The Campaign for Ar-Raqqah: February 24, 2017

By Tom Ramage

Key Takeaway: The Syrian Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) have seized the majority of ISIS-held territory in the eastern countryside of ar-Raqqah and is positioned to complete the isolation of the city in coming months. The U.S.’s main partners in Syria, the SDF and Turkey, are competing to lead the next phase of operations to seize ar-Raqqah City and thereby solidify their influence over post-ISIS governance. The SDF are currently the U.S. partner force best positioned to seize the city and have begun establishing governance structures comprised of local allied Arab leaders. Turkey’s alternative proposals for a Turkish-approved force to seize ar-Raqqah City risk an armed conflict with the SDF or pro-regime forces as well as the empowerment of Salafi-Jihadi group Ahrar al-Sham. The U.S. must work with its allies to both prevent an armed conflict between Turkey and the SDF that would detract from current anti-ISIS operations and while simultaneously setting conditions to ensure a representative governance structure for post-ISIS ar-Raqqah City.

The Syrian Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) have seized the majority of ISIS-held territory in the eastern countryside of ar-Raqqah in ongoing efforts to isolate the city. The SDF launched the third phase of Operation Euphrates Wrath on February 4 with the stated objective of seizing the eastern countryside of ar-Raqqah City. The SDF attacked south towards ar-Raqqah City along two axes from SDF-held territory east of the town of Ayn Issa, reportedly seizing 98 villages and hamlets northeast of ar-Raqqah City by February 12. The SDF connected these two axes on February 11 and was approximately 5 km northeast of ar-Raqqah City as of February 17. The SDF subsequently announced the second stage of phase three on February 17 and launched two axes of attack in a pincer movement to seize the Raqqa-Hasakah highway and encircle ISIS-held territory in Northern Deir ez Zour Province. The SDF simultaneously advanced south from newly seized territory on the Raqqah-Hasakah highway and seized the village of Judaydat Khabour on February 21, thereby weakening ISIS’s ability to resupply ar-Raqqah City. The SDF are now positioned to complete the isolation of ar-Raqqah City and subsequently transition to the next phase of seizing the city.

The U.S.’s main partners in Syria, the SDF and Turkey, are competing to lead operations to seize ar-Raqqah City and solidify their influence over post-ISIS governance. The SDF are currently advancing towards the city with increased U.S. material support, and have requested heavy weapons and additional armored vehicles to counter ISIS’s strength in urban combat. The SDF and affiliated political parties have also begun solidifying relationships and alliances with local Arab tribal leaders in order to create a governance structure of SDF-friendly local notables similar to the structure established by the SDF in Manbij City. Turkey, meanwhile, has demanded that the U.S. end its support for the SDF and proposed two alternative plans for a Turkish approved force to seize ar-Raqqah City. Turkey’s plans, however, will likely not beas effective in combating ISIS in ar-Raqqah City as a U.S.-supported SDF assault on the city and will fail to achieve U.S. strategic objectives for Syria. The first plan to advance along a 12-mile wide corridor from the town of Tal Abyad to ar-Raqqah City would bisect SDF-held territory east of the Euphrates. The SDF will not concede to this plan without major U.S. guarantees or Turkish concessions, and may launch counter-attacks if Turkey proceeds unilaterally. Turkey’s second proposal is an offensive from the recently seized town of al Bab, which would require Turkish troops to advance approximately 100 miles and seize at least two heavily fortified ISIS-held towns before reaching ar-Raqqah City. This second proposal violates a reported agreement between Turkey and Russia preventing Turkish troops from advancing south of al Bab, and pro-regime forces have already begun advancing east towards Lake Assad in an effort to prevent Turkish-backed opposition groups from seizing vast territory.

Turkish-backed opposition groups acceptable to the U.S. likely [DS1] cannot seize ar-Raqqah City without additional support from prominent Salafi-Jihadist group Ahrar al Sham. Turkey used Ahrar al Sham during the offensive on al Bab to seize territory when other Turkish backed opposition groups proved unable to effectively combat ISIS in and around the urban terrain. Turkey will likely utilize Ahrar al Sham in a leading role in a Turkish offensive on ar-Raqqah City. Ahrar al Sham’s seizure of the city would likely allow the group to dictate the composition of ar-Raqqah City’s governance structure, effectively trading control of ar-Raqqah from one Salafi-Jihadist group to another. A governance structure established by Ahrar al Sham is antithetical to U.S. strategic interests in Syria.

A U.S. failure to prevent conflict between its Kurdish- and Turkish-led partner forces in Syria could jeopardize the anti-ISIS mission in Syria. A Turkish attack on Manbij City or an attempt to bisect Kurdish territory could instigate a wider armed conflict that would distract both major U.S.-partner ground forces from the anti-ISIS fight in ar-Raqqah City. The U.S. must also set conditions to prevent the resurgence of Salafi-Jihadism after the seizure of ar-Raqqah City by ensuring that the city is governed by representatives of its population rather than another Salafi-Jihadist group or a Kurdish puppet.

Warning Update: Turkish Aggression Against Syrian Kurds Threatens to Halt U.S. Anti-ISIS Operations in Syria

By Tom Ramage

Key Takeaway: The U.S.-led coalition’s fight against ISIS in Syria is in jeopardy as Turkey threatens an offensive against the U.S.’s primary partner force on the ground, the Syrian Democratic Forces. Turkey has stated its intent to shift its focus from ISIS to the Syrian Kurds after the seizure of the ISIS-held town of al Bab in Northern Aleppo Province, which ISW forecasts is likely in the coming weeks. If the U.S. fails to protect its partner force, the Syrian Kurdish-led de facto government of Northern Syria may pursue closer cooperation with Russia, which could hinder the U.S.’s ability to influence the outcome of the Syrian Civil War and continue its operations in the country. Conflict between the U.S.’s allies in Northern Syria will also relieve pressure on ISIS in Raqqa Province and thereby allow ISIS to seize territory from the Syrian regime or reinforce its core terrain in Iraq.

Turkey’s threat to launch an offensive against the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) after the impending seizure of al Bab endangers the U.S.-led coalition’s fight against ISIS in Syria. Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) and Turkish-backed opposition groups entered the ISIS-held town of al Bab in Northern Aleppo Province on February 9 following a two and a half month offensive on the town. Pro-regime forces severed ISIS’s last remaining ground line of communication south of al Bab on February 6, and ISW forecasts that the city will likely fall in the coming weeks. Turkish President Recep Erdogan stated on January 27 that the Turkish Armed Forces and Turkish-backed opposition groups will not advance further south following the seizure of al Bab, but rather will launch an offensive against the SDF in Manbij City to push the SDF east of the Euphrates. The U.S. is relying on the SDF as the only U.S.-led coalition partner force currently capable of isolating ISIS’s de-facto capital in Syria – ar-Raqqah City. A Turkish offensive that both distracts and weakens the U.S.’s partner force in Syria will diminish the U.S.’s ability to combat ISIS in Syria.

Turkish officials have consistently announced their hostility towards the dominant group in the political alliance behind the SDF, the Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD), due to its links to the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), a U.S.-designated terrorist organization. Turkey launched Operation Euphrates Shield, currently a TSK and Turkish-backed opposition offensive against ISIS in Northern Aleppo Province, in large part to prevent the formation of a contiguous zone of control along the Syrian-Turkish border de facto governed by the PYD. In addition, TSK and Turkish-backed forces recently increased attacks against the SDF in Northern Aleppo Province, indicating that Turkey is preparing to escalate its currently low-scale conflict with the SDF. Turkey is also using arrests of alleged ‘PYD militants’ in Turkish-held Northern Aleppo Province and Turkey to reinforce Turkey’s designation of the PYD as a terrorist organization and legitimize their potential offensive.

Turkish President Recep Erdogan is likely timing its assault on the SDF in Northern Aleppo Province in conjunction with preparations to hold a referendum on a constitutional amendment package that would increase his executive powers. A Turkish offensive on the SDF will demonstrate Erdogan’s commitment to Turkey’s ongoing anti-PKK campaign, which is likely to increase popular support for the proposed constitutional amendments. Turkish officials likely also see U.S. President Donald Trump’s reported rejection of previous plans to increase support for the SDF as well as his recent phone conversation with Erdogan as indicators that the new administration is open to sacrificing support for the SDF in exchange for a closer partnership with Turkey in Syria.

A Turkish offensive to drive the SDF east could divert Turkish and SDF resources from combatting ISIS for months. The U.S. will likely attempt to hedge this effect by offering Turkey a leading role in operations to seize ar-Raqqah City. A Turkish offensive would require SDF approval to traverse Kurdish-held terrain, however, otherwise Turkish forces would have to advance approximately 100 miles through ISIS-held territory before attacking ar-Raqqah City. The PYD is opposed to allowing Turkey to establish a governing structure in ar-Raqqah City that is hostile to its goal of establishing a federal system in post-war Syria. The PYD is currently creating local governance structures for the city and the surrounding region with the support of local Arab tribal leaders in order to demonstrate the viability of its proposed governance structure and establish allied control over the region. Moreover, the extended Turkish assault on the ISIS-held town of al Bab demonstrates that Turkish-backed opposition forces are not independently combat capable of seizing ISIS-held urban terrain. A successful Turkish assault on ar-Raqqah City would require an increased commitment of TSK troops or the use of prominent Salafi-jihadi group Ahrar al Sham in addition to the full support of the U.S.-led coalition. Most dangerously, a halt to the SDF’s operations against ISIS could allow the group to retake territory in Northern Syria, divert forces to its assault on pro-regime held Deir ez-Zour City, or send reinforcements to defend Mosul City in Iraq.

The PYD may turn to Russia as an alternate patron if the U.S. fails to prevent an offensive against the SDF or attempt to allow Turkey a greater role in the ar-Raqqah offensive. Russia has attempted to reconcile the PYD with its rival Syrian Kurdish political parties in the Kurdish National Council and the Syrian regime in the past. Russia is also hosting a pan-Kurdistan meeting in Moscow on February 15 to reportedly discuss ways to foster Kurdish unity and PYD requirements for a post-war Syrian constitution. The PYD has already allowed Russian military police to patrol its controlled districts within Aleppo City and currently shares territory with pro-regime forces in Northern Aleppo Province west of the town of al Bab. The regime also reportedly delivered twenty-five tons of ammunition to the SDF on October 13 before the SDF launched operations against ISIS in ar-Raqqah City. Russian mediated reconciliation between the regime and the PYD would be a major political coup against U.S. influence in Syria, effectively pushing the U.S. further out into the fringes of being able to affect both the Syrian Civil War and the fight against ISIS in Syria.

Turkey may indicate an upcoming offensive by deploying further TSK reinforcements to the towns of Jarablus and Azaz in Northern Aleppo Province. An escalation in clashes between Turkish-backed opposition groups and the SDF in Northern Aleppo Province will also indicate that Turkey is shifting the focus of its operations in Syria from ISIS to the SDF. Syrian Kurds could show signs of drifting to Russia’s sphere of influence by accepting Russia’s offered concessions in a potential post-war Syrian constitution or taking increasingly frequent meetings with Russian officials. 

The Campaign for ar-Raqqah: January 12, 2017

By Genevieve Casagrande

Key Takeaway: The U.S. is proceeding with an emergent strategy to retake ar-Raqqah City from ISIS. The composition of forces and the contours of future operations to clear ISIS from the city remain undecided, despite ongoing operations by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to isolate the city. Both Turkey and the SDF continue to apply pressure on the U.S.-led coalition to exclude the other in any future capture and governance of ar-Raqqah City. The U.S. nonetheless moved forward with operations to isolate the city in early November to apply dual pressure to ISIS amidst an ongoing campaign to seize Mosul from ISIS in Iraq. 

The SDF launched the first phase of “Operation Euphrates Wrath” on November 5 with the aim of isolating the ISIS-held city of ar-Raqqah from the north. The SDF advanced over 15 KM south along two axes towards ar-Raqqah City with support from U.S.-led coalition airstrikes from November 5 - 19. Phase one ended after the SDF seized the village of Tel Saman on November 19, positioning the SDF at the entrance to the river valley encircling ar-Raqqah City from the north. ISIS only deployed a moderate mobile defense against the SDF in the northern ar-Raqqah countryside, allowing the SDF steady progress during the first phase of the operation. 

The SDF launched phase two of Operation Euphrates Wrath on December 10 with the aim of isolating the western axis of ar-Raqqah City after a two-week operational reset. The start of the operation coincided with the deployment of an additional 200 U.S. Special Operations Forces to support the SDF. The SDF advanced southeast from its areas of control in the vicinity of the Tishreen Dam along the eastern bank of the Euphrates River, seizing over 130 villages and advancing over 40 KM as of January 12. The advance positions the SDF within 5 KM of the Tabqah Dam, the next target for the SDF. The Tabqah Dam, located west of ar-Raqqah City, is the largest dam in Syria and a likely command-and-control node for ISIS that reportedly houses senior leadership, an arms depot, and high value prisoners. The YPG remains the force best positioned to seize the Tabqah Dam as the SDF’s local Arab components are not independently combat capable, though a local component of the SDF answerable to the YPG may symbolically hold the dam after its seizure – a strategy previously seen in operations to seize the Tishreen Dam in late December 2015. The YPG will nonetheless require support from U.S. SOF to seize the dam. The composition of the force that takes Syria’s largest dam will have major implications for the power dynamics in Eastern Syria in the long-term and can exacerbate underlying grievances about expanding Kurdish influence at the hands of the U.S.-led coalition.

ISIS is meanwhile mounting a calculated defense of ar-Raqqah City and neighboring Tabqah. ISIS likely intends to cede rural terrain in the ar-Raqqah countryside, which lacks natural defense, in order to draw the SDF into dense urban terrain in Tabqah and ar-Raqqah City, where the group can maximize its advantages in irregular warfare including improvised explosive devices and suicide attackers. The U.S.-led coalition has reportedly conducted only limited strikes against the Tabqah Dam in order to minimize damage to the structure. Combat in dense urban terrain in Tabqah will risk the exhaustion of local forces before operations in ar-Raqqah City even begin. Moreover, intelligence officials estimate that there could be up to 10,000 ISIS fighters in ar-Raqqah City by the time the fight reaches the city limits. ISIS's defense of Mosul in Iraq highlights how high the jihadist group can raise the costs for multi-faceted coalitions by exploiting seams between rival factions within a coalition and mounting a robust defense of major urban centers under its control. 

The nascent U.S. anti-ISIS strategy for ar-Raqqah City remains susceptible to potential spoilers seeking to disrupt the U.S.’s alliance with the majority-Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and NATO member state Turkey. Turkey and the SDF will continue to position themselves to shape the formation of U.S. anti-ISIS strategy in and the future of northern Syria through kinetic and political means. The U.S. must therefore consider slowing the SDF advance on ar-Raqqah or risk bringing about an Arab-Kurd war on the sidelines of Operation Euphrates Wrath. The battle for ar-Raqqah presents opportunities beyond the anti-ISIS fight, although victory in ar-Raqqah and the establishment of stable governance outside the influence of Salafi-jihadist groups will be measured in years, not months. The U.S. must not sacrifice long term stability for a quick victory against ISIS in ar-Raqqah City.

Iraq Situation Report: December 21, 2016 - January 5, 2017

By Emily Anagnostos and the ISW Iraq Team

ISIS launched waves of counteroffensives and spectacular attacks across Iraq after operations in eastern Mosul resumed on December 29. The attacks were widespread and hit highly secured areas, including Baghdad and the shrine cities of Najaf and Samarra. ISIS also attempted to sever the main highway running from Mosul to Baghdad by attacking locations north of Baiji. The attack pattern is similar to ISIS’s attacks in the week after the Mosul operation launched on October 17, when ISIS struck targets in Kirkuk, Sinjar, Rutba, and Samarra, and in the week after the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) breached Mosul’s city limits on November 1, when ISIS launched major attacks in Tikrit, al-Alam, Samarra, and Shirqat. The most recent attacks from December 29 to January 5 underscore that ISIS will react to major phase changes in Mosul by launching wide-spread attacks with the intent to spread the ISF thin, force it to reallocate units away from northern operations, and undermine political legitimacy in Baghdad. The attacks demonstrate that, despite its losses in Mosul, ISIS is capable of reopening old fronts, such as in Sinjar which it lost in November 2015; penetrating deep behind the frontlines, such as Kirkuk City; and retaining access into highly secured areas, such as Baghdad and Samarra. Continued minor attacks in the Euphrates River Valley also suggest that ISIS may be reviving networks in historical support zones. The ISF and Coalition can reasonably expect that ISIS will launch a similar wave of attacks across Iraq when the ISF reaches and crosses the Tigris River in Mosul.  

The Campaign for Mosul: December 20, 2016 - January 3, 2017

By Emily Anagnostos and the ISW Iraq Team

The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) launched the second phase of operations in Mosul on December 29, 2016, after weeks of limited gains and heavy casualties. The Coalition and ISF introduced new accelerants that revived the push, including advisors embedded at a lower-level and increased ISF deployments, allowing the ISF to make significant gains in eastern Mosul from December 29 to January 3, 2017.

The ISF announced the “second phase” of operations in Mosul’s city limits, now in its second month, on December 29 after operations paused for a week from December 21 to 28 to allow ISF units to regroup and remobilize. Since December 29, the ISF recaptured five major neighborhoods along Mosul’s main east-west highway and pushed further towards the eastern bank of the Tigris River. The advances inward have put the Mosul Airport and adjacent military base in range of ISF artillery.

New accelerants from the ISF and Coalition made this revived push successful. Three brigades of Federal Police and units from the Emergency Response Division, an elite unit in the Ministry of Interior, redeployed from the southern axis and began operating in the southeast alongside units from the 9^th Iraqi Army Armored Division. The introduction of the Federal Police into Mosul is a risk if the units are especially compromised by or comprised of pro-Iranian militias, which has historically resulted in sectarian violence, although the Coalition has previously cooperated with at least one of the three brigades in Ramadi. These reinforcements bolstered Iraqi Army efforts to retake several southeast neighborhoods from December 29 to January 3 and relieved the Counter Terrorism Service (CTS), which has shouldered the bulk of the urban warfare, the burden to both hold territory and support less-experienced ISF units.

The Coalition also accelerated the advance by embedding deeper with Iraqi units. The Coalition announced on December 24 that it would embed at a lower-level in the ISF, including alongside formations, such as the Federal Police, with which the Coalition has not embedded in the past. U.S. Defense Secretary Ash Carter had announced in July, after the ISF retook the Qayyarah Airbase, that embedding U.S. advisors at brigade- and battalion- levels was one of four accelerants it would deploy as the ISF set final conditions for Mosul, however advisors continued to remain primarily at the division level. U.S. advisors are now particularly focused on supporting the northern axis, where Iraqi Army units have not yet breached the city, though the advisors are also operating alongside the CTS and other ISF units. The ISF may also begin relying on increased Coalition airstrikes to counter ISIS targets, rather than door-to-door operations; this raises the risk of civilian casualties but can stave off further attrition.

ISIS launched a series of spectacular attacks from December 31 to January 2 in the shrine cities Najaf and Samarra and in Baghdad in response to the renewed push. ISIS will try to increase the pressure on provinces and political leaders to draw back forward deployed ISF units from Mosul operations, reducing reinforcements. It has also attempted to sever the ISF’s supply routes by attacking the Baghdad-Mosul highway around Shirqat District on January 2, though Iraqi forces later reopened the road. ISIS’s ability to continue attacks in the shrine cities and capital and to create a protracted battle in Mosul will put increasing pressure on an already vulnerable Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi, who had pledged that the operation would be over before 2017 but now states it will take another three months.

The Virtual Caliphate: ISIS's Information Warfare

By Harleen Gambhir

The Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) poses an evolving threat to the U.S., its allies, and its broader interests. Its approach to information warfare has represented a key component of its overall strategy, including during the period it has faced sustained pressure. ISIS has suffered significant setbacks on the ground, yet has demonstrated the ability to adapt.

ISIS will likely maintain the capacity to align its military and information operations (IO) in the coming years. Continuing conflicts and the plodding effort to address the underlying conditions where it has taken root will likely help ISIS retain physical sanctuary and command and control capability in Iraq, Syria, and North Africa, even if it loses control of major cities.

ISIS’s IO campaign has supported multiple objectives, including control over territory, coercion of populations, and recruitment. This campaign has enabled ISIS’s survival and execution of international terror attacks. It may ultimately usher in a “Virtual Caliphate” – a radicalized community organized online – that empowers the global Salafi-jihadi movement and that could operate independently of ISIS.

This “Virtual Caliphate,” the emergence of which becomes more likely the longer ISIS’s physical caliphate exists, would represent a unique challenge to American national security. Other hostile actors, beyond ISIS and the global Salafi-jihadi movement, are also adopting elements of a broader IO campaign, highlighting the requirement for the U.S. to formulate a determined response.

The U.S. possesses inherent advantages, including material resources, military strength and convening power, with which to confront this evolving threat. It also has challenges to overcome, including the lack of a government-wide strategy – supported by the necessary resources and proper bureaucratic organization – to counter enemy IO.

The U.S. should continue to counter ISIS and other enemies in this arena by focusing on rolling them back on the ground, degrading their technical capabilities and other means they employ to reach their intended audiences, and helping facilitate the emergence of compelling counter-narratives amenable to American interests.  

Please visit our website to read the full report. 

The Campaign for Mosul: December 6-12, 2016

The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) made significant gains in northeastern Mosul from December 6 to 12, but struggled to advance in the southeast. The ISF ordered a change in tactic on December 4 in order to address the lopsided eastern offensive, attempting to make rapid advances in the southeast rather than grind through neighborhood-by-neighborhood clearing operations. The shift, however, failed drastically when the rapid gains left the ISF open to ISIS counterattacks, resulting in heavy casualties on December 6 and 7. In response, the ISF moved units previously allocated to breach Mosul’s southwestern neighborhoods to reinforce efforts in the southeast on December 10.

The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) pushed to accelerate and complete operations in eastern Mosul from December 6 to 12 in order to reach the Tigris River and launch an offensive into western Mosul as the second month of the operation comes to an end. Efforts in the southeast, largely under the command of the Iraqi Army, however, have struggled to match efforts in the northeast, led by the elite Counter Terrorism Forces (CTS). 

The CTS, with the support the 16^th Iraqi Army Division entering from the north, made significant gains in northeastern Mosul from December 6 to 12. These gains have been the result of weeks of intensive and difficult block-by-block clearing operations. The CTS used this tactic in operations in Ramadi and Fallujah; it is not having the same level of effectiveness in Mosul as it did before, largely due to the dense civilian population remaining in the city whom ISIS has used as human shields. As a result the CTS requires additional time to advance, but it is still able to make gains against ISIS because of its superior skills and experience in urban warfare.

In the southeast quarter, the less experienced Iraqi Army has not been able to overcome ISIS’s resistance by grinding through block-by-block. As a solution, the ISF ordered a change in tactic on December 4, calling for “surprise” operations that would seek rapid extensions into ISIS-held areas. The tactic was put to the test on December 6, when a unit from the 9th Iraqi Army Armored Division made a quick offshoot west in order to retake the Salaam Hospital, near the bank of the Tigris River. The move, however, left the ISF open to ISIS counterattacks and ISIS, hidden in the area, launched a massive ambush on the unit on December 6 and 7. The failure required a Coalition airstrike and a rescue by the CTS to extract the unit on December 7, which reported one hundred casualties.

The ISF and Coalition are now focusing efforts in the southeast in order to accelerate the entire eastern operation. The ISF moved three brigades from the 5th Federal Police Division, or roughly 4,000 men, from the southern axis to reinforce the ISF in the southeast on December 10. These forces, previously allocated to spearhead operations into the Mosul airport and military base, will reportedly operate in the same neighborhood of the failed hospital offensive. They are currently mobilizing in Hamdaniya, southeast of Mosul, before they move into the city itself. Additionally, sources reported that a Coalition airstrike targeted the fifth and final bridge connecting east and west Mosul. The destruction of the bridge will reduce ISIS’s ability to transport equipment and people into eastern Mosul and will help anti-ISIS forces box in remaining ISIS militants in order to advance west. If the ISF can succeed in pushing ISIS out of southeastern Mosul, forces in the southeast may move to breach Mosul’s airport and military base from the east where it could establish a forward operating base for further operations into western Mosul. 

Iraq Situation Report: December 1-6, 2016

By Staley Smith, Michael Momayezi, and the ISW Iraq Team

ISIS spectacular attacks in Baghdad decreased from December 1-5, allowing the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) to deploy security forces from Baghdad to northern Iraq. The decrease is part of a trend over the past few weeks of limited or minor suicide attacks in Iraq’s capital. The ISF deployed an Iraqi Army (IA) brigade from Baghdad to eastern Mosul on December 1 to provide support to and operate alongside the Counter Terrorism Service (CTS) in ongoing operations to recapture the city. This deployment follows the movement of the Baghdad-based 60th Brigade from the 17th IA Division to Shirqat on November 29. ISIS may try to exploit the reduced security in Baghdad and attempt further attacks in the city in order to draw ISF units back to Baghdad or prevent additional ISF units from deploying to northern Iraq. 

The Council of Representatives (CoR) met to discuss the 2017 federal budget on December 4 and 5 but failed to put the budget to a final vote. One of the primary obstacles to passing the budget was a disagreement between the Shia National Alliance and the Sunni Etihad bloc over the Popular Mobilization Law, which passed on November 26 and institutionalizes and finances the Popular Mobilization Units (PMU) as part of the ISF. The two blocs differed on the proportion of Shi’a and Sunni units currently within the Popular Mobilization that will benefit under the new law, which did not specify which militias qualify for these benefits. The CoR needs to reach an agreement on which forces will receive funding in order to pass the budget, but Sunni parties could try to stall the vote in order to guarantee greater allocations to Sunni tribal fighters. If the structure of the PMU is decided by a clause within the budget and voted on by the CoR, the Shi’a majority within the CoR can solidify Shi’a militias as the majority in the new structure, furthering Sunni alienation from Iraqi Government.

Kurdish Seams Threaten Anti-ISIS Coalition in Iraq and Syria

By Christopher Kozak with Leah Danson and Howlader Nashara

The U.S. Anti-ISIS Campaign has inadvertently emboldened select factions of Kurds in Iraq and Syria in a manner that threatens to exacerbate preexisting political and ethnic divisions, stoke regional conflict, and disrupt current momentum against ISIS. The U.S. has provided extensive military assistance to both the Syrian Kurdish YPG and the Iraqi Kurdish Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) as indispensable partners in the Anti-ISIS Campaign, enabling both groups to consolidate their control over large swaths of terrain outside of the regions traditionally held by Kurds in Iraq and Syria. The empowerment of these factions in turn revitalized nationalist aspirations within Kurdistan. The Syrian Democratic Council (SDC) – a political coalition led by the Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) – declared the establishment of an autonomous Federation of Northern Syria - Rojava in March 2016. Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) President Masoud Barzani has become increasingly vocal regarding the possibility of formal independence from Iraq. This wave of nationalism has also reinvigorated insurgencies against the state among the sizeable populations of Kurds in Turkey and Iran.

This nationalist upheaval raises the likelihood that historic tensions along any number of established seams – both among competing factions of Kurds as well as between Kurds, Arabs, and Turks – could erupt into open conflict over the near-term. These long-standing seams include:

• Turkey – PKK: The insurgency waged by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in Eastern Turkey resumed in July 2015. The PKK – and an offshoot organization called the Kurdistan Freedom Falcons (TAK) – have conducted a steady campaign of major bombings across Southern Turkey as well as Istanbul and Ankara. The PKK maintains outposts and headquarters in the Qandil Mountains of Northern Iraq that Turkey has repeatedly targeted in cross-border operations.

• Turkey – PYD: Turkey launched an intervention against ISIS in Northern Syria called Operation Euphrates Shield in August 2016 in large part to prevent further expansion along the Syrian-Turkish Border by the PYD, which Turkey considers to be an extension of the PKK. Opposition groups backed by Turkey in Operation Euphrates Shield have engaged in intensifying clashes with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) – a military coalition dominated by the armed wing of the PYD, the Syrian Kurdish YPG. These clashes could escalate into open conflict as both the YPG and Turkey attempt to seize control over the key town of Al-Bab in Northern Aleppo Province, undermining coalition operations spearheaded by the SDF to isolate and seize Ar-Raqqa City from ISIS.

• KDP – PUK: The dominant position held by the KDP in Northern Iraq has fueled a political crisis within the KRG between the KDP and its political rivals, including the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and Gorran. President Barzani has leveraged the current security situation to retain his position long past the expiration of his already-extended term in August 2015, spurring mass outcry from opposition parties and the effective collapse of the government. The KRG remains unable to address critical challenges, including a crippling financial crisis, amidst this political paralysis. Low-level partisan violence also threatens to escalate over the medium-term.  The KDP and PUK previously fought an intense civil war in the mid-1990s.

• KRG – Iraq: The relationship between the KRG and Baghdad continues to suffer from persistent disagreements over sensitive political issues, including the structure of oil and natural gas revenue-sharing as well as the distribution of government portfolios to Iraqi Kurds. The ongoing financial crisis in Iraq has exacerbated these tensions and widened the division between the two sides, providing fuel to calls for the independence of Iraqi Kurdistan. At the same time, the current occupation of key regions in Ninewa, Kirkuk, Salah ad-Din, and Diyala Provinces by the Iraqi Peshmerga risks the eruption of future conflict over the long-term status of the Disputed Internal Boundaries (DIBs) contested between Baghdad and Arbil

• PYD – Syria: The relationship between the PYD and Damascus remains tense despite reports of deepening cooperation between the two sides against opposition forces in Northern Syria. The regime has thus far tolerated the formation of an unofficial autonomous zone run by the PYD in Northern Syria in order to concentrate its forces on other battlefronts. The regime nonetheless remains unlikely to cede its sovereignty to this autonomous zone over the long-term. The PYD has engaged in minor clashes with pro-regime forces inside their remaining outposts in Hasaka City and Qamishli in Hasaka Province. These tensions set the stage for future conflicts that could erode coalition gains against ISIS in Eastern Syria.

• Kurds – Arabs: Both the Syrian YPG and the Iraqi Peshmerga face mounting resistance from local Sunni Arab populations as the fight against ISIS carries the Kurds outside of their traditional ethnic strongholds. Opposition groups, tribal fighters, and unidentified insurgents regularly conduct attacks against the YPG and Peshmerga in regions dominated by Sunni Arabs in Iraq and Syria. At the same time, human rights groups have accused the YPG and Peshmerga of conducting ethnic cleansing and other heavy-handed repressive acts against Sunni Arabs in order to punish locals for their alleged support of ISIS, Al-Qaeda, and other Salafi-Jihadist groups. These incidents usually occur along historical fault lines where previous regimes in both countries attempted to alter ethnic demographics in order to favor Sunni Arabs over Kurds.

• KDP – PYD: The Syrian PYD and Iraqi KDP maintain their own political rivalry as both factions compete to cultivate allies and remove potential competitors across the entirety of the terrain held by Kurds in Iraq and Syria. The KDP backs an affiliated political branch called the KDP-S in Northern Syria that suffers from routine arrests and repression by the PYD. The KDP also hosts several thousand fighters from political factions opposed to the PYD - the so-called ‘Syrian Peshmerga’ – in Northern Iraq.  Meanwhile, the Syrian PYD and PKK have both deployed forces to Sinjar in Northern Iraq in an attempt to establish their own local base of support. This competition could escalate into open conflict over the long-term.

• Kurds – Iran: Kurdish separatists affiliated with both the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (PDKI) and Iran-Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK) escalated their attacks against security forces in Western Iran beginning in May 2016. These groups largely operate from bases in Iraqi Kurdistan across the Iraqi-Iranian Border. Although the current level of violence does not threaten the stability of the Government of Iran, the attacks will likely strain relations between Iraq and Iran.

The eruption of a conflict along one or more of these seams would directly undermine the Anti-ISIS Campaign in Iraq and Syria. The coalition remains over-reliant upon the Syrian Kurdish YPG and the Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga for military gains against ISIS in Iraq and Syria. Any outbreak of violence that fragments the coalition and turns coalition actors against one another – either politically or militarily – threatens to stall ongoing operations against Mosul in Iraq and Raqqa City in Syria. These seams also stand to fuel the widespread regional disorder that provides optimal safe haven to ISIS, al Qaeda, and other Salafi-Jihadist groups in Iraq and Syria. The U.S. Anti-ISIS Campaign risks the long-term failure of its mission to degrade and destroy ISIS in Iraq and Syria if the coalition proves unable to reduce tensions along these seams and rebalance its campaign to incorporate a wider variety of partner forces on the ground.

Anticipating Iraq’s Next Sunni Insurgency

By Emily Anagnostos, Jessica Lewis McFate, Jennifer Cafarella, and Alexandra Gutowski

Introduction

Iraq could face another Sunni insurgency after ISIS loses control of Mosul. The U.S.-led Operation Inherent Resolve has not resolved the political conditions that originally caused Sunni Arabs to mobilize in a non-violent protest movement in 2012-2013. Sunni Arabs in Iraq who are liberated from ISIS’s control will not necessarily be reconciled to the Iraqi Government. The success of anti-ISIS operations in 2016 will open space for other Sunni anti-government actors and armed groups to resurge in ISIS’s absence. Sunni Arabs are displaced in large numbers, which will grow as the Coalition seizes and secures Mosul. Iranian-backed Shi’a militias will exacerbate grievances as they move to clear Sunni-majority villages in northern Iraq and near Tel Afar, a historic stronghold of Sunni insurgents and al Qaeda in Iraq west of Mosul. Shi’a militias have alienated local Sunni Arab populations in other cities cleared of ISIS by conducting extrajudicial killings, ethnic cleansing, and other forms of violence against the local population. A permissive environment is emerging for a Sunni insurgency in the vacuum of control left by ISIS, into which other actors, including al Qaeda, could emerge in 2017.

Sunni Insurgent Groups and ISIS Before Mosul Fell

Iraq stood on the brink of a Sunni insurgency in late 2013 before ISIS began to seize terrain because former Iraqi PM Nouri al-Maliki reversed the gains of the previous U.S.-led Coalition to reconcile and reintegrate Sunni Arabs into Iraqi politics in 2008. Maliki launched a highly sectarian policy to marginalize Sunni politicians and consolidate control over the Iraqi military the day U.S. forces withdrew. His political actions ignited a year-long Sunni anti-government protest movement that erupted in January 2013 after the near arrest of Rafi al-Issawi, the moderate Sunni Finance Minister, in December 2012.

Sunni infighting crippled the Sunni political base in 2013, making it unable to channel or mitigate growing Sunni discontent away from an insurgency. Maliki’s maneuverings compounded these internal fractures, leading to the erosion of the Sunni political alliance, Iraqiyya, throughout 2012. Iraqiyya further split over how to handle Maliki’s administration: Issawi led a boycott of Maliki’s cabinet in January 2013 in solidarity with protests but several Sunni leaders broke rank and returned in March in favor of negotiation. The Sunni political alliance was effectively dead before the June 2013 provincial elections in Ninewa and Anbar Provinces, leaving the protest without an effective channel to a political resolution.

Clashes between the government and protesters kindled the growing insurgency and ultimately created the opening for ISIS’s capture of Fallujah in January 2014. Violent government escalations against the protest movement, such as the April 2013 massacre at the Hawija sit-in protest camp, galvanized the movement. The mass arrest of Sunni males in Baghdad after ISIS attacked the Abu Ghraib and Taji Base prisons in July 2013 heightened grievances.

Multiple anti-government organizations competed to champion the Sunni cause, harness their discontent, and facilitate a full insurgency. Chief among these competitors was ISIS, rebranded from al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). Sunni Arabs had rejected ISIS’s predecessor, AQI, and joined the Iraqi Government to defeat it in the Sahwa, or Awakening, movement from 2006 to 2008.  ISIS resurged in parallel with the anti-government protest movement and conducted a Vehicle-Borne IED (VBIED) wave campaign in 2012-2013 targeting Shi’a civilians to spark a sectarian civil war that would break the Iraqi state.

ISIS’s black flags were present within the protest camps in Ramadi starting in October 2013. AQI’s resurgence and its presence in previously off-limits camps demonstrates that Iraq’s Sunni Arab population became willing to tolerate ISIS’s presence in their midst despite the earlier expulsion of AQI, indicating the virulence of their anti-government sentiment. ISIS’s presence in the camps suggests that ISIS cooperated on some level with other anti-government insurgent organizations that had been present in the protest camps.

Jaysh Rijal al-Tariqa al-Naqshbandia (JRTN), a neo-Baathist insurgent group, harnessed the 2013 protest movement directly in order to stoke its own insurgency. JRTN infused the anti-government protest movement with revolutionary rhetoric and traditional Baathist branding. ISIS likely relied on its support to infiltrate the protest camps. Other legacy revolutionary groups, such as the 1920 Brigades, another neo-Ba’athist group, and Ansar al-Islam, a Kurdish Sunni insurgent group, re-emerged as well prior to December 2013.  Saddam-era Iraqi Army officers made up the core of JRTN and the 1920 Brigade’s manpower and lent military know-how and leadership to the groups. This experience with military organization and knowledge of the terrain made each neo-Baathist group a formidable rival to ISIS.

Maliki’s order for the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) to clear the sit-in protest camp in December spurred the development of an organized Sunni rebellion. The large scale clashes on December 30-31, 2013 between protesters and the ISF in Ramadi signaled the start of an insurgency. The General Military Council of Iraqi Revolutionaries (GMCIR) formed in January 2014 as an umbrella to absorb recently-formed local military councils in majority Sunni areas including Anbar, Fallujah, Mosul, Salah al-Din, Kirkuk, Baghdad, and Diyala. The GMCIR formed as ISIS seized control of Fallujah on January 3, but it reflected the degree of preparation by JRTN over the preceding year to cultivate a Sunni insurgency. Another umbrella organization, the Council of Revolutionaries of the Tribes of Anbar (CRTA), also formed in January 2014 in response to the clearing of the Ramadi protest camp.

JRTN supported ISIS’s rise because ISIS could further the anti-government cause. JRTN and GMCIR leader Izzat al-Douri, a top Saddam-era deputy, acknowledged on July 17, 2014, following ISIS’s first northern offensive, that ISIS “helped the revolutionaries achieve their goals and were semi-[parallel] with them in facing the Iranian Safavid project in Iraq.” These leaders, nonetheless, remained wary of ISIS’s adherence to their brand of an anti-government but pan-Iraqi insurgency: CRTA leader, Sheikh Ali Hatem, warned jihadists from taking advantage of the revolution in his formation statement on January 3, 2014.

The cooperation between ISIS and JRTN over the insurgency came to end likely by the fall of 2014 at which point ISIS began to brutally marginalize and suppress JRTN. JRTN ceased to support ISIS’s means of carrying out the insurgent: JRTN criticized ISIS openly in August 2014 after ISIS targeted Yazidis in Sinjar while the GMCIR, in which JRTN played a dominant role, criticized ISIS for taking the “revolution to a different path” and continuing north, rather than overthrowing the government in Baghdad. In turn, ISIS began to consider JRTN a competitor, especially as JRTN frequently tried to impose its own governance in overlapping territory. In response, ISIS began to systematically assassinate retired Iraqi Army officers, JRTN’s primarily recruitment pool, in Mosul in September 2014, a sign that it had begun to eliminate organized military resistance as a solution to the dispute. ISIS's military dominance forced JRTN to go to ground.

Increasing Sunni Unrest in Late 2016

Contemporary U.S.-led Coalition operations to degrade and disrupt ISIS in 2016 may unlock the Sunni insurgency that began as the GMCIR, CRTA, and other smaller groups. This outcome will transpire if conditions are not set to help Sunni Arabs in Iraq to address their original and mounting grievances. The Coalition has attempted to pursue Sunni reconciliation politically in Baghdad, including through a National Guard Law aimed to provide Sunni communities with a local security structure. These lines of effort largely failed because of efforts by Iranian proxies and pro-Iranian political groups.

The U.S. and Iraqi Governments are unlikely to be able to address the grievances in 2016, as the Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi government faces continued pressure from sectarian political and militia leaders to maintain the Shi’a-dominated status quo. These leaders could further Sunni distrust in the government. The Iraqi parliament passed the controversial Popular Mobilization Act on November 26, which institutionalizes the Popular Mobilization Units, the bulk of which are Shi’a militias, as part of the ISF. Sunni political leaders boycotted the vote, warning that the law hurt national reconciliation efforts. The law, the language of which remains open-ended, could support local Sunni security forces by ensuring that they are equally integrated into the new structure. However, Shi’a parties already rebuffed conditions by Sunni parties to increase the number of Sunni units, suggesting that Shi’a militias, including those charged with sectarian violence, will dominate the future structure of the Popular Mobilization. Meanwhile, former PM Maliki is carving a path to return to the premiership, which would further alienate Sunni Arabs in Iraq from the central government. His intermediate efforts have already resulted in changes that are marginalizing Sunnis, including his facilitation of the dismissal of Sunni Defense Minister Khalid al-Obeidi on August 25. This dismissal highlighted the division among Sunni parties in the government, undermining potential Sunni political unity.

Sunni political infighting has also emerged on the provincial level ahead of provincial elections. These elections are scheduled for April 2017, but the financial crisis could result in its merger with the 2018 parliamentary elections. The Anbar Provincial Government has made repeated attempts to oust its governor over allegations of corruption and mishandling the return of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). The Anbar Provincial Court also issued on October 16 an arrest warrant for Ahmed Abu Risha, who in 2007 succeeded his brother, who was assassinated by AQI, as the leader of the Sunni Awakening, or Sahwa, movement in Anbar that helped the U.S. defeat AQI. The legacy Sahwa elements subsequently resisted ISIS’s first attempt to retake Ramadi in January 2014. A similar dynamic is re-emerging in Salah al-Din Province: the Sunni Jubur tribe dominates local politics, but the tribe is divided on policy, including its relations with Shi’a militias, which constitute a large portion of the security force in Salah al-Din, and the return of IDPs. The divide has resulted in the governorship swapping between the rival branches of the Jubur tribe. This continuous jostling over governance and security arrangements can lend to instability in the province. This divide also appears in federal politics; recently, one Jubur parliamentary member called for the dismissal of Salim al-Juburi, the parliamentary speaker. In Ninewa Province, Sunni Arabs are displaced during anti-ISIS operations, then prevented from returning to villages that Kurdish forces have secured. Sunni Arabs could also be shut out of the post-ISIS administration of Ninewa Province if Shi’a and Kurdish parties dominate security. The failure to create secure, stable and effective local governance could drive Sunni populations to seek alternative ways to protect themselves and redress their grievances, opening avenues for insurgent groups to infiltrate.

Sunnis also remain at odds with each other and these intra-Sunni confrontations are already creating opportunities for Sunni insurgents. Unidentified tribal leaders in Ramadi have reportedly allowed the return of known ISIS militants into the city, only months after its recapture by the ISF in January 2016. Suicide attacks in Fallujah in November 2016 suggest that ISIS has already reconsolidated its networks in the city, which was cleared in June, or found residents that remain tolerant to its ideology. Meanwhile, Sunni tribes have carried out violent reprisals on other Sunni civilians who lived in recaptured ISIS-held towns, accusing those civilians off collaborating with ISIS. These divides within Sunni communities will prevent local, national, and political Sunni unity, and will require the same scale of neighborhood-by-neighborhood Sunni reconciliation efforts that U.S. forces carried out in 2007.

JRTN and AQI After ISIS in 2017

           

JRTN’s rhetorical resurgence has already begun. JRTN is seeking to demonstrate that it is the best champion for Sunnis in Iraq over the alternatives of ISIS and the Iraqi Government. JRTN is setting conditions to take immediate advantage of ISIS’s loss in Mosul in order to reclaim the city and its networks. The group issued a statement on October 17, the day Coalition forces launched operations against ISIS in Mosul, claiming to have attacked ISIS in Mosul and calling for additional resistance against ISIS. ISIS has been systematically imprisoning or killing civilians and retired Iraqi Army officers who refuse to act as human shields, an indication both that resistance to ISIS is mounting and that ISIS is attempting to decapitate it. Meanwhile, JRTN has continued to criticize ISIS’s methods, including issuing a statement against an ISIS attack at the Prophet’s Mosque in Saudi Arabia in early July, in order to show itself as kinder, more reasonable champion for Iraqi Sunnis.

JRTN and its allies are tapping into Sunni disillusionment with the Shi’a-dominated government in order to demonstrate that they are the best alternative for Sunnis. JRTN’s statements on October 15 and 17 rejected any Shi’a militia presence in the city and criticized Iranian presence in Iraq, indicating that JRTN is positioning itself to inherit ISIS’s mantle of Sunni resistance against the government. The GMCIR, on behalf of all armed groups including JRTN, issued a similar statement on October 16 criticizing the Iranian occupation of Ninewa as a way to carry out a “demographic change in Iraq and the region.” The 1920s Brigade warned on November 3 against the presence of Shi’a militias in Mosul during anti-ISIS operations. These statements underscore that JRTN and other insurgent groups are playing on concerns that the Iraqi Government will not be able to protect Sunnis from the Shi’a militias or ISIS.

JRTN’s resurgence will have other indicators. JRTN’s signature attack is a targeted assassination from a moving vehicle. Recent reports of drive-by shootings targeting ISIS militants in Mosul likely indicate that JRTN is already on the rebound. Sunni insurgents, particularly JRTN, also have run extensive IED campaigns in the past. Indicators of JRTN resurgence will therefore likely include assassinations of Iraqi security officials, particularly Popular Mobilization elements in charge of securing refugee camps and recaptured areas; IEDs along major roads targeting ISF access to key terrain in northern and western Iraq; and recruitment within the ISF. JRTN will likely recruit more successfully than ISIS among Iraq’s Sunni Arabs in 2016-2017 because ISIS re-invigorated the blood feud and also lost its control over Sunni Arab populations. ISIS will attempt to limit JRTN’s opportunities to resurge by eliminating current JRTN members and possible recruitment pools from among civilians and former ISF officials. ISIS has already executed hundreds of former police and army officers before withdrawing from cities south of Mosul. These efforts will likely lead to increased violence inside Sunni majority areas and places where Sunni IDPs are aggregating, including Kirkuk and Tikrit.

Al Qaeda in Syria is also positioning to unify disparate Sunni Arab factions in Iraq and gain popular support in the wake of ISIS. AQ seeks to perform the role of the silent vanguard of Sunni insurgencies, and it will enter Iraq with a low signature to evade the Coalition. AQ may even partner with JRTN the way ISIS did before and just after ISIS broke from al Qaeda to build a network of Sunni insurgent groups in Iraq to which AQ can preach. Al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri called on Sunnis globally to resist the “Safavid-Crusader” occupation of Iraq in a speech released on August 25, 2016, in which he called for Iraqi Sunnis to resume a “long guerrilla warfare” in the face of territorial losses and urged AQ in Syria to support this rebuilding process in Iraq, indicating al Qaeda’s intent to reinvigorate and reconstitute a Sunni insurgency against Baghdad. Zawahiri’s call for cross-border relations also suggests that AQ will renew efforts to maintain a unified, single organization across Iraq and Syria, as it tried to do before it split from ISIS in 2014.

AQ will likely seek to build its networks on top of pre-existing cells along the Euphrates River Valley in Anbar Province and in Ninewa Province, including in Mosul. AQ will attempt to coopt remnant elements of ISIS that escaped among the flows of IDPs. Attacks in IDP camps, especially in the Euphrates River Valley and Diyala Province, could signal that AQ or JRTN has infiltrated the camps and is seeking recruits. AQ will conduct outreach among ungoverned Sunni Arab populations, by providing religious classes, infrastructure, and utilities if possible. AQ will portray itself as a local Sunni resistance rather than use the AQ brand, which is a liability that AQ leader Aymen al-Zawahiri has already demonstrated he is willing to avoid. AQ’s resurgence in Iraq will therefore be difficult to track and distinguish from active and vocal Sunni mobilization. The establishment of new organized groups of Sunni resistance fighters is a likely indicator that an AQ resurgence is underway.  AQ will target IDP camps as well as civilians in ungoverned portions of major cities. The Euphrates River Valley could be AQ’s main line of effort because AQ likely has latent networks there that connect to AQ leadership in Syria.[1]

Conclusion

Preventing another Sunni insurgency, particularly one that can be coopted by JRTN and AQ, is a necessary task for the anti-ISIS Coalition. Both JRTN and AQ seek an outcome in Iraq that is antithetical to US interests. Anti-ISIS operations that do not explicitly block AQ and JRTN will instead enable them. The Coalition can prevent another Sunni insurgency if it takes preventative measures that are both military and political. These measures need to include three lines of effort within its current mission: the ISF, IDPs, and Iraqi Government. The Coalition must prepare the ISF in counterinsurgency (COIN) measures, against both the post-Mosul version of ISIS, and resurgent insurgent groups such as JRTN and AQ. Maj. Gen. Gary Volesky, commander of Combined Joint Force-Land Component, stated on October 24 that the ISF will start a new training cycle on COIN to combat an insurgent-like ISIS. These efforts will also need to inure the ISF and tribal militias against AQ and JRTN’s influence. The Coalition will also need to ensure that the IDP camps around Mosul are secured with proper security forces and not with Shi’a militias or compromised ISF units, which could inflame sectarian tensions and lend weight to insurgent ideology. Lastly, the Coalition cannot ensure the defeat of ISIS or any insurgent group without resolving the political conditions that allow it to take root. The Coalition must reinvigorate national reconciliation efforts that have fallen to the wayside. ISIS found initial support from Iraq’s Sunnis because it offered an alternative to the government which many Sunnis saw as oppressive. JRTN and AQ will try to do the same. The Coalition needs to ensure that its lines of effort reconcile Sunnis with the government to the point that Sunnis will use political rather than insurgent means to address grievances.

The U.S. will need to decide if and how it remains involved in Iraq after Mosul’s recapture, which will likely occur after President-elect Donald Trump takes office in January 2017. The Iraqi Government may set conditions for the U.S.’s withdrawal in Iraq after Mosul, but the U.S. and Coalition should not pursue an immediate drawdown of military forces themselves. Doing so could result in similar conditions that developed in 2012 and 2013 after the U.S. withdrew completely in 2011. Instead, the U.S. should continue efforts to train and advise the ISF in order to help prevent the reconstitution of insurgent groups and maintain Iraq’s sovereignty. The U.S. and its international partners should also ensure involvement in resettling IDPs and mediating the reconstruction of cities and their local governing structures. Successful resettlement and reconstruction efforts that earn the population’s trust in the Iraqi Government can prevent Salafi Jihadi groups from finding openings to resurge. The U.S. should also help address the underlying issues that fueled the Sunni insurgency and remain active in shaping Iraqi’s political reconciliation efforts and encouraging inclusive governance. The U.S. should have the expectation that it will remain involved in some capacity in Iraq in order to ensure that anti-ISIS gains stick and that it has resolved the conditions that allowed insurgent groups to arise in 2013.

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[1] Jabhat al Nusra, al Qaeda’s affiliate in Syria, was active along the Euphrates River Valley southeast of Raqqa City before ISIS seized the area in late 2014. Al Qaeda likely retains latent influence with tribes along the Euphrates River Valley that it can use to resurge if ISIS is defeated. These tribes straddle the Iraqi-Syrian border, which can provide al Qaeda with cross-border access to networks in western Iraq.