ISIS’s Global Attack Network: November 13, 2015 – November 9, 2016

By: Jessica Lewis McFate and Melissa Pavlik

Key Takeaway

ISIS has organized a number of external attacks worldwide in the past year, some of which have been thwarted. ISIS’s global network is still operating and is poised to continue conducting external attacks in late 2016. The U.S. must recognize that the campaign to recapture Mosul and Raqqa will not defeat ISIS. Rather, any military success in Iraq and Syria must be the first phase of a campaign to counter ISIS globally, whether through military or non-military means.

Overview

ISIS has been planning an external attack from Raqqa, Syria. The U.S. and its partners in the counter-ISIS coalition are assisting the major operations to recover Raqqa and Mosul, ISIS’s main urban hubs. ISIS is conducting  counter-offensives inside Iraq to divert Coalition attention from these main efforts. Similarly, ISIS will direct its global network to launch additional counter-offensives across its global footprint. Coalition partner nations face a high risk of attacks by ISIS on their homelands and their populations abroad while the offensives to recapture Mosul and Raqqa progress. The attack threat emanating from Raqqa highlights that ISIS-linked militants across the world still receive direction from ISIS in core terrain.

ISIS’s global attack network consists of two known campaigns: a general call for individuals to conduct attacks in the name of ISIS; and specific discrete attacks that are planned, coordinated, and executed by organized groups or cells of ISIS members. The specific external attack threat emanating from Raqqa falls in the latter category, over which ISIS exerts more control. Abu Mohammad al-Adnani, ISIS’s former spokesman and director of external operations, may have masterminded this two-pronged strategy and its execution. But his death on the battlefield in Aleppo Province on August 20, 2016 did not eliminate ISIS’s ability to design and coordinate such attacks. ISIS’s global network is still operating within the campaign framework defined by Adnani and other high-ranking ISIS militants and is poised to continue external attacks in late 2016.

The map below depicts coordinated attacks attributed to ISIS’s global network since November 13, 2015, when ISIS’s network in Europe executed a complex attack in Paris, killing 150 civilians. The map illustrates levels of risk for discrete directed attacks on the basis of recent historical patterns. The attacks on the map involved forward-deployed ISIS militants, many of whom were returned foreign fighters. The analysis excludes individual attackers worldwide who responded to official calls from Adnani to attack the West. Successful attacks in the U.S.—such as those on December 2, 2016 in San Bernadino or on June 12, 2016 in Orlando—are excluded for this reason. The only event in the United States considered to fit the profile of a coordinated attack directed by ISIS is the arrest of a Maryland man on December 14, 2015. This man was allegedly given nearly $9,000 from ISIS operatives overseas to conduct an attack in the Washington, D.C. area, suggesting that ISIS in core terrain intended a specific attack.

The map juxtaposes coordinated attacks by ISIS’s global network with foreign fighter flows into Syria and Iraq documented in June 2014 and December 2015 by The Soufan Group. Returned foreign fighters form the basis of ISIS’s global attack network. They also likely form the umbilical cord between ISIS and local Salafi-Jihadi groups whom ISIS recruits worldwide. The activities of ISIS-linked local Salafi-Jihadi groups and wilayats that are conducting ground campaigns are also excluded from this map because they constitute a different arm of ISIS’s global strategy. A ground campaign is a military engagement to contest control of terrain and populations by a rival army. This map therefore excludes ISIS’s ground activities in Libya, Sinai, Somalia, Afghanistan, the Philippines, and Nigeria, which ISW classifies as ground wars. ISIS is also engaged in the ongoing civil war in Yemen, meaning ISIS activity in Yemen is excluded from this map.

Tunisia, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, France, Germany, and Morocco exhibit a high correlation between foreign fighters who left for Syria and Iraq and coordinated external attacks by ISIS’s network. Foreign fighters have also returned to Southeast Asia to plan attacks. The threat in Turkey, including to U.S. persons, is particularly high as of October 29, when the State Department evacuated personnel in Istanbul following a statement by Turkish intelligence that ISIS poses a threat within six provinces in Turkey. ISIS’s attacks in Turkey and Saudi Arabia, two targets highlighted by ISIS’s leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in a statement released on November 2, 2016, also support its strategy to weaken regional power centers, as ISW forecasted in its 2016 Ramadan report. Britain’s MI5 also highlighted the generally high threat of attacks in the United Kingdom on November 1. Recent studies indicate that ISIS is still able to conduct cross-border operations through Syria, and from Libya to Italy through its nexus with organized crime, compounding the threat of attacks that are coordinated remotely from Raqqa.

ISIS’s global campaign may increase as Mosul and Raqqa come under pressure and fall. Coalition partner nations and U.S. homeland security must continue to regard ISIS’s coordinated external operations as a threat despite the death of Adnani and ISIS’s loss of key border crossings from Syria into Turkey due to Coalition anti-ISIS operations in Syria. The U.S. must recognize that the campaign to recapture Mosul and Raqqa will not defeat ISIS. Rather, any military success in Iraq and Syria must be the first phase of a campaign to counter ISIS globally, whether through military or non-military means.

Iraq Situation Report: December 22, 2015 - January 6, 2016

By Patrick Martin and ISW Iraq Team

Key Take-Away: The ISF made significant gains in Ramadi in December, clearing much of the city center and recapturing the government complex on December 28. ISIS launched a major attack on Haditha district, west of Ramadi, less than one week later, inflicting heavy casualties among the ISF and tribal fighters and briefly capturing three villages. The attack demonstrates ISIS’s continued capability to conduct significant ground operations in Anbar, despite the group’s loss of most of Ramadi. The ISF victory was also overshadowed by Saudi Arabia’s execution of prominent Shi’a cleric Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr on January 2, sparking outrage from Iran as well as Iraq’s religious establishment. Anti-interventionist leader of the Sadrist Trend political movement, Muqtada al-Sadr, condemned the execution, and his supporters protested in large numbers across Baghdad and the southern provinces on January 5. Iranian proxy militias called for the expulsion of the Saudi ambassador and the closure of the Saudi embassy one week after its first reopening since 1990. Iranian proxy militia and Popular Mobilization members protested on January 6 for protests likely intended to pressure Prime Minister Abadi into cutting off ties with Saudi Arabia. The proxy militias seek to demonstrate the necessity of Iranian support and the Popular Mobilization in the fight against ISIS at the expense of the Coalition and Iran’s regional opponents, such as Saudi Arabia and Turkey. They likely scheduled their demonstration to coincide with Iraq’s Army Day military parade in the Green Zone, occurring less than a kilometer away from the Baghdad protest site, to spoil the celebration of the ISF’s recent gains. The Prime Minister signaled an unwillingness to concede, and Foreign Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari suggested Iraq serve as a mediator between the two countries to mend relations while speaking in Tehran on January 6. However, Iranian proxy militias will continue pressuring PM Abadi to align more closely with Iran, and may be tempted to deploy targeted violence against Saudi assets or citizens, as they have done against Turkish and Qatari citizens in the past.

Update: International Community’s Position on Syrian President Bashar al-Assad

By Christopher Kozak, Syria Analyst, Institute for the Study of War

Several international actors including partners within the U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition recently changed or clarified their narratives concerning the future role of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in any political settlement to the Syrian Civil War. The shift in narratives has likely been driven by the Russian intervention into Syria and its concurrent outreach to U.S. regional partners. These changes constitute a metric for measuring the increasing influence held by Russia over Middle Eastern security concerns relative to the U.S. ISW previously published key statements by international actors including Russia, Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, the European Union, and the U.S. on September 30, in order to capture the emergent shift in attitudes. This post provides an update to significant statements regarding international leaders’ positions on Syrian President Bashar al-Assad between September 30 and October 24.

The U.S. and several of its regional partners have begun to coalesce around a proposal for a political transition which would permit Assad to retain his position in a limited capacity for up to six months in exchange for guarantees of his ultimate departure. Turkey and Saudi Arabia in particular softened their demands for an immediate departure of Assad and privately expressed an ability to tolerate his temporary presence in a transitional government. Russia and Iran nevertheless continue to defend Assad as the legitimate ruler of Syria while their military forces change conditions on the ground in his favor. Several regional powers normally aligned with the U.S. including Egypt and Jordan established military cooperation agreements with Russia that may move them closer to the Russian position on a negotiated settlement to end the Syrian Civil War.

Significant Statements:

United Kingdom – The United Kingdom reaffirmed its willingness to accept a temporary role for Assad in a transitional administration in exchange for a successful settlement to the conflict.

• Foreign Secretary Philip Hammond: 04 OCT – “If the price for [ending the Syrian Civil War] is that Assad will remain as titular head of state for a period of time, do I really care if that’s three days, three weeks, three months, or even longer? I don’t think I do.” (The Telegraph)

European Union – The European Union released a joint statement on the Syrian Civil War which attempted to merge the differing stances towards Assad held by Europe. France maintains a strong position calling for the removal of Assad while Germany and several other European states have been much more reticent in their approach.

• European Council Joint Statement: 12 OCT – “There cannot be a lasting peace in Syria under the present leadership and until the legitimate grievances and aspirations of all components of the Syrian society are addressed.” (EU)

Russia – Russian attempted to portray itself as a neutral actor in the Syrian Civil War through hints that Assad may depart as the leader of Syria over the long-term. Nonetheless, Russia continued to defend the legitimacy of Assad and the Syrian regime as a whole.

• Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev: 17 OCT - “We are not fighting for specific leaders, we are defending our national interests…at the moment Russia is working on the basis that Assad is the legitimate president.” (AFP)

Saudi Arabia – Saudi Arabia softened its position on Assad by expressing an ability to tolerate his presence in a transitional government for several months. This apparent shift conflicts with other statements reflecting persistent Saudi demands for Assad’s immediate departure.

• Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir: 19 OCT – “After the formation of this [transitional] governmental body, President Assad must step down. If it is a matter of months, two or three months or less, that is not important. But Assad has no future in Syria." (Reuters)
• Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir: 22 OCT – [On whether Assad could play a role in an interim Syrian government] “His role would be to leave Syria... The best case scenario is that we wake up in the morning and Bashar al-Assad is not there."

Turkey – Turkey also softened its stance on Assad following diplomatic talks with the U.S. and other partner nations, acceding to a transitional administration which preserves Assad as a titular head of state for up to six months.

• Anonymous Turkish officials: 20 OCT – Turkey provided initial support for a political transition that retains Assad as the “symbolic president” of a “transitional administration” for up to six months on the condition that Assad hold no control over the Syrian military or intelligence apparatus and that there be a "guarantee of his departure". The proposal was reportedly formed with a group of nine countries including the U.S. during the UN General Assembly sessions in late SEP 2015. (Hurriyet)

Iran – Iran mirrored Russian rhetoric on the future role played by Assad in a reflection of the deepening strategic alignment between the two countries over the Middle East.

•  Deputy Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian: 21 OCT - "In any political process the role played by Bashar al-Assad will be important...we are not working for Assad to stay in power forever as president. But we are very cognizant of his role in the fight against terrorism and the national unity of that country. The people of Syria will make the final decision – and whatever decision they take, we will endorse.” (The Guardian)

ISIS's Global Strategy: September 2015

By Harleen Gambhir

ISIS is executing a global strategy to defend and expand its territory within Iraq and Syria; to foster affiliates and exacerbate disorder in the Middle East, North Africa, and Central Asia; and to inspire and resource polarizing terror attacks in the wider world. The map depicts the geographic areas of those parallel campaigns, labeled the Interior, Near Abroad, and Far Abroad rings, respectively. The map also marks the areas where ISIS has declared one or more “wilayats,” or governorates in the Near Abroad. ISIS maintains active affiliates in each of its governorates, which provide the organization with strategic resiliency outside of Iraq and Syria. 

See map on our website here.

Maliki calls for Federal Court ruling and US increases presence in Northern Iraq

by ISW Iraq Team, Jessica Lewis, Kimberly Kagan

Maliki continues to resist Iraq’s transition to a new Premiership, and the security forces under his control remain active to protect pro-Maliki demonstrations in Baghdad. Attacks by ISIS in Baghdad may increase public backlash against the ISF for failing to provide security, and the capital is made vulnerable by these concurrent internal security concerns. While the U.S. increases military presence in Arbil, Iraq's security rests on the peaceful transition of power to a new premier in Baghdad who can command and control the Iraqi Security Forces operating against the pressing threat of ISIS.

Maliki calls for Federal Court Ruling

Nouri al-Maliki continues to speak from the position of Prime Minister, claiming that it will take a federal court ruling for him to leave power. Maliki stated, “I confirm that the government will continue and there will not be a replacement for it without a decision from the federal court,” according to a source quoting his speech on August 13. Calling the appointment of Haider al-Abadi to the Premiership a “constitutional breach,” Maliki also called on citizens of Iraq to reject the breach. Responding to this call, Maliki supporters demonstrated in the Furdus Square on August 13 in support of a third term while Iraqi Police and the Iraqi Army blocked main streets leading to the Square. The demonstration concluded, and streets were reopened as of 1330 local time, indicating that these demonstrations are not mass events, but rather controlled and organized on a smaller scale, and only within Baghdad.

This third pro-Maliki demonstration since August 10 comes after the Marjeya called yesterday for the populace not to take to the streets on either side. The security posture within Baghdad therefore continues to shift along political lines as elements of the ISF move to secure demonstrations, most likely under the direction of Maliki’s inner circle. Maliki tried further to consolidate his position by appointing Khalf Abdul-Samad to be leader of his Dawa bloc at the Council of Representatives (CoR) on August 13. This may have been a move by Maliki to co-opt forming resistance within the Dawa party. While Samad had previously stated that the 45 of the 54 members of the bloc support Maliki, other reports indicated that some Dawa members who did not originally support Abadi have expressed interest in supporting him now. Samad is a Maliki loyalist and may be attempting to regain the support of these defecting members. Therefore a Dawa press conference scheduled for today has been delayed to August 14, 2014.

Iraqi citizens also mobilized in Baghdad’s central Karrada neighborhood on August 12. Residents tore down a Federal Police checkpoint after ISIS detonated a VBIED, expressing outrage that the ISF has again failed to provide for security against ISIS in the capital. Yesterday, clashes ensued north of Samarra between volunteers fighting within the ISF against ISIS, fracturing internally along pro-Maliki and anti-Maliki lines. These demonstrations represent internal threats to the ISF that may present within Baghdad and elsewhere. The security of Baghdad therefore remains a chief concern in the days ahead, and some events described below call it into question.

Maliki Support Dwindling

Meanwhile, opposition to Maliki from corners of previous support continued to mount. After Iran, Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, and the Badr organization abandoned Maliki publically on August 12, support for Abadi has continued to rise among Iraqi Shi’a political leaders. The leader of the ISCI bloc the CoR, Baqir Jabur also indicated that more members who did not express initial support for Abadi stated that they wished to add their names to the list in support of Abadi’s nomination as Prime Minister. Additionally, some reports indicate that ministers comprising the Council of Premiership may have boycotted the weekly session called by Maliki yesterday as the incumbent Prime Minister continued to exercise his role. Among them, deputy PM for Energy Affairs and acting Foreign Minister Hussein al-Shahristani likely did not attend the meeting, given that he nominated Abadi for the position as the leader of Mustaqilun within the State of Law Alliance.

Outside of Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Turkey voiced support for Abadi. Iraq’s Kurdistan Alliance also indicated their support for Maliki’s replacement. Within Iraq’s security forces, some ISF commanders contacted political formations and expressed their neutral stance and distance from the political issues, according to the leader of the Fadila bloc in the CoR, Ammar Tuma. Nevertheless, Maliki has built an inner core within the security forces that will likely remain loyal to his person, and this core is not likely to shift support to Abadi. The behavior of forces loyal to Maliki therefore remains essential to watch.

The safety of Maliki and his protection from prosecution continue to be discussed in western press as potential mitigation for Maliki’s core concerns. Some suggestions extend to offering Maliki the vice presidency, which would entail immunity and government housing inside the Green Zone. Maliki is unlikely to accept such a position, however, given his demonstrated sense of entitlement to the position and his current authority over the security apparatus. The question is not whether Maliki’s personal safety is assured, but whether Maliki will relinquish control of the state after consolidating his personal power over the state apparatus since 2006.

Abadi’s Response

Abadi’s initial response has been measured, with overtures to Maliki and calls for Iraqi unity. On August 12, Abadi called for the Iraqi people to set aside sectarianism and extremism, forming a “unified vision” for Iraq. Abadi also praised the role of the Marjeya, appealing to the Shi’a population to overcome political divides. Other Iraqi reporting indicates that Abadi praised Maliki’s efforts to counter terrorism, calling Maliki a “brother and comrade.” These cautious initial moves appeared to shift on August 13, when Abadi called for political formations to “agree” on the positions of ministers. Moving forward with government formation while Maliki disputes the transition of Premiership will press the issue to resolution. The outcome remains uncertain while Maliki retains coercive means and influence within the judiciary to reject stepping out of the Premiership.

ISIS's Response and Intra-Shi'a Violence

Meanwhile, ISIS detonated three more VBIEDS in Baghdad on August 13, in the Bayaa Amil, and Baghdad al-Jadida neighborhoods in southern and eastern Baghdad. ISIS will likely continue harassment attacks such as these to stress the ISF and exacerbate public reactions such as those observed in Karrada neighborhood on August 12. ISIS may also take this opportunity to escalate attacks while the attention of the ISF is turned inward and divided. ISIS aims to disrupt public confidence in the ISF and in the government. Shi'a groups may also be escalating. Sound bombs, unattributed to any group, have also detonated multiple times, this time in Sadr City on August 13, injuring two civilians. Previously sound bombs detonated in Karbala in late July. It is possible that Shi'a groups, rather than ISIS, are using these sound bombs. The wide range of possible explanations for the perpetrator call attention to the nexus of intra-Shi’a strife, sectarian strife, and terrorism that is present within Baghdad at this time.

U.S. Response Shifts to Security

After issuing congratulations and support to Haider al-Abadi, the U.S. has increased its response to the security crisis in northern Iraq. On August 12, Secretary Hagel stated that 130 US troops would be deployed to Arbil in order to conduct a deeper assessment of the security situation in the north. U.S. CENTCOM also reported that it conducted another humanitarian aid drop on Mount Sinjar using C-17s, C-130s, and fighter aircraft on August 12. Some reports suggest that the U.S. may consider a rescue mission for the stranded Yazidis on the mountain. It is unclear whether U.S. forces deploying to Arbil will be charged with this mission. Rather, it seems likelier that they will be assessing how to train, equip, and assist Kurdish security forces against ISIS. That mission would likely strengthen Arbil vis a vis Baghdad, which may have long term significance if the political crisis in Iraq protracts and Kurdish leaders propose an independent Kurdish state.

Discussions in Washington have also begun to remark upon the effects of U.S. airstrikes to date. The question has specifically been raised about whether airstrikes will have a meaningful effect to degrade ISIS capability; or alternately to cause ISIS to revert to insurgency tactics in urban centers rather than conventional ground maneuver. The low level of U.S. airstrikes to date have played a primarily defensive role; nevertheless, the presence of U.S. airpower, and potentially that of other countries, may alter the military calculus of ISIS going forward. ISIS is likely to consolidate its military presence within urban centers and in the midst of civilian populations.

Conclusion

The U.S. strategy to counter ISIS cannot be discharged solely in northern Iraq and in support of the Kurdish Peshmerga through humanitarian and advising missions there. Iraq's security rests on the peaceful transition of power to a new premier in Baghdad who can command and control the Iraqi Security Forces. Those security forces must then operate successfully against the pressing threat of ISIS.

Maliki's enduring efforts to remove command and control from the formal chain of command and place it in the Office of the Commander in Chief, personally loyal to him, will make this transition exceptionally difficult in any case. The likelihood that Maliki will continue to resist this transition leaves Iraq strategically vulnerable, while ISIS is poised to strike the capital, and the U.S. and others await political resolution.

In reality, the present political crisis will determine whether Iraq implodes. Even the formation of a unity government to form around Haider al-Abadi may not sufficiently provide for Iraq's recovery. The U.S. is waiting for a political process that will not necessarily unfold smoothly, keep Iraq unified, or to defeat ISIS. These challenges require a successful government transition to begin, but they are just a beginning. The United States must engage the ISF directly while mitigating perceptions of Shi'a sectarian preference through Sunni tribal outreach, and it must engage more fully against ISIS. The United States must also embark on security sector reforms to assist the new premier in gaining control of the Iraqi Security Forces in ways that are consistent with democratic processes and the Iraqi constitution.