was intended to intimidate Issawi rather than detain him.

Issawi deniedclaims by a government source that he had sought to fleeto Jordan but had been prevented by the Iraqi embassy in Amman which refused to help him because, having resigned from his position as finance minister, he no longer has “official status.” The management of the Trebil border crossing into Jordan confirmedsubsequently that neither Issawi nor embassy staff had come to the crossing. In a speech to protesters in Ramadi following the incident, Issawi took a confrontational tone, insisting that he would leave Anbar only as a “dead body.”

Maliki likely used armed assets against Issawi while the parliamentarian was in Rutba in order to persuade him to flee Iraq. Such was the case when Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi, another prominent Maliki critic, was allowedto leave Iraq for the Kurdistan region in December 2011 despite the arrest of a number of his bodyguards. Hashemi was subsequently sentenced to death after being found guilty in absentia of organizing murders of political opponents and financing terrorism. Hashemi remains in exile in Turkey: he has kept up his criticism of Maliki, but his political party has been critically weakened in his absence. The claim by an “anonymous government source” that Issawi had sought to flee for Jordan may therefore have been intended to discredit Issawi.

Since the arrests of members of Issawi’s protection detail in December, rumorshave circulated of arrest warrants issued for Issawi and Iraqiyya parliamentary leader Salman al-Jumaili on charges of inciting terrorism. Similar rumors have also appearedregarding former Awakening leader and Anbari strongman Ahmed Abu Risha, an ally of Issawi in the upcoming elections. A warrant against Anbari tribal leader Ali Hatem al-Suleiman, who has been extremely vocal in his criticism of Maliki since anti-government protests began, has also been reported; Ali Hatem has denied the existence of the warrant. Most prominently, in February, special forces attemptedto arrest Anbari protest spokesman Said al-Lafi, with whom Issawi has appeared in public, at a mosque in central Fallujah. The attempt was foiled when demonstrators helped Lafi to escapethe scene.

The incident also comes at a time of rising political violence ahead of the upcoming elections. In addition to the murder of Muthana Jarwan al-Kubaisi, a member of the district council of Hit also in western Anbar was also assassinatedon March 11. Two electoral candidates in Ninewa were shot dead by unidentified gunmen in separateincidents in Mosul on March 11-12. The bodyguards of Iraqiyya candidate for Baghdad Sabah al-Khafaji were attackedby unidentified gunmen in western Baghdad while hanging election posters on March 6, while Hussein al-Janabi, an Iraqiyya candidate in Babel, was assassinatedalong with two of his guards in the north of the province on February 22. While these assassinations are likely related to local political rivalries, the increase in political violence will only heighten tension ahead of the voting.

The move against Issawi has been denounced by Maliki’s usual critics, but has yet to draw comment or support from the premier’s allies. In addition to Issawi’s own Iraqiyya list, whose spokeswoman Maysoon al-Damalouji describedthe incident as “terrorist and criminal,” the office of Kurdistan Regional Government President Massoud Barzani condemnedthe attempted arrest as “provocative,” notingthat it would deepen rifts between Iraqi communities. Sadrist MP and parliamentary security and defense committee member Hakim al-Zamili, a former deputy health minister who was accused of using the health ministry to run death squads targeting Sunnis between 2005 and 2007 but released amid rumors of witness intimidation, also criticizedthe move against Issawi, insisting that Iraq’s already fraught political situation “does not need further escalation.”

Deputy Prime Minister Saleh al-Mutlak calledthe arrest attempt “cowardly” and praised “the positions of the Anbar tribes that have accompanied Issawi.” There has not as yet been any indication that Anbari tribes were involved in preventing Issawi’s arrest as they were in protecteing Said al-Lafi. Mutlak’s statement, therefore, likely was intended to curry favor with the Anbaris who chasedhim from a demonstration in Ramadi in late December because of his continued involvement in the Maliki government. Although Mutlak was reported to have resigned on January 28 in protest at the government’s failure to meet protesters’ demands, he has continued to play an active role, particularly within Deputy Prime Minister Hussein al-Shahristani’s committee tasked with responding to the protesters, the concessions made by which Mutlak has defended. However, while apparently playing a role in helping Maliki to ensure quorum in order to pass the 2013 federal budget, Mutlak was forced to state his “anger and indignation” at the killingof anti-government protesters in Mosul on March 8 in order to have a hope of retaining some credibility with Sunni Arabs.

Given the claims that Issawi was attempting to flee to Jordan and the rumors of an outstanding arrest warrant, Issawi is likely to remain in Anbar, surrounded by his tribesmen and supporters. The latest development diminishes significantly the likelihood that Issawi will seek to return to parliament in order to benefit from parliamentary immunity from prosecution, as Maliki’s State of Law Coalition predictedhe would do following his resignation from the finance ministry. Instead, he is likely to intensify his criticism of Maliki from his home province, amplifying his denunciations as the provincial elections approach. Should Maliki send forces to Ramadi or Fallujah, where Issawi’s support is strongest, in order to attempt to arrest him, the prospects of armed clashes are extremely high. Such confrontations would almost certainly escalate Iraq’s ongoing crisis, with grave implications for Iraq’s security and stability at a time when violence from Syria has begunto spill over the border into Anbar.  

2013 Iraq Update #9: Issawi resignation presents opportunities to Maliki

March 1, 2013

By Stephen Wicken

Whether Sunni will continue to participate in the government of Iraq remains crucial to the outcome of the country’s ongoing political crisis. Leading Sunni politician Rafia al-Issawi announced on March 1 that he has resigned as Finance Minister, days after Electricity Minister Karim Aftan al-Jumaili departed Iraqiyya following a dispute over the coalition’s cabinet boycott. These developments further marginalize Iraqiyya, expose deeper political divisions within the coalition, and have exacerbated fractures among the Sunni population at large. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki now has an opportunity either to split the Sunni further by reaching out to those who advocate participation in government, or to appoint political allies to fill the ministerial positions of Iraqiyya members who continue their boycott. Either move would further reduce meaningful Sunni participation in government and move Iraq closer to majoritarian rule.

Government participation question splits Sunnis

Leading Iraqiyya figure Rafia al-Issawi announced his resignation as Finance Minister at an anti-government protest in Ramadi on March 1. In a blistering speech, Issawi toldthe protesters that he had chosento side with ‘his people’ rather than remain part of a Maliki government that had rejected “any principle of partnership”. It was Maliki’s moveagainst Issawi in December 2012 that spurred the wave of anti-government protests that have gone on in Iraq’s predominantly Sunni provinces for 10 weeks. A native Anbari, Issawi has been the Sunni politician on the national stage closest to the protest movement, appearing at the largest protests in Anbar to great reception. Issawi’s resignation is likely a move to bolster his profile further ahead of the upcoming provincial elections, although having left office he remains vulnerable to prosecution of the type that Maliki pursued against Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi in 2012. Following Issawi’s speech, al-Iraqiyah state television quoted Maliki as sayingthat he would not accept Issawi’s resignation until an investigation into “financial and administrative irregularities” had been concluded. It is unclear whether this ‘investigation’ is related to rumorsthat an arrest warrant would be issued against Issawi and Iraqiyya MP Salman al-Jumaili on charges of inciting terrorism. Maliki ally Hanan al-Fatlawi claimedon March 1 that Issawi was resigning in order to return to parliament and regain parliamentary immunity from prosecution. Maliki’s statement may therefore constitute a threat against Issawi, encouraging the latter to discontinue his high-profile criticism of the premier.

Issawi’s public resignation as Finance Minister is a symbolic move: Issawi was in fact replacedin early February by Sadrist Planning Minister Ali al-Shukri on an acting basis. Issawi’s statement that there was no “honor” in taking part in a “sectarian government”, however, was an implicit criticism of Electricity Minister Karim Aftan al-Jumaili, whom Iraqiyya publicly expelledon February 27 after he brokethe coalition’s boycott of cabinet meetings. Aftan justifiedhis decision to return to work by insisting that he is a technocrat and not a political candidate, suggesting that he is likely to continue as an independent rather than join another political bloc: his official biography states that he “does not belong to any political orientation.” His return to the cabinet, however, has further exposed the bloc’s internal divisions and the disagreement within the Sunni Arab community over involvement in government and the political process. Only a day after Aftan’s departure, Iraqiyya MP Talal al-Zobaie criticized the boycott policy, claimingthat it had not been approved by a majority of Iraqiyya members, and he called the list an “inharmonious mixture”. Meanwhile, Rafia al-Jumaili, a representative of Aftan’s tribe, criticizedAftan’s return to government, saying that the tribe “condemns and deplores” the move.

The loss of another ministerial portfolio further marginalizes Iraqiyya within the government and further exposes the bloc’s internal divisions. Today, Iraqiyya retains only five ministerial positions: Education Minister Mohammed al-Tamim, of Saleh al-Mutlak’s Hiwar party; Industry Minister Ahmed al-Karbouli, of al-Hal; Agriculture Minister Izz al-Din al-Dawla of Osama al-Nujaifi’s Iraqiyoun; Water Resources Minister Muhanad al-Sa’idi; and Science and Technology Minister Abd al-Karim al-Samarrai of Hashemi’s Tajdeed party. A source within Maliki’s State of Law Coalition claimedon February 28 that all but Issawi and Samarrai were expected to return to cabinet meetings soon. On March 1, however, Iraqi Awakening Conference leader Ahmed Abu Risha claimedthat Issawi’s resignation would soon be followed by those of other Iraqiyya ministers. However, Abu Risha, who had signed up to Issawi and Nujaifi’s ‘Uniters’ coalition for the provincial elections, himself faced a leadership challengethis week, and may have been sidelined within the Awakening movement.

The question of involvement in government threatens to divide Iraqiyya and the Sunni population it was elected to represent. Iraqiyya’s failure to present a united front on the question of governmental participation threatens further to diminish Iraqiyya’s relevance in Iraqi politics at a time when it is already under pressure from State of Law, other political blocs, and its own Sunni constituency. It also raises the question of Maliki’s response. Maliki statedon January 24 that Iraqiyya ministers boycotting cabinet sessions would be placed on “compulsory leave” and replaced with other Iraqiyya members. It is possible that Maliki will now seek out more pliant members of Iraqiyya in order further to split the bloc. In Issawi’s case, however, Maliki appears to have struck a dealwith the Sadrists to give them the Finance Ministry. Should Maliki repeat this step, installing National Alliance members in the place of Iraqiyya’s few remaining ministers, he would complete Shi’a dominance of Iraq’s government.

Deepening budget impasse presents opportunity to Sadrists

While the prospect of more ministries and greater access to power and resources would no doubt be appealing to the Sadrists, they remain Maliki’s primary opponents in the battle for Shi’a Arab votes. The continuing impasse over the 2013 budget presented an opportunity this week for the Sadrists to demonstrate their populist credentials. The Sadrists have highlighted repeatedly the issue of distribution of oil revenues during the budget process, proposing in December 2012 that surplus oil revenues be distributed to the population, and accusingthe Maliki government of marginalizing southern oil-producing provinces through “centralist” planning. The Sadrists led a protest at the edge of Baghdad’s Green Zone on February 26 at which thousands of demonstrators demanded that parliament pass the budget. Leading Sadrist parliamentarian Dhia al-Asadi insistedthat the protesters opposed the use of the budget negotiations for political gain and demanded the legislation’s passage in order to pay for new service projects and encourage employment – key themes for the Sadrists in their competition with Maliki for political support.

Fearing that the protests might grow and turn violent, the Office of the Commander in Chief was reportedto have declared a state of full alert, and security forces blockedentrances to Baghdad and the bridges between al-Rusafa and al-Karkh. However, the Sadrists ultimately decidedto end the demonstration, although Muqtada al-Sadr threatened on February 27 to call for a second “peaceful sit-in” should the budget impasse continue. The demonstration is a sign both that the Sadrists retain the ability to call out supporters at short notice to demonstrate, and that despite recent transactional alignments with Maliki – over control of the Finance Ministry and the Accountability and Justice Commission – Sadr continues to emphasize both his populism and Maliki’s failure to provide services and employment ahead of his anticipated battle with Maliki for Shi’a votes in the provincial elections scheduled for April 20.

Meanwhile, the standoff between the Kurdistan Regional Government and the central government also continues to stifle budget negotiations. The key stumbling blocks are the enduring issues of the Kurdistan region’s share of the budget, payments to oil companies working in Kurdistan, and paymentof the Kurdish Peshmerga security forces. A deliberative session was heldon February 25, but voting was postponedagain in the face of continued disagreement over the Kurdish share of the budget. Members of the Shi’a National Alliance continue to insistthat parliament is on the verge of adopting the budget, while Kurdish representatives maintainthat they expect no agreement in the near future. A delegation from the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) headed by KRG Natural Resources Minister Ashti Hawrami traveledto Baghdad on February 28 to meet with Iraqi Oil Minister Abd al-Karim al-Luaibi, but returned to Erbil without an agreement after five hours of negotiations.

Mixed signals on Baghdad-Ankara relations

Contradictory statements on Turkey’s hydrocarbons trade with the KRG have highlighted again the tense state of Iraqi-Turkish relations. On February 25, the state-run al-Iraqiyah television network reported an announcementfrom Oil Minister Luaibi that Turkey had officially informed Iraq that it would not support the building of oil and gas pipelines from the KRG to Turkey without Baghdad’s approval. The Turkish government has neither confirmed nor denied the statement. Luaibi’s announcement was contradicted, however, on February 28, when Tony Hayward of the Anglo-Turkish firm Genel Energy predicteda formal agreement between Turkey and the KRG. Hayward pointed to the “symbolic” importance of ongoing exports by truck from the KRG to Turkey, and claimed that good progress was being made on a pipeline that he expected to be operational by 2014.

Luaibi’s statement, if true, would signal a significant shift in Turkish policy. Turkey has insisted upon the legality of trading in oil with the KRG – in spite of US pressure– and as recently as February 8 Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan criticizedthe Iraqi government’s desire to oversee the KRG’s energy agreements. Turkish-Iraqi relations have been extremely poor for some time, with the Turks granting residence to fugitive Iraqi Vice President and Maliki critic Tariq al-Hashemi, and premiers Maliki and Erdogan repeatedlytradingaccusations. Iraq has been without an ambassador to Turkey for more than two months, although officials on both sides have claimedthat the delay in naming a new ambassador reflects internal disputes within Iraq rather than the status of relations with Turkey. While this is plausible, the fact remains that the vacant role diminishes the prospect of improved relations between Baghdad and Ankara – a relationship that could have the potential to ease regional tensions. Luaibi’s statement, should it prove true, could signal a Turkish attempt to improve bilateral relations, as Baghdad has made clear its oppositionto an independent Turkey-KRG pipeline. However, in the absence of Turkish confirmation and in light of preponderant evidence of Turkey prioritizing economic relations with Erbil over diplomatic relations with Baghdad, Luaibi’s claim seems unlikely.    

2013 Weekly Iraq Update #1- Protests heighten political crisis

January 3, 2012

By Sam Wyer and Marisa Sullivan

For over two weeks, sustained anti-government protests have fueled an entrenched political crisis in Iraq, which has divided the country and threatened the power-sharing foundation of the Iraqi government. Protests broke out after Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki arrested the security staff of Iraqi Finance Minister Rafa al-Issawi on December 20. Sunni demonstrators in the provinces of Anbar and Salah ad-Din denounced the arrests and called for the removal of Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. Since then, protests have spread throughout the predominately Sunni provinces of Anbar, Salah ad-Din, Diyala, and Ninewa, drawing support from various anti-Maliki tribal, clerical, and governmental figures. In general, the demonstrators are protesting against issues that they see as symbolic examples of Maliki’s politicized expansion of executive power, including the detainment of prisoners without warrants and the use of Chapter IV of the Anti-Terrorism Law.

The demonstrations are manifestations of deep-seeded Sunni discontent regarding their representation in the Iraqi state and the legitimacy of the political process. Over the past year, Maliki has accelerated efforts to strengthen his power in Iraq by commandeering independent bodies, manipulating the judiciary, consolidating control of security forces, and sidelining Sunni political leaders, such as Maliki’s move against Iraqi Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi. However, Maliki’s recent action against Issawi—a technocratic cabinet member with a strong base of support among Sunnis in Anbar—marks an escalation by Maliki in these efforts.

While the resulting protests have exacerbated political tension in Iraq and revealed widespread support for Issawi, they have also highlighted the inability of Sunni political leaders to form a unified opposition front. In particular, the protests revealed that Deputy Prime Minister for Services Affairs Saleh al-Mutlaq no longer has sizeable support among the Sunni constituency represented at the demonstrations. On December 30 Mutlaq was violently chased out of a demonstration in Ramadi. Given his political maneuvering throughout 2012, however, this rejection is not entirely surprising. Following the Hashemi affair of 2011, Mutlaq referred to Maliki as a “dictator” and was subsequently barred from the cabinet. Despite this, Mutlaq was reinstated soon after the ordeal, suggesting that Mutlaq submitted to a deal with a Maliki, which undermined his credibility as a Sunni opposition leader.

Maliki’s response to the protests is still evolving and has the potential to inflame the tenuous situation. Maliki’s actions during the anti-government protests in 2011 may offer hints to the direction of this evolution. Maliki has previously offered limited concessions to protesters, while also stoking security fears and threatening the use of force to quell protests. Following demonstrations in February and March 2011, Maliki promised to cut government salaries, lower electricity costs, and reallocate funding to enhance food handouts as well as pledging not to seek a third term as prime minister. Maliki also warned protesters that insurgents and foreign elements were planning on hijacking the demonstrations and create unrest. As so-called security precautions, Maliki banned all vehicles in Baghdad, imposed curfews, and deployed additional security forces in numerous cities. These initiatives failed immediately to quell protests. Demonstrators clashed with security forces, resulting in the death of around 20 people. The protests eventually quieted down in an atmosphere of tight security.

Maliki’s responses to this month’s protests have thus far followed a similar pattern. Soon after the start of the protests in Anbar and Salah ad-Din, Maliki attempted to appease the protesters by pledging minor concessions, including the release of female detainees held without warrants and the formation of a special committee tasked with investigating the conditions of Iraqi prisons. When these concessions failed to stop the demonstrations, Maliki warned that protests would not be allowed to continue indefinitely and that the government would soon intervene. He also warned of terrorist plots against protesters in Fallujah and Ramadi in an effort to deter further demonstrations. Yet these steps have failed to stem the protests. The largest and most widespread demonstrations to date occurred on January 4, with protests breaking out in over a dozen towns in Anbar, Salah ad-Din, Baghdad, Ninawa, Diyala, Babil, Kirkuk, and Dhi Qar. Still, there are important distinctions between these protests and past demonstrations. Where the focal point of the protests in 2011 was Baghdad, this month’s demonstrations are centered on Anbar province, where there has historically existed a large bastion of anti-government sentiment. Thus, Maliki may have a harder time suppressing protests by force. Furthermore, unlike in 2011, protesters are almost unanimously calling for Maliki’s resignation and have adopted phrases identical to those used in the Egyptian, Tunisian, and Syrian revolutions.

While Iraqi security officials have not responded to the current protests with force, the potential for them to turn violent remains. Based on his past behavior, Maliki may not tolerate public demonstrations for much longer before security forces intervene to disperse the crowds. Thus far, Maliki has urged security forces to use restraint. On the other hand, radical elements may use the protests as an opportunity to spark violent confrontation. Despite the potential for escalation, rival mediation efforts have been launched to defuse the crisis. Parliamentary speaker Osama al-Nujaifi has called for an emergency session of parliament to take place on the January 6 in order to discuss the current crisis and the disputed Anti-Terrorism Law. While the Sadrist Movement has pledged support, Maliki’s State of Law Coalition and the White Bloc, a pro-Maliki secular Shi’a fraction of Iraqiyya, are planning to boycott the meeting. At the same time, Ibrahim al-Jaafari, the head of the Shi’a National Alliance, attempted unsuccessfully to hold a meeting with various political entities on January 4. Jaafari had previously met with Iranian ambassador to Iraq Hassan Danaifar on December 23, suggesting that the Iranians may be attempting to use Jaafari as a mediator in the conflict.

The current political crisis in Iraq has major political implications. The ultimate danger is that Sunnis will withdraw from politics altogether and return to violence. Such a situation could develop in a number of ways. First, if Sunni political leaders are unable to form a united opposition, they run the risk of further disenchanting their support base. In turn, the potential for violence as a means of political expression becomes increasingly possible as Iraqi Sunni are left without legitimate political representatives. Second, as Maliki continues to consolidate power, Sunni leaders may continue to be sidelined politically, following the precedent set by Maliki with Hashemi and Issawi. Third, increasingly sectarian rhetoric on the part of protesters and Sunni leaders coupled with a sense of opportunity might prompt Maliki to take formal steps towards establishing a majoritarian Shi’a government, which would dissolve Iraq’s power sharing agreement and have grave consequences for regional stability.