Iraq Update 2014 #1: Showdown in Anbar

by Jessica Lewis and the ISW Iraq Team

A Sunni insurgency in Anbar has begun. Prime Minister Maliki confronted Anbari tribal leaders at the Ramadi protest site on December 30 and forced its evacuation. Violent clashes occurred between Anbari tribal militias and Iraqi Security Forces in Ramadi and Fallujah as a result. On December 31, amidst the violence, Maliki promised to withdraw the Iraqi Army from the cities. On January 1, in the wake of the Army’s withdrawal, al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) led an attack upon multiple police stations across Ramadi and Fallujah. In Ramadi, there are reports that tribal militias have combined with Local Police to retake the police stations from AQI. In Fallujah, there are reports that some tribal militias are cooperating with AQI. These events coincide with ongoing military operations to counter AQI in the desert, to which the US has provided military aid. As of January 2, the Iraqi Army is attempting to return to the cities, but is being blocked by unidentified gunmen at the periphery. A three-way contest for control of Anbar is underway between Iraqi federal forces, AQI, and tribal militias aligned with Iraqi police. Iraqi Federal Forces can become a flash point within urban areas as tribal militias or local forces mobilize. Iraq’s urban areas are highly vulnerable to escalation attempts by AQI.

Maliki claims that the Ramadi protest camp is an al-Qaeda Headquarters

Several events in late December precipitated a dramatic inflection in the stand-off between al-Qaeda in Iraq, Prime Minister Maliki and the Iraqi Army (IA), Sunni protest movement leaders, and tribal militias in Anbar. On December 21, 24 Iraqi Army officers including the 7^th IA Division commander were killed in an ambush at an AQI compound in western Anbar. On December 22, Maliki announced a new operation to counter AQI in the western desert. This incident might have galvanized tribal support for the government against al-Qaeda in Iraq, but instead Maliki turned his attention to the Ramadi protest camp. Maliki claimed in a speech on December 22 that the Ramadi protest camp was an al-Qaeda headquarters, and he ordered protesters to disband. The same day, Anbar Provincial Council Chairman Sabah Karhout said that Anbar would cooperate with the ISF against AQI.

Other tribal leaders in Anbar objected. Fallujah protest leader Sheikh Hamed al-Jumaili stated on December 22 that the people of Ramadi would carry arms against any force that approaches the site. Sheikh Ibrahim al-Dulaimi of the Ramadi camp also claimed that protesters would attack any militias that attempt to attack the sit-ins. Grand Mufti of Iraq Sheikh Rafi al-Rifai stated that the tribes would take a stand if the protesters were targeted. Anbar tribal leader Ali Hatem al-Suleiman further warned on December 23 that the tribes of Anbar will counter any attack against the protesters.

Government security around the Ramadi protest site increases

Meanwhile, indications that the ISF would move on the protest camp began to occur. On December 24, sources reported that security forces had cordoned off the sit-in sites in Anbar. The following day, acting Minister of Defense Sadoud al-Dulaimi assured the tribes that the government would not attack the protest sites. Nevertheless, on December 27, further reports indicated that the ISF had tightened security at the camp, searching individuals entering and leaving. The same day, a security source indicated that armed gunmen attacked IA vehicles near the Ramadi protest site, and that the IA returned fire. The MOI quickly released a statement that the action had been a response to an al-Qaeda attack, and not an attack upon the Ramadi protest site.

The same day, on December 27, Maliki issued a statement that Friday’s prayer would be the last at the Ramadi site. He demanded that the tribes pull the tents before they “burn.” Leader of the Sahwa [Awakening] Council Mohammed al-Hayes, a known Maliki ally, sided with Maliki on December 27 and echoed the description of the protest sites in Anbar as headquarters for al-Qaeda. He claimed to have support from multiple tribal leaders in Anbar for the ISF and condoned the removal of tents from the protest sites. The week prior, before Maliki’s statement about the Ramadi protest camp, Hayes stated that he had reached a deal with the governor of Anbar and other tribal leaders to shut down the protest camps.

Sheikh Mohammad al-Dulaimi and Sheikh Mohammed al-Bajari made strong statements in response, reiterating that moves against the camp would be met with armed resistance. Sheikh Dulaimi is quoted as saying, “let those who want their children to be orphans and their wives to be widows come close to the sites.” On December 27, Speaker for the Fallujah protest camp Sheikh Abd al-Munim al-Kubaisi called for Sunni religious leadership to unite in their stance against Maliki so that protesters could follow their lead either to remain peaceful or to take up arms, based upon Maliki’s next actions.

Maliki arrests Iraqiyya MP Ahmed al-Alwani

In the midst of this tension, Maliki’s next action was inflammatory. On December 28, Maliki arrested Iraqiyya MP Ahmed al-Alwani after a firefight at his residence in which his brother, reported to be the target, was killed. Alwani is influential within the Ramadi protest site, and the ISF imposed a curfew in Ramadi after the arrest. The same day, Council of Representatives (COR) Speaker Osama al-Nujaifi called for a fair investigation of the arrest of Alwani, meeting with other government officials to address the crisis in Anbar. He claimed officially that the arrest was illegal on account of the immunity granted  to MPs. The delegation he formed to investigate was reportedly blocked from entering Anbar by the Baghdad Operations Command. On December 29, leader of Iraqiyya Ayad Allawi proposed to work with the government to counter al-Qaeda in Iraq. The same day, Anbar Provincial Council chairman Falih al-Issawi submitted a proposal to close the protest camps in exchange for Alwani’s release and the withdrawal of all ISF in Anbar province. On December 30, according to BBC Radio, prominent sheikhs in Anbar gave Maliki a 12-hour ultimatum to release Alwani, or they would “take the disagreement with the government to the next stage.” He was not released. The same day, two elite battalions of the Iraqi Army stationed in Wasit arrived in Anbar province as reinforcements.

Maliki “empties” the Ramadi protest sit-in site

On December 30, the Ramadi protest camp was shut down. Reports about the nature of the confrontation at the Ramadi protest site vary. Iraqi media reports from an MOD source that a joint task force of IA and IP assaulted the camp after blocking internet and communications to Ramadi. Iraqi social media sources indicated that the Iraqi Security Forces moved on the protest camp in Ramadi and were repelled by heavy machine gun fire, in a gun battle that BBC Radio reported as lasting the night. Iraqi social media also indicated that the reinforcements from Wasit were involved in the assault on the protest site, and that tribal militias defeated them.

By contrast, Anbar Governor Ahmed al-Dulaimi stated emphatically on December 31 that the camp was only approached by local police and tribal elements. Furthermore, he reported that there were no casualties inside the camp, which he claims was empty at the time of the assault. On December 31, Maliki also made a statement, emphasizing zero casualties while the government “emptied” the camps. He described that the local, religious, and provincial leadership in Anbar called for the intervention of the federal government to close camps controlled by “terrorists,” and that the government merely cooperated. He also stated that the Iraqi Army would withdraw from the cities after this success, affirming their involvement. The Iraqi Police (IP) is the typical security force inside the cities, and is more palatable to locals because most are locally recruited.

Sunni Influencers’ Reaction

Multiple Sunni influencers, including moderate Sunni cleric Sheikh Abdul Malik al-Saadi and prominent digital influencers, called for Sunnis to take up arms against Maliki’s government as a result of the incident. The resonance of a particular incendiary social media page called Iraqi Revolution has skyrocketed from 148,000 to 158,000 followers after December 30. Jaysh al-Izza, the Pride and Dignity Army formed after the incident at the Hawija protest site in April, also issued its first statement calling the “sons of Anbar” and all Iraqis to carry arms and take a united stand.

Sheikh al-Saadi, who is a leader of the Ramadi protest movement, demanded in an inflammatory speech that the ISF pull out from the city, that members of the ISF disobey their chain of command, that Anbaris mobilize to prevent ISF reinforcements from reaching Ramadi, and that Members of Parliament resign and boycott the government.

Statement from Sheikh Abdul Malek al Saadi, translated and summarized by Omar Abdullah

Today’s ISF assault on the Izza wal Karama square is a good example of the government’s bad intentions. I demand that the government stop this war in which Iraqi citizens are fighting each other. Withdraw your troops to avoid war. I also ask ISF troops not to obey orders by their superiors when they send them to definite death. Otherwise, you will face fire in life and in after-death, because you are assaulting well defended citizens to satisfy unjust ruler. This ruler brought Iraq nothing but more war, more poverty, and more sectarianism. Oh people of Anbar, especially the sheikhs of Anbar, defend yourselves and your people. Stand against your vicious enemy. And if your enemy asks for a truce or reconciliation, do not refuse. This is what Islam taught us. Oh heroes of Fallujah and other towns. Cut the road and prevent Maliki’s troops from reaching your brothers in the heart of Anbar. Maliki wants to wipe out every one of the people he dislikes, using the anti-terrorism pretext again. He [Maliki] wants to gain more votes by committing such heinous crimes. Oh our brothers in the south of Iraq [Shi’a tribes] warn your sons and ask them not to take part in this heinous assault against your brothers in Anbar. Sunni ministers and Members of Parliament should resign immediately and boycott the political process in Iraq and stand at their peoples’ side, especially because their existing in this government doesn’t change any of the unfortunate realities in which we live.

Sheikh Rafi al-Rifai, Grand Mufti of Iraq, encouraged “Mujahideen” to carry arms against sectarian militias, for religious leaders to take a stand, and for rebels and civilians to cut the supply lines of the “rogue” forces, a reference to the Iraqi Security Forces.

Statement by Rafi al-Rifai, summarized and translated by Iraq Team

Rifai encouraged and supported the “Mujahedeen” who are currently carrying arms in their targeting of sectarian and hateful “militias.” The Mufti also called for the tribal leaders in southern Iraq not send their sons [members of the IA and Federal Police] to sacrifice themselves for such a “tyrant.” He also called for religious leaderships to announce their stance regarding the ongoing events. Regarding the local Iraqi Police, Rifai called for them to support “their people” and called for the tribal “rebels” not to attack members of the IP in their provinces. He called for residents of provinces witnessing the Sunni Opposition Movement [Hirak] to support “their brothers” in Anbar and perform their “military duties” and to cut the supply lines of the “rogue” forces. 

Clashes between Anbar tribal militias and the ISF in Ramadi and Fallujah

Violence in Anbar quickly escalated after the closure of the protest site. Clashes between armed gunmen and the Iraqi Security Forces continued on December 31 in Ramadi and Fallujah, according to mainstream Iraqi media. On December 31, clashes took place near the eastern entrance of Fallujah between gunmen and military units. The clashes followed similar events that took place in the preceding day. Additional reports indicate that the road between al-Baghdadi Military Base to Ramadi was closed to ISF convoys on December 31. Another report indicates that an Iraqi Army headquarters north of Ramadi was attacked with indirect fire reported to be Katyusha rockets. In these cases, the attackers were likely tribal militias, who assaulted federal security forces until they withdrew at Maliki’s command on December 31.

In conjunction with the Iraqi Army’s withdrawal, on December 31, reports indicated that gunmen took control of a police station in Ramadi. This may have been an isolated incident, to which the Iraqi Army reportedly responded by bombing the police station from the air; it may also have been the first attack in what appeared to be the first in a synchronized attack upon many police stations in Ramadi and Fallujah. On January 1, gunmen carrying AQI flags were reported to control most of the IP stations in Anbar. In Fallujah, an attack on the police directorate on January 1 resulted in the freeing of 100 prisoners. AQI likely carried out the attack, given its past attacks on prisons with the stated objective of freeing prisoners. Furthermore, the synchronized attack upon the local police stations is likely the work of AQI, because that organization has the capacity to conduct orchestrated campaigns. It is not possible, however, to determine with certainty whether the attackers in every event were members of tribal militias, al-Qaeda in Iraq, or a combination.

Tribal responses to AQI’s advance on Anbar’s cities

Anbar Provincial Council Chairman Falih al-Issawi made a statement on January 1 that indicated some tribes in Fallujah had reached a “deal” with AQI. However, all other indications of tribal militia activity since AQI attacked the police stations suggest that the tribes are mobilized against al-Qaeda in Iraq. Tribal elements from Anbar Province have begun to cooperate with local security forces, particularly the local Iraqi Police, in order to regain control in Ramadi and Fallujah. According to media and security sources, the cooperation between the tribal groups and local IP appears to have been instrumental in retaking a number of police stations that had been attacked and occupied by AQI and their supporters during the previous days. One example of this is demonstrated in the joint operation between the Abu Bali tribe and local IP forces which regained control of the al-Sediq police station, located in the al-Jazeera area on the outskirts of Ramadi. Another example is the Albo Ghanim tribe, which reportedly arrested three AQI members in Ramadi on January 2.

Sources have reported that there had been a massive increase in the presence of tribal forces in the streets of Ramadi, and that they had fought alongside local IP forces in numerous violent clashes against AQI and their supporters. Although most of the information and media reports concerning tribal cooperation and joint operations has been confined to Ramadi, an anonymous security source stated that a meeting took place on January 2 between tribal elders, religious scholars, intellectuals, and notables to discuss the developing security situation and the intention to cooperate fully and actively with security forces to regain control of Fallujah. Tribes and notable figures in Fallujah also met on January 1 to declare committees to provide security. On January 2, a New York Times report indicated that tribal militias had reluctantly chosen to join with government forces to counter AQI in Fallujah. One tribal leader was quoted as saying, “we do not want to be like Syria.” Yet thus far all cooperation reported has been with between the tribes and Iraqi Police, not army units.

The ISF disposition in Anbar: IP Desertions and Federal Reinforcements

One YouTube video allegedly shows ISF officers hosted by tribal members and giving up their military uniforms on December 31. On January 1, signs of desertion in the ranks of the Iraqi police appeared, as members of the police abandoned their positions in Fallujah and the police stations subsequently fell under the control of gunmen. This desertion likely resulted from their realization that the police station was not defensible against an assault. It also suggests that other local security forces operating in the province may desert, units may dissolve, and individuals and units may join the tribal militias. Confirming the desertion of Iraqi police members, Anbar’s governor, Ahmed al-Dulaimi, stated that Iraqi police members gave their weapons to the attacking gunmen. Government loss of control is not limited to Ramadi and Fallujah, but has also included the areas of Khaldiyah, Hit, and Husseba.

Image from Twitter allegedly showing clothing left behind by defecting police

The disposition of federal security forces (these include the Iraqi Army, National Police, and specialized units such as SWAT and CT units) in Anbar is not clear at this time. Original reports indicate that the Iraqi Army forces in Ramadi withdrew to the west. Some reports suggest that the Iraqi Army never left the cities, though the assault upon the police stations on January 1-2 suggests that they were vulnerable. Others suggest that SWAT remains in the center of Ramadi, while new Iraqi Army elements, ordered into the cities from the east (the Baghdad side), are being repelled by unidentified gunmen at the checkpoints on the periphery of Fallujah. New reports indicate that seven Iraqi Army battalions are re-entering Ramadi with armored support, although photographs suggest these are armored personnel carriers or BMPs rather than tanks. Some sources reported previously that IA reinforcements from Basra, Maysan, Dhi Qar, and Taji are also gathered in Anbar province, potentially for desert or urban operations. These southern forces are likely loyal to Maliki.

This video reportedly shows Iraqi Army soldiers surrounded by tribal militia members in Fallujah

The presence of Iraqi Army reinforcements, particularly those from Shi’a areas, also escalates the grievance of the Anbari tribes against the security establishment. The ISF do not always behave intelligently or in a non-sectarian fashion; a pro-government Facebook page posted a video of an ISF member reproaching Alwani in captivity, which likely exacerbated the Sunni response to his arrest. Rumors are already thick regarding the sectarian character of ISF deployment – dubious photos spread widely on Twitter allegedly showing ISF vehicles “heading to Anbar” displaying Shi’a flags. Federal security force presence in the cities may still incite violent resistance from the tribal militias, as these militias are now caught in the middle trying to wrest control from AQI while still resisting further government intervention. This tension has the potential to fracture the ISF in Anbar.

National Sunni Political Response

The decisions of national Sunni politicians throughout this violent crisis in Anbar will be important to watch. On December 30, Osama al-Nujaifi announced that he had withdrawn from the Honor Document, a formal rapprochement with Maliki, and a contingent of 44 Mutahidun representatives have reportedly submitted their resignations. If their intentions are real, their resignation from parliament will likely generate a Sunni boycott of elections. If Nujaifi instead guides them to remain, they could be a source of renewed conciliation with Maliki. His leverage with Maliki will depend on the outcome of events.

Nujaifi’s behavior since December 30 suggests that reconciliation is his motivation, although he is making specific demands of Maliki. On December 31, Nujaifi stated that the Mutahidun parliamentary withdrawal was temporary, pending further developments in Anbar. On January 1, an Iraqiyya parliamentary delegation composed of MPs Khaled al-Alwani, Sumayya al-Qallab, and Hamid al-Zobaie met with MP Alwani, still in custody in Baghdad, after acting Defense Minister Sadoud al-Dulaimi and Iraqi Awakening Conference leader Ahmed Abu Risha visited Alwani on Tuesday. On January 2, Mutahidun released a statement repeating its demands for devolution of security control to local police forces and the immediate release of MP Alwani, along with the transfer of Alwani’s legal case to Anbar province. The statement also reiterated Mutahidun’s belief that Iraqi Army operations in Ramadi and Fallujah were unnecessary and overly damaging. They maintained that order had been restored by local forces without help from Baghdad, which they considered as carrying out politicized targeting by PM Maliki. Also of note on January 2 was Ninewa governor Athil al-Nujaifi’s announcement of his desire to maintain good relations with ISF in his province, stating that political disputes should remain separate from security issues, echoing Mutahidun’s earlier statement.

Also of note, Anbar tribal leader, Ahmed Abu Risha, issued a statement on January 1 calling on the people of Anbar to target AQI elements who have “abandoned the desert and headed to Anbar and Fallujah to spread among its people killing and corruption.” Abu Risha apparently realizes that if AQI is able to control Anbar, and specifically Ramadi, that he will be a target as the leader of the Awakening Movement. This fear may also explain his urgency to weigh in on Alwani’s arrest, as he was part of a delegation that visited Alwani in prison.   

AQI’s advances in Anbar and the subsequent reactions to them by Iraqi Sunni figures suggest that the tide may have shifted against AQI. Governor Nujaifi’s statement of cooperation with the ISF indicates that, as he stated, armed groups – likely AQI and Jaysh Rijal al-Tariqah al-Naqshabandiah (JRTN) – were preparing to attack Mosul. Similarly, Abu Risha’s statement calling on the people of Anbar to defend themselves indicates a fear of AQI’s overreach. Although Saadi maintained that the presence of federal forces will be an “occupation of the province,” he also issued a statement calling on the tribes in Anbar to defend the province from “outlaw elements,” referring to AQI. However, the ISF will need to have a conciliatory approach to the locals and a better relationship with the community if the central government wishes to turn the tide against AQI, as there are still reports that some armed tribal elements are negotiating with AQI to keep them away from the fight in Anbar so as not to attract a heavy ISF response.

Conclusion

Maliki’s Political Calculus

Maliki’s move against the Ramadi protest camp was politically motivated, and is the proximate cause of the current crisis. Maliki sought to dissolve the Anbari protest movement before upcoming national elections. He saw an occasion to do so as he massed ISF in the Anbar desert to avenge the death of those killed in the December 21 ambush. Maliki overreached and created a political and security crisis in Anbar in the process.

Many tribes view the federal security forces, namely the Iraqi Army and the Federal Police, as adversaries, particularly after the December 30 confrontation in Ramadi. Despite the threat to their homes, these tribal militias prefer the prospect of cooperating with the local police rather than working with federal security to counter AQI. Excessive reinforcement of Anbar by Iraqi Army and federal forces is therefore perilous.

Maliki may nevertheless make political gains despite his political overstepping. Sunni political leaders are weakened because AQI has seized the opportunity to move on the cities in the wake of ISF withdrawal, and because the local police force suffers desertions. The first indicator of Maliki’s strength relative to Sunni politicians may be that protest movement leaders accept his proposals to increase the presence of the ISF in Anbar without getting any real concessions.

Maliki’s targeting of al-Qaeda in Iraq in Anbar stems from both security and political concerns. The operations against AQI have symbolic value for Maliki in the political sphere, as he needed a successful and decisive operational victory ahead of elections to appear strong.

Maliki’s Security Calculus

AQI also presents a genuine security threat to Iraq. AQI’s operations in Anbar have clearly increased since al-Raqqa fell out of Syrian government control in March 2013. Although AQI’s control of western Anbar has become increasingly significant, this is not 2006 and Anbar is not the heart of AQI, which now possesses multiple centers of gravity in Iraq and Syria. Ground warfare to clear AQI in the desert is a waste of precious resources, given that AQI seeks control of cities. Maliki seems to have made an operational military mistake by focusing his main effort on striking AQI in the Anbari desert in the Horan Valley.

Vulnerability of Urban Areas and U.S. Policy

Reinforcement of Anbar by Iraqi Army from other provinces may also leave other critical areas such as Baghdad more vulnerable to AQI. Should AQI re-enter urban areas en masse, the ISF will not succeed in getting them out without escalating the situation. Local civilian populations may well see federal ground forces as targeting them instead of AQI. Because of the bad precedents set by Maliki’s actions against Iraqi Sunnis to date, it is difficult to imagine a scenario in which the security forces can succeed to penetrate urban areas accessible to AQI without incurring violent repulsion by Sunnis who are mobilized in self-defense.

The U.S. has supplied the Iraqi Security Forces with Hellfire missiles and aerial reconnaissance drones, according to Maliki’s media advisor. These tools are excellent means to disrupt remote AQI camps away from urban centers. The question now becomes whether the ISF will use them in the urban fight in close proximity to tribal militias. Furthermore, while the use of these tools in the Jazeera desert may cause AQI to be more cautious about cross-border operations, they will not succeed in dismantling the organization, whose leadership very likely now resides in Syria. Such weapons are therefore insufficient to accomplish American or Iraqi objectives to contain or disrupt AQI.

It could be coincidence that his media advisor leaked information about that military support on December 27, the day that Maliki issued his ultimatum to the Ramadi protest camp. It could also, however, have been a deliberate leak to indicate his position of strength. By offering unqualified support in the form of military assistance, the U.S. may have inadvertently empowered Maliki to act against the Ramadi protest camp by boosting his confidence in his military capabilities and his impunity.

U.S. military aid offered to Maliki without conditions generates the unfortunate impression among Sunnis in Iraq and the region that the U.S. has picked a side in a sectarian war. Whether or not these perceptions of American policy are correct, these perceptions along with Maliki’s ill-timed move against Sunni political opposition provides a huge boon to AQI as it poises itself to exploit the crisis in Anbar.

Jessica Lewis is Research Director at the Institute for the Study of War

Iraq's sectarian crisis reignites as Shi'a militias execute civilians and remobilize

by Jessica Lewis, Ahmed Ali, and Kimberly Kagan

Escalating violence in Iraq crossed a new and very dangerous threshold this week.  Al Qaeda in Iraq launched a concentrated wave of car-bomb and other attacks specifically against civilian Shi'a targets in and around Baghdad.  Shi'a militias are mobilizing and have begun a round of sectarian killings facilitated by false checkpoints, a technique characteristic of the 2006-2007 period.  Prime Minister Nuri al Maliki has taken a number of steps to demonstrate that he remains in control of the situation.  The expansion of Shi'a militia activity, however, is likely to persuade many Iraqis that he is either not in control or is actively abetting the killings.  The re-mobilization of Shi'a militias in Iraq coincides with the formal announcement by Lebanese Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah of his organization's active military participation in the Syrian civil war.  Al Qaeda in Iraq's sectarian mass-murder attacks coincide with the announcement by AQI's affiliate in Syria, Jabhat al Nusra, that attacking Hezbollah is that group's primary target henceforth.  The stage appears to be set not merely for the collapse of the Iraqi state into the kind of vicious sectarian killing and sectarian cleansing that nearly destroyed it in 2006 and 2007, but also for the expansion of that sectarian warfare throughout both Mesopotamia and the Levant.

Sectarian violence has escalated sharply in Iraq. On Monday, May 27, al-Qaeda in Iraq conducted a coordinated operation to target Shi‘a neighborhoods in Baghdad with numerous and large vehicle-borne explosive devices (VBIEDs). This operation followed a wave of VBIED attacks on May 20 that targeted the lines of communication into Baghdad and some Shi‘a populations across Iraq. An estimated 212 people have diedin violent attacks in Iraq since May 20, and another 624 have been injured. May’s casualties are thus likely to surpass April’s, which had made that month the most violentin Iraq since 2008. Most of these attacks, especially VBIEDs and suicide attacks, conform to the methods usually attributed to AQI. Additional reports from Baghdad and Diyala also indicate that Shi‘a militant groups, including the Iranian-backed Sadrist splinter group Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, have begun to mobilize in Iraq to establish checkpoints in Baghdad and to conduct extra-judicial killings (EJKs) against Sunnis. Extra-judicial killings reportedlycarried out by militias also occurred in the city of Hilla in central Iraq. AAH, along with Lebanese Hezbollah and Kata’ib Hezbollah, publically acknowledgedits military involvement in Syria in April 2013. Lebanese Hezbollah has mobilized in Syria throughout May. This regional military activation, as well as the elevated threat to the Iraqi Shi‘a population posed by AQI, lends greater credibility to the reports that Iraqi Shi‘a militant groups have mobilized to conduct intimidation and violence against Sunni in the name of defending Shi’a populations.

AQI’s 2013 VBIED Campaign

Violent attacks by al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) escalated sharply in April and May. AQI has maneuvered among anti-government protests and Iraqi Security Force deployments to project attacks throughout Iraq, most prominently in Baghdad, Salah ad-Din, and Ninewa Provinces. Vehicle-borne improvised-explosive devices (VBIEDs) are re-emerging as a primary attack type, reverting to a trend first seen as the sectarian civil war expanded in 2006. In particular, the two waves of VBIED attacks on May 20 and May 27 demonstrate a concerted effort by AQI to exacerbate sectarian tensions and escalate violence, to fix Iraqi security forces in certain positions and drive them from others, to gain freedom of movement along lines of communication, and to set conditions for deliberate targeting of neighborhoods that were prime locations for sectarian violence in 2006-7. AQI conducted a campaign in July 2012 (under the banner of the Islamic State of Iraq) that focused on Iraqi government officials, security forces, Sahwa (Awakening) leaders, and Shi‘a civilians in order to limitthe reach and effectiveness of Maliki’s government and to regain lost territory. Since that time, AQI has conducted attacks using IEDs, suicide bombers, armed clashes, assassinations, and coordinated simultaneous explosions.  The recent waves differ both in the number of VBIEDs used simultaneously and in the specific targeting of Shi’a civilians in known sectarian hot-spots.

The concentration of VBIED attacks in late May 2013 demonstrates AQI’s capacity to stage in the locations around the outskirts of Baghdad (the Baghdad belt) from which it had launched attacks in 2006-7, to procure the components necessary to build VBIEDs in large numbers, and to project force into Shi‘a communities and mixed areas within Baghdad. Moreover, the campaign has deliberately escalated violence and selected targets to shape not only the perceptions of Iraqi Sunnis, but also those of Iraqi Shi‘a, who may begin to lose faith in the Maliki government if attacks are allowed to continue. 

GRAPHIC 1 | VBIED ATTACKS IN BAGHDAD, 20 AND 27 MAY 2013

Wave of VBIED attacks: May 20

A wave of 11 VBIED attacks and seven additional explosions struck urban centers across Iraq on Monday, May 20 resulting in at least 60 deaths and 178 injuries. Two other VBIEDs were defused before they could explode on their targets. Six of the VBIEDs detonatedin predominantly Shi‘a neighborhoods along the periphery of Baghdad city. These events, depicted on the map above, accounted for a small percentage of the total casualties on that day, yielding one death and 21 injuries. The low casualties may indicate AQI’s difficulty entering Shi‘a neighborhoods to hit prime targets. In light of the wave of attacks a week later that did hit such targets, however, it is more likely that AQI was using the first series of attacks to establish access routes into Baghdad and test its ability to synchronize operations. The neighborhoods chosen represent the outer rim of Shi‘a communities in Baghdad that are most easily accessible from main supply routes and proximate Sunni neighborhoods. The attacks collectively illustrate a campaign to attack a very selective target set just inside the city rim.

Other VBIEDs on May 20 in the cities of Basra, Mahmoudiyah, Wasit, Hilla, Balad, Samarra, and Baiji, accounted for the majority of the casualties. The most lethal attack occurredin Hilla city, Babel Province, where two car bombs exploded in a market near the Shi’a Wardiya mosque, killing 22 and wounding 77. Targeting of religious sites clearly indicates AQI’s intent to elicit a sectarian response, particularly given the centrality of the Samarra mosque bombing in 2006 to the subsequent mobilization of Shi‘a  militias for sectarian combat. Additionally, the car bomb in Balad on May 20 targeted a bus full of Iranian pilgrimsbound for the Shrine of Imam Mohammed, leaving four dead and 10 wounded. This incident, along with another attack on Iranian pilgrims at the Samarra mosque on May 25, feed into the justifications being proffered by Shi’a fighting groups in support of their activities.  Key figures within Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq have used these attacks recently as rallying cries to defend holy sites. Iran has also responded to previous attacks by launching probes into the deaths of pilgrims in Iraq. Iran’s Director General of the Hajj and Pilgrimage Organization in charge of Holy Sites Masoud Akhavan announcedin December 2012 that Iranian security companies were escorting Iranian pilgrims into Iraq. This practice may also be a vehicle by which Iran could funnel IRGC-QF augmentation into Iraq, for which there is historical precedent.  It also explains AQI’s focused targeting of these pilgrims.

Comparing the VBIED attacks on May 20 to concurrent attacks using improvised explosive devices (IED) and adhesive explosive devices (AED), the VBIEDs were used to target large numbers of civilians, while IEDs and AEDs were often used for targeted killings or attacks against security force patrols or members of the Sahwa (Awakening). The Samarra VBIED on May 20 targeted Sahwa as they gathered to receive their salaries. VBIEDs have also been used in 2013 to target ISF at security checkpoints, but in May 2013 they have largely been used to target Shi‘a civilians.

Wave of VBIED attacks: May 27

Two days after Iraqi security forces moved to conduct operations in western Anbar, AQI launched a second wave of 13 VBIEDS and one additional explosion on May 27 that killed 36 and wounded 147. This time, all 14 attacks occurred in the vicinity of Baghdad, indicating a deliberate shift to focus upon the capital region. Within Baghdad, the map above demonstrates a geographic shift from the periphery to the center, in particular to neighborhoods at the heart of the sectarian strife in 2006-7 such as Saadoun (in Rusafa), Khadimiya, Huriya, Saadriya (in central Karkh), and Shaab (just outside of Sadr City). Attacks in Habbibiyah in Sadr City may also be meant to show the government and Shi‘a militant groups that AQI can attack even into the heart of their territory.

AQI’s ability to plan and execute 13 simultaneous VBIED attacks at strategically selected sites within Baghdad is also noteworthy. VBIEDs are among the most expensive and complex improvised weapons systems, capable of achieving massive effects in isolation, and often historically reserved for that purpose. The use of so many VBIEDs in a single day demonstrates a high degree of technical and organizational skill and suggests the ability to produce VBIEDs in large numbers and rapidly.  It indicates the dramatic extent to which AQI appears to have recovered from the defeats inflicted on it in 2007 and 2008.

AQI attacks did not slow after May 27, moreover. Attacks have continued over the last three days, including six more VBIEDs in the vicinity of Baghdad, and one in particular against a wedding in Jihadon May 30 that claimed 20 casualties. Jihad is another predominantly Shi‘a neighborhood in southwestern Baghdad that was heavily contestedin 2006-7, and sufficiently Shi’ified through migrations and extra-judicial killings that it supported Moqtada al Sadr in the Baghdad Uprising in 2008. This attack occurred one day after a VBIED attackin the market of Jihad, which killed 16 and wounded 45. Cumulatively, these two events claimed the greatest number of casualties over the last ten days.

Shi‘a Militant Response

The recent bombing waves in Baghdad have gripped residents with fear of sectarian war. Their sentiments are reminiscent of the atmosphere that engulfed the city in 2006 as broader conflict loomed.  As a result of the deteriorating security in Baghdad, commercial activity in the city has been declining.   Social media posts and isolated reportshave been circulating since the beginning of the week that Iraqi Shi‘a militias, primarily Asai’b Ahl Al-Haq (AAH), have been patrolling streets of Baghdad, setting up “false checkpoints,” and conducting extra-judicial killings against Sunnis. Residents have beenexpressing fear of extra-judicial killings since early May. The evidence is clear; Shi’a militants have mobilized in Baghdad and are conducting executions of civilians.

GRAPHIC 2 | SHI'A MILITANT ATTACKS IN BAGHDAD, MAY 2013

Several attacks over recent days bore the signature of Shi’a militant groups. On 28 May, the bodiesof two university students were found in northern Baghdad in Agarguf area of the Mansour District with hands bound behind them, shot in the chest and head. They had been thrown from an unmarked vehicle according to witnesses who also noted that false checkpoints had been set up in the same area. Agarguf area was used by Shi’a militant groups to dump hundreds of bodies in 2007. Three people had been kidnappedby armed persons in an unmarked vehicle on the evening of 26 May at al-Mu’atham bus stop in central Baghdad, which is frequently used by students. It is possible that these events, both involving signature tactics of Shi’a militant groups, had the same victims. Additionally, on 26 May, armed persons wearing police uniforms invadeda home in al-Za’franiya in southeast Baghdad, dragging the owner outside and shooting him. The method of attack and geographic location correspond with historical patterns of Shi’a militancy and make attribution to Sunni terrorist groups implausible. Sunni mosques were also attacked in the Baghdad neighborhoods of Mansourand Saydiyahand twice in Diyalaprovince, which clearly points to Shi‘a militancy.

Morality policing executions have also been reported in areas of Baghdad just outside of Sadr City. On 14 May, unidentified armed men attackeda police checkpoint in Zayunah, handcuffing security personnel but leaving them unharmed. Afterwards, the same gunmen traveling in an SUV raided five liquor stores and killed 12 people. A week later, on 22 May, unidentified armed men attacked a brothelin Zayunah and killed five men, five women, the owner, and his wife with silenced weapons and knives. Also on 22 May, unidentified armed men travelling in a car shota liquor shop owner while driving near a market in al-Shaab, in northeast Baghdad. Zayuna and al-Shaab are predominantly Shi’a neighborhoods, and militia activity there most likely indicates the militia’s intent to re-establish control.

Additionally, several assassinations this week fit patterns of violence historically characteristic of Shi’a militant groups. On 26 May, the imam of the al-Qadisiyah Mosque was attackedby unidentified armed men with silenced weapons while driving in Diyala Province. The same day, unidentified armed individuals shot a policemanin al-Waziriyah, in the northeast quadrant of Baghdad, again using silenced weapons, and a primary school teacher was killedwith silenced weapons in al-Qahirah, a neighboring area in the northeast of Baghdad. On 27 May, another teacherwas shot with silenced weapons near the militia stronghold of Khalis in Diyala. Additionally, in an assassination that drew more public attention to this rise in targeted killings, Abbas Ja’far, the brother of a famous soccerplayer, was shot on 25 May by two armed men on a motorcycle outside his home in Habibiyah, a neighborhood in eastern Baghdad abutting Sadr City. Two other attacks involved drive-by shootings of civilians in Jisr Diyala in southeast Baghdad, one a civilianas he was leaving his home, and another the owner of a grocerystore. Other variants of these militia signature attacks included the killing of four civilians as they exited a taxi in al-Kadhimiyah, north of Baghdad, and the killing of two owners of a goldsmith shop in al-Mashtal, on the rim of southeast Baghdad. Some of these instances clearly demonstrate sectarian violence because they hit obviously Sunni targets. Others, in predominantly Shi’a areas of Baghdad, instead demonstrate intra-Shi’a violence.

Other attacks likely conducted by Iraqi Shi‘a militias can be detected by method and by target. The most recent target set has included cafés, where larger groups congregate. They include an improvised explosive device (IED) attackon a café in the western Baghdad neighborhood of Ameriya on April 18 that killed 27 people. Another café attack took place in Baghdad in the nearby Jamia neighborhood on May 5 (killing or wounding 15 people) and anotheron May 29 in the Hib Hib area in Diyala province that resulted in 22 people killed and wounded. While these attacks have not been clearly attributed, they differ from attacks customarily attributed to AQI, such as car bombs, suicide bombings, and attacks against Iraqi Shi‘a targets. These attacks all took place in predominantly Iraqi Sunni locales. In four of them, IEDs were used; in the fifth, the attack on the Ihsan mosque in Mansour, was conducted by hand grenades. On May 31, police sources in Babil revealedthat gunmen killed four people in Hilla. The sources describe the gunmen as traveling with impunity and using silenced weapons, killing former members of the Baath party and one shop owner in Hilla—again, hallmarks of Shi’a militia rather than AQI activity. This comes one week after the VBIED attack upon a Shi’a mosque there.

It is conceivable that AQI has conducted these attacks to instigate retaliatory violence. Their divergence from AQI’s attack methods and their locations, however, make it much more likely that they are reprisal attacks by Shi‘a militant groups. The widespread perception among the public that Shi’a militias conducted these attacks is a major driver and amplifier of fear among the population.

IMAGE 1 | MEMBERS OF ASA'IB AHL AL-HAQ IN PARADE ON 4 MAY 2013

AAH has been in the in the spotlight of renewed militant and political activities since April 2013. The group itself confirmed its role and participationin military activities in Syria along with other Shi‘a groups. Moreover, and in a major projection of force and political prominence, AAH organized a massive, campaign-style rally in Baghdad on May 4. The event was held in a government-owned soccer stadium in Baghdad, the Sina’a Club Stadium on the border of Sadr City, and was ostensibly to celebrate the 10^thanniversary of the group. Members of the Iraqi Council of Representatives are reportedto have attended. Photos of the gathering reveal the presence of AAH’s senior leadership, parades, large attendance, tribal figures, and sophisticated organizational capabilities. During the event, AAH’s intentions and capabilities for increased activity were made clear. AAH leader, Qais Al-Khazali, calledon members of “the resistance across the spectrum” to maintain readiness and warned politicians who are connected to “regional agendas” that they will be pursued regardless of whether they are “in fortified areas, secured hotels, or armored vehicles.” The resistance is the title used by AAH to describe itself, as well as the word Iranian and Lebanese Hezbollahi leaders use referring to the “axis of resistance” against Israel and its allies. Al-Khazali also urged anti-government protesters to refrain from sectarian slogans and to reject the killing of ISF members. Those statements cameunder attack by some Iraqi politicians who also condemned the government for allowing the event to happen. AAH ability to hold events in government-owned facilities is attributed to its relations with Maliki. He has welcomed them into the political process and views them as a countervailing force against the Sadrist Trend, led by Muqtada Al-Sadr, from which the group split in 2004. 

IMAGE 2 | LEADERSHIP OF ASA'IB AHL AL-HAQ ON 4 MAY 2013

Spread of “false checkpoints”

Since 2007, Baghdad’s security procedures have incorporated a vast network of street checkpoints manned by Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) members. The purpose of those checkpoints is to look for car bombs and capture wanted individuals. Reports describing “false checkpoints” suggest that some are not manned by ISF members, but instead by personnel in civilian clothes who may or not be security officials. Reportedly, these checkpoints have been inspecting identification cards and inquiring about the sectarian affiliation of passengers. There are also reportsthat the militias have kidnapped and killed people based on their identity and that the targeting has primarily been of Iraqi Sunnis. The areas where those checkpoints are reported to have operated are concentrated in western Baghdad, which has neighborhoods that are mixed between Iraqi Shi‘a and Iraqi Sunnis.

This way of operating closely echoes events in 2006-7, during which Shi’a militia groups established checkpoints in Baghdad at which they stopped cars, checked identification cards, and kidnapped and then executed Sunnis. They manned those checkpoints either in militia garb or dressed as Iraqi Security Forces. In 2006, the ISF was infiltrated by these militias and tolerated such checkpoints within sight of their official locations or operated them.

Further reports surfacedon May 30 detailing that individuals in civilian clothes have been present at multiple official Baghdad checkpoints; the Iraqi Ministry of the Interior described the individuals as “belonging to formation within the Ministry of Interior.” The MoI spokesperson added that the ministry relies on members from intelligence or other departments who are sometimes tasked with verifying identification cards. According to the same report and citing an unnamed senior security source, militias have been active in both the Rusafa and Karkh sections of Baghdad, but the report asserted that talks of false checkpoints are "exaggerated and intended to spread an atmosphere of fear among citizens.” Despite the explanation offered by MoI, the presence of civilian-clothed individuals is bound to stoke the fears of populations that encounter such checkpoints. It may, indeed, feed speculation that the MoI has become re-infiltrated by militias or is itself engaging in sectarian violence.

Allegations of militia reactivation in Baghdad have been emerging since early May. On May 8, just four days after the AAH parade in the soccer stadium, Iraqiyya issued a statement condemning the government for tolerating rhetoric and threats from Iraqi Shi‘a militias, including AAH, Kata’ib Hizballah (KH), and the Mokhtar Army (an Iraqi Hezbollah unit which was formed in February 2013). Iraqiyya positedthat statements from these militias are “directly or indirectly tied to those events that resulted in the death of innocent youth.” Iraqiyya may have been referring to increased attacks on cafes where youth congregate.

On May 21, Muqtada Al-Sadr,issued a statement in which he urged followers to “ostracize extremism and what is issued from some of those who belong to Wahhabism or what is issued by some Shi‘a militias.” With this statement, Sadr attempted to take the middle ground in condemning Sunni extremist groups while also criticizing Shi‘a groups. Sadr’s critique of groups like AAH is natural. They are rivals and they compete over turf in Baghdad and elsewhere in southern Iraq. Their rivalry is two-fold, as the leader of AAH, Qais al-Khazali, views himself as the heir to Sadr’s father Ayatollah Mohammed Sadiq Al-Sadr. Muqtada al-Sadr stands to lose if AAH mobilizes while the Sadrist Trend does not. AAH is also the Sadrists’ primary political, military, and increasingly social competitor; this competition is very likely to continue in the future.

The Iraqi government has made a number of announcements to reassure the public and assuage its fears. The cabinet announced on May 28 that it will “pursue all types of militias and firmly strike anybody who violates public order.” Additionally, Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki visited the areas in western Baghdad where most militia activities are reported to have taken place. He inspected checkpoints in Jihad, Amriyya, Mansour, Adel, Huriyya, Kadhimiyah, Taji, and Al-Adhamiyah on May 29. His deputy, Saleh Al-Mutlaq, visited the Saydiyah area on the same day. These are the mixed areas where much of the sectarian violence occurred in 2006-7 and where the public is most concerned about militia activities. The Ministry of Interior (MoI) denied the presence of false checkpoints and urged citizens to contact authorities with information regarding their presence. The Baghdad Operations Center, which absorbed ISF headquarters in Rusafa (East Baghdad) and Karkh (West Baghdad) last week, announced a travel ban for all unregistered vehicles starting at 0600 on Friday, May 31.  Vehicles without license plates have been cited in reports of kidnapping and executions.

Maliki has recently ordereda major shift of key leaders across the security sector, ostensibly in response to heightened security concerns. Those major changes may signal his lack of confidence in their leadership for the security of Baghdad. The leadership changes might also have been a prerequisite for moving trusted leaders into vital positions in the provinces, where Maliki had begun to conduct more aggressive offensive operations after the Hawija incident. Such a hypothesis would seem more plausible if former trusted leaders emerge in new positions, and some of them have. It is also likely that Maliki’s recent restructure of Iraqi Security Force leadership heralds a new security strategy for Baghdad. It is not clear what new strategy he might have intended, but he has at this point either tolerated the mobilization of militias or lost control of their activities in Baghdad.

The possible reactivation of militias poses a serious challenge for him as a security breakdown in Baghdad will be seen as a major setback to ISF and the prime minister. Maliki has hitherto been able to isolate Baghdad from the protesting provinces. The large range of AQI and the reemergence of the militias links the violence in the capital and the provinces in ways he will not likely control. In that light, Maliki’s strategic embrace of AAH in 2012 in order to limit Muqtada al-Sadr’s influence may backfire in 2013. Muqtada may be marginalized, but so too may be Maliki.

And there is evidence that Muqtada is losing control of his militias as well.  In a significant development, a member of the Sadrist trend office in Mahmudiyah organized a parade. The date of the parade is not known but on May 30 Muqtada Al-Sadr warned his followers to refrain from any action “that reignites sectarianism” and declared that organizing parades is his sole responsibility.  He further disowned the actions of the organizer, Karim Al-Araji, and stated that Araji acted independently. The Mahmudiyah event carries a number of implications. It is a mixed area in the Baghdad belt and since 2006 has continued to be on the fault line of sectarian tensions. The parade suggests that, with reports emerging about militia activation, organizers perceived a need to project force to compete with reported activities by AAH. They may have acted independently of Sadr’s control but his statement demonstrates that he is concerned about ceding ground to AAH’s mobilization. For AAH, discontented members of the Sadrist trend would be prime recruitment targets that could significantly enhance the capabilities of the group.     

For its part, AAH has deniedinvolvement in operations in Baghdad. Its spokesperson, Ahmed Al-Kanani, stated with regard to false checkpoints that AAH “in cooperation with the security apparatus investigated the news of a false checkpoint in Al-Liqa Square in Iskan and other areas in Baghdad, but did not find any trace of them.” AAH’s political bureau chief, Adnan Faihan Al-Dulaimi addedon May 30 that the group is not involved in any activities, but warned that the current conditions are similar to the ones that appeared in 2006. Al-Dulaimi emphasized that AAH “is ready for it [mobilization] and we are ready to protect our people.”

Despite the withdrawal of U.S. forces and AAH’s ostensible transition to a socio-religious and political role, AAH has remainedan active militant group that did not disarm. Moreover, as the group has been playing an active role in the Abu Al-Fadhel Al-Abbas Brigade (AFAB) in Syria, with responsibility to protect the Sayyida Zeinab shrine in Damascus, AAH has been activated for battle since 2012. This mobilization for Syria reduces the obstacles to taking up arms in Iraq.

AAH has overtly linked the conflict in Syria to the one in Iraq. According to AAH’s political deputy Al-Dulaimi, “The Sayyeda Zeinab shrine has had symbolic importance for Muslims all over the world and the targeting of this shrine by Takfiri extremists will result in a disaster, because an attack on it will be followed by a similar attack on the Imam Askari shrine in Samarra. An attack on the Imam Askari shrine in Samarra will inflame the sectarian crisis in Iraq.” The line of argument serves AAH well by justifying mobilization in both Syria and Iraq.

Dulaimi stated in the same interview that “[AAH] is alongside Iraq’s security forces and emphasizes the existing political process in this country.” With the escalation of attacks by AQI, it is also increasingly likely that AAH and other Iraqi Shi‘a militant groups will perceive the need to defend predominately Iraqi Shi‘a areas throughout Iraq; and in Baghdad especially. Attacks against Iraqi civilians have continued despite the efforts of Iraqi Security Forces to contain them. In 2006, when ISF was unable to contain the civil war in Baghdad and Diyala, Iraqi Shi‘a militant groups mobilized to provide protection. Although the ISF's capabilities have vastly improved since 2006, the continuation of AQI attacks in Baghdad will reduce the confidence of the population and set conditions for the return of Iraqi Shi‘a militias as defenders of the Shi’a.

AAH mobilization in Baghdad comes as other Iranian-backed groups have increased their involvement in the Syrian conflict. Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah made two visits to Tehran in April, the firstto meet with IRGC-Qods Force Commander Qassem Suleimani and the second to meet Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei. Afterwards, Nasrallah admitted his fighters’ involvement in Syria, announcedthat “Hezbollah could become more deeply involved in the future,” and said that Syria had “real friends” who would aid it. He further stated that there would be “very serious repercussions” if the shrine of Sayyida Zeinab was destroyed or damaged. This announcement was concurrent with Hezbollah’s sending of numerous reinforcements, probably more than two thousand, to assist regime forces in besieging the strategically important town of Qusayr.

In Qusayr, Hezbollah met fierce resistance, with estimatesof over 50 militants killed in action between May 18-21. On May 24, 75 fighters had been reportedkilled to that point in the month. The next day, Nasrallah officially signaledhis “undying loyalty” to the Syrian regime; this shift in rhetoric is notable, from a commitment primarily to defending Lebanese civilians in Syria and religious sites using veiled language to an explicit and overt commitment to defending the Syrian regime.

Compounding Hezbollah’s official commitment to the ongoing Syrian civil war, the group has come into direct conflict with Sunni-oriented extremist elements. Jabhat al-Nusra, the al-Qaeda affiliated rebel organization, announcedon May 15 that targeting Hezbollah would be their top priority. Jabhat al-Nusra has also clashed with the Abu Fadl al-Abbas (AFAB) brigade, which is a Shi‘a Syrian militant group affiliated AAH. AFAB and AAH, like Hezbollah, are all Iranian-linked militant organizations. This signals a broadening conflict between Sunni and Shi‘a militant groups expanding across the Iraqi and Syrian fronts.

Iraqis, and particularly the people of Baghdad, have proven resilient in the face of violence since 2008, but their reaction to increased attacks and the news of Iraqi Shi‘a militias resurgence indicate genuine concern. The overt mobilization of Iraqi Shi‘a militias has already included: public military parades, increased inflammatory and threatening rhetoric, leaflets and night letters dropped demanding the departure of Iraqi Sunnis, assassination of local Sunni clerics, and possible retaliatory attacks that target Iraqi Sunni areas. If AAH has mobilized, other Iraqi Shi‘a militias like KH and Sadr’s Promised Day Brigade will feel pressured to take part in order to burnish their credentials as protectors of the Iraqi Shi‘a, which could escalate quickly to sectarian war, not only in Iraq, but throughout the region.

 Ahmed Ali is an Iraq Research Analyst at the Institute for the Study of War. Jessica Lewis is the Research Director at the Institute for the Study of War. Dr. Kimberly Kagan is the President at the Institute for the Study of War.