by: ISW Syria Team
Wednesday, May 20, 2015
ISIS Sanctuary Map: May 20, 2015
ISW has updated its ISIS Sanctuary map. This map, covering both Iraq and Syria, shows the extent of ISIS zones of control, attack, and support throughout both countries.
Op-Ed: The Fall of Ramadi Was Avoidable
By Kimberly Kagan and Frederick W. Kagan
The Washington Post, May 18, 2015
The seizure of Ramadi on Sunday leaves President Obama’s strategy against the Islamic State in ruins not only in Iraq but also throughout the Muslim world. It means that the Iraqi security forces will almost certainly not be able to recapture Mosul this year and, therefore, that the Islamic State will retain its largest city in Iraq. Worse, it gives the group momentum again in Iraq even as it gains ground in Syria and expands in the Sinai, Yemen, Afghanistan and elsewhere. This defeat was avoidable. Neither the Islamic State nor any other al-Qaeda offshoot has ever taken a major urban area actively defended by the United States in partnership with local forces. This is what happens when a policy of half-measures, restrictions and posturing meets a skillful and determined enemy on the battlefield. If the president does not change course soon, he will find that his legacy is not peace with Iran and ending wars, but rather the establishment of a terrorist state with the resources to conduct devastating attacks against the United States and a region-engulfing sectarian war.
Obama reacted slowly and reluctantly to the initial Islamic State surge last June from Syria into Mosul and then down the Tigris toward Baghdad. He authorized U.S. air support to assist the defense of the Kurdish capital of Irbil in August and eventually deployed first a few hundred and then a few thousand U.S. advisers. He did not allow those advisers to fight alongside the Iraqi units they were assisting. U.S. airstrikes have destroyed many fixed Islamic State targets and killed its fighters by the thousands since then, mainly in Iraq, but have allowed the group to retain a haven in Syria and even to maneuver freely within Iraq.
The Islamic State maneuver that led up to the fall of Ramadi was sophisticated and many weeks in the making, as a recent publication from the Institute for the Study of War shows. It entailed diversionary attacks in Baiji and Garma, a prison break in Diyala, attacks against pilgrims in Baghdad and raids near Ayn al-Asad air base west of Ramadi, a major hub of U.S. forces and Iraqi training. It was accompanied by a coordinated offensive around Deir ez-Zor, in Syria, that could give the group the ability to operate all along the Euphrates and toward Damascus as well. Numerous Islamic State fighters moved across Iraq and Syria. Although they leveraged poor weather that impedes U.S. reconnaissance, such activity must have created a signature that a properly resourced U.S. force in the region would have detected, and it certainly created a proliferation of targets on the ground for combinations of attack aviation and ground maneuvers — had those resources been available and allowed to operate freely. U.S. military power, properly employed and resourced, can thwart these kinds of maneuvers. The fall of Ramadi was unnecessary and avoidable....
Read the rest of this Op-Ed here.
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Kimberly Kagan is president of the Institute for the Study of War. Frederick W. Kagan is director of the Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute
Monday, May 18, 2015
ISIS Captures Ramadi
By: Patrick Martin, Genevieve Casagrande, Jessica Lewis McFate,
and the ISW Iraq and Syria Teams
For years, ISW has paid close attention to Ramadi and its strategic importance as the capital of the largely Sunni Anbar Province. ISIS first attacked both Ramadi and Fallujah in January 2014. Although driven from Ramadi by local tribes and the ISF, ISIS contested control of the city since then.
ISIS’s capture of Ramadi over May 15-18 was the culmination of months of ISIS probing and shaping operations around the city. Despite strategic gains by ISIS in Anbar and continued attacks on Ramadi throughout 2014, the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) largely defended Ramadi successfully and maintained supply lines into the city center. ISIS however came close to overcoming their defenses in October 2014 and December 2014. ISIS resumed major attacks on Ramadi in April 2015, and on May 15, 2015, ISIS launched a coordinated attack on multiple fronts, contesting and eventually seizing major government infrastructure in central Ramadi by May 17, 2015. This strategic gain constitutes a turning point in ISIS’s ability to set the terms of battle in Anbar as well to project force in eastern Iraq. It is also an important element of ISIS’s consolidation strategy, enhancing ISIS’s overall defense.
ISIS’s capture of Ramadi over May 15-18 was the culmination of months of ISIS probing and shaping operations around the city. Despite strategic gains by ISIS in Anbar and continued attacks on Ramadi throughout 2014, the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) largely defended Ramadi successfully and maintained supply lines into the city center. ISIS however came close to overcoming their defenses in October 2014 and December 2014. ISIS resumed major attacks on Ramadi in April 2015, and on May 15, 2015, ISIS launched a coordinated attack on multiple fronts, contesting and eventually seizing major government infrastructure in central Ramadi by May 17, 2015. This strategic gain constitutes a turning point in ISIS’s ability to set the terms of battle in Anbar as well to project force in eastern Iraq. It is also an important element of ISIS’s consolidation strategy, enhancing ISIS’s overall defense.
This presentation tracks the ISIS campaign against Ramadi from January 2014 to its capture this past weekend. See the full presentation here.
Friday, May 15, 2015
Thursday, May 14, 2015
New ISIS Offensives in the Syrian Civil War
By: Christopher Kozak
Key Takeaway: ISIS has neither been defeated nor relegated entirely to the defensive in Syria despite a string of losses to Kurdish forces assisted by U.S.-led coalition airstrikes. Instead, ISIS has launched two major offensives targeting Syrian military positions in central and eastern Syria since May 6, 2015, likely taking advantage of the Assad regime’s preoccupation with recent JN and rebel advances in Idlib Province. A consolidation of these gains would leave ISIS in position to contest and potentially seize the most important remaining military installations in eastern Syria, eliminating any potential roadblocks to further ISIS expansion into the Syrian central corridor.
ISIS dramatically escalated its efforts against the Assad regime in eastern Syria over the past week, initiating two major offensives targeting several towns and military positions in Deir ez-Zour and Homs Provinces. These operations demonstrate that ISIS has not lost its offensive capability in Syria despite a string of significant losses to Kurdish forces supported by U.S.-led coalition airstrikes in northeastern Syria. The size and scope of these offensives indicates that ISIS may have made the strategic decision to direct a large portion of its combat reserves and materiel resources away from Kurdish territory in eastern Aleppo and Hasaka Provinces towards central Syria. This shift is likely motivated by a desire to reassert ISIS’s ‘narrative of victory’ following recent setbacks in northern Syria and in Iraq which have slowed the group’s operational momentum. The perceived weakness of the Assad regime following major victories by JN and rebel forces in Idlib City and Jisr al-Shughour presents an inviting target for ISIS’s expansion. ISIS may also desire to reaffirm its status as a prominent anti-Assad actor in response to the JN successes in Idlib Province in order to bolster its recruitment efforts among the Syrian opposition.
ISIS’s escalation in eastern Syria began on May 6, 2015, when ISIS launched a wide-scale attack targeting the regime-held sections of eastern Deir ez-Zour city. Clashes centered around the southeastern neighborhoods of al-Sina’a, ar-Rusafa, and al-Omal, all located north of the regime-held Deir ez-Zour Military Airport. ISIS seized the al-Jumayn Checkpoint in the al-Sina’a District after conducting a tank-borne SVBIED against the position. ISIS also made additional advances in the al-Omal and Jubaylah Districts after detonating at least two tunnel bombs under regime positions. On May 13, ISIS claimed to seize Saker Island in the Euphrates River north of the Deir ez-Zour Military Airport following a week of heavy clashes. As of publication, ISIS forces have capitalized on their control of Saker Island to stage attacks into Harrabesh District and other areas along the northern perimeter of the Deir ez-Zour Military Airport.
104thRepublican Guard Brigade commander Brig. Gen. Issam Zahreddine in Deir ez-Zour, late 2014
Photo Distributed by Al-Masdar News, September 5, 2014
ISIS’s advance in Deir ez-Zour has likely been enabled in part by the reported redeployment of regime Brigadier General Issam Zahreddine and his elite 104th Republican Guard Brigade away from Deir ez-Zour to the Eastern Ghouta suburbs of Damascus in early May 2015. The 104th Brigade played a key role in stabilizing frontlines between ISIS and the regime in Deir ez-Zour after its arrival to reinforce the SAA 137thBrigade in Deir ez-Zour in early 2014. The defense of Deir ez-Zour represented a key component of Assad’s “army in all corners” strategy, which called for pro-regime forces to maintain far-flung combat outposts such as the Deir ez-Zour Military Airport in order to pin the bounds of a unified post-war Syrian state and reinforce Assad’s claim to political legitimacy. The withdrawal of the 104th Brigade signifies a clear deprioritization of the Deir ez-Zour front by the Assad regime and suggests that recent rebel advances in western Syria may be forcing the regime to reevaluate the viability the “army in all corners” strategy.
ISIS applied additional pressure to the Assad regime on May 13, 2015, launching a second offensive targeting regime positions throughout eastern Homs Province. One element of the ISIS advance targeted al-Sukhna northeast of Palmyra, capturing the town after heavy clashes which killed nearly sixty combatants and left over one hundred wounded. On the same day, ISIS conducted a two-pronged offensive targeting the major regime strongpoint of Palmyra from the north and west, seizing the al-Amiriyah District north of the city and shelling the strategic Palmyra Military Airbase with Grad rockets. ISIS militants conducted raids targeting a large complex of weapon depots located northwest of Palmyra, while pro-ISIS social media accounts also claimed the seizure of several regime checkpoints surrounding the T3 Pumping Station east of the city. As of May 14, activists continued to report heavy clashes between ISIS and regime forces on the northern, western, and eastern outskirts of Palmyra.
ISIS Offensives in Central Syria, May 6 – May 14, 2015
The ISIS offensives targeting al-Sukhna and Palmyra differ dramatically from the previous pattern of ISIS attacks witnessed in eastern Homs Province. Previous ISIS operations in the region had emphasized rapid, mobile raids against isolated regime positions that were intended to inflict casualties and seize weapons while avoiding retaliatory airstrikes. In contrast, the recent offensives reveal that ISIS retains the desire and capability to secure and hold urban terrain. If ISIS can consolidate its gains, it will be in position to contest the Palmyra Military Airbase and simultaneously isolate the ground line of communication to the Deir ez-Zour Military Airport via the Homs-Palmyra-Deir ez-Zour Highway. ISIS’s advances in both Deir ez-Zour and eastern Homs Province threaten to undermine the remaining military installations in eastern Syria, eliminating any potential roadblocks to further encroachment by ISIS into the Syrian central corridor near Homs and Hama cities. The Assad regime suffers from long-standing manpower problems which force the regime to conduct a zero-sum balancing act across its many standing fronts and its forces have been further strained by recent opposition advances in both northern and southern Syria. This lack of a flexible combat reserve means that Assad will likely have to choose between devoting resources to face the emergent ISIS threat in central Syria or the advancing JN-rebel coalition in western Syria. In either scenario, Salafi-jihadist factions are set to make further territorial gains in Syria.
Wednesday, May 13, 2015
Tuesday, May 12, 2015
Monday, May 11, 2015
Friday, May 8, 2015
Wednesday, May 6, 2015
Tuesday, May 5, 2015
Monday, May 4, 2015
Warning Intelligence Update: Possible Upheaval in the Syrian Capital
by: Jennifer Cafarella
Key Takeaway: Major operations targeting entrenched anti-Assad forces in the outskirts of Damascus appear to be upcoming as Hezbollah and the Syrian regime prepare to target anti-Assad hold out positions in the capital and its countryside. In addition, indicators have emerged of a possible intervention by regional actors to assist in defeating Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. This includes ongoing negotiations to deepen the cooperation between prominent hardline Islamist groups Jaysh al-Islam and Harakat Ahrar al-Sham, which would increase the effectiveness of anti-Assad forces regardless of direct regional intervention. Together these trends indicate that a major shakeup of the military situation in Damascus Province is likely in coming weeks.
The Syrian regime launched an attack on May 3 targeting the town of Maydaa, which buffers a crucial remaining rebel supply line into the partly besieged Eastern Ghouta suburbs of Damascus. The regime made immediate gains, but clashes are reportedly ongoing in the area. According to Damascus-based Jaysh al-Islam commander Zahran Alloush, “if the army succeeds in taking Maydaa they could use it as a launchpad to storm Eastern Ghouta.” It therefore appears that the Assad regime may be setting conditions for a major campaign inside of the capital. Following the attack, conflicting reports indicate that either multiple IEDs or a suicide bomber detonated inside the Rukn al-Din neighborhood of Damascus on May 4, injuring a regime major general. The Rukn al-Din neighborhood is home to a number of senior regime officials and elements of Syria’s intelligence apparatus. Jabhat al-Nsura (JN) later claimed via twitter that three JN fighters successfully penetrated a military logistics and supply building on Barniya Street near the neighborhood, likely in the same attack that killed the regime general. This attack could be an attempt by JN disrupt the regime’s operation in Eastern Ghouta.
The attack also indicates JN’s ability to penetrate core regime-held neighborhoods with spectacular attacks. If anti-Assad strongholds in the eastern outskirts of the capital begin to fall, JN could attempt to force a constriction in the regime’s deployment in the capital through spectacular attacks targeting core regime-held terrain. Seeming to indicate this threat, unconfirmed reports emerged from a Saudi newspaper that the regime's intelligence service asked all of the “top families” of Damascus to relocate to Latakia city within 48 hours on May 3, 2015. According to the report, the regime has specifically asked the families of the Mezzeh district to abandon the city. The Mezzeh Military Airbase is one of Assad’s primary airports to support its operations in Damascus, and is located less than five miles from the Presidential Palace, making the Mezzeh district some of the regime’s most fortified terrain.
The possibility of a regional intervention by Saudi Arabia and Turkey to support Damascus-based rebels may encourage the regime to secure immediate gains in the capital that could neutralize opportunities for regional actors. Indications of a possible Saudi and Turkish intervention in Syria against Assad have increased in recent weeks. Following the fall of Idlib City and Jisr al-Shughour in Idlib Province to JN and rebel forces, reports emerged of increased amounts of regional aid being delivered to rebels in northern Syria. In addition, major rebel groups in southern Syria claimed in late April to have engaged in discussions with regional actors regarding the provision of “Arab air cover” or other anti-aircraft capabilities to Syrian opposition fighters for an upcoming operation against the regime, likely in southern Damascus and Dera’a Provinces. Zahran Alloush, the leader of the Saudi-backed Jaysh al-Islam, is currently in Turkey after arriving on April 17 for a series of undisclosed meetings. According to photos circulated by pro-opposition sources, Alloush recently met with leaders from hardline Islamist group Harakat Ahrar al-Sham al-Islamiya (HASI). The discussions underway in Turkey reportedly constitute an attempt by these two groups to negotiate a new cooperative relationship, likely under Saudi and Turkish supervision. A member of the Islamic Front Shura Council denied that the groups were considering a full merger but indicated that deepening cooperation between the groups is upcoming.
From left to right: HASI leader Hassem Sheikh, Jaysh al-Islam leader Zahran Alloush, and Suqour al-Sham (HASI’s armed wing) leader Sheikh Ahmed Issa
A united HASI and Jaysh al-Islam could provide regional actors with a powerful ally on the ground to serve as a partner for action against the Assad regime in the near term. An apparent recent increase in Jaysh al-Islam’s military capabilities seems to indicate that regional support to the group has actually increased in the past few months. This augmentation seems to confirm that the group will be a designated partner for any future operations directly carried out by regional actors against the Syrian regime. In mid-April, Jaysh al-Islam conducted a large military parade and graduation ceremony in the Eastern Ghouta suburbs of Damascus. The scope of the parade and the equipment showcased suggest a recent infusion of increased support, likely from Saudi Arabia. Some of these newly trained fighters appear to have participated in the battle to seize Jisr al-Shughour in Idlib Province. Jaysh al-Islam was a signatory to the “Battle of Victory” operations room, which seized the town on April 25. Jaysh al-Islam also signed onto a new operations room in Aleppo City the following day, a notable expansion of its operations inside Aleppo that could signify Jaysh al-Islam’s growing role as a cross-front actor in Syria.
Meanwhile, unconfirmed Lebanese sources are also indicating that Hezbollah’s expected offensive targeting the Qalamoun border region with Syria is imminent and “could start in hours.” According to “field sources” cited by the Lebanese paper Janoubiya on May 3, a large number of Shi’a youth have traveled from villages in the western Bekaa Valley to the Northern Bekaa region to prepare for the “Battle of Spring” in Qalamoun, which is expected to begin in the next 48 hours. Jihadists in the border region also appear to be gearing up for upcoming operations, likely indicating that a battle in the border region will require a significant military effort from Hezbollah. JN released a series of photos from the Qalamoun region showing its fighters training on a variety of anti-tank weapons systems. The tweets follow a set of earlier pictures from a graduation ceremony from a JN training camp. One of these tweets stated that “[the mujahideen] are almost ready to free their villages,” likely indicating upcoming JN offensive operations in the border region. JN and rebel fighters in the Qalamoun region launched a surprise assault against Hezbollah and Syrian regime positions in the Zabadani area and the Tfeil enclave on May 4, possibly indicating the start of a JN-led campaign in the border region.
A JN trainer instructs JN fighters using anti-tank weapon
It is unclear if the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) will be able to maintain security in Lebanon’s bordering Bekaa valley if a major Qalamoun offensive occurs. Lebanese Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri indicated that he supports the upcoming Hezbollah offensive and that the LAF will continue to respond to jihadist activity on the Lebanese side of the border in case of escalation. With Hezbollah’s backing, the LAF and Lebanese General Security have made a string of important arrests that appear to be dismantling the jihadist network inside Lebanon. However, jihadist actors in the Qalamoun, including both JN and ISIS, have dormant strength in the Bekaa Valley and will likely leverage this to escalate on both sides of the Lebanese-Syrian border.
Assad is likely to calculate his activities in Damascus in the context of the security of key regime supply lines transiting the Damascus countryside from Lebanon. Escalation in both the capital and its countryside could result in dangerous destabilization that could jeopardize the continued security of key regime terrain in the capital, such as that represented by the Mezzeh district. Yet a combined regime and Hezbollah assault against anti-Assad hold out positions in both Damascus and the Qalamoun region could also achieve a major victory and reestablish the military superiority of pro-regime forces in Syria. Regional actors are likely to engage with this dynamic and calculate the possibilities and prospects of intervention according to the realities of the military situation in the province. Jaysh al-Islam and HASI will be key players in rebel activities in Damascus province regardless of whether intervention materializes.
Friday, May 1, 2015
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