Key Takeaway: Moldova has recently overtly signaled its intention to integrate more closely with Western structures, particularly the European Community and NATO, and its neighbor Ukraine. Russia sees such possible integration as a threat to its strategic goal of reasserting itself within the borders of the former Soviet Union. As a result, Russia could move to destabilize Moldova prior to its October 30 elections by stirring social unrest or even escalating to civil conflict or civil war as a means of justifying intervention by Russian forces in Transnistria. If pro-Russia actors can destabilize the Moldovan government and slow Moldova’s pursuit of Euro-Atlantic integration, Russia will have successfully undermined a third member of the former Soviet Union (prior targets include Georgia and Ukraine) as it sought western integration.
Moldova faces escalation by Russia and
Russian-proxy forces in response to its increasingly overt advances towards EU
and NATO. The Kremlin perceives
Moldova’s pursuit of integration with the west as a threat to Russia’s grand strategic
objectives of regaining control of lost territory within the former Soviet
Union and reestablishing itself as a global power. Russia may choose to destabilize
the Moldovan government, particularly before its October 30th
elections, in order to stop Moldova’s efforts to integrate with the West. Russia
can achieve this through use of pro-Russia political parties within Moldova,
overt political pressure, and its conventional and proxy military forces in
Transnistria. Russia caused civil discontent in and ultimately invaded Georgia
in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014 as they pursued similar goals.
The Republic of Moldova is a
politically and ethnically divided country in which Russia maintains a high
degree of political influence as well as conventional military forces. Moldova, formerly the Romanian province of
Bessarabia, was created by the Soviet Union in 1940 and gained its independence
in 1991. The Russian separatist region of Transnistria declared independence
from Moldova in 1990 Russia’s 14th Army
intervened on the side of the breakaway groups in 1992 and has maintained a
presence in the Transnistria region since the conflict froze. Russia justified
the intervention as a means to protect the self-determination of Russian
“compatriots.” Pro-Russia parties with close ties to Russian leadership
continue to operate in Moldova. These movements have wide support among Russian
speakers and those dissatisfied with current corruption and low standards of
living in Moldova.
Russia and its proxy forces in
Transnistria have issued a number of threatening warnings to the Moldovan
government, signaling the Kremlin’s intent to alter Moldova’s paths towards
NATO and the EU. Russia reaffirmed its
support of ethnic Russians in Transnistria, a narrative Russia also advanced
prior to invading Georgia and Ukraine, and warned Moldova against cooperating
with its neighbors Ukraine[1]
and Romania[2]
prior to the July 08-09 NATO Summit in Warsaw. Russian Deputy Prime Minister
Dmitry Rogozin conducted[3]
an official visit to Moldova from July 05-July 07, his first visit since 2014. He
warned Moldova that if it were to pursue unification with NATO member Romania, Transnistria
would seek full independence. He added that Moldova “had better let
Transnistria go amicably” and emphasized that Russian forces deployed in
support of the Transnistrian separatists would “fulfill their duties until the
end.” Rogozin justified Russia’s continued support for Transnistria by claiming
that “our compatriots, our citizens, our brethren” live in the region. He
announced that Russia would expand[4]
its ties to Transnistria in coming years, signaling Russia’s long-term interest
in supporting the separatist region. The leader of Transnistria Yevgeny
Shevchuk accused[5]
Moldova of violating its neutrality by expanding cooperation with NATO July 05th.
He also accused Romanian aircraft of frequently violating[6]
Transnistrian airspace to “photograph military facilities.” This explicit
warning about alleged Romanian activity in Moldova and Transnistria from
Russian proxy forces is a Russian warning to Moldova over its close
relationship with Romania. The majority of Moldovans share deep cultural and
linguistic ties to Romania and there have been efforts from both sides to
reunify the states. The narrative of
Romanian interference in Moldova as preparation for reunification may be used
by pro-Russia actors as justification for destabilizing activity in Moldova.
Moldova has been increasingly overt
about its intention to integrate further with the western structures and break
away from Russia’s grip after Rogozin and Shevchuk made their warnings. Moldova has crossed four potential Russian
redlines in the past two weeks.
- First, Moldovan Minister of Defense Anatol
Salaru called on NATO at the NATO summit to support the removal
of Russian forces from Transnistria, calling instead for a multinational civil
mission. This move by Moldova is not only a clear signal to Russia that it will
not follow Moscow’s mandates about its foreign policy, but also that it is
willing to go so far as to request support from NATO. This is likely to be seen
as highly provocative by the Kremlin.
- Second, the Moldovan government took decisive
steps internally to limit Russian influence following Russia and Transnistria’s
warnings. The Moldovan parliament adopted[7]
amendments to a bill in its first of two rounds of voting that would severely
restrict Russian controlled and Russian language media broadcasts in Moldova on
July 07. The Russian Foreign Ministry denounced[8]
the “unfriendly move” and warned that it would monitor the situation
“closely.” The bill would pose a serious
threat to Russia’s domination[9]
of the information space in Moldova if implemented.
- Third, Moldova continued its outreach to Ukraine
based on the shared goals of integration into the Euro-Atlantic community and common
security
concerns. President of Moldova Nicolae Timofti met[10]
with leading Ukrainian and Moldovan statesmen while Ukrainian Foreign Minister
Pavlo Klimkin met with his Moldovan counterpart on July 12 after Rogozin and
Shevchuk issued their warnings. Leaders at both meetings discussed[11]
the common goal of pursuing integration into the EU and Euro-Atlantic community
and the shared threat posed by the Russian occupation of Donbas and
Transnistria. Moldova announced
that it would end trade restrictions with Ukraine following the meeting on July
12 in order to develop “harmonious” relations with Ukraine.
- Fourth, Moldova and Romania, a NATO member
state, continued to strengthen their close relationship. The Romanian
ambassador to Moldova promised continued economic assistance for the struggling
Moldovan government and reemphasized Romania’s support
for Moldova over crisis regarding Transnistria on July 14th. Prominent
leaders,[12]
including the former President of Romania
on July 08, and political
movements in both countries have called
for the reunification of the two countries. These movements are opposed by
pro-Russia Moldovan parties who accused
the U.S. of orchestrating a plot to reunify the two countries in order to
provoke conflict between Russia, Ukraine, and the West.
Russia maintains the grand strategic objective of asserting dominance over the former Soviet Union, particularly over non-NATO and non-EU states like Moldova. Russia’s forces in the separatist region of Transnistria provide Russia with valuable terrain near NATO’s eastern border and threatening Ukraine in which they have the opportunity to expand their military infrastructure and troop presence. Russia prioritizes the strategic value of its garrison and proxy forces in Transnitria, which allows Russia to easily exert pressure the Moldovan government and threaten Ukraine’s western border. The Transnistrian border is less than 50 miles from Ukraine’s key port-city of Odesa, allowing Russia to directly threaten and continue to support destabilizing pro-Russian[13] forces within the city. Moldova’s overt steps towards western structures and its efforts to solidify alliances with its neighbors threaten Russia’s ability to apply military pressure in the region.
Russia may choose to escalate
social tensions before the October 30 presidential election in order to topple
the current pro-western Moldovan government. Moldova’s government would likely collapse
in face of widespread social pressure. Russia could attempt to use its soft
power assets including the pro-Russian “Party of Socialists” and “Our Party” to
mobilize mass protests,
similar to the protest movement which stormed the Moldovan parliament on
January 21st. This would destabilize the fragile Moldovan government
and likely lead to snap elections. Snap elections would likely result in the
greater empowerment of pro-Russia parties in the Moldovan government which
could derail the country’s efforts to integrate with western structures.
Destabilization
in Moldova could be easily be escalated by President Putin to civil conflict or
civil war. Russia could use such clashes to justify intervention by Russian
“peacekeeping forces” currently deployed in Transnistria in order to restore
stability. Overt Russian military activity in Moldovan territory outside
Transnistria is especially dangerous, as it could pull in various regional
actors, including NATO member states. Moldova’s regional partner Ukraine may intervene
in support of pro-western Moldovans in order to support its vulnerable neighbor
and secure its western border. Ukraine would perceive a collapsed Moldova and
an empowered Transnistria with an active, combat effective Russian garrison as
a direct military threat to its western flank. Ukrainian forces clashing with Russian or
Russian proxy forces in Moldova could escalate the conflict in eastern Ukraine
and be used to justify Russian overt retaliation against Ukraine. Romanian
intervention to end the crisis on its eastern border and support its
compatriots could involve NATO in the conflict. Many NATO members would likely
oppose supporting Romania in order to avoid escalation with Russia. States with
large Russian minorities such as Latvia and Estonia would interpret Russia’s
actions in Moldova as clear signaling about its intentions within the former
Soviet Union. These countries, likely be backed by other Eastern European
states, would likely call for support of Romania. This could threaten the integrity of NATO
should Romania call for support using NATO Article 5.
President Putin retains the ability
to rapidly escalate in Moldova in order to halt its efforts to integrate with
the west. Continued or heightened rhetoric from Russian officials and media calling
for support of Russian compatriots would likely precede Russian action in
Moldova. Events that trigger public or international outcry against the
Moldovan government, such as sudden revelations of corruption or gross
misconduct within Moldovan government, would indicate that Russia may be laying
the groundwork for mass protests aimed at toppling the Moldovan government.
Russia would likely couple street protests with overt military pressure on the
Moldovan and Romanian governments in order to prevent action against Russian
provocations. Increased Russian military activity in Transnistria and the
western Black Sea, or sudden Ukrainian deployments to the
Ukrainian-Transnistrian border would indicate that Russia is preparing to
attempt to pursue this course of action. Widespread protests across the country
from all political groups would likely indicate that Russia has managed to
generate sufficient outrage against the government to lead to its implosion. Russia
would signal its intent to overtly intervene in the crisis by surging military
activity in Transnistria and continuing its narrative of having a responsibility
to support Russian speakers amidst deadly clashes as it did in Ukraine in 2014,
Georgia in 2008, and Transnistria in 1992. Russian escalation in response to
Moldova’s efforts to pivot to the west poses security risks for Moldova,
Ukraine, and NATO.
[1] “Russian deputy PM warns
Moldova of possible provocations by Ukrainian radicals,” TASS, July 6, 2016,
http://tass(.)ru/en/politics/886642
[2] “Russian official: Moldova
may lose Transdniestria due to rapprochement with Romania,” TASS, July 8, 2016,
http://tass(.)ru/en/politics/887032
[3] “Russian deputy prime
minister Dmitrii Rogozin comes to Moldova for a two-day visit,” PUBLIKA(.)MD,
July 5, 2016, http://en.publika(.)md/russian-deputy-prime-minister-dmitrii-rogozin-comes-to-moldova-for-a-two-day-visit_2625001(.)html
[4] “Russia adheres to its
guarantor of peace status on Dniester – deputy PM,” TASS, July 6, 2016,
http://tass(.)ru/en/politics/886651
[5] “Transdniestria leader
accuses Moldova of stepping up cooperation with NATO,” TASS, July 5, 2016,
http://tass(.)ru/en/world/886438
[7] “Russian Foreign Ministry
slams Moldova’s intention to toughen broadcast law,” TASS, July 11, 2016,
http://tass(.)ru/en/politics/887569
[9] “Freedom House report:
Press freedom in Moldova remains constrained by partisanship,” Moldova(.)org,
June 18, 2016,
http://www.moldova(.)org/en/freedom-house-report-press-freedom-moldova-remains-constrained-partisanship/
[10] “Moldovan foreign minister
meets Ukrainian counterpart,” MOLDPRES, July 12, 2016,
http://www.moldpres(.)md/en/news/2016/07/12/16005628
[11] “Nicolae Timofti Meets
With Former Presidents of Ukraine and Moldova,” Tribuna, July 12, 2016,
http://tribuna(.)md/en/2016/07/12/oaspeti-de-rang-inalt-la-presedintie-necazul-ii-uneste-pe-oameni/
[12] [“Basescu proposes a
referendum on the unification of Romania and Moldova”], Deschide Stirea, August
16, 2015,
http://deschide(.)md/ro/news/romania/18181/B%C4%83sescu-propune-un-referendum-privind-unirea-Rom%C3%A2niei-cu-RMoldova(.)htm#
[13] “Ukraine Says It Uncovered
Plot to Create People’s Republic in Odessa,” The Moscow Times, October 28,
2014,
http://www.themoscowtimes(.)com/articles/ukraine-says-it-uncovered-plot-to-create-peoples-republic-in-odessa-40821
