Russian-Syrian-Iranian Coalition Seizes ISIS-Held Palmyra

By Christopher Kozak

Pro-regime forces seized Palmyra as well as the adjacent Palmyra Airbase in Eastern Homs Province on March 27 after ISIS withdrew from the city, completing an operation that began on March 7 with the aim of recapturing the strategic crossroads. The Syrian Arab Army and its auxiliary National Defense Forces conducted multiple offensives against ISIS in the western countryside of Palmyra in the eight months after its rapid fall to ISIS in May 2015, achieving limited tactical gains at a high cost in manpower and equipment. The latest offensive proceeded as a three-pronged frontal assault similar to previous regime-directed operations against Palmyra, displaying little-to-none of the sophisticated operational design that characterized the recent campaign in Aleppo Province. Instead, the regime relied upon large numbers of reinforcements from Russia, Iran, and other foreign backers as well as a lull in combat generated by a nationwide ‘cessation of hostilities’ that began on February 27 in order to generate sufficient combat power to overwhelm ISIS in Palmyra.

Russia played a major role in enabling the successful seizure of Palmyra following months of indecisive engagements. The Russian Armed Forces shifted the focus of its air campaign against Palmyra and its environs in March 2016 despite a drawdown announced by Russian President Vladimir Putin on March 14. The Russian Ministry of Defense claimed to conduct at least 41 sorties against 146 targets near Palmyra between March 22 and March 24 alone, while local activists reported that the constant aerial bombardment has destroyed up to fifty percent of the city. Russia paired its air campaign with a significant deployment of ground forces. ISIS claimed to kill up to five Russian Spetznaz personnel west of Palmyra on March 18 and posted images appearing to show one of the men standing in front of the symbol of the Russian Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU). Russia later confirmed that at least one special forces officer died near Palmyra while “directing airstrikes onto terrorist targets” near Palmyra.  Media reports also revealed the deployment of Russian TOS-1 and BM-30 ‘Smerch’ heavy multiple rocket launcher systems as well as Mi-24 ‘Hind’ helicopter gunships in support of operations to seize Palmyra.

The regime also received significant reinforcements on the ground in Eastern Homs Province in recent weeks, allegedly raising the total number of participants in the operation to over five thousand personnel. Activists noted that the offensive included hundreds of fighters from Lebanese Hezbollah, Iraqi Shi’a Militias, and the Afghan Shi’a Liwa al-Fatimiyoun. The death of a member of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps near Palmyra on March 16 suggests that Iran also deployed its own ground forces in order to oversee its coalition of proxy forces in the operation. Meanwhile, the regime deployed a convoy of up to one thousand Syrian Marines and pro-regime militiamen from the Syrian Coast to Eastern Homs Province on March 18. These redeployments were enabled in part by the ongoing ‘cessation of hostilities’ which allowed the regime and its allies to withdraw troops from its frontlines with opposition groups in Latakia, Aleppo, and Quneitra Provinces without major risk.

The fall of Palmyra represents a major victory on the international stage for both Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and Russian President Vladimir Putin. The new gains allow the Russian-Iranian-Syrian coalition to claim a significant win in the fight against ISIS, bolstering its narrative as the ideal partner in the anti-ISIS campaign. This message may stand to gain additional traction within Europe in the aftermath of a major terrorist attack by ISIS in Brussels, Belgium on March that killed thirty-one civilians and wounded several hundred others. The advance also bolsters the current position of strength held by Syrian President Bashar al-Assad amidst the ongoing Geneva III Talks to end the Syrian Civil War. The seizure of Palmyra curtails the ability of ISIS to project force into Western Syria from its safe haven along the Euphrates River Valley and provides a much-needed buffer for several critical regime-held oil and natural gas fields that provide electricity to Western Syria. The regime and its allies will likely leverage Palmyra and its military facilities as an optimal forward position for follow-on operations against ISIS in Ar-Raqqa and Deir ez-Zour Cities, complicating the position of the U.S.-led coalition in the region.

Assad Regime Gains in Aleppo Alter Balance of Power in Northern Syria

By: Christopher Kozak

Battlefield realities rather than great power politics will determine the ultimate terms of a settlement to end the Syrian Civil War. Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and his allies in Russia and Iran have internalized this basic principle even as Washington and other Western capitals pinned their hopes upon UN-sponsored Geneva Talks, which faltered only two days after they began on February 1, 2016. Russian airpower and Iranian manpower have brought President Assad within five miles of completing the encirclement of Aleppo City, the largest urban center in Syria and an opposition stronghold since 2012. The current campaign has already surpassed the high-water mark set by the regime’s previous failed attempt to besiege Aleppo City in early 2015. The full encirclement of Aleppo City would fuel a humanitarian catastrophe, shatter opposition morale, fundamentally challenge Turkish strategic ambitions, and deny the opposition its most valuable bargaining chip before the international community.

The campaign against Aleppo City began in October 2015 and proceeded in several phases. Regime forces enabled by Russia and Iran initially mounted probing attacks along multiple fronts in Aleppo and Idlib Provinces as part of a larger campaign designed to confuse and overextend the opposition. They conducted shaping operations in the southern, eastern, and northern countryside of Aleppo City in order to draw opposition forces out of urban terrain, relieve long-besieged pockets of regime forces, and set conditions for a future decisive operation to besiege the city, as ISW warned on December 30, 2015. They also secured core regime terrain along the Syrian Coast against further opposition attacks through a series of rapid offensives in Latakia Province. These gains marked a fundamental shift in battlefield momentum following dramatic losses experienced by the regime in the first half of 2015.

President Assad has used unconventional shaping operations to complement these ground offensives and further strengthen his bargaining position. The regime intensified its campaign of sieges and aerial bombardment against opposition-held pockets in Homs and Damascus Provinces in order to impose one-sided local ceasefires that would allow it to consolidate control in these two vital cities. These operations in some cases included the use of chlorine gas and other unidentified chemical weapons in violation of international prohibitions. The regime also escalated a campaign of targeted assassinations against key opposition commanders - most notably the Saudi-backed Damascus powerbroker Zahran Alloush - in order to weaken the political influence of its opponents. These gains strengthen the hand held by President Assad at the negotiating table and incentivize further violence among all sides in an attempt to secure additional concessions during an eventual settlement. The mounting pressure will tend to drive the opposition towards militarily reliable but politically irreconcilable Salafi-jihadist groups such as Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra. Conditions on the ground remain unsuitable for the achievement of any meaningful peace in Syria.

Aleppo Province

The regime and its allies have waged a multi-pronged campaign in Aleppo Province over the past four months to set conditions for an offensive to isolate and ultimately seize Aleppo City. The opposition is uniquely vulnerable in Aleppo City due to its position along a lengthy salient that relies upon one primary ground line of communication (GLOC) that faces compounding pressures from the regime, ISIS, and the Syrian Kurdish YPG. The return of the largest urban center in Syria to government control would represent a major victory for Syrian President Bashar al-Assad that would bolster his leverage in current or future political negotiations. A successful campaign for Aleppo City would also constitute a serious blow to the morale of opposition groups that have contested the city since mid-2012.

The operations in Aleppo Province have hinged upon heavy military support from both Russian warplanes and Iranian proxy fighters. Russia concentrated a significant portion of its air campaign against opposition forward positions and supply lines in Aleppo Province. Meanwhile, U.S. officials estimated in October 2015 that up to 2,000 Hezbollah, Afghan, and Iraqi Shi’a militia fighters led by Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) – Quds Force commander Maj. Gen. Qassem Suleimani currently operated in Aleppo Province. U.S. officials also stated that Russian Spetsnaz special operations forces recently began operating in conjunction with pro-regime forces near Aleppo City. The regime has become increasingly dependent on this foreign support in order to conduct successful maneuver warfare.

Southern Aleppo Province

The regime and its allies launched the first shaping operations of their reinvigorated campaign in Aleppo Province on October 15, 2015. Regime forces supported by heavy Russian air cover and Iraqi Shi’a militiamen mounted an offensive against the sparsely-populated opposition-held villages in the southern countryside of Aleppo City. The regime secured steady advances against opposition forces over subsequent weeks despite opposition attempts to reinforce the front with hundreds of fighters drawn from Aleppo City and northern Aleppo Province. Several Western-backed opposition factions also deployed multiple TOW anti-tank missiles systems to the region. An opportunistic attack by ISIS in late October 2015 managed to disrupt the ongoing operation temporarily by seizing several positions along the regime’s primary ground line of communication (GLOC) to Aleppo City. Pro-regime forces nonetheless seized the opposition-held towns of Hadher and Al-Eis on November 12, securing the only prominent population centers in southern Aleppo Province.

The opposition responded to the advances by deploying valuable reinforcements to the region. Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) and other key opposition groups reinforced the southern countryside of Aleppo City from Idlib Province. Prominent Salafi-jihadist group Ahrar al-Sham (HASI) issued a general call for mobilization to southern Aleppo Province on November 13, 2015. The arrival of fresh opposition reinforcements managed to blunt and in some cases reverse regime gains on a tactical level. These minor reversals also corresponded with an apparent operational pause by pro-regime forces to consolidate their new holdings and receive additional reinforcement, including several advanced T-90 main battle tanks provided by Russia. The regime mounted a renewed offensive in early December and seized the opposition-held town of Khan Touman directly southwest of Aleppo City by December 20. The regime and its allies have used these new gains to contest the strategic M5 Highway and the opposition-held southwestern suburbs of Aleppo City.

The regime designed its operational maneuvers in southern Aleppo Province to set conditions for the upcoming offensive to isolate opposition forces in Aleppo City. The offensive drew opposition reinforcements out of Aleppo City and fixed them in a battle of open terrain that allowed the regime to fully-utilize its advantages in armor, airpower, and artillery. The loss of this pool of combat reserves will weaken opposition defenses against future operations by the regime and its allies to isolate Aleppo City. The gains also position the regime to threaten the eastern flank of core opposition-held terrain in Idlib Province. Iranian-backed proxies have repeatedly asserted that the operation in southern Aleppo Province ultimately aims to relieve the besieged pro-regime towns of Fu’ah and Kefraya near Idlib City. The need to defend against this threat further constrains the flexibility and freedom of action available to opposition commanders in northwestern Syria.

Kuweires Airbase and Al-Bab

The regime and its allies began a second simultaneous shaping operation in eastern Aleppo Province on October 15, 2015 in order to relieve the besieged Kuweires Airbase. The base faced repeated challenges from ISIS that threatened to overrun the facility, fueling simmering discontent within the regime’s base of popular support along the Syrian Coast. Elite regime light infantry units supported by Russian aircraft and reinforcements from Lebanese Hezbollah conducted a slow battle of penetration along a narrow front in the face of heavy ISIS resistance. Pro-regime forces successfully established a ground line of communications (GLOC) to the Kuweires Airbase on November 10 in a major symbolic victory for Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. The operation revitalized the morale of regime loyalists and demonstrated the first tangible battlefield achievement for the regime since the Russian intervention on September 30.

The regime has since leveraged its forward position at the Kuweires Airbase as a staging ground to conduct follow-on operations against ISIS in eastern Aleppo Province. Pro-regime forces expanded the defensive perimeter of the Kuweires Airbase throughout late November 2015, enabling the regime to resume both fixed-wing and rotary-wing flights out of the airbase by December 15. Regime forces later conducted several advances west of Kuweires Airbase in an offensive aimed at encircling an ISIS pocket that threaten the key regime-held logistical hub of Al-Safira and the adjacent supply route to Aleppo City. This offensive sets the stage for a classic ‘cauldron battle’ drawn from Soviet military doctrine, illustrating the degree to which Russian advisors likely play a role in operational planning. The regime also advanced north from the Kuweires Airbase in January 2016, seizing several villages less than five miles from the major ISIS-held urban center of Al-Bab. Regime forces currently hold optimal positions to mount a potential operation to seize Al-Bab and secure additional legitimacy before the international community as a partner against ISIS. Russia reportedly deployed two hundred personnel and several air defense systems to Kuweires Airbase in February 2016 in likely preparation for such an operation. The regime may intend to use future anti-ISIS operations by the U.S.-led coalition in eastern Aleppo Province as an opportunity to secure its own gains near Aleppo City.

Northern Aleppo Province

The regime mounted its most significant shaping operation in Aleppo Province in February 2016 with a renewed attempt to complete the encirclement of Aleppo City. Pro-regime forces lifted the siege of the pro-regime towns of Nubl and Zahraa in northern Aleppo Province on February 3, linking regime forces in an arc of control that dominates almost all opposition supply lines between Turkey and Aleppo City. The regime previously failed to capitalize upon a similar offensive over the same terrain in February 2015. The opposition nonetheless faces a severe challenge in mobilizing sufficient forces to reverse this new attack given the conditions set by the regime and its allies in Aleppo Province over the past four months. The regime and its allies will likely attempt to complete the encirclement of Aleppo City in coming weeks by seizing its opposition-held northwestern suburbs. The end result of this operation could be a protracted siege of Aleppo City that bolsters the political leverage exerted by Syrian President Bashar al-Assad while subjecting the remaining civilian population in opposition-held districts to a punishing campaign of starvation and aerial bombardment.

Latakia Province

The regime and its allies simultaneously conducted major operations to expel opposition forces from core regime terrain along the Syrian Coast. Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) and other armed factions have occupied the Jabal al-Turkman and Jabal al-Akrad regions of northern Latakia Province since 2012, providing the opposition with a safe haven from which to threaten the Alawite population that constitute the popular base of support for Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. This threat reached unprecedented heights after opposition forces secured control over almost all of Idlib Province in mid-2015 and began posturing for an offensive into Latakia Province. The stabilization of this front thus constituted an immediate priority for the regime and its foreign backers. Russia provided extensive military support with the provision of technical advisors, armored vehicles, rocket artillery, and a heavy campaign of aerial bombardment based from its nearby airfield at Bassel al-Assad International Airport near Latakia City. Iran also committed significant numbers of proxy forces to enable the mobilization of local pro-regime militias. These deployments produced a significant reversal in the balance of forces in Latakia Province over recent the past three months.

Pro-regime forces launched an offensive against opposition forces in Jabal al-Turkman on November 19, 2015 in an attempt to deny opposition forces access to supply routes across the Turkish border. The regime seized multiple villages and hilltops in the mountainous region within several days with the support of heavy Russian airstrikes. The offensive drew immediate condemnation from Turkey as thousands of ethnic Turkmen refugees fled across the border ahead of regime forces. Two Turkish fighter jets later shot down a Russian warplane on November 24 after the aircraft violated the border while conducting operations against the opposition. The escalation in geopolitical tensions nonetheless failed to prevent continued tactical advances by the regime and its allies in both Jabal al-Turkman and Jabal al-Akrad.

The regime secured major breakthroughs in its operations to clear Latakia Province in January 2016. Regime forces seized the opposition stronghold of Salma in Jabal al-Akrad on January 12 after successfully surrounding the town from three sides over the preceding weeks. Salma occupied a dominant high ground and served as the anchor for the opposition frontline in northern Latakia Province. The regime and its allies exploited the collapse of the front in order to secure rapid advances deep into opposition-held terrain. Pro-regime forces later successfully encircled and seized the town of Rabi’ah on January 24, securing the primary command-and-control node for the opposition in Jabal al-Turkman. These gains threaten to expel all overt opposition presence from Latakia Province over the next few months. The regime and its allies likely intend to ultimately seize the opposition-held city of Jisr al-Shughour in western Idlib Province in order to anchor their advance and secure a buffer against future counterattacks.

Strategic Effects

The direct threat posed by Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to core opposition terrain in Aleppo City and other parts of Northern Syria will present a critical challenge for U.S. strategic interests. The realities on the ground currently being set by the regime will entrench the position of President Assad and his foreign backers, preserving Syria as a regional base of operations for both Iran and Russia. The renewed pressure being placed upon the opposition also risks driving opposition groups to deepen their coordination with Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) and other Salafi-jihadist factions. Major opposition factions in the Jaysh al-Fatah Operations Room based in Idlib Province reportedly came close to signing a unification agreement supported by Jabhat al-Nusra emir Abu Muhammed al-Joulani. The incentives to solidify this cooperation will only grow in the face of further regime gains. The current violence thus stands to solidify Syria as an arena for U.S. adversaries over the coming months.

The willingness of parties on both sides to pursue further conflict will only serve to prolong the bloodshed of the Syrian Civil War and exacerbate the humanitarian consequences of the conflict. UN officials reported that nearly 40,000 civilians fled the southern countryside of Aleppo City amidst regime operations in October 2015, while at least 70,000 civilians have fled the latest round of violence in northern Aleppo Province. The regime has also conducted a series of engagements in in Central and Southern Syria meant to increase the pressure brought to bear upon remaining opposition pockets, particularly through the use of sieges and starvation as weapons of war. The flows of displaced persons generated by this campaign will place additional strain upon regional U.S. allies while fueling further resentment and radicalization among the refugee population.

The looming siege of Aleppo City poses a strategic dilemma for Turkey. Turkish President Recep Erdogan provided weapons, supplies, and safe haven to opposition forces in order to advance Turkey’s strategic objectives, including the formation of a Sunni Islamist government to replace Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. The mounting opposition losses in Aleppo Province directly undermine these core strategic interests and bring Russian military personnel to vital positions within forty miles of the Syrian-Turkish border. Turkey will likely respond to these inflections through military force. President Erdogan may even consider a range of high-risk military options to reassert his control over the conflict that could include providing the opposition with man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS) or mounting a cross-border intervention into Northern Syria. These operations risk fueling an intensified regional proxy war or even a direct confrontation between Turkey and Russia. The current campaign undertaken by President Assad and his allies in Moscow and Tehran will be a driver of long-term disorder in Syria and the wider Middle East.

The Military Situation in Syria’s Aleppo Province

December 30, 2015

By: Jennifer Cafarella, Genevieve Casagrande, and Jodi Brignola

Capturing Aleppo City remains a primary objective for both pro- and anti-regime military forces in Syria. While no key terrain in Aleppo changed hands in 2015, the aggregation of numerous pressures on rebel defensive lines could enable Syrian regime forces to finish the encirclement of Aleppo City in 2016. Pro-regime forces supported by Russian airstrikes have made important gains south of the city, but have failed to advance on key front lines to its north. Pro-regime forces have also advanced against the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) east of the city, notably securing the besieged Kuweiris military airbase on November 10, but largely remain focused on Syrian rebels despite Russian propaganda to the contrary.

Russian and ISIS military actions against rebels in the northern Aleppo countryside are nevertheless compounding pressures that threaten to undermine the rebel defense of the city itself. Russia increased its aerial bombardment of rebel-held areas in Aleppo following the downing of a Russian jet by Turkey on November 24, and continues to target rebel supply lines and key infrastructure necessary to support the continued defense of Aleppo City. ISIS continues to attack rebel forces supported by Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) in an effort to seize control of the border town of Azaz and the adjacent Bab al-Salam border crossing. Frequent skirmishes between Syrian rebels and JN against the Syrian Kurdish People’s Defense Units (YPG) in northwestern Aleppo Province further draw resources away from crucial front lines. This delicate military balance is unlikely to hold under current conditions, which could enable either or both the Syrian regime and ISIS to advance.

The following maps depict regime gains facilitated by Russian airstrikes in Northern Syria and the combination of military pressures that threaten to overwhelm rebel defenses in Aleppo City. 

This map shows gains made by pro-regime forces on two key front lines since Russian airstrikes began: Southern Aleppo Province and Northeastern Latakia Province. The map also depicts one rebel advance north of Hama City. Gains by pro-regime forces in Damascus and Dera’a Provinces are not depicted here, but are similar in scale.

This map depicts the military objectives of the Syrian regime and ISIS, areas frequently targeted by Russian airstrikes, and the key towns and military infrastructure in Aleppo Province in order to show the aggregation of pressures on Syrian rebel forces in Aleppo. 

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) released its own map of Aleppo Province in an effort to demonstrate the effectiveness of the Russian air campaign in bolstering regime operations. The maps contain disinformation that exaggerates the progress made by pro-regime forces with Russian support. The map appears to claim that the regime secured its positions in the southeastern countryside of Aleppo with Russian air support, although these areas have been held by the regime since November 2013. Furthermore, regime control lines in Eastern Aleppo, as portrayed by the Russian map below, are notably exaggerated as the regime has yet to clear the entirety of the supply route running from Aleppo City to Kuweires Airbase. Although the pressures on the opposition have increased, it is important not to overstate the territorial gains that pro-regime forces have made. The regime and Russia seek to undermine rebel will to continue to fight in order to achieve greater leverage at upcoming negotiations between the regime and select opposition members in Geneva on January 25.

This map, released by the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), exaggerates the gains made by pro-regime forces with Russian assistance in Aleppo Province. ISW added the yellow ovals and call out boxes to highlight the Russian overstatements. The other symbols and captions appeared on the MoD map. A zoomed out version of this map released by the Russian MoD map dates the interior control line as September 30, 2015, the start of the Russian aerial campaign in Syria. ISW reproduced the dates for the control lines on this map.

Pro-Regime Forces Relieve Besieged Airbase in Symbolic Victory

By Christopher Kozak

The Syrian regime and its allies reestablished a ground line of communication (GLOC) to the hitherto-besieged Kuweires Airbase east of Aleppo City in their first significant victory since the start of the Russian air campaign in Syria on September 30. Activist sources and Syrian state television reported that an advance party of regime forces established contact with several hundred Syrian Army soldiers besieged by ISIS in Kuweires Airbase on November 10 after seizing the adjacent village of Kuweires al-Sharqi. Clashes are reportedly ongoing as newly-arrived regime reinforcements attempt to expand the base’s defensive perimeter. The advance marks the culmination of one component of a multi-pronged offensive which began on October 15. The success of the operation relied heavily upon Russian air support as well as reinforcement from hundreds of Iranian-backed proxy fighters. U.S. officials previously reported in mid-October that up to 2,000 Iranian, Hezbollah, and Iraqi Shi’a militia fighters had massed southeast of Aleppo City in order to participate in ongoing offensives targeting Kuweires Airbase as well as rebel-held terrain in the southern Aleppo countryside.

The successful relief of the regime forces trapped in Kuweires Airbase will provide a powerful morale boost to the military forces loyal to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. The operation constitutes a much-needed symbolic victory for the Syrian regime following major territorial losses in the first half of 2015 as well as an initial lack of significant progress following the Russian intervention. The rescue of several hundred Syrian Army soldiers who have been besieged since December 2012 will tamper simmering discontent regarding his conduct of the Syrian Civil War. Alawite populations along the Syrian Coast – a core base of popular support for the Syrian regime – organized several protests this summer criticizing the government for failing to relieve Kuweires Airbase and other besieged pro-regime enclaves in northern Syria.

The Syrian regime’s operational intent following the offensive to secure Kuweires Airbase remains unclear. Kuweires Airbase provides no tangible benefit to the Syrian Air Force, which maintains a well-defended and functional airfield at the Aleppo International Airport thirty kilometers to the west. The position of the base itself, however, provides a potential staging ground for regime forces to conduct follow-on operations that challenge ISIS’s presence in eastern Aleppo Province. A continued presence in Kuweires Airbase could allow the Syrian regime to contest ISIS-held terrain on the eastern outskirts of Aleppo City as well as critical ISIS supply lines connecting ar-Raqqa City to the Turkish border. Claims that the elite Syrian Army ‘Tiger Forces’ will soon redeploy from Kuweires to Hama Province nevertheless suggest that the Syrian regime does not intend to use the airfield as a launch pad for major offensive operations in the near-future. The base also remains vulnerable to an ISIS counterattack unless regime forces can seize additional terrain to provide their salient with defense-in-depth. Alternatively, the Syrian regime may intend to withdraw from Kuweires Airbase after securing safe passage for the exfiltration of the base’s garrison. A withdrawal from the airfield would free significant amounts of manpower, equipment, and aerial resupply assets for use on other fronts.

The advances east of Aleppo City nonetheless do little to change the immediate strategic outlook for President Assad. Pro-regime forces have thus far achieved only tactical gains throughout other parts of northwestern Syria despite expanded support from Russia and Iran. Meanwhile, rebel forces seized the operationally-significant town of Morek along the strategic M5 Highway on November 5 as part of a new offensive threatening regime-held Hama City. ISIS also continues to pressure key supply lines for the Syrian regime in both Homs and Aleppo Provinces. Activists reported that ISIS deployed a convoy of at least forty vehicles from ar-Raqqa City to eastern Aleppo Province on November 9 in a likely response to the imminent fall of Kuweires Airbase. These challenges suggest that the Syrian regime and its allies will struggle to translate symbolic gains into enduring operational success.

ISIS Contests Regime Supply Line to Aleppo City

By: Christopher Kozak

ISIS launched a multi-phase counterattack against the Syrian regime and its allies in Aleppo Province which threatens the regime’s control over its primary ground line of communication (GLOC) to Aleppo City. ISIS seized multiple checkpoints along the highway between the towns of Khanaser and Ithriya in southern Aleppo Province on 23 OCT. These gains blocked the route used by the Syrian regime to deploy reinforcements to Aleppo from Hama and Homs Provinces. ISIS subsequently initiated a major attack targeting the key regime-held town of Safira southeast of Aleppo City. Safira serves as a key node for Iranian military activity in Syria. The town also contains a complex of strategic defense factories implicated in the production of chemical weapons and ‘barrel bombs’ for the Syrian regime. ISIS fighters have reportedly advanced into the far-northern outskirts of Safira despite initial deployments of regime reinforcements to the area.

The advances by ISIS near Aleppo City demonstrate the limited capabilities of the Syrian regime despite expanded support from Iranian-backed proxy groups and Russian airstrikes. ISIS remains unlikely to seize Safira due to the strategic importance of the town to both Iran and the Syrian regime. Nonetheless, ISIS’s counterattacks have successfully forced the regime to assume a defensive posture and deprioritize the ongoing offensive to relieve the besieged Kuweires Airbase. ISIS may intend to exploit this redirection of forces through further attacks against the regime either northeast of Aleppo City or further south in eastern Hama Province. Rebel forces in Aleppo Province also stand to benefit from the redeployment of pro-regime forces away from frontlines south of Aleppo City. The Syrian regime made no significant gains against rebel forces in Aleppo Province over the past four days following major advances last week. Recent intensifications in Russian and Iranian support to the Syrian regime may not be sufficient to force a rapid change in the dynamics of the Syrian Civil War.

Regime and Iranian Forces Launch Multi-Pronged Offensive in Aleppo

By: Christopher Kozak

The Syrian regime and its allies launched a major, multi-pronged offensive in Aleppo Province on October 15 in order to bolster the regime's foothold in Aleppo City. Both Russia and Iran likely aim to enable Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to reassert control over Syria’s largest city given the heavy involvement of their military forces in these operations. Russia and Iran will not limit their support to reinforcing the regime's defenses in its heartland along the Syrian coast.  Regime forces supported by Iranian proxy fighters conducted an unsuccessful operation to complete the encirclement of rebel forces inside Aleppo City in February 2015. Expanded Russian and Iranian support could enable the Syrian regime to mount a renewed effort to besiege the city. 

The renewed ground operations aim at a minimum to relieve the long-standing sieges of pro-regime enclaves in Aleppo Province. Joint regime and Iranian forces began a push to relieve several hundred Syrian Army soldiers trapped in the Kuweires Airbase east of Aleppo City on October 15. ISIS forces have threatened to overrun the airbase at least twice over the past few months. Pro-regime forces may also ultimately seek to lift the siege on the Shi’a-majority towns of Nubl and Zahraa northwest of Aleppo City, which have been besieged by rebel forces since July 2012. Alawite populations along the Syrian Coast – a core support zone for the Syrian regime – organized several protests this summer criticizing the government for failing to relieve the siege of Nubl, Zahraa, and Kuweires Airbase. A successful operation to relieve the base would provide a powerful morale boost to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s base of popular support and tamper simmering discontent regarding his conduct of the Syrian Civil War.

Syrian forces also began the second prong of the offensive against rebel-held villages south of Aleppo City on October 15. The operation received support from both Russian airstrikes and up to 2,000 Iranian, Hezbollah, and Iraqi Shi’a militia fighters led by Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) – Quds Force commander Maj. Gen. Qassem Suleimani. Aleppo-based rebel factions reinforced their positions with hundreds of fighters drawn from Aleppo City and the northern Aleppo countryside. Several rebel factions also deployed TOW anti-tank missiles systems provided by a covert U.S.-backed Military Operations Command (MOC) based in Turkey. Pro-regime forces have thus far seized at least seven villages amidst heavy clashes which in turn destroyed at least fifteen regime tanks, bulldozers, and armored personnel carriers.

The maneuver south of Aleppo City likely aims to set conditions for an upcoming offensive to isolate rebel forces in Aleppo City. Regime and Iranian forces began conducting probing attacks along rebel frontlines throughout northwestern Syria after the Russian air campaign began on September 30. These localized offensives likely constitute components of a larger campaign designed to confuse and overextend rebel forces in advance of a decisive operation to penetrate into core rebel-held terrain. The decisive blow will likely target rebel positions north of Aleppo City. The attacks south of Aleppo City may thus constitute an attempt draw rebel reinforcements away from Aleppo City and fix them far from the northern Aleppo countryside. Any successful operation to seize or otherwise neutralize Aleppo City would deal a powerful symbolic and material blow to the Syrian opposition. Tightening control over Syria’s largest city would also place the Syrian regime and its allies in a position of strength before any negotiations regarding a political transition, an initial proposal for which the U.S. and eight other countries floated over the past few weeks. 

The Regime's Strategic Objectives

This analysis of the Syrian regime’s strategic objectives is adapted from the ISW report “An Army in All Corners”: Assad’s Campaign Strategy in Syria by ISW Syria Analyst Christopher Kozak published in April 2015. 

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May 21 Update: The recent fall of the strategic city of Palmyra to ISIS highlights the risks faced by Syrian President Bashar al-Assad as he attempts to counterbalance the regime’s increasingly-fraught military position with his desire to maintain an “Army in All Corners” strategy. Palmyra represented a key lynchpin in the system of remote outposts garrisoned by the regime throughout the country as a way of maintaining the appearance of a national presence while reinforcing Assad’s “own legitimacy as the only viable alternative to a failed, jihadist-dominated Syrian state.” The loss of Palmyra thus marks a major blow to the campaign designs of the Assad regime and signals that time may be running out for Assad’s plan to garner international support as the only effective anti-ISIS actor on the ground.

The military campaign of the Syrian regime has been primarily driven by Assad’s core objective to preserve his rule in a post-war Syria through a negotiated “political solution.” However, Assad’s efforts to drive the situation on the ground in a favorable direction faced a number of key challenges. The geographic dispersion of regime positions and the countrywide scope of the Syrian Civil War forced the Assad regime to prioritize among military fronts in 2014, enabling opposition forces to advance in multiple locations including Idlib and Dera’a Provinces. Salafi-jihadist rebel groups also grew in strength and coordination in 2014. The regime faced new challenges on the battlefield as the consolidation of military strength among JN, Ahrar al-Sham, and other Salafi-jihadist factions in Syria throughout 2014 enabled numerous major battlefield victories over the regime in Aleppo, Idlib, and Dera’a Provinces.

However, these developments also sparked new opportunities for Assad to align with the international community by fueling the narrative that the Syrian government faces an invasion of ‘terrorists’ that poses a transnational threat. Assad promoted this framing of the conflict in order to reinforce his own political legitimacy as the only viable alternative to a failed, jihadist-dominated Syrian state. Assad likely reasons that by avoiding decisive defeat and preserving his presence throughout the country, the insurgency will eventually be depleted as opposition forces grow increasingly radicalized and alienated from their domestic and international supporters.

Syrian President Bashar al-Assad Visits Troops in Jobar

Maintaining Syrian Territorial Integrity

The Assad regime prioritizes maintaining Syrian Arab Army (SAA) presence throughout Syria in order to frame its claim to a united and contiguous post-war Syrian state. President Assad expressly delineated this policy in his January 2015 interview with Foreign Affairs, stating: “If you look at a military map now, the Syrian army exists in every corner. Not every place; by every corner, I mean north, south, east, west, and between. If you didn't believe in a unified Syria, that Syria can go back to its previous position, you wouldn't send the army there as a government.” The strategy of an “army in all corners” is designed to preclude a partitioned Syria or rump Syrian state from forming. The existence of SAA formations across Syria also provides President Assad with a political narrative as the leader of a sovereign and undivided country. Assad is unable, however, to use his dispersed footprint to establish security throughout the country in the face of an active armed opposition.

Assad’s remote outposts incur risk to his campaign. Their strict defensive posture and inability to project force into their surroundings makes them targetable by opposing forces. Limited options for reinforcement and resupply can leave their garrisons isolated and vulnerable in the face of concerted offensives. This risk was brutally demonstrated in July and August 2014 when ISIS militants overran a series of holdout regime military bases in ar-Raqqa and Hasaka Provinces, capturing and executing hundreds of SAA soldiers. Nevertheless, these strongholds also frequently withstand enemy attacks, providing the Assad regime with staying power at little cost. The besieged Wadi al-Deif and al-Hamidiyah military bases in southern Idlib Province, for example, fixed opposition forces for nearly two years before being overrun in a joint Jabhat al-Nusra (JN)–Ahrar al-Sham (HASI) operation in December 2014. Ultimately, this element of regime strategy fails when outposts are isolated and overwhelmed. This trend may accelerate in 2015 amidst increasing coordination between mainly-Islamist opposition forces.

Dominating Human Terrain

The Assad regime also seeks to maintain its control over the Syrian civilian population in order to bolster its image as the only legitimate governance structure in the country. President Assad has repeatedly stated that the most critical battle in Syria is the one for the Syrian people. Assad also detailed this policy in his interview with Foreign Affairs: “Before talking about winning territory, talk about winning the hearts and minds and the support of the Syrian people. That’s what we have won. What’s left is logistical; it’s technical. That is a matter of time.” Experts estimate that the Syrian regime controls between 55 and 72 percent of the Syria’s remaining populace as of January 2015. The Syrian opposition, on the other hand, controls less than a third of the country’s population – affirming President Assad’s boast that “the communities which embraced terrorists have become very small.” Assad did not mention that the remainder of Syria’s population now lies within areas under the regime’s control as a deliberate outcome of Assad’s own punitive depopulation campaigns.

On the ground, this rhetoric translates into an extremely lethal form of population-centric counter-insurgency (COIN) in areas under opposition control. The Syrian regime inflicts mass punishment against civilians in opposition areas to force large-scale displacement. Regime ground forces besiege rebel-held neighborhoods and cities, cutting off aid supplies and spurring thousands to flee to regime zones of control in the face of starvation. Civilians in opposition-held zones are also subject to indiscriminate targeting by artillery, airstrikes, and crudely-devised “barrel bombs.” By March 2015, these barbaric methods had killed more than 220,000 Syrians and displaced over 11.5 million civilians, mainly from opposition-held terrain. In sum, the concentration of the Syrian population in territory controlled by Assad comes in large part as the result of a humanitarian crisis generated by the regime itself.

Syrian Defense Minister Fahd al-Freij

This disparity offers the Assad regime several distinct advantages over rebel forces. Control over the majority of the surviving Syrian population provides opportunity to tap manpower reserves to aid the regime’s fight and also restricts civilians from joining the Syrian opposition. The regime also benefits from enduring economic activity that generally no longer exists in rebel-held areas. Continuous efforts to depopulate opposition-held zones and consolidate civilians into regime-held areas feed into the narrative that “the majority of the Syrian people…support their president.” This argument manipulates Syria’s recent history and portrays the staying power of Bashar al-Assad and his government favorably in political negotiations. Acceptance of this statement at face value risks legitimizing mass violence against civilians as a tool which could be used in other conflicts.

Projecting Domestic and International Legitimacy

The regime uses the appearance of enduring military and social control in Syria to bolster domestic and international legitimacy in preparation to discuss political settlement. Assad regularly uses “jihadism” in Syria as an argument to curry international favor. In an interview conducted on November 28, 2014, President Assad criticized U.S.-led coalition airstrikes against ISIS in Syria by insisting that “terrorism cannot be destroyed from the air, and you cannot achieve results on the ground without land forces.” Regime officials regularly promote the SAA as the only realistic force with the “experience in the field” to counter terrorist groups operating in Syria, such as JN or ISIS Assad reaffirmed in a later interview on January 20, 2015 that this partner “definitely…has to be Syrian troops.” In some cases, Assad backs his claims with force. The Syrian Air Force, for example, conducted several sorties against the ISIS “capital” of ar-Raqqa in a move clearly designed to align with the global anti-terrorism campaign following the launch of anti-ISIS coalition air raids in Syria on September 22, 2014.

The regime also attempts to maintain vestiges of democratic processes in order to underscore the claims of legitimacy made by the Syrian government. The 2014 Syrian presidential elections were widely held by regime officials as an expression of mass popular support for the Syrian government despite pervasive indications of fraud and voter suppression. The Assad regime retains a “tolerated” internal opposition group, the National Coordination Committee for Democratic Change (NCCDC), which provides a façade of political pluralism. On January 26, 2015, regime officials even traveled to Moscow to hold talks with NCCDC members. The NCCDC possesses no representation from either the exiled Syrian National Coalition (SNC) opposition government or the armed Syrian opposition on the ground. The delegations unsurprisingly agreed on most of the key building blocks of the regime’s political strategy, including the maintenance of Syrian unity and sovereignty, the importance of combating terrorism, and the necessity of a political settlement.

The Assad regime’s political goals generated a military strategy which remained relatively consistent throughout 2014 and into 2015 despite shifts in battlefield dynamics which forced the regime to adapt to new circumstances. These disruptions, including unexpected rebel successes in southern Syria and the withdrawal of thousands of allied Iraqi Shi’a fighters from Damascus following the fall of Mosul in June 2014, have often sparked key inflection points in the campaign for Syria. These shifts forced the regime to adapt its capabilities frequently, but they have rarely altered the ways in which regime forces have attempted to carry out the war. This resiliency indicates that the Assad regime possesses a coherent military strategy that has been robust enough to absorb the pressures of unanticipated events. Assad likely believes that upholding this clear plan of action while avoiding unnecessary risks on the battlefield will allow him to win the war for Syria without an outright military victory.

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Next installment: The Regime's Military Capabilities: Part 1--The Syrian Army, Paramilitaries, and Asymmetric Capabilities