Iraq Update 2014 #14: ISIS Condemns Elections, Posts Warnings in Kirkuk, Diyala, Ninewa, and Northern Baghdad

By Omar Abdullah, Jessica Lewis, Alex Bilger, and Iraq Team 

The Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), formerly known as al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), recently condemned Iraq’s upcoming national elections by disseminating official messages in Kirkuk, Diyala, Ninewa, and Northern Baghdad. ISIS conveyed these messages in March 2014 through leaflets in northern Baghdad and Twitter pages dedicated to its Wilayats (States) the ‘ISIS Wilayat Diyala,’ the ‘ISIS Wilayat Kirkuk,’ 'ISIS Wilayat Ninewa', and the ‘ISIS Wilayat Northern Baghdad.’ Until April 30, 2014, when Iraq’s national elections are scheduled to take place, ISIS should be considered a direct threat to electoral candidates, election centers, and voters in these locations. 

The threat to elections posed by ISIS is not without precedent. AQI also attempted to derail political process before national elections in 2010; however the present context is critical. The ability of ISIS to cause security conditions in multiple provinces to deteriorate to the point that elections centers cannot open, or that Iraqis cannot safely register for voter cards, has the potential to jeopardize electoral process. At an operational level, ISIS may intend to destabilize Iraq by disrupting elections. At a strategic level, ISIS may consider the failure of elections as a victory against democracy. Without free and fair elections, Iraq’s political institutions may not be able to withstand pressure from anti-government groups. Iraq’s stability therefore depends upon successful elections on April 30, 2014. Until that date, ISW will report on observed security threats to the elections. 

This report contains full translations of the March 3, 2014 statements condemning elections posted to the Twitter pages of ISIS Wilayat Diyala, ISIS Wilayat Kirkuk, and ISIS Wilayat Ninewa. Images of the distribution of anti-election leaflets distributed in Northern Baghdad are also included, as posted to the Twitter page of the ISIS Wilayat Northern Baghdad. The existence of these Twitter pages, as well as the consistency of their message content, confirms the intent of ISIS to establish alternate governance structures inside of Iraq. Wilayats are governorates within the broader construct of the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham (ISIS), and they also historically subdivided the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI). ISIS Wilayats have also been observed in Anbar, Salah ad Din, Ninewa, and the South, likely referring to northern Babel. ISIS Wilayats are also present in Syria. It is therefore important to note that ISIS is not operating solely as a military organization in Iraq. ISIS seeks to gain legitimacy relative to the government of Iraq through religious authority as well as hard power. 

ISIS Wilayat Kirkuk 

In Kirkuk province, a statement dated March 3, 2014 was released by the Sharia Commission of the Islamic State in Iraq and Sham [ISIS] in Wilayat Kirkuk regarding the participation and facilitation of the upcoming elections. The statement, along with other anti-elections leaflets, were distributed students in at least one school and to citizens elsewhere in Kirkuk. The statement claimed that participation in the elections is Kufr, or a concealment of Islamic truth, for replacing “God laws” with the laws of “infidels.” The statement also declared polling centers and centers used to distribute the Voter Card, (electronic cards planned to be used by voters on the day of the elections) as targets and warned “Sunni” citizens from going near them. 

An image and full translation of the official statement posted to the ISIS Wilayat Kirkuk Twitter page is provided below. 

In the name of god most merciful      

“Islamic State in Iraq and Sham”                                                       March 3rd 2014 

The Shari’a law committee 

In Kirkuk State 

All the glory and thanks to Allah who set the rules for his followers, the rules that should keep them living happily and peacefully in this life under the justice of just and fair rulers, in a perfect world where there should be no powerful-unjust men nor there are victims. May God also bless the spirit of his glory messenger to us, Mohammed [P(eace) B(e) U(pon) H(im)]. [Translator’s Note: In this section the letter quotes a verse from Quran (Shura 21) which implies that Muslims should not set laws that have no roots in Sharia law]. 

All Muslims know the following fact; participating in elections is severely prohibited in Islam, because this process replaces the laws of Shari’a, which are the laws of Allah, with laws that are manmade, furthermore, those laws are created by the infidels themselves. The Rafidhi government in Baghdad has forced our Muslim people to obtain the electoral-smart card by linking those smart cards to the food rations’ supplies for each family, which is a cowardly way that aims to swerve our people from the path of God. 

Because of the above; we warn the owners of the food rations’ centers in this state [Kirkuk] from processing any of those so called “the voter’s card” [same as the smart-card mentioned above] or else! 

We also ask our Sunni people in this glorious state [Kirkuk] to not fall victims to the plans of this Safavid and Rafidhi government. And as a friendly reminder; we have previously warned everyone that electoral-centers will be targeted during elections’ days. Thus, we again remind you to stay far as possible from those centers. 

God will always win, and his word should always be the truth

[Author’s Note: The photo above was posted to the ISIS Wilayat Kirkuk Twitter page to illustrate the distribution of leaflets condemning elections.] 

ISIS Wilayat Diyala 

Another statement was released by ISIS in Diyala on March, 2014, the same month. The statement again described the elections and the representation of citizens in the parliament as Kufr since they replace Gods laws. The statement added that selecting a candidate from any background is Kufr and that the candidates and the voters, are both equally Kafirs and “Infidels.” The statement warned the Sunni people from participating in the elections, declaring them as targets if they do participate. It also warned speakers of the mosques from garnering support for the elections. Finally, the statement warned that the electoral centers and locations used to distribute Voter Cards would be targeted. 

An image and full translation of the official statement posted to the ISIS Wilayat Diyala Twitter page is provided below.

In the name of god most merciful 

“Islamic State in Iraq and Sham”                                                         March 2014 

The Shari’a law committee 

In Diyala State 

Warning to Muslims from the plans of infidels 

All the glory and thanks to Allah who sat the rules for his followers. May God also bless the spirit of his glory messenger to us, Mohammed P(eace) B(e) U(pon) H(im). [Translator’s Note: Here the letter quotes a verse from Quran (Hud 113) which implies that Muslims should not listen to those who lost the path of the goodness]. 

After a long sequence of failures by those who adopt the electoral process in Iraq, and after Mujahideen have struck those who came with the deceiving “democracy,” the traitors and the small slaves of those in power within this government came up, inspired by the Satan himself, a well thought plan to force Muslims to participate in the upcoming elections. 

Oh Muslims, we want to steer your attention to the following; do you really think that it will be right to elect a non-cleric person with a suit and tie and give him the power to sit in the so called parliament to tell us all what is right and what is wrong without going back to Quran or Sharia law, all in the name of “constitution” and “political process?” 

The voter and the candidate are both equally against the Sharia of Allah, and therefore both the voter and the candidate will be equally targeted and punished. 

What brought people to this mess is their lack of education and information when it comes to Shari’a laws, and not following the clerics who have merit to be followed and have devoted their lives for this purpose, to be well informed so they can inform those who ask and seek knowledge. Muslims should not seek benefits of this life; they should seek the rewards and benefits of the eternal life after death. 

Maliki’s smart card is no doubt a smart one; it is designed to intimidate you! And you all have gained nothing from Maliki before but mass killing campaigns carried out against you by the dirty hands of his militias. We ask all of the teachers, Mosque Imams and everyone who have audience to warn his audience from participating in elections. Those who participate in elections are infidels, there will be no excuses, in case you did NOT know, you DO know after this warning! 

• Warning to the public: Electoral centers will be high-probability targets for our men. Stay as far as possible. 
• Warning to food rations’ centers’ owners and operators in addition to teachers: promoting the “voter’s card” or encouraging the public to obtain it is an act that is severely punishable by us. 

God will always win, and his word should always be the truth 

ISIS Wilayat Northern Baghdad 

An equivalent image of the statement released by the ISIS Wilayat Northern Baghdad was not posted to their Twitter page, though ISIS Wilayat Northern Baghdad released the following photo, illustrating the distribution of anti-election leaflets. 

[Authors’ Note: Pictures posted by ISIS’s Northern Baghdad State account on Twitter show gunmen distributing leaflets on the elections.]

ISIS Wilayat Ninewa 

A statement equivalent to the statement released by the ISIS Wilayat Kirkuk was released by ISIS Wilayat Ninewa. The statement was released on February 24, 2014 from the “media department of Mosul section.” 

Below is an image of the statement 

Conclusion 

Iraq’s national elections have already been jeopardized by the ongoing security crisis in Anbar province. On March 24, 2014, the Anbar local government informed IHEC that elections cannot be held in almost half of Anbar, especially in Fallujah and other surrounding areas since these areas are still mostly under control of ISIS. In addition to fighting, ISIS is now engaging the Sunni populations in Kirkuk, Diyala, Ninewa, and Northern Baghdad in an attempt to dissuade them from electoral participation before launching attacks. The delivery of the leaflets displayed in the images shown above indicates that ISIS is operating overtly in these areas of Iraq, which all have mixed populations. As of yet, the Twitter pages associated with the ISIS Wilayats in Anbar, Salah ad Din, and the South have not indicated involvement in this anti-election messaging campaign. This may indicate that ISIS is most organized and able to project influence in Kirkuk, Diyala, and Northern Baghdad. It may also indicate where ISIS perceives the greatest opportunity to stoke ethnic and sectarian rivalries and mutual violence ahead of elections. It will be important to consider how these messaging strategies relate to ISIS military operations in each area. This will be the subject of ongoing analysis.

Iraq Update 2014 #11: Maliki Proposes Four New Provinces in Iraq

By Ahmed Ali

Iraq’s election season has begun. In the midst of a security crisis in Anbar, the Iraqi government decided to form four new provinces. The decision represents the most significant administrative change in Iraq since the 1970s and has been welcomed by Iraqi Turkmens and Iraqi Christians. However, the decision is politically and legally controversial as it has been rejected by officials in Ninewa and Salah ad-Din. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s decision to form new provinces illustrates his strategy to reset the terms for the electoral campaign, divide his opponents, and shape the post-elections environment.      

  

Background

On January 21, the Iraqi government announcedthe decision to convert four administrative districts into provinces. The four administrative districts include Tuz Khurmatu, locally known as Duz, located in eastern Salah ad-Din province; the Ninewa Plains area to the northeast of Mosul in Ninewa province; and Fallujah, in Iraq’s western Anbar province. The announcement stated that this decision was made “in principle” and will be followed by the formation of a committee to establish “guidelines and established standards to convert a district to a province.” The committee will be headed by the Minister of State for Provincial Affairs Turhan Mufti and representatives from the Ministry of Justice, Municipality Ministry, and the General Secretariat of the Council of Ministers.

In addition to these three districts, Mufti announcedthat the Council of Minister also approved a proposal to convert Tal Afar district in Ninewa into a province. Mufti, an Iraqi Turkmen, added that the Tal Afar decision was made after a proposal by Minister of Youth and Sports, Jassim Mohammed Jaafar, a fellow Iraqi Turkmen and member of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law Alliance. The Iraqi government previously agreedto make the Iraqi Kurdish district of Halabja in Sulaymaniyah into a separate province on December 31 at the request of the Kurdistan Regional Government and the Iraqi Kurdish leadership. Halabja’s early conversion may have been a concession by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s to preempt the Iraqi Kurds before converting administrative districts that fall within the Disputed Internal Boundaries (DIBs).

All of these districts enjoy a special status. Tuz and Tal Afar are the most contentious. Tuz district is a mixed area that includes Iraqi Turkmens, Iraqi Arabs, and Iraqi Kurds. It is geographically significant as well, given that it lies on the highway connecting northern Iraq with Baghdad. The district is also included in Article 140 of the Iraqi constitution that is designed to address the issue of Disputed Internal Boundaries areas (DIBs) primarily between the federal government and the Kurdistan Regional Government. Since last year, the city has been the scene of sustained waves of violent attacks including Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIEDs). Those attacks were likely carried out al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), which has historically exploited ethno-sectarian tensions to exacerbate violence and ethno-sectarian confrontations. Those attacks have ledto calls by the sizeable Iraqi Turkmen population to increase efforts to establish local forces to provide protection.

Tuz was also the scene of a prolonged confrontation between the federal government Iraqi Security Forces and the Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga in December 2012. There have been prior calls by Iraqi Turkmen parties in Tuz to convert it into a province, with the latest coming in Julyand November2013. Iraqi Turkmen leader, Riyadh Sari Kahya, proposed that one name of the province should the “Bayat Province,” named after the most dominant tribe in the area, the Bayati Tribe. As a preemptive measure, the Kirkuk provincial council voted on December 3 toannex Tuz to Kirkuk province, where the district administratively belonged prior to a decision by the Saddam Hussein government to annex it to Salah ad-Din in the 1970s. In a sign of disapproval, the Iraqi Arabs and Iraqi Turkmen members of the Kirkuk council boycottedthe Tuz voting session in December.

Tal Afar is also significant, given that it falls within the DIBs and is another ethno-sectarian mixed area. Tal Afar also became a stronghold for AQI after 2003. The district was eventually pacified and stabilized by U.S. and Iraqi forces in 2005. Tal Afar includes Iraqi Shi’a Turkmens and Iraqi Sunni Turkmens. It is an area on which Iraqi Shi’a political parties and groups place a great deal of significance. In the predominantly Iraqi Sunni province of Ninewa, it is the only place with a sizeable Iraqi Shi’a population. This has led to an effort by various Iraqi Shi’a groups to compete and place resources during elections. Mohammed Taqi Mawla, who has been a proponentof converting the district into a province, is a senior figure in Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) and prominent in the district. Demonstrating the district’s significance to Iraqi Shi’a groups, Iraqi Shi’a militia group Asai’b Ahl al-Haq (AAH) openedan office in Tal Afar in September of 2012.

In contrast to Tuz and Tal Afar, the Ninewa Plains boundaries will be more complicated to define. While Tuz and Tal Afar are identified as administrative districts, Ninewa Plains is comprised of three geographic areas combining multiple administrative units. In general, the term Ninewa Plains refers to Tel Kayef, Hamdaniyah, and Shaikhan districts. Those areas are predominantly occupied by Iraqi Christians, but they also include other minority groups like Yazidis and the Shabak. Iraqi Christian political parties have had a long-standing demandto convert the area into a province, thus allowing them more freedom and authority.

Fallujah’s potential conversion into a province is more difficult to explain. The district represents the second biggest area in the sprawling province of Anbar. It is predominantly Iraqi Sunni and was the area where Iraq’s insurgency and AQI were the prevailing authorities from 2004-2008, until the establishment of the anti-AQI awakening movement in 2006. While Anbar has always enjoyed a unique status within Iraq due to its location and social tribal fabric, Fallujah is also unique within Anbar, as it is not dominated by a single tribe and has a conservative religious base. Since the beginning of the Anbar crisis in December 2013, Fallujah has been out of central government’s control, with various armed anti-government groups controllingthe city. Its inclusion in the government’s decision is likely intended to combat the appearance of ethno-sectarianism in the government’s overall decision. However, unlike the other administrative districts, there is no well-established historical demand for this decision in Anbar. The decision to include Fallujah in this decision was rejectedby the head of Anbar’s provincial council, Sabah Karhout on January 22. Prime Minister Maliki may be using it to divide the political leadership of Anbar ahead of national elections. The decision may alternately drive unity among Anbari leaders who would fundamentally oppose division of the province. In either case, the decision will create a new political opportunities for Maliki in Anbar.            

The Implementation of the Decision

Despite the issuance of the decision to create new provinces, there is no clear legal mechanism to implement it. The Iraqi constitution does not contain any articles pertaining to the formation of new provinces, and other legislation such as the 2008 Provincial Powers Law (PPL) and its subsequent amendmentsin June 2013 do not address the mechanism of the formation of new areas. Therefore, this is legally and constitutionally an ad hoc effort.

The Mufti Committee will play the crucial role in determining the status of these districts and their conversion into provinces. Notably for Tal Afar’s conversion, the Iraqi government’s decision has included areference to make the decision contingent on a vote in the Iraqi Council of Representatives (CoR). This indicates that the other conversions may include the CoR’s involvement as well. But these procedures can change since they are ad hoc.    

      

Reactions to the Decision

The reactions to the decision have varied. It has been generally welcomedby the Iraqi Turkmens and especially for the Iraqi Christians who have been advocating for an autonomous area in the Ninewa Plains.

On the other hand, the Ninewa and Salah ad-Din provincial governments have rejected the decision. On January 23, Governor of Ninewa Atheel al-Nujaifi statedthat the approval of the government to convert the Ninewa districts of Tal Afar and Ninewa Plains is a “preemptive measure” to prevent the formation of a “united region” in Ninewa. On the same day, member of Ninewa Provincial Council Hosam al-Din al-Ayar stated that a request was submittedto the CoR to announce the Region of Ninewa consisting of three provinces, although the new provinces are not specified. This request is likely intended to counteract the government’s decision with regards to Tal Afar and the Ninewa Plains. According to Ayar, the request was signed by more than one third of council members, which fulfills the legal requirements to submit a request for a federal region.

Ayar added that the request was sent to the CoR for a vote. Despite this statement, legally the decision to announce an autonomous region has to go through the Iraqi government first, and then a referendum is required in the province to ratify the decision. This is a long-term process, and it will not take place before parliamentary elections in April 2014. Thus, the request by Ninewa’s government is likely tactical. Member of Mutahidun Mohammed Iqbal, who is from Ninewa, attributedthe central government’s decision to create new provinces to electoral motives. Furthermore, Iqbal discounted the decision, stating that there is no legal basis for it.  

Iraqi Kurdish political reaction has also been extremely critical. This reaction is expected, since three of the proposed provinces border Iraqi Kurdistan’s boundaries and are areas where Iraqi Kurdish parties have spread their influence since 2003. Head of the CoR’s legal committee and Iraqi Kurdish CoR member Khalid Shwani describedthe decision as a “violation” of the laws and constitution. Shwani added that Tal Afar and Tuz are part of Article 140 and thus cannot be included until Article 140 is implemented. Furthermore, Shwani added that the decision is intended to achieve “political and electoral goals.”   

The reactions of the Iraqi Shi’a political parties have been different. Senior Sadrist member of the CoR Baha al-Araji statedthat the decision is “constitutional and legal,” but came under “conditions that were not legal.” Araji also added that the approach of the April 2014 national elections is a reason for the decision. ISCI, the other major Iraqi Shi’a political party was more sympatheticto the decision, particularly with regards to Tal Afar. In one of its media outlets, al-Forat, ISCI remindedreaders of previous demands by ISCI to convert Tal Afar to a province. This statement is another example of the significance of Tal Afar for the Iraqi Shi’a parties. Sadrist member of the CoR Jawad al-Juburi has further called to convertBaghdad’s Sadr City into a province. If Sadr City is converted into a province in the future, it will allow the Sadrists a greater degree of influence through the control of local security forces and the possibility of winning more seats in the national elections allocated to Sadr City directly.             

Other reactions have included calls by other groups in Ninewa to form a province. On January 23, the leader of the Yazidi Movement for Reform and Progress, Amin Farhan Jaju, announcedthat his movement had sent a request to the Council of Ministers to convert Sinjar district, where a sizeable Yazidi population resides, into a province. Jaju was also supportive of the decision by the government’s decision to convert districts in Ninewa into provinces.

Implications and Conclusions

The new provinces will not be formed before the elections. This is due to the lack of clarity about the legal and constitutional process to do so, the approach of the national elections, and the CoR’s few remaining sessions. Therefore, this decision is best viewed within the prism of the April 2014 elections and Prime Minister Maliki’s strategy to counter post-provincial elections developments that have limited the powers of the federal government.

As an electoral strategy, the decision allows Maliki to shift popular and government focus from security concerns and Maliki’s under-performance in provincial elections. The decision has already caused controversy and allowed Maliki to drive the electoral campaign agenda. The new dynamic may temporarily deflect attention from the security challenges that make Maliki appear weak. The focus on Tal Afar and Tuz allows Maliki to win some Iraqi Shi’a support and also increase his leverage with the Iraqi Kurds after the elections. Tal Afar’s inclusion will paint Maliki as the defender of the Iraqi Shi’a. Tuz’s inclusion can function as a bargaining chip after the elections, as Maliki can offer the cancelation of the decision as an incentive to the Iraqi Kurds in return for their support for his third term as Prime Minister.   

The decision also allows Maliki to weaken the leading Iraqi Sunni politicians in Ninewa, governor Nujaifi and his brother, speaker of the CoR Osama al-Nujaifi. Shortly after the formation of the new Ninewa provincial council, the Ninewa provincial council authorizedgovernor Nujaifi to sign contracts with oil companies in the province. Some of the fields are projected to be in the Ninewa Plains. Thus Maliki’s decision can hinder that plan even if temporarily, raising a concern for potential oil investors. Furthermore, the decision allows Maliki to contestthe newly-amended Provincial Powers Law that allowed the provinces more authorities. Additionally, turning Ninewa into three provinces will potentially deprive it of future petrodollars if the province becomes a major oil-producing area.     

The decision represents the most significant administrative change in Iraq’s history since the 1970s. Moving forward, it will be imperative to observe how other districts in Iraq will react to this decision. This is particularly true in contentious areas like Hawijah in Kirkuk, Nukhaib in Anbar, and Zubair in Basra. Maliki’s maneuver positions him well for now, but the possible unification of his political opponents may divert his momentum.

Ahmed Ali is a Senior Iraq Research Analyst and the Iraq Team Lead at the Institute for the Study of War.