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Monday, March 30, 2015

Assad Regime Loses Idlib to Jabhat al-Nusra and Rebel Offensive

by: Jennifer Cafarella

Rebel forces led by al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) wrested control of Idlib City from the Assad regime on March 28, 2015. Removing the regime from a second provincial capital is arguably the biggest rebel victory since the fall of al-Raqqa to JN and rebel forces in March 2013. It represents a turning point in the Syrian civil war that is likely to alter the trajectory of the conflict in coming months, with implications for how rebels wage war in 2015. JN and Islamist rebel forces have achieved shocking success in reinvigorating the rebel campaign with the seizure of Idlib City. This is likely to provide momentum to the JN-Islamist axis in Syria at the expense of moderate rebel forces, and hinder efforts to foster a political solution to the conflict.

JN and rebel forces seized the northern provincial capital during a swift four-day assault, preceded by days of indirect fire bombardment. The assault exhibited highly effective command and control, which was made possible by a newly formed “operations room” named Jaysh al-Fatah. The operations room had participation from JN; Islamist groups Jund al-Aqsa, Harakat Ahrar al-Sham al-Islamiya (HASI), Faylaq al-Sham, and Ajnad al-Sham; and a few other local groups. By evening on March 27, JN claimed the fall of half of the city and shortly after noon the following day, the Jaysh al-Fatah operations room declared the complete “liberation” of the city. JN immediately raised a JN flag above the governorate building, and tweeted videos purporting to show Idlib civilians celebrating the capture of the city by JN and rebel forces.

The offensive was widely covered through social media, with all participating groups using a standardized hashtag as they tweeted their progress against the city. JN also branded its videos and photos with the Jaysh al-Fatah logo, illustrating JN’s desire to nest its military contribution within a wider rebel front. This follows a recent increase in JN twitter activity that makes careful mention of the rebel groups participating in JN-led attacks. A Twitter account was also established for the Jaysh al-Fatah operations room, gaining over 8,000 followers in the first 48 hours of the attack. This social media coverage generated a high degree of visibility regarding the offensive and illustrated the high propaganda value of the successful liberation of a provincial capital.


The JN and rebel seizure of Idlib city threatens the Assad regime by challenging its perceived staying power. Assad’s strategy hinges on its ability to maintain outposts in every province in order to portray an image of state power. This image is directly threatened by the loss of a second provincial capital, a psychological blow that may generate asymmetric military effects on other battlefronts. The regime must now defend its remaining isolated enclaves in Idlib Province, northeast, southeast, and southwest of Idlib City from a considerably weakened force posture. The inability to do so will affect Assad’s ability to maintain the support of his population base, which has already begun to show signs of war weariness. The establishment of alternate forms of governance within rebel-held terrain furthermore challenges the regime by offering a possible alternative form of stability. The Syrian National Coalition (SNC) seemingly affirmed this possibility when it issued a statement calling the seizure of Idlib city an important advance along the road to the liberation of Syria and announcing its intent to transfer its headquarters into Idlib City. 

The fall of Idlib City also threatens the regime’s ability to defend Latakia Province to the southwest. JN and rebel forces remain active in the province’s eastern mountain ranges, where they recently advanced against regime forces to seize the town of Dorin on March 11. After declaring the seizure of Idlib City on March 28, the Jaysh al-Fatah twitter accounted tweeted that it is not a “temporary” operations room and that it will continue its operations soon. This likely indicates JN and rebel intent to capitalize on their victory in Idlib city to deepen the connectivity between JN and rebel-held terrain in Idlib and Latakia provinces, possibly by attacking the regime stronghold of Jisr al-Shughour at the seam between these provinces. This possibility is suggested by a statement released by a Liwa al-Furqan affiliate on March 29 indicating its intent to challenge the regime in Jisr al-Shughour and claiming to form an operations room to liberate the city.

The victory in Idlib City is likely to accelerate a shift in the nature and composition of the anti-Assad revolution in 2015 that favors JN. It occurred amidst a renegotiation of how JN and rebel forces cooperate through which JN has increased its relative dominance within rebel ranks. The success of the JN-led Jaysh al-Fatah operations room contrasts with the limited effectiveness of coalitions supported by regional and Western actors such as the Dera’a-based Southern Front and the Revolutionary Command Council. JN’s established value as a partner in the fight against Assad has led numerous rebel groups to deepen their cooperation with JN in order to increase unity across rebel ranks and to prevent an incursion by the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) into rebel-held terrain. JN is increasingly attractive as a partner to rebel forces on two planes, assisting in the revolution against the Assad regime while simultaneously securing rebel-held terrain against the threat of ISIS expansion. Remaining moderate forces may be forced to seek opportunities to participate in JN-led governance and military initiatives in order to remain relevant as JN and Islamist rebels consolidate their gains in Idlib and move forward with the implementation of governance.

The victory in Idlib City is as much or more of a victory for al-Qaeda in Syria than a victory for the Syrian revolution. JN’s success in Idlib will likely validate the al-Qaeda grand strategy in the view of many within the global jihadist community, enabling al-Qaeda to begin to counterbalance the ISIS rise to prominence. JN’s strategy of prioritizing joint governance serves the long-term objective of the al-Qaeda organization to establish an Islamic Emirate in Syria with the support and participation of local populations that can be a future component of its envisioned future global Caliphate. While al-Qaeda may attempt to coerce JN into issuing a more direct challenge to ISIS in Syria in the near term, the success achieved by JN to date is likely to encourage central al-Qaeda leadership to follow JN’s lead and remain invested JN’s long-term strategy. Over time, success in this effort by JN may enable al-Qaeda to invalidate ISIS’s brutal and unsustainable methodology and present its longer-term but still malign alternative. 

The fall of Idlib City to JN-led rebel forces will reverberate across other Syrian battle lines. As the Assad regime absorbs the loss, it will likely attempt to demonstrate success in its own war effort, possibly by bringing increased combat power to bear on Aleppo City. The regime can be expected to use the fall of Idlib City to propagate its existing narrative that Assad must stay in power to “assist” the international community in “combating terrorism.” Nonetheless, Assad has already begun to retaliate against rebel forces through indiscriminate tactics such as barrel bombs, and is likely to conduct future chemical weapons attacks in the area. Assad therefore continues to be a radicalizing actor whose behavior serves to generate local support for groups such as al-Qaeda who are willing and able to resist. JN is likely to leverage its current momentum to deepen its cooperation with rebel forces on other battlefronts where JN and rebel forces remain less united. Given the dual threat of ISIS incursion and regime advance, rebels are increasingly likely to buy into JN’s model on other fronts. If successful in increasing their military capability through deepened cooperation, JN and rebels may be able to turn momentum in their favor. Resource constraints on all sides of the conflict, however, continue to define the Syrian conflict as one which no actor is capable of winning, ensuring that the war will continue until meaningful international engagement with Syria occurs. The longer this window is kept open, the greater al-Qaeda’s foothold in Syria will become.

Friday, March 6, 2015

Iraq Situation Report: March 5-6, 2015

by Sinan Adnan and ISW Iraq Team

Syrian Jihadists Signal Intent for Lebanon

by Jennifer Caffarella

Both the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) and the al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) plan to conduct attacks in Lebanon in the near term. Widely presumed to be enemies, recent reports of an upcoming joint JN and ISIS offensive in Lebanon, when coupled with ongoing incidents of cooperation between these groups, indicate that the situation between these groups in Lebanon is as fluid and complicated as in Syria. Although they are direct competitors that have engaged in violent confrontation in other areas, JN and ISIS have co-existed in the Syrian-Lebanese border region since 2013, and their underground networks in southern and western Lebanon may overlap in ways that shape their local relationship. JN and ISIS are each likely to pursue future military operations in Lebanon that serve separate but complementary objectives. Since 2013 both groups have occasionally shown a willingness to cooperate in a limited fashion in order to capitalize on their similar objectives in Lebanon. This unusual relationship appears to be unique to Lebanon and the border region, and does not extend to other battlefronts. Despite recent clashes that likely strained this relationship in February 2015, contention between the groups in this area has not escalated beyond localized skirmishes. This suggests that both parties have a mutual interest in preserving their coexistence in this strategically significant area. In January 2015, JN initiated a new campaign of spectacular attacks against Lebanese supporters of the Syrian regime, while ISIS has increased its mobilization in the border region since airstrikes against ISIS in Syria began in September 2014. Conditions favor a continued limited détente between JN and ISIS past March 2015.

Wednesday, March 4, 2015

Tikrit Situation Report: March 4, 2015

by Sinan Adnan, Jessica Lewis McFate and ISW Iraq Team


ISIS Sanctuary: March 4, 2015

by Jessica Lewis McFate

ISIS SANCTUARY UPDATE
March 4, 2015

ISIS core control zones inside Iraq and Syria have not shifted significantly since anti-ISIS operations began in June 2014, though anti-ISIS forces have cleared ISIS from several of its major frontier positions in Iraq and Syria. The most significant counter-attacks launched against ISIS were the November 2014 operation to clear ISIS from Baiji and the ongoing March 2015 offensive to clear ISIS from Tikrit (see area on map northwest of Baghdad). The Tikrit operation has the potential
to provide the Iraqi Security Forces access to northern Iraq, in support of a future offensive on ISIS’s core terrain. The operation does not, however, meaningfully change ISIS’s battle plan to sustain urban control throughout Iraq and Syria. March 4, 2015

ISIS lost several frontier positions in late 2014. In eastern Iraq, ISIS lost control of several cities including Jalula, Sadia, Udhaim, and Suleiman Beg, compromising ISIS’s access to the Hamrin ridge support system. In response ISIS shifted its Hamrin forces to the desert area east of the Tigris. ISIS also lost historic support positions in the Baghdad Belts, specifically in northern Baghdad and southwest of the capital in Jurf al-Sakhar. ISIS still maintains a desert support zone north of
Fallujah that provides access to northern Baghdad. ISIS also lost control of Sinjar city and several towns northeast of Tel Afar along its northern frontier in Iraq. These losses, while substantial, have not compromised ISIS’s urban priorities of Mosul and Raqqa. 

Two notable losses did complicate ISIS’s defenses in the environs Mosul and Raqqa. ISIS lost the battle for Kobane, northwest of Raqqa, in December 2014, and the Syrian Kurdish YPG subsequently pushed ISIS presence back to the perimeter of Raqqa district, re-capturing two strategic bridges along the upper Euphrates (see area on map northwest of Raqqa). In response ISIS consolidated its defenses between Raqqa city and these new Kurdish positions. In Iraq, Kurdish Peshmerga attacks at Gwer and anti-ISIS Sunni tribal activity near Qayarra and Sharqat in early 2015 perforated a critical ISIS stronghold in southern Ninewa. Losses in this area compromise ISIS’s ability to defend Mosul from the south. ISIS reacted to the Peshmerga and Sunni tribal attacks by declaring new governorates in the Jazeera and the Zaab in February 2015, suggesting a greater defensive mobilization around Mosul.
 
ISIS is expanding visibly on two fronts: in Hasaka province in northeastern Syria (see area on map northeast of Raqqa) and in the Damascus, Qalamoun, and Bekaa valley region in southwestern Syria (see area on map north of Damascus). ISIS lost territory to YPG forces near Tel Hamis and Hasaka city in February 2014, and subsequently increased attacks against the YPG along the road between Tel Tamr and Ras al-Ayn. Beginning in December 2014, ISIS also increased its activity along the Syrian-Lebanese border, establishing a Shari’a court east of Arsal and clashing with the Lebanese Armed Forces in the vicinity of Ras Baalbek. This activity sparked rumors that ISIS intends to establish a “wilayat” within Lebanon in the near term. In addition, past ISIS-linked attacks in Beirut and Tripoli indicate that ISIS may project force into these areas in the future. ISIS also intensified its activities in the environs of Damascus city in early 2015, reasserting its latent historical presence in the southern suburb of Hajar al-Aswad and seizing several positions from opposition forces in the sparselypopulated areas southeast of the capital.

 ISIS currently enjoys popular support in some areas of Jordan, Gaza and the West Bank, as demonstrated pro-ISIS demonstrations and arrests of ISIS supporters in the past several months. However, these pockets do not provide a high level of material support to ISIS, and thus are not marked as support zones. ISIS attacked Iraq-Jordan and Iraq-Saudi Arabia border crossings several times in January and February 2015, however, a reminder that ISIS is engaging neighboring states with more than violent rhetoric. ISIS’s current mission, as articulated in the October 2014 issue of its English-language Dabiq magazine, is to both “Remain and Expand.” ISIS will persist in its expansion attempts even as its strategic defenses are tested in Iraq and Syria. ISW will continue to update this ISIS sanctuary map to account for ISIS’s losses and gains.




Wednesday, February 18, 2015

Iraq Situation Report: February 17-18, 2015

by Sinan Adnan and ISW Iraq Team

Iranian-Backed Militias Cause a Political Crisis for Iraq

By Patrick Martin and Omar al-Dulimi with Kimberly Kagan and Sinan Adnan


Key takeaway

A new political crisis is brewing in Iraq as Sunni political leaders are threatening to boycott the Council of Representatives. Reconciliation of Sunni political and tribal leaders is an essential prerequisite for reconstituting the Iraqi state. Iraq's Prime Minister, Haidar al-Abadi, made some significant attempts to reach out to and reconcile with Sunni political and tribal leaders. Notably, he and the Council of Ministers initiated a vote on the National Guard Law and the Justice and Accountability Law on February 3, the passing of which was a key promise that brought the Sunnis into his government in September of 2014. However, Prime Minister Abadi's inability to control the Shi’a militias is undermining his credibility and the coherence of the Iraqi state.

Anbar Sunni figures have complained that their marginalization has been ongoing for months. Sunni politicians and tribal leaders have repeatedly called for weapons and material support to Sunni tribal fighters in Anbar to face ISIS fighters, and their pleas have largely gone unaddressed. In addition, the Sunni populace is reluctant to trust its security to the Shi’a militias and members of the “Popular Mobilization” after multiple reports that the militias engaged in sectarian targeting of Iraqi Sunnis in areas of operations like Diyala, Anbar, and Jurf as-Sakhar in northern Babil. 

Three events have amplified and accelerated the complaints of Sunni leaders about the Shi’a militias. First, Shi’a political forces attempted to manipulate the National Guard Law after it was voted on by Sunni ministers in the Council of Ministers and actually passed the Justice and Accountability Law that deals with the De-Baathification without an agreement of Iraqi Sunni ministers. The second is the murder of two Sunni tribesmen in the Ramadi area, almost certainly carried out by Shi’a militiamen. The last is the killing of a major Sunni tribal leader, his son, and his bodyguards, after being kidnapped from their convoy south of Baghdad. This paper reviews the unfolding reactions of Iraq's Sunni political leadership to the events of the past two weeks and the consequences they may have on the integrity of the central government. 

The National Guard Law and the Justice and Accountability Law

On February 3, Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi opened a Council of Ministers session to vote on the National Guard Law and the draft modifications to the Justice and Accountability Law, both of which are important to Sunni politicians. The National Guard Law would form provincial armed units under the command of the Prime Minister. The law originated to create Sunni security forces to be in charge of security in Iraqi Sunni provinces and was a condition outlined by the Sunni political leadership prior to joining the government of PM Abadi. Some Shi’a politicians have hoped to leverage the National Guard Law to have the government pay for the primarily-Shi’a “Popular Mobilization.” Meanwhile, Sunni politicians pushed for modifications to the Justice and Accountability law - also known as the De-Baathification Law - that would enable vetted former Baath party members to re-enter government service and the security forces. Many Sunnis saw changes to the law as necessary for reconciliation of former Baath party officials and security forces, many of which have opposed the Iraqi government. The law had also been used as a method to sideline and reduce the influence of Sunni politicians under former Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki.

For the drafts to become law, the legal procedure requires that the Council of Ministers approve the draft, which is then sent to the State Advisory Council (SAC) of the Justice Ministry for review. The SAC would then send it back to the cabinet. The Cabinet then sends the draft to the CoR. The CoR members would certainly argue over additional modifications, and would then vote on whether or not to enshrine the modifications and the draft into official laws.

Disagreements immediately surfaced between Sunni and Shi’a parties during the Council of Ministers (CoM) voting process. Sunni CoM members reportedly boycotted the vote on the Justice and Accountability Law. A member of the Wataniyya list, Abd al-Karim Abtan, stated that ministers of his list and minsters from the Iraqi Sunni political formation Etihad did not vote on the law and that their CoR members would have the “same stance” at the CoR. He further highlighted the need to abide by the Political Agreement without going into details about the exact reason behind the law’s rejection. The Political Agreement had highlighted the conditions under which Iraqi Sunni political leadership would participate in PM Abadi’s government. However, the Justice and Accountability law still managed to pass the CoM vote, despite Sunni objections, with a “simple majority.”

Sunni politicians also had concerns over the National Guard law, the details of which remain hazy. Leaders of the Iranian-backed militias, working alongside the popular mobilization, participated in drafting the law, and the Sunni politicians are understandably concerned. Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis sat on the committee that drafted the law. He is a close ally of Iranian Qods Force Commander Qassem Suleimani and the Vice Chairman of the Popular Mobilization Commission that has authority over the Shi’a-dominated “Popular Mobilization” forces. The United States Department of the Treasury has designated him as a terrorist since July 2009. 

Regardless, the National Guard Law also passed the Council of Ministers, with “all” Sunni members voting in favor, despite a claim by Union of Forces bloc MP Muhammad al-Karbuli that they “did not read it closely.” Both draft laws went to the CoR for voting on February 10. Sunni cries of foul play coincided with their arrival. Speaker Salim al-Juburi delayed the reading of the two laws because they had not been submitted “formally” by the Council of Ministers. A Mutahidun Bloc CoR member, Intisar al-Juburi, stated that the Council of Ministers had bypassed the Advisory Council and sent the draft laws directly to the CoR, though the Presidency Commission of the CoR had realized this “at the last minute” and sent them back to the Advisory Council for legal review. She highlighted that the draft did not include the names of ministers who voted for or against the draft law.On February 11, Vice President and Etihad leader, Osama al-Nujaifi, stated that the draft National Guard Law that was submitted to the CoR was "replaced" and is not the same as the draft voted on at the CoM and that it did not include their proposed modifications. Al-Nujaifi also claimed that the draft Justice and Accountability Law was a more “stringent” version than the law in effect now. He called for an investigation and an emergency meeting with the three presidencies - the Speaker, the President, and the Prime Minister - as well as political leaders on the matter. 

The confusion behind the introduction of the two draft laws to the CoR exacerbated tensions. The very mechanisms that were supposed to reconcile the angry Sunni leadership and promote national unity in the government that Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi had championed became a major point of grievance for Sunnis. The draft law fiasco also reinforced their narrative that the government was neglecting their interests in favor of Shi’a interests. 

Albu Jabir killings in Ramadi

The voting process was made even more complicated by a crisis that unfolded nearly simultaneously in the capital of Anbar province. On February 8, two Sunni members of the Albu Jabir tribe were kidnapped at a checkpoint and killed in the Ramadi area. Their bodies were reportedly dumped in front of Anbar Operations Command (AOC) in Ramadi, sparking protests by local tribesmen. The Chairman of the Anbar Provincial Council, Sabah Karhut, stated that the two men were detained by the “Popular Mobilization” and executed within the AOC facility. The Albu Jabir tribal leader, Zaidan al-Jabiri, claimed that the execution was ordered by a “Popular Mobilization” leader.

The most plausible scenario puts a Shi’a militia group, most likely Katai’b Hezbollah (KH), at fault for the murders. The two men may have been kidnapped in al-Sjariya, east of Ramadi. This is an area in which KH established a presence and began to participate in security operations on January 28 at the invitation of the Anbar Provincial Council, according to an Anbar Provincial Council member, Jamil Sadiq. This is the furthest extent into Anbar any lethal Shi’a militia has reached since the ISIS attack on Mosul in June of 2014. The killings have likely further diminished the trust of Sunni tribes in the Ramadi area in the “Popular Mobilization” forces deployed in Anbar. 

The National Guard and Justice and Accountability laws thus reached the CoR at a time when Sunni tribal leaders in the “Council of Tribal Sheikhs in Anbar” were calling for the outright removal of all armed groups outside of the Iraqi Army and the Iraqi Police from Anbar province. The governor of Anbar, Suhaib al-Rawi, contradicted Jamil Sadiq when he stated that the government of Anbar had never requested the presence of the “Popular Mobilization” in the first place, and that the security forces had detained a “Popular Mobilization” member in connection with the killings. Sunni tolerance of abuses by the militias had reached an all-time low when the overt militia acts took place in Baghdad (see below). 

The Kidnapping and Execution of Sheikh Qassim Sweidan al-Janabi

The latest major incident to undermine the reconciliation of Sunni political and tribal leaders occurred on February 13, when Shi’a militias kidnapped and executed a major Sunni tribal leader, Sheikh Qassim Sweidan al-Janabi, and his entourage. “Unidentified gunmen” manning a checkpoint and wearing “Iraqi security forces uniforms” stopped Sheikh al-Janabi’s convoy and kidnapped him; his son, Mohammad Qasim al-Janabi; eight bodyguards; and Sheikh Janabi’s nephew and member of the CoR, Zaid al-Janabi. Baghdad Operations Command (BOC) spokesperson General Saad Maan stated that the dead bodies of Sheikh al-Janabi, his son, and eight bodyguards were later found inside 3 SUVs, under a bridge in al-Shaab neighborhood, in the mostly Shi’a northeastern Baghdad. However, Zaid al-Janabi was “severely beaten” by the gunmen, but then released likely because he is a member of the Council of Representatives. 

Sunni bloc reactions

The execution of Sheikh al-Janabi elicited strong condemnation from and uproar among Sunni political parties, who saw the latest attack as a clear indication of the growing power of Shi’a militias in Baghdad. A joint statement from two leading political parties, the Union of Iraqi Forces (Etihad) and the 

Wataniyya list, stated that they would suspend their activities in the CoR until further notice. The leadership in both parties stressed the need for the CoM to produce a law that would outlaw militias and to pass a law that would criminalize sectarianism. The Sunni blocs also called for an urgent meeting between the three presidencies - the President, Prime Minister, and Speaker of CoR - to discuss the demands presented in the statement. On top of blaming the “well-known militias” for killing Sheikh al-Janabi, the Sunni blocs placed the blame on Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi, as well as Defense Minister Khalid al-Obeidi and Interior Minister Mohammed al-Ghaban, for the breakdown in security and letting “criminal militias” commit crimes of “ethnic cleansing.” Moreover, both parties announced the formation of an “negotiations committee” that is made up of leaders from both blocs, including Speaker of Parliament Salim al-Juburi, Vice President Osama al-Nujaifi, and Deputy Prime Minister Saleh al-Mutlaq. The committee will negotiate with the government over the process and conditions that need to be implemented in order to protect Iraqi Sunnis. 

Sunni political parties have threatened to boycott the parliament. Deputy Prime-Minister Saleh Mutlaq echoed these fears through his response to the killing of Sheikh al-Janabi, when he stated that “we are at the mercy of these gangs,” and that “we cannot participate in this miserable political process any longer, while our sons are being slaughtered.” If it transpires, the withdrawal of Sunni parties from the political process may greatly hinder PM Abadi’s Sunni reconciliation plan and his efforts to reconstitute the Iraqi state. 

Iraqi Sunni political party Etihad and the secular Wataniyya list have boycotted CoR sessions as a response to the incident. This boycott is temporary. On February 15, a CoR member from Etihad stated that ministers from Etihad and Wataniya will boycott sessions of the Council of Minister for four days but will continue to perform duties in their ministries. Also, major Iraqi Sunni figures like the Speaker of the CoR Salim al-Juburi, Deputy Prime Minister Salih al-Mutlaq, and Vice President Osama al-Nujaifi appear to be willing to work through the issue. They attended a February 15 meeting with PM Abadi that included the commander of Baghdad Operations Command (BOC), General Abd al-Amir al-Shammari to discuss this development. Also, on February 16, the Defense and Security Committee of the CoR hosted the defense and interior ministers for the same purpose; a meeting which Speaker Juburi attended. 

Sunni political parties in the past have boycotted parliament in order to convey their displeasure with the Maliki government over sectarian issues, such as the arrest warrant for former Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi. This strategy was rarely successful in the Maliki era. The fact that this current boycott is temporary and contained reflects an adaptation of Sunni leaders and a sign of good faith toward PM Abadi.

Shi’a bloc reactions

The blatant murder of Sheikh al-Janabi has also drawn strong condemnations from Shi’a political blocs and the government itself. The main Shi’a political parties are leveraging the issue in order to critique Iranian-backed militias obliquely. They are attempting to differentiate their party’s contributions to the “Popular Mobilization” from those of these other lethal groups. Some are calling for measures that would help the government regain a monopoly on the use of force, although it is not clear that the state can enforce such a monopoly. Other Shi’a parties are also trying to retain Sunni political parties within the government.

Moqtada al-Sadr, the Shi’a cleric and leader of the Sadrist Trend, suspended the activities of his militias, the Peace Brigades and the Promised Day Brigades, along with the activities of "other actors" as "proof of good faith." He called on political parties to "show restraint" and not withdraw from the political process. He called on his political bloc to write a "political charter" with the other political blocs so as to prevent sectarian bloodshed. Al-Sadr also stated that past violence against Shi’a does not justify "unjust" aggression against others, adding that "we must together" reject violence and extremism and embrace moderation. 

The Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), another leading Shi’a political party, said in a statement that the organization condemned the killing of Sheikh Qassim al-Janabi. ISCI offered condolences to the al-Janabi Tribe and stated that the "crime" will not re-stoke "sectarian sedition" and will not hinder national reconciliation efforts. ISCI called for the immediate prosecution of the perpetrators, and called for "all political forces" to be patient and "stand as one" against efforts "to fragment our unity." 

ISCI is also emphasizing that Popular Mobilizations must follow the direction of Shi’a cleric, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani and the religious establishment in Najaf. A member from Mowatin bloc (ISCI) in the CoR, Falih al-Sari, called on the government to monopolize the power to carry weapons, and not to allow groups outside the government to "tamper with the security of the state." Al-Sari further stated that the conditions in "demilitarized zones" have not changed, and that weapons and "group offices" are still present. Moreover, al-Sari stated that the country is undergoing special circumstances that required the participation of a number of "armed groups" in the battle against ISIS. He stated that the CoR does not deny the existence of "offenders and delinquents" among these "armed formations" and is aware that some groups not represented in the CoR operate "illegally," referring to the Iranian backed, lethal Shi’a militias such as Katai’b Hezbollah. He further stated that his political bloc oversees an armed group called Saraya Ashura that is helping the political process and not sabotaging it. However, al-Sari noted that there are other armed groups that do not comply with the instructions of the religious authority in Najaf.

State of Law Alliance (SLA) member Mowafaq al-Rubaie released a statement on February 15 regarding the Sheikh al-Janabi incident. He highlighted that the incident would serve ISIS in undermining the national unity and therefore "PM Abadi should conduct a speedy and professional investigation and not a political one." Al-Rubaie also called for the need to complete the investigation into the Camp Speicher incident in mid-June in which ISIS executed many Iraqi Shi’a members of the Security Forces. 

Government response

Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi’s office released a statement condemning the kidnapping of Zaid al-Janabi and the assassination of Sheikh Qassim. It stated that those who carried out the crime aimed to divert the attention of security forces away from battling ISIS and sought to create a rift in the political process. Abadi stated that the government will strike with an “iron fist” against anyone who meddles with the security and lives of Iraqis. Furthermore, an anonymous source in the CoR stated that Speaker al-Juburi decided to call the interior and the defense ministers for the upcoming CoR session in order to uncover the circumstances concerning the attack on Zaid al-Janabi and his uncle. The CoR would also discuss with the ministers the security measures being taken in order to uncover the perpetrators of the attack. Moreover, Baghdad Operations Command (BOC) spokesperson Saad Maan stated that BOC had formed a security committee of senior officers who would investigate the convoy attack. 

Conclusion

A major challenge lies ahead for Prime Minister Abadi. The Sunnis will need to see a concerted push by the central government to reduce the impunity of Shi’a militias. They will also need to see the passage of a National Guard Law and Justice and Accountability Law that satisfies the expectations they initially had when they joined the government. They will also need to lead. Maliki deliberately weakened Sunni leadership by issuing arrest warrants for leading Sunni politicians in 2011, fracturing the tenuous consensus among the remainder and causing them to fight amongst themselves. The fall of Fallujah and then Mosul and other Iraqi Sunni areas in northern and western Iraq have further isolated the Sunnis from their politicians in Baghdad. The current conditions as outlined above are making it more challenging for Iraqi Sunni politicians in Baghdad to appear as effective leaders who can protect and represent their constituency.

The Iraqi Shi’a officials also need to lead, both in helping reconcile Iraq’s disenfranchised Sunni minority and in re-establishing the official security force institutions. Moderate Shi’a political parties and leaders, like the PM, likely desire to regulate and marginalize the Iranian-backed militias like Badr, AAH, and KH. Unregulated and sectarian acts by these militias are eroding the sovereignty of the state and its security forces. On the other hand, these militias play a major role on the battlefield countering ISIS, which makes it very challenging for the state to assert control over them. The more the militias become successful and expand their areas of operations, the more their influence increases and the state’s decreases. Even should military operations render ISIS no longer an existential threat, these militias would greatly threaten the sovereignty of the Iraqi state. 


Syria Situation Report: February 10-17, 2015

by Christopher Kozak