Assad Regime Gains in Aleppo Alter Balance of Power in Northern Syria

By: Christopher Kozak

Battlefield realities rather than great power politics will determine the ultimate terms of a settlement to end the Syrian Civil War. Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and his allies in Russia and Iran have internalized this basic principle even as Washington and other Western capitals pinned their hopes upon UN-sponsored Geneva Talks, which faltered only two days after they began on February 1, 2016. Russian airpower and Iranian manpower have brought President Assad within five miles of completing the encirclement of Aleppo City, the largest urban center in Syria and an opposition stronghold since 2012. The current campaign has already surpassed the high-water mark set by the regime’s previous failed attempt to besiege Aleppo City in early 2015. The full encirclement of Aleppo City would fuel a humanitarian catastrophe, shatter opposition morale, fundamentally challenge Turkish strategic ambitions, and deny the opposition its most valuable bargaining chip before the international community.

The campaign against Aleppo City began in October 2015 and proceeded in several phases. Regime forces enabled by Russia and Iran initially mounted probing attacks along multiple fronts in Aleppo and Idlib Provinces as part of a larger campaign designed to confuse and overextend the opposition. They conducted shaping operations in the southern, eastern, and northern countryside of Aleppo City in order to draw opposition forces out of urban terrain, relieve long-besieged pockets of regime forces, and set conditions for a future decisive operation to besiege the city, as ISW warned on December 30, 2015. They also secured core regime terrain along the Syrian Coast against further opposition attacks through a series of rapid offensives in Latakia Province. These gains marked a fundamental shift in battlefield momentum following dramatic losses experienced by the regime in the first half of 2015.

President Assad has used unconventional shaping operations to complement these ground offensives and further strengthen his bargaining position. The regime intensified its campaign of sieges and aerial bombardment against opposition-held pockets in Homs and Damascus Provinces in order to impose one-sided local ceasefires that would allow it to consolidate control in these two vital cities. These operations in some cases included the use of chlorine gas and other unidentified chemical weapons in violation of international prohibitions. The regime also escalated a campaign of targeted assassinations against key opposition commanders - most notably the Saudi-backed Damascus powerbroker Zahran Alloush - in order to weaken the political influence of its opponents. These gains strengthen the hand held by President Assad at the negotiating table and incentivize further violence among all sides in an attempt to secure additional concessions during an eventual settlement. The mounting pressure will tend to drive the opposition towards militarily reliable but politically irreconcilable Salafi-jihadist groups such as Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra. Conditions on the ground remain unsuitable for the achievement of any meaningful peace in Syria.

Aleppo Province

The regime and its allies have waged a multi-pronged campaign in Aleppo Province over the past four months to set conditions for an offensive to isolate and ultimately seize Aleppo City. The opposition is uniquely vulnerable in Aleppo City due to its position along a lengthy salient that relies upon one primary ground line of communication (GLOC) that faces compounding pressures from the regime, ISIS, and the Syrian Kurdish YPG. The return of the largest urban center in Syria to government control would represent a major victory for Syrian President Bashar al-Assad that would bolster his leverage in current or future political negotiations. A successful campaign for Aleppo City would also constitute a serious blow to the morale of opposition groups that have contested the city since mid-2012.

The operations in Aleppo Province have hinged upon heavy military support from both Russian warplanes and Iranian proxy fighters. Russia concentrated a significant portion of its air campaign against opposition forward positions and supply lines in Aleppo Province. Meanwhile, U.S. officials estimated in October 2015 that up to 2,000 Hezbollah, Afghan, and Iraqi Shi’a militia fighters led by Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) – Quds Force commander Maj. Gen. Qassem Suleimani currently operated in Aleppo Province. U.S. officials also stated that Russian Spetsnaz special operations forces recently began operating in conjunction with pro-regime forces near Aleppo City. The regime has become increasingly dependent on this foreign support in order to conduct successful maneuver warfare.

Southern Aleppo Province

The regime and its allies launched the first shaping operations of their reinvigorated campaign in Aleppo Province on October 15, 2015. Regime forces supported by heavy Russian air cover and Iraqi Shi’a militiamen mounted an offensive against the sparsely-populated opposition-held villages in the southern countryside of Aleppo City. The regime secured steady advances against opposition forces over subsequent weeks despite opposition attempts to reinforce the front with hundreds of fighters drawn from Aleppo City and northern Aleppo Province. Several Western-backed opposition factions also deployed multiple TOW anti-tank missiles systems to the region. An opportunistic attack by ISIS in late October 2015 managed to disrupt the ongoing operation temporarily by seizing several positions along the regime’s primary ground line of communication (GLOC) to Aleppo City. Pro-regime forces nonetheless seized the opposition-held towns of Hadher and Al-Eis on November 12, securing the only prominent population centers in southern Aleppo Province.

The opposition responded to the advances by deploying valuable reinforcements to the region. Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) and other key opposition groups reinforced the southern countryside of Aleppo City from Idlib Province. Prominent Salafi-jihadist group Ahrar al-Sham (HASI) issued a general call for mobilization to southern Aleppo Province on November 13, 2015. The arrival of fresh opposition reinforcements managed to blunt and in some cases reverse regime gains on a tactical level. These minor reversals also corresponded with an apparent operational pause by pro-regime forces to consolidate their new holdings and receive additional reinforcement, including several advanced T-90 main battle tanks provided by Russia. The regime mounted a renewed offensive in early December and seized the opposition-held town of Khan Touman directly southwest of Aleppo City by December 20. The regime and its allies have used these new gains to contest the strategic M5 Highway and the opposition-held southwestern suburbs of Aleppo City.

The regime designed its operational maneuvers in southern Aleppo Province to set conditions for the upcoming offensive to isolate opposition forces in Aleppo City. The offensive drew opposition reinforcements out of Aleppo City and fixed them in a battle of open terrain that allowed the regime to fully-utilize its advantages in armor, airpower, and artillery. The loss of this pool of combat reserves will weaken opposition defenses against future operations by the regime and its allies to isolate Aleppo City. The gains also position the regime to threaten the eastern flank of core opposition-held terrain in Idlib Province. Iranian-backed proxies have repeatedly asserted that the operation in southern Aleppo Province ultimately aims to relieve the besieged pro-regime towns of Fu’ah and Kefraya near Idlib City. The need to defend against this threat further constrains the flexibility and freedom of action available to opposition commanders in northwestern Syria.

Kuweires Airbase and Al-Bab

The regime and its allies began a second simultaneous shaping operation in eastern Aleppo Province on October 15, 2015 in order to relieve the besieged Kuweires Airbase. The base faced repeated challenges from ISIS that threatened to overrun the facility, fueling simmering discontent within the regime’s base of popular support along the Syrian Coast. Elite regime light infantry units supported by Russian aircraft and reinforcements from Lebanese Hezbollah conducted a slow battle of penetration along a narrow front in the face of heavy ISIS resistance. Pro-regime forces successfully established a ground line of communications (GLOC) to the Kuweires Airbase on November 10 in a major symbolic victory for Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. The operation revitalized the morale of regime loyalists and demonstrated the first tangible battlefield achievement for the regime since the Russian intervention on September 30.

The regime has since leveraged its forward position at the Kuweires Airbase as a staging ground to conduct follow-on operations against ISIS in eastern Aleppo Province. Pro-regime forces expanded the defensive perimeter of the Kuweires Airbase throughout late November 2015, enabling the regime to resume both fixed-wing and rotary-wing flights out of the airbase by December 15. Regime forces later conducted several advances west of Kuweires Airbase in an offensive aimed at encircling an ISIS pocket that threaten the key regime-held logistical hub of Al-Safira and the adjacent supply route to Aleppo City. This offensive sets the stage for a classic ‘cauldron battle’ drawn from Soviet military doctrine, illustrating the degree to which Russian advisors likely play a role in operational planning. The regime also advanced north from the Kuweires Airbase in January 2016, seizing several villages less than five miles from the major ISIS-held urban center of Al-Bab. Regime forces currently hold optimal positions to mount a potential operation to seize Al-Bab and secure additional legitimacy before the international community as a partner against ISIS. Russia reportedly deployed two hundred personnel and several air defense systems to Kuweires Airbase in February 2016 in likely preparation for such an operation. The regime may intend to use future anti-ISIS operations by the U.S.-led coalition in eastern Aleppo Province as an opportunity to secure its own gains near Aleppo City.

Northern Aleppo Province

The regime mounted its most significant shaping operation in Aleppo Province in February 2016 with a renewed attempt to complete the encirclement of Aleppo City. Pro-regime forces lifted the siege of the pro-regime towns of Nubl and Zahraa in northern Aleppo Province on February 3, linking regime forces in an arc of control that dominates almost all opposition supply lines between Turkey and Aleppo City. The regime previously failed to capitalize upon a similar offensive over the same terrain in February 2015. The opposition nonetheless faces a severe challenge in mobilizing sufficient forces to reverse this new attack given the conditions set by the regime and its allies in Aleppo Province over the past four months. The regime and its allies will likely attempt to complete the encirclement of Aleppo City in coming weeks by seizing its opposition-held northwestern suburbs. The end result of this operation could be a protracted siege of Aleppo City that bolsters the political leverage exerted by Syrian President Bashar al-Assad while subjecting the remaining civilian population in opposition-held districts to a punishing campaign of starvation and aerial bombardment.

Latakia Province

The regime and its allies simultaneously conducted major operations to expel opposition forces from core regime terrain along the Syrian Coast. Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) and other armed factions have occupied the Jabal al-Turkman and Jabal al-Akrad regions of northern Latakia Province since 2012, providing the opposition with a safe haven from which to threaten the Alawite population that constitute the popular base of support for Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. This threat reached unprecedented heights after opposition forces secured control over almost all of Idlib Province in mid-2015 and began posturing for an offensive into Latakia Province. The stabilization of this front thus constituted an immediate priority for the regime and its foreign backers. Russia provided extensive military support with the provision of technical advisors, armored vehicles, rocket artillery, and a heavy campaign of aerial bombardment based from its nearby airfield at Bassel al-Assad International Airport near Latakia City. Iran also committed significant numbers of proxy forces to enable the mobilization of local pro-regime militias. These deployments produced a significant reversal in the balance of forces in Latakia Province over recent the past three months.

Pro-regime forces launched an offensive against opposition forces in Jabal al-Turkman on November 19, 2015 in an attempt to deny opposition forces access to supply routes across the Turkish border. The regime seized multiple villages and hilltops in the mountainous region within several days with the support of heavy Russian airstrikes. The offensive drew immediate condemnation from Turkey as thousands of ethnic Turkmen refugees fled across the border ahead of regime forces. Two Turkish fighter jets later shot down a Russian warplane on November 24 after the aircraft violated the border while conducting operations against the opposition. The escalation in geopolitical tensions nonetheless failed to prevent continued tactical advances by the regime and its allies in both Jabal al-Turkman and Jabal al-Akrad.

The regime secured major breakthroughs in its operations to clear Latakia Province in January 2016. Regime forces seized the opposition stronghold of Salma in Jabal al-Akrad on January 12 after successfully surrounding the town from three sides over the preceding weeks. Salma occupied a dominant high ground and served as the anchor for the opposition frontline in northern Latakia Province. The regime and its allies exploited the collapse of the front in order to secure rapid advances deep into opposition-held terrain. Pro-regime forces later successfully encircled and seized the town of Rabi’ah on January 24, securing the primary command-and-control node for the opposition in Jabal al-Turkman. These gains threaten to expel all overt opposition presence from Latakia Province over the next few months. The regime and its allies likely intend to ultimately seize the opposition-held city of Jisr al-Shughour in western Idlib Province in order to anchor their advance and secure a buffer against future counterattacks.

Strategic Effects

The direct threat posed by Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to core opposition terrain in Aleppo City and other parts of Northern Syria will present a critical challenge for U.S. strategic interests. The realities on the ground currently being set by the regime will entrench the position of President Assad and his foreign backers, preserving Syria as a regional base of operations for both Iran and Russia. The renewed pressure being placed upon the opposition also risks driving opposition groups to deepen their coordination with Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) and other Salafi-jihadist factions. Major opposition factions in the Jaysh al-Fatah Operations Room based in Idlib Province reportedly came close to signing a unification agreement supported by Jabhat al-Nusra emir Abu Muhammed al-Joulani. The incentives to solidify this cooperation will only grow in the face of further regime gains. The current violence thus stands to solidify Syria as an arena for U.S. adversaries over the coming months.

The willingness of parties on both sides to pursue further conflict will only serve to prolong the bloodshed of the Syrian Civil War and exacerbate the humanitarian consequences of the conflict. UN officials reported that nearly 40,000 civilians fled the southern countryside of Aleppo City amidst regime operations in October 2015, while at least 70,000 civilians have fled the latest round of violence in northern Aleppo Province. The regime has also conducted a series of engagements in in Central and Southern Syria meant to increase the pressure brought to bear upon remaining opposition pockets, particularly through the use of sieges and starvation as weapons of war. The flows of displaced persons generated by this campaign will place additional strain upon regional U.S. allies while fueling further resentment and radicalization among the refugee population.

The looming siege of Aleppo City poses a strategic dilemma for Turkey. Turkish President Recep Erdogan provided weapons, supplies, and safe haven to opposition forces in order to advance Turkey’s strategic objectives, including the formation of a Sunni Islamist government to replace Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. The mounting opposition losses in Aleppo Province directly undermine these core strategic interests and bring Russian military personnel to vital positions within forty miles of the Syrian-Turkish border. Turkey will likely respond to these inflections through military force. President Erdogan may even consider a range of high-risk military options to reassert his control over the conflict that could include providing the opposition with man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS) or mounting a cross-border intervention into Northern Syria. These operations risk fueling an intensified regional proxy war or even a direct confrontation between Turkey and Russia. The current campaign undertaken by President Assad and his allies in Moscow and Tehran will be a driver of long-term disorder in Syria and the wider Middle East.

Russian Airstrikes in Syria: January 26 - February 1, 2016

By Genevieve Casagrande and Jodi Brignola 

2/3/2016 UPDATE: Pro-regime forces backed by heavy Russian air support reestablished a supply line to the partially besieged Shi’a-majority towns of Nubl and Zahra’a northwest of Aleppo City. Opposition forces have denied access to the towns since seizing control of the northern Aleppo countryside in 2012. The regime’s advance severs the opposition-held ground line of communication (GLOC) from the Turkish border into Aleppo City, and positions pro-regime forces to complete the siege of opposition-held neighborhoods of Aleppo City. 

Note: The map below surveys Russian airstrikes from January 26-February 1.  The developments from today described above will be reflected in a new airstrikes map.

Key Takeaway: Russian warplanes concentrated their airstrikes in opposition-held territory in northwestern Aleppo Province in support of an ongoing regime offensive to sever the primary opposition ground line of communication (GLOC) from Aleppo City to the Syrian-Turkish border. Pro-regime forces seized three villages in the northern countryside of Aleppo City on February 1 - 2, bringing the regime within five miles of linking with besieged regime forces in the towns of Nubol and Zahraa. The offensive marks the culmination of a series of Russian-backed shaping operations in Aleppo Province that began in October 2015. Anonymous U.S. defense officials confirmed that Russian Spetsnaz special operations forces have also been working to enable the ongoing campaign in Aleppo Province. The isolation of Aleppo City would provide Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and his foreign backers with valuable leverage against their opponents amidst ongoing UN-sponsored Geneva Talks to end the Syrian Civil War. The opposition High Negotiations Committee (HNC) condemned the advances north of Aleppo City on February 2 and reaffirmed that the opposition will not participate in the negotiations until the regime and its allies implement confidence-building measures detailed in previous UN Security Council resolutions, including an end to aerial bombardment on civilian targets. Russia nonetheless attempted to portray itself as a constructive actor in the political process. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov announced that Russia has agreed to include representatives from prominent Salafi-jihadist groups Jaysh al-Islam and Ahrar al-Sham in negotiations on an individual basis despite previously condemning the groups as terrorist organizations.

Meanwhile, a Russian Su-34 bomber violated Turkish airspace on January 29 in the first reported airspace incursion since Turkey downed a Russian fighter jet in November 2015. The Russian Ministry of Defense denied responsibility for the violation, terming the report “unsubstantiated propaganda” despite NATO confirmation. Russia later claimed to deploy advanced Su-35S air superiority fighters to its airbase at the Bassel al-Assad International Airport in Latakia Province. The deployment of Russia’s most advanced fighter jets to Syria provides a new boost to its ability to provoke Turkey and assert its freedom of action along the southern flank of NATO.

The following graphic depicts ISW’s assessment of Russian airstrike locations based on reports from local Syrian activist networks, Syrian state-run media, and statements by Russian and Western officials. This map represents locations targeted by Russia’s air campaign, rather than the number of individual strikes or sorties.  

High-Confidence reporting. ISW places high confidence in reports corroborated both by official government statements reported through credible channels and documentation from rebel factions or activist networks on the ground in Syria deemed to be credible.

Low-Confidence reporting. ISW places low confidence in secondary sources that have not been confirmed or sources deemed likely to contain disinformation.

ISIS's Regional Campaign: January 2016

By Claire Coyne with Harleen Gambhir

ISIS is building strategic resiliency and projecting an image of continued expansion through its regional campaign, even as it faces opposition in Iraq and Syria. The organization executed a complex operation across multiple Libyan cities this month, demonstrating its capability and intent to develop Libya as a safe haven to increase presence throughout North Africa. ISIS also used its Southeast Asian foreign fighter network to direct and resource its first attack in Indonesia, reflecting a growing consolidation of pro-ISIS militant groups. ISIS will likely continue outreach to jihadist elements in North Africa and Southeast Asia in order to prepare for formal military expansion into those areas in support of its grand strategic objective of expanding its caliphate to all historically Muslim lands. 

Iraq Situation Report: January 26 - February 1, 2016

By Patrick Martin and ISW Iraq Team

Key Take-Away: Financial difficulties stemming from collapsed oil prices, corruption, and the cost of the anti-ISIS fight pose an increasingly dire threat to Iraq that may prove more destabilizing than ISIS. Iraqi Kurdish officials visited Baghdad and met with Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi and President Fuad Masoum on January 31 to discuss ways to cooperate on reforms and address financial issues. The meeting came ten days after Regional President Masoud Barzani restated his interest in pursuing independence for Iraqi Kurdistan, reflecting desperation by Iraqi Kurdish officials to secure funding from Baghdad. In particular, Iraqi Kurdish officials stressed a strong interest in obtaining a portion of a large World Bank loan that Iraq intends to secure in the future. The loan represents one of the few sources of obtainable outside funding for the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), which cannot otherwise secure international financial support without Baghdad’s consent. The Kurdish financial crisis has devolved to such an extent that Peshmerga have not been paid for months, and thousands of teachers marched in Suleimaniyah and Halabja to protest months of work with no salary payments. Baghdad’s ability to alleviate these burdens remains minimal, however, as it suffers from its own financial crisis caused by the same factors. Provinces in southern Iraq suffer from power shortages, deteriorating water and river maintenance, corruption, and stalled provincial government projects, issues that set off popular demonstrations in Baghdad and southern Iraq in August 2015. In addition, Iraq needs to fund repairs for the deteriorating Mosul Dam, neglect of which could cause serious damage to population centers along the Tigris Valley. Continued financial difficulty may be more destabilizing for Baghdad and Arbil than ISIS attacks, as an ongoing financial crisis will both compromise Baghdad and Arbil’s abilities to pay their forces and exacerbate ongoing popular discontent. The U.S. will need to intensify its support for its Iraqi allies in order to help prevent the financial difficulties from manifesting into a political crisis. Financial constraints also add justification for additional U.S. military support to ensure the expedient and effective recapture of territory from ISIS and provide important political support for the Iraqi government. 

Russian Airstrikes in Syria: January 23 - 28, 2016

By Jodi Brignola

Key Takeaway: The Russian air campaign continued to target opposition-held terrain in an effort to solidify regime gains and increase negotiating leverage in the days immediately prior to the Geneva talks on January 29. Russian warplanes targeted over 40 separate locations in Aleppo, Idlib, Latakia, Hama, Homs, Damascus and Deir ez-Zour Provinces from January 26 – 28. Russia’s intervention has significantly changed the situation on the ground, enabling significant regime victories in Aleppo, Latakia, and Dera’a and placing the regime in a superior negotiating position after suffering a number of meaningful losses to both the armed opposition in Idlib and ISIS in Eastern Homs in early- and mid-2015.  Russian warplanes continued to support the regime’s clearing operations in Northeastern Latakia and target locations in Western Idlib, likely to set conditions to seize the strategic town of Jisr al-Shughour and secure regime control over the high ground in the Jebel al-Akrad and Jebel Turkmen mountain ranges. The Russian air campaign also continued to target opposition-held positions in Northwestern Aleppo and supported regime efforts to tighten the siege on the opposition-held pocket in Northern Homs. In the south, regime forces continued their offensive in Dera’a with the support of Russian air power after fully capturing opposition-held Sheikh Meskin on January 25. UK Envoy for Syria Gareth Bayley stated that Russian assistance in the Sheikh Meskin operation “reveals the hypocrisy of Russian targeting in Syria,” and that “this blatant targeting of opposition groups is deeply concerning, particularly as it comes just days before UN-led negotiations for a political settlement leading to transition in Syria.” The UK envoy also criticized Russia for the way Russian warplanes targeted the town, which has essentially left the city leveled. Russian warplanes continue to indiscriminately target civilian-populated areas, incurring high numbers of civilian casualties. The Russian air campaign targets ISIS-controlled territory in Northeastern Aleppo, ar-Raqqa, and Deir ez-Zour at the expense of civilian casualties. The activist organization Raqqa Slaughtered Silently reported that the majority of Russian strikes that target ISIS-held Raqqa City hit civilian-populated residential neighborhoods, while no more than 15 percent actually target ISIS’s strongholds in the city.  

The following graphic depicts ISW’s assessment of Russian airstrike locations based on reports from local Syrian activist networks, Syrian state-run media, and statements by Russian and Western officials. This map represents locations targeted by Russia’s air campaign, rather than the number of individual strikes or sorties.  

High-Confidence reporting. ISW places high confidence in reports corroborated both by official government statements reported through credible channels and documentation from rebel factions or activist networks on the ground in Syria deemed to be credible.

Low-Confidence reporting. ISW places low confidence in secondary sources that have not been confirmed or sources deemed likely to contain disinformation.

Russia Security Update: January 12-26, 2016

by Hugo Spaulding

Russia continues to aggressively posture against NATO from both Ukraine and Syria while casting itself as a constructive actor in both conflicts. U.S. European Command (EUCOM) accused Russia of destabilizing Europe by violating international norms and named deterring Russian aggression as its strategic priority. Moscow announced plans to form three new military divisions in western Russia to counter NATO. Russia is also reportedly developing an airbase near the Turkish border in northwestern Syria, an expansion of its military footprint in the Middle East that threatens to reignite its conflict with NATO member Turkey. France and the U.S. nevertheless signaled their intent to lift sanctions against Russia this year if it fulfills its commitments under the February 2015 ceasefire agreement in Ukraine. The U.S. held senior-level talks with both Ukraine and Russia to discuss plans for elections in separatist-held southeastern Ukraine, a key Russian demand within the ceasefire agreement. Russia has used superficially democratic tools to cloak its aggression throughout its Ukraine campaign and again seeks to use controlled elections to legitimize its occupation of Ukrainian territory. Western pressure on Kyiv to support the separatist elections as new Russian hardware reportedly enters the conflict zone reflects the additional leverage Moscow has gained by intervening in the Syrian Civil War and posturing as a partner against ISIS.

Russia is courting anti-EU and anti-NATO opposition parties across Europe in order to assert itself as a rival center of power on the continent. Congress ordered the U.S. Director of National Intelligence to conduct an investigation into the Kremlin’s connections with far-right and far-left opposition parties in the EU that are opposed to Brussels. Russian efforts to cultivate ties with European opposition parties extend beyond the EU. Moldova’s pro-Russian opposition launched a wave of anti-government protests on January 20 calling for snap elections and the resignation of the newly-appointed pro-European prime minister. The Kremlin, which reportedly hosted Moldova’s pro-Russian opposition leaders in the buildup to the protests, likely seeks to capitalize on the corruption scandals plaguing the ruling pro-European faction in order to reverse the former Soviet republic’s Western geopolitical trajectory. Russia has made similar overtures to the anti-NATO opposition in Montenegro, where the pro-European government faces a possible vote of no confidence on January 27. Russia’s deputy foreign minister met with opposition leaders in Montenegro to discuss the promotion of a possible referendum on the Balkan country’s planned NATO accession. In tandem with its efforts to revise international norms in Ukraine, Russia’s outreach to anti-EU and anti-NATO opposition movements advances its strategic objective of expanding its sphere of influence in Europe at the expense of the U.S. and allied governments.

Russian Airstrikes in Syria: January 20 - 25, 2016

By Jodi Brignola

Key Takeaway: The Russian air campaign in Syria enabled strategic gains in the regime’s longstanding effort to buffer its coastal heartland in Latakia from January 23 - 25. Russian strikes targeted opposition-held positions along the frontline in both Jebel al-Akrad and Jebel Turkmen mountain ranges in Northern Latakia, facilitating the regime’s seizure of the town of Rabi’ah, the last major opposition-held town in the province on January 24. The regime’s clearing operations in northern Latakia were enabled by Russian air support and were also reportedly guided by Russian advisers on the ground who likely contributed to the operation’s success. The regime’s consolidation of territory in northeastern Latakia comes after the seizure of Salma by pro-regime forces on January 12, which penetrated the opposition’s defensive line and left opposition forces vulnerable to further regime gains. The Russian air campaign has prioritized the preservation of regime-held territory, especially on the coast and in the central corridor, since its inception. Russia began its military intervention shortly after opposition forces began advancing in northeastern Latakia, and the threat to the regime’s heartland likely precipitated Russia’s military effort in Syria. Regime advances in Latakia also apply increasing pressure on opposition forces in neighboring Idlib province, an opposition stronghold. Russian airstrikes also allowed pro-regime forces to fully recapture the town of Sheikh Meskin in Dera’a province on 25 January following several weeks of clashes with opposition forces.

Russian forces also sought alternate ways to support regime ground operations as the air campaign continues to be forced to sustain multiple fronts. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed to conduct strikes using Tu-22M3 long-range bombers against targets in Deir ez-Zour province from January 22 - 24. Russia has not claimed the use of Tu-22s since December 8, when Russia similarly targeted opposition- and ISIS-held terrain simultaneously. The deployment of long-range bombers may indicate that the existing fleet operating out of Bassel al-Assad Airport is not sufficient to sustain the current rate and distribution of strikes against both opposition- and ISIS-held territory. Russian warplanes have demonstrated a concerted effort against ISIS since the group’s advance on regime-held parts of Deir ez-Zour City on September 17; however, Russian indiscriminate targeting continues to incur high numbers of civilian casualties, and Russian operations aimed at degrading the armed opposition have continued unscathed. Russian warplanes targeted opposition-held territory in Aleppo, Idlib, and Dera’a from January 23 - 25. Russia provided military aid to Kurdish forces via helicopter in northwestern Aleppo on January 25. Russia’s shipment of weapons to Kurdish forces northwest of Aleppo City marks a new stage in Russia’s effort to strengthen ties with Kurdish elements, and will increase pressure on opposition groups operating in the area. Increasing Russo-Kurdish cooperation can disrupt US partnerships with Kurdish forces in other parts of Syria, introduce the potential for Turkish military reaction, and exacerbate Kurdish-Arab tensions in Aleppo province as Kurdish forces attempt to advance on Arab-dominant terrain. Although Russia attempts to present itself as a constructive actor in Syria, it continues to prioritize the preservation of the Assad regime without concern for civilian lives, ethnic tensions, or regional stability. 

The following graphic depicts ISW’s assessment of Russian airstrike locations based on reports from local Syrian activist networks, Syrian state-run media, and statements by Russian and Western officials. This map represents locations targeted by Russia’s air campaign, rather than the number of individual strikes or sorties.  

High-Confidence reporting. ISW places high confidence in reports corroborated both by official government statements reported through credible channels and documentation from rebel factions or activist networks on the ground in Syria deemed to be credible.

Low-Confidence reporting. ISW places low confidence in secondary sources that have not been confirmed or sources deemed likely to contain disinformation.

Iraq Situation Report: January 20 - 25, 2016

By Patrick Martin and ISW Iraq Team

Key Take-Away: The U.S. is actively searching for ways to increase its impact on the anti-ISIS fight in Iraq. U.S. Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter called on Coalition members on January 22 to increase the amount of support they provide, and the U.S. indicated plans to intensify its own assistance for anti-ISIS actors in Iraq. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Joseph Dunford stated that the U.S. was exploring the option to embed U.S. advisers with Iraqi units at bases and outposts in northern Iraq for a future operation to recapture Mosul. Operation Inherent Resolve Spokesperson Col. Steve Warren stated that the new advisers would total “hundreds” at most to advise and assist Peshmerga and Iraqi Security Forces in recapturing Mosul. Meanwhile, U.S. Ambassador Stuart Jones discussed the possibility of increasing Coalition airstrikes with the Iraqi Ministry of Defense while offering adviser support for the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) to assist with the KRG’s ongoing financial crisis. Intensified anti-ISIS efforts are necessary to destroy ISIS safe havens and regain territory in Iraq. Increased U.S. support for the ISF and Kurdish partners is also essential to help Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi resist pressure from Iranian proxies who seek to reduce the Coalition’s role in the anti-ISIS fight. Now is an opportune time to for the U.S. to bolster support for the Iraqi government, as many Iranian proxy militias have shifted a large number of their fighters from Iraq to Syria and have diminished capabilities in Iraq as a result.