The Military Situation in Syria’s Aleppo Province

December 30, 2015

By: Jennifer Cafarella, Genevieve Casagrande, and Jodi Brignola

Capturing Aleppo City remains a primary objective for both pro- and anti-regime military forces in Syria. While no key terrain in Aleppo changed hands in 2015, the aggregation of numerous pressures on rebel defensive lines could enable Syrian regime forces to finish the encirclement of Aleppo City in 2016. Pro-regime forces supported by Russian airstrikes have made important gains south of the city, but have failed to advance on key front lines to its north. Pro-regime forces have also advanced against the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) east of the city, notably securing the besieged Kuweiris military airbase on November 10, but largely remain focused on Syrian rebels despite Russian propaganda to the contrary.

Russian and ISIS military actions against rebels in the northern Aleppo countryside are nevertheless compounding pressures that threaten to undermine the rebel defense of the city itself. Russia increased its aerial bombardment of rebel-held areas in Aleppo following the downing of a Russian jet by Turkey on November 24, and continues to target rebel supply lines and key infrastructure necessary to support the continued defense of Aleppo City. ISIS continues to attack rebel forces supported by Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) in an effort to seize control of the border town of Azaz and the adjacent Bab al-Salam border crossing. Frequent skirmishes between Syrian rebels and JN against the Syrian Kurdish People’s Defense Units (YPG) in northwestern Aleppo Province further draw resources away from crucial front lines. This delicate military balance is unlikely to hold under current conditions, which could enable either or both the Syrian regime and ISIS to advance.

The following maps depict regime gains facilitated by Russian airstrikes in Northern Syria and the combination of military pressures that threaten to overwhelm rebel defenses in Aleppo City. 

This map shows gains made by pro-regime forces on two key front lines since Russian airstrikes began: Southern Aleppo Province and Northeastern Latakia Province. The map also depicts one rebel advance north of Hama City. Gains by pro-regime forces in Damascus and Dera’a Provinces are not depicted here, but are similar in scale.

This map depicts the military objectives of the Syrian regime and ISIS, areas frequently targeted by Russian airstrikes, and the key towns and military infrastructure in Aleppo Province in order to show the aggregation of pressures on Syrian rebel forces in Aleppo. 

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) released its own map of Aleppo Province in an effort to demonstrate the effectiveness of the Russian air campaign in bolstering regime operations. The maps contain disinformation that exaggerates the progress made by pro-regime forces with Russian support. The map appears to claim that the regime secured its positions in the southeastern countryside of Aleppo with Russian air support, although these areas have been held by the regime since November 2013. Furthermore, regime control lines in Eastern Aleppo, as portrayed by the Russian map below, are notably exaggerated as the regime has yet to clear the entirety of the supply route running from Aleppo City to Kuweires Airbase. Although the pressures on the opposition have increased, it is important not to overstate the territorial gains that pro-regime forces have made. The regime and Russia seek to undermine rebel will to continue to fight in order to achieve greater leverage at upcoming negotiations between the regime and select opposition members in Geneva on January 25.

This map, released by the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), exaggerates the gains made by pro-regime forces with Russian assistance in Aleppo Province. ISW added the yellow ovals and call out boxes to highlight the Russian overstatements. The other symbols and captions appeared on the MoD map. A zoomed out version of this map released by the Russian MoD map dates the interior control line as September 30, 2015, the start of the Russian aerial campaign in Syria. ISW reproduced the dates for the control lines on this map.

The Syrian Opposition’s Political Demands

By Genevieve Casagrande with Jennifer Cafarella

Key Takeaway: The ongoing Vienna process will likely fail to end the Syrian Civil War because it does not provide adequate incentives to Syria’s powerful armed opposition factions to lay down arms. The Vienna process relies on agreements made between international powerbrokers independent from the demands of both pro- and anti-regime Syrian factions. No single Syrian opposition group is able to speak for a majority of the Syrian armed opposition, and powerbrokers have the potential to spoil the Vienna process. This chart highlights the political demands made by the various elements of the Syrian opposition in order to show the kinds of endstates they seek, the frictions that will emerge should they or others negotiate within the Vienna framework, and the range of issues that effective negotiations must ultimately address.  

Read the full report here.

Russian Airstrikes in Syria: December 18 - 27, 2015

By Genevieve Casagrande

Russian airstrikes continue to weaken the position of the Syrian armed opposition ahead of negotiations between pro- and anti-regime forces scheduled for January 25. An alleged Russian airstrike in Eastern Ghouta on December 25 killed leading Salafist rebel commander Zahran Alloush, the commander of prominent Damascus-based group Jaysh al-Islam. Alloush’s death could result in further instability inside rebel-held areas of the capital, threatening the success of a local U.N.-brokered evacuation deal between rebels and the Syrian regime in Southern Damascus as well as the upcoming January 25 negotiations. Jaysh al-Islam was the largest armed opposition group to sign the Riyadh opposition conference outcome document on December 10 and it remains unclear if Jaysh al-Islam will retain its support of the document following Alloush’s death. Russian airstrikes also concentrated across rebel frontlines with ISIS in Northern Aleppo Province, compounding pressure on Aleppo-based rebel factions. The majority of strikes targeted rebel positions from December 22 - 27, although Russian warplanes conducted a limited number of airstrikes in support the regime’s anti-ISIS operations in Homs, Aleppo, and Deir ez-Zour Provinces. 

The Russian air campaign continues to target local populations within rebel-held terrain in order to weaken the resolve of the Syrian opposition amidst renewed efforts to bring about a negotiated settlement to the Syrian Civil War. Amnesty International accused Russia of deliberately targeting civilian infrastructure and killing over 200 civilians since the start of its air campaign, asserting that these incidents constitute “violations of international humanitarian law.” The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) subsequently denied the allegations.Local activist sources continued to report Russia’s targeting of civilian infrastructure in rebel-held terrain, accusing Russian warplanes of killing as many as 14 in strikes against hospitals in Azaz in the northern countryside of Aleppo on December 25. 

The following graphic depicts ISW’s assessment of Russian airstrike locations based on reports from local Syrian activist networks, Syrian state-run media, and statements by Russian and Western officials. This map represents locations targeted by Russia’s air campaign, rather than the number of individual strikes or sorties. 

High-Confidence reporting. ISW places high confidence in reports corroborated both by official government statements reported through credible channels and documentation from rebel factions or activist networks on the ground in Syria deemed to be credible. 

Low-Confidence reporting. ISW places low confidence in secondary sources that have not been confirmed or sources deemed likely to contain disinformation.

Iraqi Security Forces Clear Ramadi’s Government Center

by Patrick Martin

The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) reportedly recaptured the government complex in central Ramadi on December 28 after clearing ISIS-held areas south of the complex on December 26 and 27. The ISF also reported that the 10^th Iraqi Army Division and units attached to it recaptured the Ramadi Barrage in western Ramadi on December 26. ISW is thus changing the status of these areas to “Contested.” ISIS likely can no longer field a cohesive military defense in Ramadi and its main elements have likely retreated to the ISIS-held eastern suburbs of the city, such as the areas of al-Sufiyah and al-Sijariyah.

The ISF has not yet cleared Ramadi of ISIS, however. The ISF has not yet reported entering, contesting, or clearing certain structures such as the Justice Palace and the Grand Mosque, and ISW has therefore left some areas in downtown Ramadi marked as “ISIS controlled.”  The ISF likewise have not entered a number of neighborhoods in northern Ramadi, IEDs remain emplaced throughout the city, and there are possibly pockets of resistance from remaining ISIS fighters. Clearing operations are still required both in the city center and in Ramadi’s environs. The ISF continue to conduct clearing operations in areas north of the city center, while operations are still required to clear ISIS pockets from the areas between Ramadi and the Habaniya base, east of Ramadi. ISW therefore assesses that Ramadi remains contested, though with a heavy ISF presence that has the initiative and momentum.  Defense Secretary Ashton Carter’s congratulation to Iraq on recapturing the city, however, indicates that the full clearance of the city is within the ISF’s grasp.

Iraq’s Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi declared that the ISF’s next objective will be recapturing Mosul. It will be extremely difficult for the ISF to clear Mosul successfully in the near future, however. The Mosul counteroffensive requires large forces to succeed. It  also requires adjudication among the competing interests of the Iraqi government, the Peshmerga, Sunni politicians, and Iranian proxy groups, all of whom have interests in the composition of the forces that recapture Mosul. ISF deployment away from Ramadi in order to set conditions for Mosul operations would likely reduce the forces available to secure Ramadi and its environs, creating opportunities for ISIS. ISIS will continue launching attacks both on Ramadi and along the Euphrates River Valley, while also conducting spectacular and localized attacks along the Tigris River and in Diyala Province in order to divert the ISF’s resources and attention.



Control of Terrain in Syria: December 23, 2015

By: ISW Syria Team

The direct intervention of Russia into the Syrian Civil War has shifted battlefield momentum in favor of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad since ISW published its last Control of Terrain in Syria Map in mid-September. Russia began its air campaign in Syria on September 30, enabling the regime to mount renewed offensives against opposition-held terrain throughout Western Syria. In Aleppo Province, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and associated proxy forces launched a multipronged offensive on October 15 that has seized large swaths of rebel-held terrain in the southern countryside of Aleppo City, threatening to sever the strategic M5 Highway. Meanwhile, pro-regime forces relieved the besieged Kuweires Airbase in Eastern Aleppo Province on November 10 in a key symbolic victory that positioned the regime to exploit future U.S.-led coalition operations against ISIS along the Syrian-Turkish border. The regime also achieved tactical gains against the opposition in Northeastern Latakia Province and parts of Northern Hama Province as well as the Eastern Ghouta suburbs of Damascus.

The regime nonetheless suffers from chronic shortages of manpower that render it unable to fully capitalize upon the expanded support provided by Russia and Iran. Rebel factions seized the town of Morek in Northern Hama Province on November 5, securing a strategic position directly north of Hama City. Regime forces have also struggled to repel repeated incursions by ISIS into Central Syria despite the presence of Russian airpower. ISIS temporarily severed the vulnerable regime ground line of communication to Aleppo City in October, disrupting ongoing operations in Southern Aleppo Province. ISIS also engaged in back-and-forth battles over the town of Mahin in the Eastern Qalamoun Mountains over the past two months, threatening to disrupt the M5 Highway between Damascus and Homs City. ISIS currently retains its position in Mahin despite the deployment of Russian helicopter gunships to the region.

Meanwhile, the U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition continued to enable further gains against ISIS in Northeastern Syria. The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) – a U.S.-backed force composed primarily of Syrian Kurds – seized control over Al-Hawl along the Syrian-Iraqi border on November 13. The operation occurred on the same day as the seizure of Sinjar in Northern Iraq, restricting ISIS’s freedom of movement between Mosul and ar-Raqqa City. The SDF are currently advancing towards the key ISIS-held crossroads town of Shaddadi in Southern Hasaka Province. Initial mobilizations have also been reported for future operations to seize the ISIS-controlled Tishreen Dam along the Euphrates River as well as the northern outskirts of ar-Raqqa City.

ISW also modified this map in order to highlight a new zone of control for ISIS in Southwestern Dera’a Province reflecting new confidence in reports that Liwa Shuhada al-Yarmouk constitutes an unofficial ISIS affiliate in Southern Syria. ISW also instituted minor changes to the zones of control along the M20 Highway between Palmyra and Deir ez-Zour City after assessing that ISIS previously seized several regime checkpoints in the region. Finally, ISW adjusted the borders of the Afrin Canton in Northwestern Aleppo Province in order to more accurately depict the territory controlled by the Syrian Kurdish YPG and its allies.

Control Map of Ramadi: December 22, 2015

By Patrick Martin

The ISF began a major operation to penetrate central Ramadi on December 22, 2015. An element lead by the Counter-Terrorism Service (CTS) entered Ramadi from al-Humaira area south of Ramadi into the city’s southern neighborhoods. A separate CTS force entered from Ta’mim area southwest of Ramadi into al-Haouz neighborhood in southern Ramadi using a pontoon bridge, as all of Ramadi’s bridges have been heavily damaged. ISW has confirmed that formations from the 8th Iraqi Army (IA) Division, local police, and Anbar tribal fighters have also entered the city. ISW was not able to confirm or deny the participation of elements of the 16th IA Division, a formation that was trained and armed by the Coalition. At the time of publication, ISW confirmed the presence of the ISF in al-Haouz, al-Dhubbat, al-Bakir, and al-Aramil neighborhoods in southern Ramadi, with possible but unconfirmed operations in al-Malab and al-Andalus neighborhoods.

The ISF appear to have consolidated control over areas additional areas southwest of Ramadi, including the 8th Brigade Base (also known as Camp Warrar) west of Ramadi and the neighborhoods of 5 Kilo and Ta’mim, as these areas have witnessed no significant kinetic activity for weeks. ISW is changing the status of these areas to “ISF / Tribal Fighter control.” The operation to fully clear the city of ISIS still faces significant obstacles. ISIS’s manpower within the city is vastly diminished – Operation Inherent Resolve spokesperson Steve Warren estimated on December 22 that ISIS only had 250 to 350 fighters left in the city. Nevertheless, the ISF continue to encounter resistance in the form of IEDs, tunnel networks, and suicide bombings. At least one attacker with an SVEST or SVBIED attempted to target security forces in southern Ramadi on December 22 following previous SVBIED and direct fire attacks to the north on December 15 and east of Ramadi on December 16. The ISF are still in the process of clearing the northern areas of Juraishi, Albu Thiab, and Albu Faraj. Neighborhoods outside of central Ramadi to the north and south thus remain contested, though the ISF maintain a heavy presence.

Recapturing the city will be a major victory for the ISF and PM Abadi, but significant challenges lie ahead. For one, Ramadi will remain exposed to counter-attacks by ISIS, particularly from the north from ISIS-held Hit district, if the ISF shifts forces away from Ramadi to focus on other operations. Large sections of the city suffered heavy damage during the operation, and resettling internally-displaced persons (IDPs) may prove to be both a logistical and a security challenge. Finally, it is unclear who will ultimately hold and secure Ramadi against counter-attacks by ISIS. The ISF have stated that local tribal forces and local police would secure recaptured areas, but ISF formations will also be required to hold the area. It remains uncertain whether those formations are responsive to the Iraqi government or consist of forces loyal to Iranian proxy militias. Iranian proxy militias and the Federal Police, which have close ties with Iranian proxy militias, are positioned to the east of the city near Habaniya base. These forces may advance into Ramadi’s eastern suburbs and towards the city center in order to claim credit from the ISF for participation and obtain leverage over the final composition of the security forces in the city. Iranian proxy militias made a similar move in Tikrit in April 2015, positioning themselves around some of Tikrit’s entrances in order to control who could enter and exit the city. Intervention by Iranian proxy militias in Ramadi would undermine ISF operations and the overall security of the area by inflaming sectarian tensions.

Russian Airstrikes in Syria: December 13 - 21, 2015

By Christopher Kozak, Jodi Brignola, Genevieve Casagrande, and Jared Ferris

Key Takeaway: Russia continues to use its air campaign in Syria to bolster the position of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad despite an ongoing political process to end the Syrian Civil War. Russian warplanes concentrated airstrikes against rebel positions southwest of Aleppo City from December 18 to December 21, enabling pro-regime forces to seize the keytown of Khan Touman and several nearby villages on December 20. Russian airstrikes later shifted to target rebel forces along the strategic M5 Highway to Aleppo City in likely preparation for future offensive operations. Russia also continued to indiscriminately target rebel-held terrain throughout Northwestern Syria and Damascus in an effort to bolster ongoing regime offensives and weaken the resolve of the opposition. Russia conducted only a limited number of airstrikes against ISIS targets in Aleppo and Homs Provinces over the reporting period. 

Russia remains willing to conduct its air campaign in Syria without regard to civilian casualties or international law. Russian warplanes targeted residential neighborhoods in rebel-held Idlib City on December 20, killing or wounding over two hundred civilians. The heavy bombardment sparked renewed clashes near the besieged pro-regime enclaves of Fu’ah and Kefraya northeast of Idlib City, threatening to overturn a UN-sponsored local ceasefire that also includes the besieged rebel-held town of Zabadani near Damascus. Russia also targeted a relief organization and food distribution center in the besieged Eastern Ghouta suburbs of Damascus on December 20, demonstrating calculated intent to target critical civilian infrastructure as a tactic of war. Meanwhile, Russia reportedly began dropping PFM-1 ‘Green Parrot’ cluster mines in Syria in a new demonstration of disregard for international norms. ‘Green Parrot’ mines generated high levels of child casualties during the Soviet War in Afghanistan due to their bright colors and harmless ‘toy-like’ appearance. Nonetheless, Russian President Vladimir Putin insisted that Russia could use even more of its military capabilities if necessary in order to achieve its goals in Syria. 

The following graphic depicts ISW’s assessment of Russian airstrike and cruise missile locations based on reports from local Syrian activist networks, Syrian state-run media, and statements by Russian and Western officials. This map represents locations targeted by Russia’s air campaign, rather than the number of individual strikes or sorties. 

High-Confidence reporting. ISW places high confidence in reports corroborated both by official government statements reported through credible channels and documentation from rebel factions or activist networks on the ground in Syria deemed to be credible.
Low-Confidence reporting. ISW places low confidence in secondary sources that have not been confirmed or sources deemed likely to contain disinformation.

Iraq Situation Report: December 15 - 21, 2015

By Patrick Martin and ISW Iraq Team

ISIS launched spoiling attacks across Iraq to relieve pressure by anti-ISIS forces on multiple fronts. ISIS’s attacks follow operations by the Coalition and ISF and Iraq and the Coalition-backed National Democratic Forces in Syria to constrain ISIS on both fronts. In a recent press conference, Operation Inherent Resolve spokesperson Col. Steve Warren cited ongoing anti-ISIS operations in Baiji, Makhoul, and Sinjar in northern Iraq as well as Hit and Ramadi in western Iraq, combined with operations in Shaddadi and Deir ez-Zour in southern Syria. ISIS responded with attacks involving a significant offensive east of Mosul, which was reportedly the largest ground attack since ISIS recaptured Ramadi in May 2015. ISIS also attempted to set back ISF efforts to prepare an assault on Ramadi. ISIS additionally attempted diversionary and probing attacks near Tikrit, Samarra and Fallujah, in order to forestall any upcoming anti-ISIS operations elsewhere in Iraq and force anti-ISIS forces shift resources to re-secure targeted areas ISIS remains on the defensive but maintains attack capabilities across northern and western Iraq. Meanwhile, heavy pressure on PM Abadi from pro-Iranian elements forced PM Abadi to reject Coalition support for the Ramadi operation. However, the Operation Inherent Resolve spokesperson stated that PM Abadi approved of a small U.S. SOF force to cut ISIS’s supply lines between Iraq and Syria. PM Abadi’s ability to accept increased Coalition support suffered further when a Coalition airstrike accidentally hit an Iraqi Army unit near Fallujah on December 18, causing an uproar among pro-Iranian and Iranian proxy actors.

Russian Airstrikes in Syria: December 7 - 17, 2015

 By Genevieve Casagrande and Jodi Brignola

 

Key Takeaway: Russia continues to use disinformation to present its air campaign as a constructive force in Syria ahead of the next wave of talks on the Syrian conflict. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed to provide air support to elements of the Free Syrian Army in an effort to “unite” the various efforts of regime and “other groups” in Syria on December 15. Alleged recipients of Russian air support include the “Desert Lions” and “the Democratic Forces,” likely a reference to the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) currently operating in Aleppo and Hasaka Provinces. The Russian MoD claimed its first airstrikes in Hasaka Province on December 16. However, local reporting has not yet substantiated these claims and, thus, ISW does not assess them at even a level of Low Confidence at this time. Russian warplanes meanwhile continued to indiscriminately target rebel-held areas in northwestern Syria, which are home to both hardline and “moderate” FSA-affiliated rebel factions from December 13-17. The Russian air campaign continued its efforts to weaken the Syrian opposition as airstrikes concentrated along rebel front lines with the regime, ISIS, and Kurdish YPG forces in Damascus, Hama, Latakia, and Aleppo Provinces. Russian warplanes also continued to conduct a limited number of strikes against ISIS targets west of the Euphrates as regime forces continued to clear ISIS-held terrain near the Kuweires Airbase east of Aleppo City. 

The following graphic depicts ISW’s assessment of Russian airstrike and cruise missile locations based on reports from local Syrian activist networks, Syrian state-run media, and statements by Russian and Western officials. This map represents locations targeted by Russia’s air campaign, rather than the number of individual strikes or sorties.

High-Confidence reporting. ISW places high confidence in reports corroborated both by official government statements reported through credible channels and documentation from rebel factions or activist networks on the ground in Syria deemed to be credible. 

Low-Confidence reporting. ISW places low confidence in secondary sources that have not been confirmed or sources deemed likely to contain disinformation.

Iraq Situation Report: December 8 - 14, 2015

By Patrick Martin and ISW Iraq Team

Key Take-Away: The ISF accomplished major gains in Ramadi amid reports of an imminent increase of U.S. support, recapturing key areas north and south of the city and began advancing into the city’s southeastern neighborhoods. ISIS’s destruction of four bridges around Ramadi may slow the ISF’s advance, though ISF operations in southern Ramadi continued towards the city center on December 14. Defense Secretary Ashton Carter signaled willingness to provide additional assistance, including attack helicopters and additional advisers, but PM Abadi has yet to accept the assistance. PM Abadi is likely hesitating because of longstanding pressure from Iranian proxies, who threatened the possibility of a vote of no confidence on December 2 if PM Abadi accepted any more U.S. assistance. Pro-Iranian Shi’a politicians and proxy militias are using the controversy over Turkish troops near Mosul as an additional tactic to pressure PM Abadi to accept no additional foreign assistance other than from Iran and Russia.

Russian Strikes in Syria: December 3-12, 2015

By Genevieve Casagrande and Jared Ferris

Russia and the Syrian regime faced significant setbacks in Syria this week as ISIS recaptured the towns of Maheen and Hawareen in the southeastern countryside of Homs on December 9. ISIS successfully repelled attempts by regime forces to recapture these towns on December 10, despite a large concentration of Russian airstrikes in the area. The regime previously seized Maheen and Hawareen on November 23 as components of a larger offensive to retake Palmyra further east in Homs Province. The seizure of Palmyra would represent a significant victory for both Syrian President Basar al-Assad and Russia as Russia continues to present itself and the Assad regime as effective anti-ISIS actors in Syria. Following these setbacks, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu claimed ISIS’s influence in Syria is increasing and that the militant group controls around 70% of Syria. 

Russian airstrikes in Syria, however, continue to be concentrated in rebel-held terrain in Aleppo, Idlib, and Hama Provinces, targeting positions across rebel front lines with the regime, ISIS, and Kurdish YPG forces. Russian airstrikes continued to target locations along the key rebel ground line of communication (GLOC) from northern Aleppo City to the Turkish border, coinciding with a recent ISIS offensive to sever the GLOC. Rebel forces, however, successfully slowed ISIS’s advance and recaptured the town of al-Hamzat in northern Aleppo from ISIS on December 11, despite the concentration of Russian strikes in the area. Russian airstrikes also targeted rebel front lines near the Kurdish Afrin canton in northwestern Aleppo, a site of recent clashes between rebel and Kurdish YPG forces.

The Russian air campaign continues to provide the regime with asymmetric capabilities against the armed Syrian opposition. A report published by the Syrian Network for Human Rights on December 8 illustrated that Russia’s concentrated air campaign in northern Syria has enabled the regime to direct the majority of its barrel bomb operations towards rebel-held Damascus suburbs and other areas of southern Syria. The use of barrels bombs by the regime and Russia’s continued punishment of local Syrian populations in rebel-held territory, such as the targeting of hospitals, bakeries, and markets, will only further exacerbate the humanitarian situation in Syria and increase refugees flows into Turkey and Europe.  

The following graphic depicts ISW’s assessment of Russian airstrike and cruise missile locations based on reports from local Syrian activist networks, Syrian state-run media, and statements by Russian and Western officials. This map represents locations targeted by Russia’s air campaign, rather than the number of individual strikes or sorties.

High-Confidence reporting. ISW places high confidence in reports corroborated both by official government statements reported through credible channels and documentation from rebel factions or activist networks on the ground in Syria deemed to be credible. 

Low-Confidence reporting. ISW places low confidence in secondary sources that have not been confirmed or sources deemed likely to contain disinformation. 

Afghanistan Threat Assessment: The Taliban and ISIS

By Jessica Lewis McFate, Rob Denaburg, and Caitlin Forest

 

This map partially depicts areas of Taliban control and support and ISIS presence across Afghanistan as of December 10, 2015 as well as the status of district centers that have been attacked by Taliban militants in 2015. Some support zones depicted on the map exceed the bounds of the districts explicitly researched as part of this project. These low-confidence support zone assessments are based upon historical, terrain, and demographic analysis. High-confidence support zones are depicted in districts that were fully researched as part of this project. ISW analysts have assessed conditions in 200 of 409 districts. Taliban militants captured the district center of Reg-e Khan Neshin district, Helmand province on December 9 after prolonged clashes with police and ANSF, the last district center capture portrayed on this map. Taliban militants loyal to Mullah Akhtar Mansour attacked the joint U.S.-Afghan Kandahar Airfield near Kandahar City on December 8. This attack is not represented on the map because it does not constitute an attempt by Taliban militants to control a district center. ISW will update this map as ground conditions change and as analysts continue to assess support zones.

 

 

Control Map of Ramadi: December 9, 2015

By Patrick Martin and ISW Iraq Team

The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) achieved major gains in Ramadi and recaptured key terrain in the city’s environs on December 8. The ISF spearheaded by the Counter-Terrorism Service (CTS) launched an operation on December 4 to recapture Ta’mim, an area composed of Ramadi’s southwestern neighborhoods which ISIS captured on June 27, 2014. As of December 8, the ISF claimed to have seized all of the neighborhoods in Ta’mim as well as several bridges leading into central Ramadi. Iraqi Army (IA) formations from the 8th and 16th Divisions have entered Ta’mim to secure it and the bridges alongside local tribal fighters, while the ISF have sent at least one Federal Police Emergency Battalion composed of former local police from Habaniya base, east of Ramadi, to Ta’mim to hold the area. If the ISF is able to fully clear and hold Ta’mim, it will have multiple access points into central Ramadi from the southwest. ISW is changing the status of Ta’mim and several of its bridges to “Contested with ISF / Tribal Fighters presence.” ISW is also upgrading the status of the Anbar University compound, where the CTS is headquartered near Ramadi, to “ISF control.”

The ISF also made symbolic gains on December 8 when an Anbar Operations Command (AOC) operation led by the 10th IA Division successfully cleared the AOC headquarters compound northwest of central Ramadi. The compound was captured by ISIS in May 2015 and overlooks the Warrar Dam, an important water infrastructure facility that controls water levels for the Euphrates River that doubles as a bridge into central Ramadi’s Warrar neighborhood. ISW is upgrading the status of the AOC HQ compound to “ISF control.” The ISF are still engaged in clearing operations in the northern neighborhoods of Albu Faraj, Albu Thiab, and Albu Aitha according to the AOC commander. These areas remain exposed to counterattacks by ISIS. 

The recapture of the Ta’mim area and the AOC HQ put the ISF in a position to begin preparations to recapture central Ramadi. The success of the Ramadi operation, which is led by the ISF and supported by the U.S-led Coalition, is critical for the Iraqi government and the ISF to exercise independence from Iranian influence. However, continued ISF success may lead to greater interference from Iranian proxy militias, some of which maintain a presence around the Habaniya base east of Ramadi but do not participate in Ramadi operations. Nujaba Movement, an Iranian proxy militia, claimed to have killed ISIS members during Ramadi operations, but there has been no indication of Nujaba Movement units are positioned near the front lines in Ramadi. Proxy militias will likely release similar disinformation in the future to discredit the ISF. PM Abadi is facing immense pressure from Iranian proxies to reject foreign support, particularly from the Coalition, in the wake of a unilateral deployment of Turkish troops to the outskirts of Mosul on December 4. Defense Secretary Ashton Carter’s December 9 proposal to deploy attack helicopters and “accompanying advisers” to assist the IA in recapturing Ramadi could offset this pressure by showing strong support for the ISF. U.S. support will also expedite the swift recapture of the city, underscoring the importance and effectiveness of the U.S. in the anti-ISIS fight.

ISIS's Regional Campaign: November 2015

By Harleen Gambhir

 

ISIS achieved significant successes in its global strategy to expand its caliphate in the Near Abroad and defeat the West in November 2015. ISIS’s directed and inspired attacks in Paris and San Bernardino demonstrated the organization’s reach in the Far Abroad. These attacks also stoked cultural polarization, another of ISIS's goals, as reflected in growing debates on refugee admission in the U.S and Europe. Meanwhile ISIS continued to expand the geographic boundaries of its Near Abroad campaign. ISIS likely plans to establish new regional affiliates in Bangladesh, Tunisia, and eventually Somalia due to its rhetorical emphasis on recruitment and attacks in those locations. ISIS will likely use its affiliates to launch additional attacks on the West. Destroying the threat posed by ISIS will become more difficult as the organization gains strategic resiliency through its regional affiliate and global radicalization campaigns.

 

 

 Read this update online

 

 

Russian Airstrikes in Syria: November 30 - December 6, 2015

 By Genevieve Casagrande and Jodi Brignola

Key Takeaway: Russia resumed its air campaign in Southern Syria in support of regime ground operations against the FSA-affiliated Southern Front from December 3-6. Russia’s renewed effort follows a December 3 declaration by FSA-affiliated Southern Front factions, including tribal fighters who claim to receive funding from Jordan, of a new offensive to seize the regime-held Judayyah artillery battalion in the northwestern countryside of Dera’a province. Russian airstrikes targeted areas along the nearby frontline surrounding the battalion, an area primarily held by Southern Front-affiliated factions. The shift comes just two weeks after Russian President Vladimir Putin vowed to avoid hitting “healthy,” non-terrorist rebel groups in Syria and to focus air operations against ISIS. While talks between members of the Syrian opposition and the Syrian regime are tentatively scheduled for January 1, 2016, Russia’s continued aggression makes the prospects of a mutually agreeable political transition unlikely.

The Syrian Foreign Ministry accused the U.S.-led coalition of conducting an airstrike against a regime military position in the town of Ayyash in Deir ez-Zour province on December 6 killing four Syrian Arab Army (SAA) soldiers and wounding thirteen others. The ministry sent a letter to the U.N. Security Council in protest of “flagrant aggression by the U.S.-led coalition forces.” Operation Inherent Resolve Spokesman Colonel Steve Warren denied that the Coalition carried out the attack, stressing that the nearest coalition strikes targeted an ISIS-held oil field 35 miles away from the incident. Anonymous Pentagon officials stated that radar data indicated that the bombing had been a 'friendly fire' incident committed by a Russian bomber. Local sources have previously reported on alleged Russian strikes against regime positions along frontlines in both Homs and Latakia Provinces. 

The following graphic depicts ISW’s assessment of Russian airstrike and cruise missile locations based on reports from local Syrian activist networks, Syrian state-run media, and statements by Russian and Western officials. This map represents locations targeted by Russia’s air campaign, rather than the number of individual strikes or sorties.

High-Confidence reporting. ISW places high confidence in reports corroborated both by official government statements reported through credible channels and documentation from rebel factions or activist networks on the ground in Syria deemed to be credible. 

Low-Confidence reporting. ISW places low confidence in secondary sources that have not been confirmed or sources deemed likely to contain disinformation. 

Iraq Situation Report: December 3 - 7, 2015

By Patrick Martin and ISW Iraq Team

Key Take-Away: Turkey deployed “hundreds” of troops with armored vehicles northeast of Mosul on December 4, drawing outrage from the Iraqi government and Shi’a political parties. Turkey deployed forces near Mosul in a KDP-controlled area likely to ensure its immediate influence over anti-ISIS operations and thereby its long term influence within Mosul. The Turkish deployment coincided with high tension in Baghdad over the planned deployment of up to 200 U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) to Iraq, announced on December 1, intended to target ISIS leaders directly. PM Abadi is facing intense pressure from other Shi’a political parties and Iranian-backed militias on account of both deployments. Some Shi’a parties asserted that the CoR, not the Prime Minister should approve foreign deployments. The Badr Organization raised the possibility of a no-confidence vote in PM Abadi. These measures will restrict PM Abadi’s ability to engage the U.S.-led coalition, the intended effect of Iranian-led forces in Iraq that seek to align Iraq with the Russian-Iranian coalition. Meanwhile, ISIS deployed mobile defenses against the ISF in Ramadi’s environs, demonstrating the continued ability to conduct attacks in the area despite recent gains by the ISF. A decisive ISF-led operation to clear Ramadi is essential for PM Abadi to exercise independence from Iran. ISIS’s resilience in Iraq remains a major obstacle.

Turkey Unilaterally Deploys a Battalion near Mosul

By Patrick Martin

Key Take-Away: Turkey deployed an armored battalion northeast of Mosul, ostensibly as part of a training mission for Kurdish Peshmerga and a local anti-ISIS militia. Turkey’s forces bolster Masoud Barzani and his Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), a primary rival to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) active in Syria, Turkey, and parts of Iraq. Turkey will also maintain influence over any future operation to recapture Mosul and Ninewa from ISIS. Turkish military forces have been present in northern Iraq since 1997, but the size and composition of the new force, reports that Barzani has granted the Turks a permanent base outside of Mosul, and the expected deployment of U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) to Iraq have made Iraqi politicians extremely sensitive to the arrival of any foreign forces. The deployment has sparked a rhetorical backlash from Iraqi politicians that will likely outweigh any impact the Turkish force will have on the battlefield. The Turkish deployment will generate greater resistance from Shi’a political parties against the involvement of any foreign military force in Iraq and will make it even harder for Iraq’s Prime Minister Abadi to publicly support any additional Coalition deployment, such as the U.S. Special Operations forces that Defense Secretary Ashton Carter announced on December 1. The Iranian-backed militias have already threatened the Abadi government with a no-confidence vote if he accepts U.S. forces. 

Turkey increased its influence over future developments in northern Iraq by deploying an armored battalion on December 4 to a camp in Mount Bashiqa, less than ten miles northeast of Mosul in Ninewa Province. Video footage showed Turkish forces transporting armored vehicles “towards Mosul.” Turkey’s announced that the force will replace a force that had been present at Mount Bashiqa in order to train Kurdish Peshmerga. Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu denied that Turkey had any intention of seizing territory and asserted that Turkey would assist its “Iraqi brothers” in fighting both ISIS and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), the Kurdish terrorist group that has waged an on-and-off insurgency against the Turkish state since 1984. Turkey may nonetheless seek to establish a permanent military base in Bashiqa, according to Turkish media. The deployment grants Turkey continued leverage to ensure that pro-Turkish elements ultimately control Mosul and its environs following any operation to recapture the city from ISIS. 

The deployment of Turkish troops is not in itself a new development but rather is part of a longtime effort to secure Turkish influence in northern Iraq. Turkey has maintained a military presence in Dohuk Province along the Turkish border since 1997 as part of an agreement signed with Saddam Hussein in 1995 to monitor the outlawed PKK and prevent it from crossing into Turkey. This force remained in place throughout the U.S. occupation without any objections from former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. The Turkish trainers in Bashiqa had been present in Iraq for “more than two years,” according to Turkish army sources, but the new force is likely larger than its predecessor, consisting of “hundreds” of Turkish troops and up to 30 tanks and armored vehicles. Turkey has also launched periodic ground and air assaults against PKK targets in northern Iraq, including major incursions in October 2011 and in September 2015. These cross-border raids involve hundreds of ground troops and airstrikes against PKK targets as far east as the Qandil Mountains on the Iran-Iraq border, where the PKK maintains its headquarters. 

The recent deployment into northern Iraq differs from past deployments in three ways. First, Turkey does not appear to have undertaken the action in order to contain the PKK directly, as there is no significant PKK activity in or around Bashiqa. The base is also located too far from other priority territory for the PKK, including Sinjar west of Mosul, to be used as an effective staging point for future operations against the PKK. Second, the Turkish battalion, deployed to an area within the Disputed Internal Boundaries (DIBs) – areas that have substantial Kurdish populations but remain outside of Iraqi Kurdistan. Turkey likely intends to support Barzani and the KDP in securing control over the DIBs while also positioning its own forces to better influence what forces participate in the future operation to recapture Mosul, formerly an ethnically diverse city including Arabs, Kurds, and Turkmen. Third, the Turkish deployment came only four days after Defense Secretary Ashton Carter announced that additional U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) would deploy to Iraq to conduct raids and intelligence-gathering in Iraq and Syria, an announcement that generated denunciations from the Shi’a political parties and threats of no-confidence votes against the Prime Minister, forcing PM Abadi to reject publicly the presence of foreign ground troops in Iraq. The Turkish troops thus deployed at a particularly sensitive time. 

Turkey also maintains close connections with key players in northern Iraq. Turkey has cooperated with Kurdistan Regional President Masoud Barzani since 2013, particularly over crude oil exports through the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline. Barzani and Turkey share a mutual distrust of the PKK, and the KDP currently competes with the PKK for control over Sinjar district. Turkey also possesses close relations with former Ninewa Province governor Atheel al-Nujaifi, who maintains a camp of former local police and Arab fighters in Bashiqa called the “National Mobilization.” Turkish support was essential for Atheel al-Nujaifi’s elevation to the Ninewa governorship in 2009. Finally, Turkey has close relations Osama al-Nujaifi, Atheel’s brother and the leader of the Sunni Etihad bloc in the Council of Representatives (CoR). Turkey will likely leverage these connections in order to secure greater control over what armed and political actors participate in operations to recapture Mosul. In particular, Turkey will likely support the Nujaifis over Sunni Arabs with whom Turkey has not cultivated relations.

Turkey’s deployment of troops sparked strong rejection from the full spectrum of Iraqi political actors. Iraqi Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi and Iraqi President Fuad Masoum strongly condemned the deployment as a violation of Iraqi sovereignty and demanded that Turkey conduct an immediate withdrawal. All major Shi’a parties denounced the deployment as a violation of Iraqi sovereignty, with a leading Sadrist official calling for Iraqi airstrikes on the Turkish force if it did not depart the country. Another pro-Maliki CoR member suggesting that “a Russian force” could intervene to expel the Turkish battalion. The KDP’s primary political rival, Gorran, rejected the Turkish deployment as a violation of international law, though Gorran’s position more likely stems from its feud with Barzani over control of the KRG than any real concern for Iraqi sovereignty. A leading member of Sunni Etihad, Muhammad al-Karbouli, also rejected the Turkish deployment that came without an agreement with the Iraqi government. Etihad’s statement was nonetheless less vehement than any Shi’a political party’s rejection, and Karbouli also took the opportunity to denounce the corrosive effect of “outlaw militias” – referring to Iranian-backed proxy militias – on the ability of Iraq to resist foreign pressure.

Turkey remains unlikely to withdraw its forces from northern Iraq in the near-term, given the current lack of leverage its opponents currently possess to reverse its decision. Neither the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) nor the Iranian proxy militias realistically possess the ability to expel the Turkish force from Bashiqa. Both forces lack a meaningful presence in the region as well as the freedom of movement to deploy near Mosul. The Iraqi government thus remains limited to rhetorical condemnations and appeals to the U.S. to force a Turkish withdrawal. The U.S. will not likely press Turkey on the issue, as anonymous U.S. defense sources merely indicated that the U.S. was "aware" of Turkey’s intentions. Iranian proxy militias, however, could challenge Turkey elsewhere in the country. Iran likely ordered Iranian proxy militias to kidnap 18 Turkish construction workers on September 2 in order to pressure Turkey into ordering Turkish-backed rebels to cooperate with a ceasefire around the besieged Shi’a majority towns of Fu’ah and Kifriya in northern Syria. The kidnappings provided sufficient leverage against Turkey and the kidnapped workers were released after Syrian rebels enacted a local ceasefire. Iran could pursue similar actions against Turkish assets in Baghdad or in southern Iraq.

This situation may escalate further if Iran views the deployment as threatening its vital strategic objectives in Iraq or Syria. Iran rejects any foreign forces other than their own on Iraqi soil and backs the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), Barzani’s rival in Iraqi Kurdish politics trying to contest his control over the Kurdistan regional presidency. Iranian proxies also recently sparred violently with the Peshmerga in Tuz Khurmato in eastern Salah al-Din proxies on November 12. Iran has also angered Turkey by repeating false Russian rhetoric that Turkey purchases oil from ISIS, part of a disinformation campaign that followed Turkey’s downing of a Russian plane over Turkish airspace on November 24, while Turkey and Iran remain in a proxy contest over control of Aleppo in Syria. Should Iran decide to resist Turkey’s escalation in ways that the Prime Minister will not or cannot, the Prime Minister Abadi may face a vote of no-confidence, which the Iranian-backed militias have already threatened.

Shi’a parties will use the episode to pressure PM Abadi to strongly reject foreign intervention, particularly if reports that Turkey and Barzani signed an agreement to establish a permanent Turkish base in Bashiqa are correct. These calls could complicate U.S. plans to additional Special Operations Forces (SOF) to Iraq to as a “specialized expeditionary targeting force” that will conduct raids and intelligence-gathering in Iraq and Syria. The timing of the Turkish deployment will make it even harder for PM Abadi to approve of the U.S. SOF deployment announced on December 1. PM Abadi could also face further pressure to accept Russian assistance, an outcome that has become popular among Iranian proxies and the Sadrist Trend since Russia began launching airstrikes in Syria on September 30. Russian airstrikes would run counter to U.S. regional interests and interfere with the Coalition’s ability to conduct its own airstrikes as well as advise and assist operations in Iraq.