Iraq Situation Report: February 14-16, 2015

by Sinan Adnan

Iraq Situation Report: February 10-11, 2015

by Sinan Adnan and ISW Iraq Team

Iraq Situation Report: February 2, 2015

by ISW Iraq Team

Iraq Situation Report: December 30-31, 2014

By: Sinan Adnan & Brian Fisher



Iraq Situation Report: December 9-10

by: Sinan Adnan, Jessica Lewis McFate & Brian Fisher



Iraq Situation Report: October 30-31, 2014

by Sinan Adnan and Brian Fisher

Iraq Situation Report: September 25-26, 2014

by: Ahmed Ali and Nichole Dicharry

Ahmed Ali is a Senior Iraq Research Analyst and the Iraq Team Lead.

ISIS Ramps Up Activity in Northwestern Baghdad

By: Christopher Kozak and Jessica D. Lewis

Airstrikes in Iraq and Syria have the potential to disrupt ISIS by obstructing the physical links across its disparate operating areas. Degrading the military ability of ISIS to launch coordinated attacks across a wide area and limiting the ability of ISIS to launch new ground offensives is vital. However, these strikes do not operate inside a closed system. Observing how ISIS operates on its multiple fronts is key to understanding how airstrikes in one area affect the others. One of the primary areas where ISIS has been on the offensive in September 2014 is the Northern Baghdad Belts zone in Iraq, including strikes upon the capital itself. U.S. airstrikes have recently begun to target ISIS assets in this zone and it is important to anticipate how ISIS will react within Iraq’s capital region.

Attacks upon the capital

Explosive attacks have continued in Baghdad throughout the summer. On September 4, ISIS detonated an SVBIED in Kadhmiyah, apparently aimed at civilian targets in Abdul Mohsen al-Kadhimi Square. Kadhmiyah is a predominantly Shi’a neighborhood housing one of Iraq’s most important shrines, and ISIS has attacked it often in order to incite sectarian mobilization. The ISIS attack on the Adala Prison in the Kadhmiyah military intelligence headquarters complex on September 18 marked an escalation in ISIS’s operations in the Baghdad zone. This attack was the first ground force attack upon a fixed military facility in the city since the fall of Mosul in June 2014. ISIS had attacked numerous prisons across Iraq during the 2012-2013 “Breaking the Walls” campaign, ending with the successful prison break at Abu Ghraib in July 2013. The complex combined arms attack against the prison in Kadhmiyah included mortars, an SVBIED, two SVESTS, and small-arms fire. ISIS detonated an additional VBIED at the office of the Badr organization in Iskan, western Baghdad. ISIS denied that the operation was an unsuccessful prison break attempt, but at minimum the attacks indicate that ISIS is exercising its ability to breach capital defenses at a concentrated point near a shrine in order to strike military and Shi’a militia targets.

Indirect fire was also reported from locations north of Baghdad on September 15 and September 21. The use of indirect fire in the capital may indicate attempts by ISIS or other groups to attack Baghdad from a distance. Isolated indirect fire events may also constitute operational testing in support of future attacks. However, ISF defenses have increased in response to recent attacks. The ISF closed two bridges in central Baghdad after a VBIED detonated in the Karrada neighborhood on September 19. While airstrikes continue to escalate against ISIS positions in Iraq and Syria, ISIS may react by projecting greater force within the Baghdad zone.

Attacks to control the lower Tigris

ISIS militants have also made repeated efforts to break the line of ISF defenses along the Tigris River which protect access to the northern Baghdad belts. On September 8 and 9, ISIS launched a two major attacks on the village of Dhuluiya, southeast of Samarra, involving mortars, three SVBIEDs, and two IEDs emplaced on boats. ISIS successful used another IED-equipped boat on September 13 to destroy the last remaining bridge to Dhuluiya, severing lines of resupply linking the ISF garrison to Baghdad and Camp Taji military base. Extensive indirect fire on the area was also reported between September 11 and September 16, including a possible attack by chlorine gas shells on September 15. These actions marked a heavy escalation of force and were likely an attempt to prepare the ground for a future offensive by softening ISF fortifications. If confirmed, the deployment of chemical assets to the area conforms to a historical pattern of chlorine gas use by Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and may also signal the strategic importance which ISIS places on the northern Baghdad front. On September 18, ISIS launched another major attack on Dhuluiya which was repelled by local tribal fighters. As ISIS comes under increasing pressure on other fronts, particularly from airstrikes in Iraq and Syria, further pressure on the northern Baghdad system can be expected.

Increasing levels of mobilization have been occurring behind this exterior line of ISF positions as well, in the vicinity of Taji, Balad, and Ishaqi. ISIS control of these areas would break the main lines of communication between Baghdad and forward-deployed ISF units in Tikrit, Samarra, and Dhuluiya. A chain of small-scale insurgent attacks, including roadside IEDs in Taji in September 14 and 20 as well as an attempt to kill a local Sahwa [Awakening] commander in Tarmiyah on September 22, indicate that ISIS maintained at least a low-level presence to harass ISF operations in the area. Following the Kadhmiyah prison break attempt, however, ISIS has visibly increased its force posture north of Baghdad. On September 21, ISIS launched a ground assault on the village of Dujail from four axes and has continued to apply pressure through daily attacks. ISIS forces also seized the village of Kaban in the Ishaqi sub-district on September 21, placing the neighboring village of Abu al-Sifa under siege. Dujail and Ishaqi both sit along the highway connecting the ISF units and Shi’a militias in Baghdad and Camp Taji with Samarra and Tikrit. Direct clashes also took place on September 23 in Tarmiyah, Mashahda, and Filahat, northeast of Camp Taji near the road to Baquba and al-Udhaim. This series of attacks is a decisive step change in ISIS behavior in the northern Baghdad belt and may be indicative of an ISIS response to increased pressure in other areas. The manpower required to execute simultaneous ground offensives also suggests that ISIS has redeployed units from neighboring control zones or activated latent capabilities in the northern Baghdad belt. One potential source of these reinforcements is the neighboring Thar Thar region, which has been previously assessed as a zone of strong ISIS control. Another ISIS line of communication may run along the far bank of the Tigris River from the outskirts of Dhuluiya, through al-Dujma across the river from Balad, and on to Tarmiyah. From this area, militants could also travel across unsecured desert to interact with other ISIS systems in the Hamrin Mountains and Tikrit.

Attacks to clear the lower Euphrates

In the western Baghdad belts, in the vicinity of Fallujah, ISIS has also expanded their operations in recent days. On September 21, ISIS militants overran an ISF military base in Saqlawiyah, northwest of Fallujah, after a multi-day siege, killing up to several hundred ISF members. Survivors reported that ISIS militants deployed an SVBIED and several SVESTs to breach the garrison’s defenses. The ability to concentrate and subsequently deploy a critical mass of forces in an active combat zone implies the presence of a nearby ISIS strategic reserve, likely located in the adjacent Thar Thar region. In conjunction with the attacks to the north of Baghdad, the location of the attack also suggests that ISIS elements in the Thar Thar area have been mobilized to cut ISF lines of communication to points in western Anbar, including Habbaniyah and Ramadi. The fall of the base in Saqlawiyah demonstrates the vulnerability of ISF positions on the outer Baghdad belt if ISIS efforts to isolate them from reinforcement and resupply are successful.

Baghdad locator map with ISIS control, attack, and support zones.

Conclusion

The Thar Thar region that stretches from Fallujah north to Samarra is a likely stronghold for ISIS, which took control of the Muthanna Complex there on June 11 - only a day after Mosul fell. The ISF have increasingly targeted villages on the southern edge of the region, such as Garma, after ISIS entered Fallujah in December 2013, but the evidence indicates that ISIS probably maintains a significant force in this zone. This ISIS force, along with elements in the northern Baghdad Belts near Taji and Balad, are likely responsible for attacks in northwestern Baghdad. They also likely contribute to attacks upon Samarra, Dhuluiya, and Balad. Combined with the ISIS force operating within Fallujah, this Thar Thar force was also likely responsible for the September 22 attack upon the ISF compound in Saqlawiyah, north of Fallujah. This force has been increasingly active in September 2014, a necessary reminder that ISIS still possesses the capacity to go on the offensive in the Baghdad zone. U.S. strategic planners appear to have recognized the threat posed by ISIS elements in the Thar Thar region. On September 23, one U.S. airstrike hit an ISIS vehicle northwest of Baghdad and on September 24 two additional U.S. airstrikes targeted ISIS armed vehicles to the west of Baghdad. These were the first strikes to be carried out in this area. A key measure for the effectiveness of these airstrikes will be whether ISIS can continue to mount further attacks forward of its primary control zones.

Iraq Situation Report: September 12-14, 2014

by: ISW Iraq Team, Jessica D. Lewis, and Nichole Dicharry

Iraq Situation Report: September 8-9, 2014

By Ahmed Ali, ISW Iraq Team, and Nichole Dicharry

Ahmed Ali is a Senior Iraq Research Analyst and the Iraq Team Lead.

Iraq Situation Report: September 5-7, 2014

By Ahmed Ali, Jessica Lewis, and Nichole Dicharry

Iraq Situation Report: August 20-21, 2014

by ISW Iraq Team, Lauren Squires, and Nichole Dicharry

Iraq Situation Report: August 18-19, 2014

by ISW Iraq Team, Lauren Squires, and Nichole Dicharry

Iraq Situation Report: August 15, 2014

by ISW Iraq Team, Lauren Squires, and Nichole Dicharry

Iraq Situation Report: August 14, 2014

by ISW Iraq Team, Jessica D. Lewis, Lauren Squires, and Nichole Dicharry

Maliki calls for Federal Court ruling and US increases presence in Northern Iraq

by ISW Iraq Team, Jessica Lewis, Kimberly Kagan

Maliki continues to resist Iraq’s transition to a new Premiership, and the security forces under his control remain active to protect pro-Maliki demonstrations in Baghdad. Attacks by ISIS in Baghdad may increase public backlash against the ISF for failing to provide security, and the capital is made vulnerable by these concurrent internal security concerns. While the U.S. increases military presence in Arbil, Iraq's security rests on the peaceful transition of power to a new premier in Baghdad who can command and control the Iraqi Security Forces operating against the pressing threat of ISIS.

Maliki calls for Federal Court Ruling

Nouri al-Maliki continues to speak from the position of Prime Minister, claiming that it will take a federal court ruling for him to leave power. Maliki stated, “I confirm that the government will continue and there will not be a replacement for it without a decision from the federal court,” according to a source quoting his speech on August 13. Calling the appointment of Haider al-Abadi to the Premiership a “constitutional breach,” Maliki also called on citizens of Iraq to reject the breach. Responding to this call, Maliki supporters demonstrated in the Furdus Square on August 13 in support of a third term while Iraqi Police and the Iraqi Army blocked main streets leading to the Square. The demonstration concluded, and streets were reopened as of 1330 local time, indicating that these demonstrations are not mass events, but rather controlled and organized on a smaller scale, and only within Baghdad.

This third pro-Maliki demonstration since August 10 comes after the Marjeya called yesterday for the populace not to take to the streets on either side. The security posture within Baghdad therefore continues to shift along political lines as elements of the ISF move to secure demonstrations, most likely under the direction of Maliki’s inner circle. Maliki tried further to consolidate his position by appointing Khalf Abdul-Samad to be leader of his Dawa bloc at the Council of Representatives (CoR) on August 13. This may have been a move by Maliki to co-opt forming resistance within the Dawa party. While Samad had previously stated that the 45 of the 54 members of the bloc support Maliki, other reports indicated that some Dawa members who did not originally support Abadi have expressed interest in supporting him now. Samad is a Maliki loyalist and may be attempting to regain the support of these defecting members. Therefore a Dawa press conference scheduled for today has been delayed to August 14, 2014.

Iraqi citizens also mobilized in Baghdad’s central Karrada neighborhood on August 12. Residents tore down a Federal Police checkpoint after ISIS detonated a VBIED, expressing outrage that the ISF has again failed to provide for security against ISIS in the capital. Yesterday, clashes ensued north of Samarra between volunteers fighting within the ISF against ISIS, fracturing internally along pro-Maliki and anti-Maliki lines. These demonstrations represent internal threats to the ISF that may present within Baghdad and elsewhere. The security of Baghdad therefore remains a chief concern in the days ahead, and some events described below call it into question.

Maliki Support Dwindling

Meanwhile, opposition to Maliki from corners of previous support continued to mount. After Iran, Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, and the Badr organization abandoned Maliki publically on August 12, support for Abadi has continued to rise among Iraqi Shi’a political leaders. The leader of the ISCI bloc the CoR, Baqir Jabur also indicated that more members who did not express initial support for Abadi stated that they wished to add their names to the list in support of Abadi’s nomination as Prime Minister. Additionally, some reports indicate that ministers comprising the Council of Premiership may have boycotted the weekly session called by Maliki yesterday as the incumbent Prime Minister continued to exercise his role. Among them, deputy PM for Energy Affairs and acting Foreign Minister Hussein al-Shahristani likely did not attend the meeting, given that he nominated Abadi for the position as the leader of Mustaqilun within the State of Law Alliance.

Outside of Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Turkey voiced support for Abadi. Iraq’s Kurdistan Alliance also indicated their support for Maliki’s replacement. Within Iraq’s security forces, some ISF commanders contacted political formations and expressed their neutral stance and distance from the political issues, according to the leader of the Fadila bloc in the CoR, Ammar Tuma. Nevertheless, Maliki has built an inner core within the security forces that will likely remain loyal to his person, and this core is not likely to shift support to Abadi. The behavior of forces loyal to Maliki therefore remains essential to watch.

The safety of Maliki and his protection from prosecution continue to be discussed in western press as potential mitigation for Maliki’s core concerns. Some suggestions extend to offering Maliki the vice presidency, which would entail immunity and government housing inside the Green Zone. Maliki is unlikely to accept such a position, however, given his demonstrated sense of entitlement to the position and his current authority over the security apparatus. The question is not whether Maliki’s personal safety is assured, but whether Maliki will relinquish control of the state after consolidating his personal power over the state apparatus since 2006.

Abadi’s Response

Abadi’s initial response has been measured, with overtures to Maliki and calls for Iraqi unity. On August 12, Abadi called for the Iraqi people to set aside sectarianism and extremism, forming a “unified vision” for Iraq. Abadi also praised the role of the Marjeya, appealing to the Shi’a population to overcome political divides. Other Iraqi reporting indicates that Abadi praised Maliki’s efforts to counter terrorism, calling Maliki a “brother and comrade.” These cautious initial moves appeared to shift on August 13, when Abadi called for political formations to “agree” on the positions of ministers. Moving forward with government formation while Maliki disputes the transition of Premiership will press the issue to resolution. The outcome remains uncertain while Maliki retains coercive means and influence within the judiciary to reject stepping out of the Premiership.

ISIS's Response and Intra-Shi'a Violence

Meanwhile, ISIS detonated three more VBIEDS in Baghdad on August 13, in the Bayaa Amil, and Baghdad al-Jadida neighborhoods in southern and eastern Baghdad. ISIS will likely continue harassment attacks such as these to stress the ISF and exacerbate public reactions such as those observed in Karrada neighborhood on August 12. ISIS may also take this opportunity to escalate attacks while the attention of the ISF is turned inward and divided. ISIS aims to disrupt public confidence in the ISF and in the government. Shi'a groups may also be escalating. Sound bombs, unattributed to any group, have also detonated multiple times, this time in Sadr City on August 13, injuring two civilians. Previously sound bombs detonated in Karbala in late July. It is possible that Shi'a groups, rather than ISIS, are using these sound bombs. The wide range of possible explanations for the perpetrator call attention to the nexus of intra-Shi’a strife, sectarian strife, and terrorism that is present within Baghdad at this time.

U.S. Response Shifts to Security

After issuing congratulations and support to Haider al-Abadi, the U.S. has increased its response to the security crisis in northern Iraq. On August 12, Secretary Hagel stated that 130 US troops would be deployed to Arbil in order to conduct a deeper assessment of the security situation in the north. U.S. CENTCOM also reported that it conducted another humanitarian aid drop on Mount Sinjar using C-17s, C-130s, and fighter aircraft on August 12. Some reports suggest that the U.S. may consider a rescue mission for the stranded Yazidis on the mountain. It is unclear whether U.S. forces deploying to Arbil will be charged with this mission. Rather, it seems likelier that they will be assessing how to train, equip, and assist Kurdish security forces against ISIS. That mission would likely strengthen Arbil vis a vis Baghdad, which may have long term significance if the political crisis in Iraq protracts and Kurdish leaders propose an independent Kurdish state.

Discussions in Washington have also begun to remark upon the effects of U.S. airstrikes to date. The question has specifically been raised about whether airstrikes will have a meaningful effect to degrade ISIS capability; or alternately to cause ISIS to revert to insurgency tactics in urban centers rather than conventional ground maneuver. The low level of U.S. airstrikes to date have played a primarily defensive role; nevertheless, the presence of U.S. airpower, and potentially that of other countries, may alter the military calculus of ISIS going forward. ISIS is likely to consolidate its military presence within urban centers and in the midst of civilian populations.

Conclusion

The U.S. strategy to counter ISIS cannot be discharged solely in northern Iraq and in support of the Kurdish Peshmerga through humanitarian and advising missions there. Iraq's security rests on the peaceful transition of power to a new premier in Baghdad who can command and control the Iraqi Security Forces. Those security forces must then operate successfully against the pressing threat of ISIS.

Maliki's enduring efforts to remove command and control from the formal chain of command and place it in the Office of the Commander in Chief, personally loyal to him, will make this transition exceptionally difficult in any case. The likelihood that Maliki will continue to resist this transition leaves Iraq strategically vulnerable, while ISIS is poised to strike the capital, and the U.S. and others await political resolution.

In reality, the present political crisis will determine whether Iraq implodes. Even the formation of a unity government to form around Haider al-Abadi may not sufficiently provide for Iraq's recovery. The U.S. is waiting for a political process that will not necessarily unfold smoothly, keep Iraq unified, or to defeat ISIS. These challenges require a successful government transition to begin, but they are just a beginning. The United States must engage the ISF directly while mitigating perceptions of Shi'a sectarian preference through Sunni tribal outreach, and it must engage more fully against ISIS. The United States must also embark on security sector reforms to assist the new premier in gaining control of the Iraqi Security Forces in ways that are consistent with democratic processes and the Iraqi constitution.

Iraq Situation Report: July 29, 2014

by ISW Iraq Team, Lauren Squires, and Jessica D. Lewis

Iraq Situation Report: July 28, 2014

by ISW Iraq Team, Lauren Squires, and Jennifer Cafarella

Iraq Situation Report: July 27, 2014

by ISW Iraq Team, Lauren Squires, Jessica D. Lewis, and Nichole Dicharry

Iraq Situation Report: July 15, 2014

by Ahmed Ali, ISW Iraq Team, and Aaron Reese

Ahmed Ali is the Iraq Team Lead and senior Iraq analyst at the Institute for the Study of War.