Ukraine Warning Update: Possible Clashes Could Trigger Snap Elections

By Nataliya Bugayova, Kathleen Weinberger, Franklin Holcomb and the ISW Russia-Ukraine Team

Key Takeaway: President Putin and pro-Russia actors within Ukraine aim to trigger snap parliamentary elections to bring pro-Russian and populist parties to power and start rebuilding the client regime. ISW assesses that Russia intends to provoke clashes during a large march of Orthodox Christians to Kyiv on July 27 to cause a crisis, to try to set conditions for snap elections. Russia’s military action against Ukraine failed to reverse the political defeat dealt to Russia when the Euromaidan movement came into power in 2014. President Putin seeks to find lower profile methods of regaining control of Ukraine, including exploiting lack of political unity and decreasing public support for the current Ukrainian governing coalition. Bringing Ukraine back to Russia’s orbit is a major strategic objective for President Putin in his efforts to reassert Russia’s power globally.

Tripwire: The Ukrainian government may face a Russian-provoked political crisis if clashes erupt between Russian Orthodox members and Ukrainian nationalists, as this could be sufficient to undermine the governing coalition’s mandate, forcing snap elections and allowing pro-Russia and populist parties to regain political influence. The “All Ukrainian Crusade for Peace,” a march of thousands of Orthodox Christian believers, departed from its primary rallying points in Svyatohirs’k in the east and Pochaiv in the west on July 03 headed for the Ukrainian capital of Kyiv. The march, the first of its kind, will move throughout Ukraine, including separatist controlled territory, and will culminate on July 27^th in Kyiv with services projected to be attended by 30,000 people. Ukrainian officials claimed  on July 16^th that Russian intelligence services have infiltrated the march and are preparing provocations to spark clashes. Ukrainian nationalist groups, opposed to the Orthodox march due to its ties to Russia, have blocked roads along the procession and announced their intention to refuse the march entrance to the center of Kyiv. Ukrainian security services are on high alert. The Ukrainian Ministry of Internal Affairs formed a “coordination council” to safeguard the Orthodox march and prevent violence.

Pattern: Russia has previously utilized pro-Russia social movements and the narrative of religious and political rights violations to mobilize resistance against state governments. This is a strategy that has been used in separatist areas in Ukraine, in Georgia in 2008, in the breakaway region of Transnistria in Moldova and with regard to ethnic Russians in the Baltic States. Russia has undertaken a deliberate media campaign since the march began to frame Ukrainian nationalists, who they claim are terrorizing[i] and threatening[ii] the Orthodox believers, as likely perpetrators of violence. These accusations are consistent with Russia’s efforts to frame[iii] Ukraine as a latently fascist society that targets Russian Orthodox[iv] believers and Russian speakers in Ukraine. Russia might use women and children participating in the march as human shields as has been done by Russian proxies in Eastern Ukraine, in order to perpetrate this narrative and further undermine Ukraine’s image in the international community.

Timing: The march is occurring as opposition parties in Ukraine openly prepare themselves for early parliamentary elections. Although the current Ukrainian government holds a mandate until 2019, snap parliamentary elections can be automatically triggered if the parliament is not able to operate for 30 days or if called by the president at will. While Ukraine is showing some progress towards further integration with the EU and rebuilding the economy, the Ukrainian government remains politically vulnerable. Public approval of parliament’s performance and of President Poroshenko is low, the economic situation continues to stagnate, and there is an overall lack of consolidation among pro-western forces. Violent clashes between marchers and Ukrainian nationalists could trigger snap elections by causing political and social chaos that would allow opposition parties to claim that the ruling party no longer holds a mandate. Political players in Ukraine have positioned themselves to increase their presence in parliament in the case that elections are called:

• Pro-Russian former allies of former-President Viktor Yanukovich are preparing for a political comeback. Leaders and members of the Opposition Bloc, the successor to Yanukovich’s pro-Russian Party of Regions, were forced to assume a low profile after he was ousted in 2014. However, recently Opposition Bloc members have begun to reemerge and reinsert themselves into Ukrainian politics. The Opposition Bloc attempted to establish a perception of legitimacy when it claimed victory[v] in a number of local elections in eastern and southwestern Ukraine in October 2015. They have openly called for the new parliamentary elections.
• Ukrainian political parties that are not overtly pro-Russia but oppose the Ukrainian government are attempting to gain political influence as support for the governing coalition wanes. Yulia Tymoshenko, leader of the Fatherland Party and former Ukrainian Prime Minister, called for early elections most recently on July 18^th. Tymoshenko has allied herself with the leader of the Opposition Bloc and former close ally of President Victor Yanukovich, Yuri Boyko. Tymoshenko and Boyko blockaded the podium of Ukraine’s parliament on July 12^th in a protest with highly populist economic overtones. Tymoshenko also aligned herself with the leader of the Radical Party Oleh Lyashko to lead a populist demonstration[vi] in Kyiv on July 6 to protest rising gas prices while accusing Ukrainian President Poroshenko and Ukrainian Prime Minister Volodymyr Hroysman of organizing “tariff genocide.” 
• Reformist and western-oriented politicians in Ukraine have been preparing to join the political race by posturing as reformist alternatives to the Petro Poroshenko Bloc. Former Georgian President and Governor of Odesa Mikheil Saakashvili indicated in May that he will form his own political party in Ukraine. Pro-Western politicians affiliated with the Euromaidan movement also aim to create their own reformist “Democratic Alliance party.”   

Assessment: The eruption of clashes on or around July 27^th could provide opposition groups and pro-Russian forces with sufficient leverage to trigger early elections in Ukraine. The opposition parties will try to exploit low approval ratings of the current government, a deteriorating economic situation, and the lack of unity in pro-western factions to win more seats in parliament. If pro-western reformist parties maintain political unity heading into elections, however, they could stop the Russian loyalists and populists from making significant gains in the elections.

• Russia’s Most Likely Course of Action: Russia is likely to use the Orthodox march to encourage or instigate clashes between Ukrainian nationalists and pro-Russian groups when the march reaches Kyiv. Russia aims to create sufficient political chaos with these clashes that President Poroshenko is pressured to call early elections, or else to disrupt parliament and trigger snap elections according to Ukrainian law. Russia will support Ukrainian political movements that oppose the current government to ensure that they gain power in the case of snap elections and push for representatives from separatist regions to be included. Russia will also exploit the clashes in the march to frame Ukraine as an unstable and violent society in order to discourage further Western support.  If Ukrainian security forces manage to prevent violent clashes, Russia will aim to push for early elections in Ukraine by other means, such as increased economic pressure.
• Russia’s Most Dangerous Course of Action:  Russia could provoke clashes which pro-Russian actors would escalate to the point of major violence or major protests in Kyiv. These clashes could destabilize, and potentially, collapse the Ukrainian government and return a Russian client regime to power. They may tempt separatist forces to escalate militarily in the Donbas region in order to exploit distraction and disunity in Kyiv.

Implications: Opposition parties in Ukraine, including pro-Russian players, have a high likelihood of winning significant political victories in parliament if snap elections are called. Victory of parties loyal to the Russian Kremlin in Ukraine will have far-reaching implications for Ukraine’s relationship with the West and for Russia’s ability to pursue revanchist policies.

1. The return of pro-Russia and populists parties to power in Ukraine would be a major geostrategic victory for President Putin. It would begin the reversal of gains made in the aftermath of Euromaidan Revolution. Ukraine would be pulled further from the EU and the reform path, and closer to Russia. It would also signal to the rest of the former Soviet Union that Moscow will not relinquish control of territory it perceives as within Russia’s presumed sphere of influence. 
2. Political turmoil and nationalist clashes in Ukraine can help Russia build its anti-Ukrainian narrative in the EU to pull Ukraine further away from European integration. 
3. Russia could potentially succeed in persuading European countries to lift sanctions in December of 2016. EU countries suffer from sanctions on Russia and could be convinced to lift them if Ukraine abandons its pro-Western stance and pursues rapprochement with Russia. The easing of sanctions would indicate to President Putin that he may act with impunity in Eastern Europe due to the absence of punishment mechanisms for Russia’s revanchist policies. 
4. U.S. support for Ukraine might weaken if Ukraine realigns towards Russia. Russia may use the violent clashes in its information warfare campaign to undermine Ukraine’s image and cast
   doubt on its reliability as a partner. 

Indicators: The continued propaganda campaign that tracks the Orthodox march indicates that Russia is continuing to prepare the information space in Europe and domestically and believes that clashes are likely. Aggressive or increasingly agitated statements from Ukrainian nationalist organizations such as Right Sector would indicate that Ukrainian nationalists may be preparing to act against what they perceive as Russian provocateurs and infiltrators. Aggressive statements or signs of preparations for rapid escalation by pro-Russia separatist forces in Donbas would indicate that Russia’s military proxies are preparing to exploit political uncertainty and civil discontent within Ukraine. Editorials[vii] by the Russian press predicting snap elections or government collapse could also reveal Russian intent to trigger these events.

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[i] [“Militants of ‘Right Sector’ tried to disrupt the Christian march for peace in Ukraine.”] Lenta.ru, July 13, 2016, [https://lenta.ru/news/2016/07/13/pravosector/

[ii] [“ ‘Right Sector’ and ‘Azov’ attack the Christian march for peace in Ukraine.”] Pravda, July 13, 2016, http://www.pravda.ru/news/world/formerussr/ukraine/13-07-2016/1306523-ukraina-0/

[iii] “Odessa tragedy ‘fascism in action’. RT, May 7, 2016, https://www.rt.com/news/157292-lavrov-odessa-ukraine-fascism/

[iv] [“On the meeting of K.K. Dolgov, Representative on Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia with Samardzic Markovic, the Director General of Democracy at the Council of Europe .”] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, March 23, 2016, http://www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/2184470

[v] “Ukraine’s Opposition Bloc says it has won elections in six regions.” TASS, October 25, 2015. tp://tass.ru/en/world/831691

[vi] “Protest march in Kiev against increased gas prices and civic services.” TASS, July 6, 2016, http://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/3432749

[vii] “Ukraine from July 12-19: Radicals Raged.” RIA, July 20, 2016. http://ria.ru/analytics/20160720/1472413639.html

Ukraine Warning Intelligence Update: Social Unrest Likely as Ukraine’s Ruling Coalition Breaks

By Hugo Spaulding

Key Takeaway: Ukraine’s post-revolution leadership faces an existential crisis on the second anniversary of the collapse of Russia’s client regime in Kyiv, which transpired on February 21, 2014. The pro-Western coalition lost its parliamentary majority at a moment of severe popular distrust of President Petro Poroshenko and Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk. Without sustained efforts to support reform and combat corruption, Poroshenko faces the prospect of mounting social unrest and the resurgence of Ukraine’s political old guard.

Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko’s party triggered the disintegration of the pro-Western four-party coalition by launching a failed vote of no confidence against Ukrainian Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk on February 16. Poroshenko called for Yatsenyuk’s resignation on the day of the vote after junior coalition parties announced their unwillingness to work with the prime minister, threatening to deadlock already stagnant efforts at economic and anti-corruption reform. The “Fatherland” party of former Prime Minister Yuliya Tymoshenko and the Western Ukraine-based “Self Help” party defected to the opposition in response to the failure of the no-confidence motion, which precludes another vote of no confidence until the next session of parliament begins in September. The withdrawal of the two junior parties deprives the “European Ukraine” coalition of its majority in parliament and takes it farther from the constitutional supermajority with which it began its mandate.

The collapse of the coalition is likely to ensure the continued stagnation of reforms necessary to maintain vital financial support from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which signaled earlier this month that it would delay an assistance package worth $1.7 billion until the future of the cabinet became clear. Russia’s continued military operations in the southeastern Donbas region and economic pressure have also ensured that Ukraine’s pro-Western government remains frail. A protracted political struggle, worsening economic conditions, and the pro-reform elite and population’s hardening distrust of Ukraine’s leaders threaten to spiral into widespread social unrest.  Poroshenko may thus face a perfect storm on the anniversary of sniper attacks on protestors in the final days of the “Euromaidan” revolution.

President Poroshenko called for Yatsenyuk’s resignation in response to mounting domestic and Western pressure to kick-start Ukraine’s stalled anti-corruption and reform efforts. The failed no-confidence motion follows the February 3 resignation of Lithuanian-born Economy Minister Aivaras Abromavicius, who blamed pervasive corruption in the central government and singled out Poroshenko allies for his departure. The resignation of Abromavicius prompted new scrutiny over the fate of the cabinet, which is divided between other foreign-born technocrats and coalition party officials. Yatsenyuk in particular has faced heavy criticism for protecting the interests of oligarchs at the expense of the reforms required to maintain IMF assistance and avoid bankruptcy. On the day of the failed no-confidence vote, Poroshenko also called for the resignation of ally Prosecutor General Viktor Shokin, widely accused of corruption. Poroshenko finally caved to long-standing pressure to dismiss Shokin following the February 15 resignation of reformist Deputy Prosecutor General Vitaly Kasko, who accused Shokin of blocking judicial reforms. Like Poroshenko’s decision to push out Shokin from the judiciary, the president’s support for the no-confidence motion against Yatsenyuk was likely an effort to deflect criticism for failing to combat corruption and promote reform.

The manner in which the no-confidence motion failed raises doubts over the sincerity of Poroshenko’s intent to revise the political status quo, which is guided by oligarch consensus. The motion against the widely unpopular prime minister and his cabinet fell short of a parliamentary majority by 32 votes. Despite Poroshenko’s call for the resignation of the cabinet and the initiation of the motion by the president’s party, 39 MPs from his party were absent, abstained, or otherwise did not participate in the vote. The majority of the pro-Russian “Opposition Bloc,” the successor of the ousted Yanukovych regime’s “Party of Regions,” also walked out on the vote, depriving the no-confidence motion of as many as 33 votes. A total of 41 MPs from the two parties voted the same day to recognize the performance of the cabinet as unsatisfactory but stopped short of supporting the no-confidence motion. Mustafa Nayyem, a prominent reformist MP from Poroshenko’s party and an early supporter of the 2013-2014 “Euromaidan” revolution, accused the president of colluding with rival oligarchs who support the “Opposition Bloc” and Yatsenyuk to stage a failed no-confidence vote.

If Poroshenko did intend to use the failed vote to defuse pressure to overhaul the cabinet and cast himself as a champion of reform, this gamble appears to have backfired. Neither the no-confidence motion nor the dismissal of Shokin from the judiciary resolved the underlying driver of the political crisis. The failed vote of no confidence appears to have instead exacerbated the public and reformist political elite’s mistrust of Poroshenko and Yatsenyuk. Poroshenko, Yatsenyuk, and Ukraine’s other pro-Western leaders will need to make sustained efforts to crack down on corruption and support reform in order to restore this faith. The resignation of Yatsenyuk and a cabinet reshuffle that introduces new technocratic ministers is likely a prerequisite needed to prevent deepening political gridlock from devolving into a new wave of social unrest.

Ukraine’s latest political crisis may escalate in ways that place the survival of the current Western-backed government at risk. Several hundred protestors outside parliament called for Prime Minister Yatsenyuk’s resignation ahead of the failed no-confidence vote, an early warning of the potential for the political status quo to catalyze the population into demonstrations against the government. The demonstrators included supporters of the far-right “Freedom” party, which played a leading role in the August 31, 2015 riot that resulted in three killed and over 100 injured. More dangerously, former Prime Minister Yuliya Tymoshenko is poised to fuel the crisis to reassert herself as a significant powerbroker in Kyiv. Tymoshenko called for snap elections to be held as soon as possible during an early February visit to Washington, D.C., where she met with senior diplomats and congressional leaders. All other party leaders from the former five-party coalition have dismissed snap elections as only a course of last resort given their potential to trigger further instability. Tymoshenko, a historical opportunist with a mercurial relationship with the Kremlin, may find success at the ballots along with the pro-Russian “Opposition Bloc” in the vacuum created by popular dissatisfaction with Poroshenko and Yatsenyuk. A strengthened position in parliament for either Tymoshenko or the “Opposition Bloc” would further cement the already lingering heritage of oligarch-driven politics and restore levers of Russian influence in Kyiv.

Ukraine’s political crisis coincides with escalating offensive operations by Russian-backed separatist forces along the front line in the southeast. Ukraine has come under increasing pressure from its Western backers to fulfill its political concessions tied to the February 2015 “Minsk II” ceasefire agreement despite the continued presence of forward-deployed Russian forces, weaponry, and cyclically escalating indirect fire attacks on Ukrainian positions. These concessions include the constitutional recognition of the “special status” of the occupied southeastern territory, a proposed amendment that lacks support outside Poroshenko and Yatsenyuk’s parties and sparked the August 31 riot. Populist leader Oleh Lyashko, who participated in the riot and defected to the opposition days later, offered to restore the coalition’s majority on February 18. Lyashko conditioned his return to the coalition, however, on the rejection of the “special status” clause in “Minsk II,” a move that Russia would likely meet with further escalation. Russia has deliberately made the fulfillment of the concessions politically untenable for Poroshenko and Yatsenyuk by preserving its offensive posture in southeastern Ukraine. By demanding the concessions in exchange for potential peace, Russia has also led the West to continue prodding Poroshenko and Yatsenyuk into supporting the measures that isolate them from their former coalition allies.

Poroshenko and Yatsenyuk can prevent the political crisis from spilling onto the streets by showing genuine effort to move reforms forward and combat corruption, starting within their own circles. A cabinet reshuffle and a new coalition agreement will also be necessary but not likely sufficient to prevent reforms from stalling further. The preservation of Yatsenyuk as prime minister is likely to obstruct the return of Tymoshenko’s “Fatherland” and the “Self Help” party to the coalition unless they are given significantly expanded decision-making roles. Yatsenyuk would not likely need to resign to form a new coalition with Poroshenko’s party and Oleh Lyashko’s “Radical Party,” however, which have only demanded a cabinet reshuffle. Without the introduction of a truly technocratic cabinet out of Yatsenyuk’s control, such a coalition would nevertheless only harden public mistrust and political dividing lines until a new no-confidence measure can be launched in September.

Despite the collapse of the coalition, a majority of MPs from all three former coalition parties worked with Yatsenyuk and Poroshenko’s parties to pass a key set of anti-corruption bills prescribed by the EU and IMF on February 18. The passage of this legislation offers some hope that Ukraine’s pro-Western leaders can overcome factional divides to support reform, however, they will need to sustain these efforts to earn back the trust of the population. Emotions will be high as Ukraine remembers the roughly 100 killed on Kyiv’s Independence Square (“Maidan Nezalezhnosti”) in the final days before Yanukovych’s ousting on February 21, 2014. If post-revolution leaders in Kyiv fail to escape the pull of political recidivism and make persistent efforts to reform, Ukrainians may likewise slide back into a revolutionary mindset to protect the legacy of “Euromaidan.”