Russian Airstrikes in Syria: July 14 - August 9, 2016

By Jonathan Mautner

Russia intensified its air operations in and around Aleppo City after Syrian opposition groups lifted the regime’s blockade of the city’s eastern districts on August 6, demonstrating its continued commitment to bolster the regime in the Syrian Civil War. Russia continued to conduct strikes in Aleppo from July 28 – August 9 in support of the regime campaign to besiege Aleppo City and force the surrender of the primary stronghold of opposition factions acceptable to the West in Northern Syria. The opposition reestablished its ground line of communication (GLOC) leading out of the city on August 6, dealing a significant setback to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in his attempt to capture Syria’s largest urban and commercial center. Russian warplanes subsequently intensified their airstrikes against opposition targets in eastern Aleppo City and villages along the M5 Aleppo – Damascus Highway in the southern Aleppo countryside, preventing civilians and humanitarian organizations from using the newly-established GLOC into the city. The targeted strikes also constrained the movement of opposition forces as they attempted to further consolidate control in the southwestern districts of Aleppo City. Russia’s continued use of air power against critical infrastructure and densely-populated terrain in Aleppo City follows U.S. President Barack Obama’s statement on August 4 that Russia’s “direct involvement” in support of regime operations to besiege the city has raised “very serious questions” about its commitment to a political resolution of the Syrian Civil War. Russia continues to prioritize the pursuit of pro-regime military objectives despite a recent proposal for partnership with the U.S. against ISIS and al-Qaeda in Syria. Russia is likely to continue to wage its air campaign in order to bolster pro-regime forces attempting to encircle the city, the surrender of which would pose an existential threat to the viability of the acceptable Syrian opposition in Northern Syria.

Russia also intensified its air operations against opposition targets in Idlib Province after an unidentified opposition group downed an Mi-8 Russian helicopter near the town of Saraqeb in northern Idlib on August 1, killing the five Russian military personnel on board. The downing of the helicopter marked the single deadliest event for Russia since its air campaign began in Syria on September 29, 2015. Russian warplanes conducted retaliatory airstrikes against several small opposition-held areas in the vicinity of Saraqeb from August 1 - 2 and targeted neighborhoods in Saraqeb from August 5 – 7. Local activist sources also reported that Russian jets dropped incendiary munitions while conducting airstrikes against Idlib City on August 7, suggesting that Russia intended to achieve punitive and deterrent effects against opposition forces in the province. Russia will likely continue to target core opposition-held terrain in Idlib Province in order to disrupt Idlib-based opposition forces massed in Aleppo. Russia also conducted airstrikes against ISIS-held terrain near the city of Palmyra in eastern Homs Province on August 7 following pro-regime deployments to Aleppo City from the Palmyra area. Russia likely aims to prevent ISIS advances against pro-regime forces in Palmyra as the regime is redeploying forces away from the area.

The following graphic depicts ISW’s assessment of Russian airstrike locations based on reports from local Syrian activist networks, statements by Russian and Western officials, and documentation of Russian airstrikes through social media. This map represents locations targeted by Russia’s air campaign, rather than the number of individual strikes or sorties. 

High-Confidence reporting. ISW places high confidence in reports corroborated by documentation from opposition factions and activist networks on the ground in Syria deemed to be credible that demonstrate a number of key indicators of Russian airstrikes.

Low-Confidence reporting. ISW places low confidence in reports corroborated only by multiple secondary sources, including from local Syrian activist networks deemed credible or Syrian state-run media.

Russia posturing to escalate militarily in Ukraine following alleged attack on Crimea

 By Kathleen Weinberger and Franklin Holcomb

Russian President Vladimir Putin has positioned Russian forces rhetorically and militarily to stage a large-scale operation in Ukraine. In response to claims that Ukrainian military intelligence staged an attempted infiltration of Crimea 07-08 AUG, Putin stated that Russia is obligated to respond. Putin cited this incident and a failed assassination attempt in separatist-held Luhansk 07 AUG as evidence that Ukraine is unwilling to settle the conflict in Eastern Ukraine through peaceful negotiation. Russia previously positioned troops and military hardware on Ukraine’s northern and eastern border, as well as in Crimea. Putin may use this incident to justify military escalation in Ukraine as an ostensibly defensive operation.

Russia’s security service arrested Ukrainian security officials as they attempted to enter Crimea, which resulted in clashes on 07, 08 AUG.

• Russia claimed that Ukrainian security forces attempted to enter Crimea on the night of 07 AUG with 20 improvised explosive devises and mines before being detained (link).
• Russian security services stated that a Russian soldier was killed by Ukrainian fire on 07 AUG near the de-facto Ukraine-Crimea border and that Ukrainian infiltrators killed an FSB officer during clashes on 08 AUG. Russia reported that ten other Russians were injured in the clashes.(link - link - warning: link to .RU website)
• Russian security forces claimed to have detained at least one member of Ukrainian intelligence as well as six “local agents” near the town of Armyansk. (warning: link to .RU website)

Russia has been framing this incident as an attack that demands a reaction, while Ukraine denies that the incident took place:

• The State Council of Russian-occupied Crimea referred to these actions as a “declaration of war” (link)
• Russian President Vladimir Putin warned that the purported attack on Crimea by Ukrainian military intelligence “will not go unanswered” (link).
• Putin directly addressed “European and American counterparts” and stated that Ukraine was not interested in resolving the conflict through negotiation. (link)
• Putin cited an earlier failed assassination attempt against the leader of the separatist Luhansk People’s Republic as further evidence of Ukraine’s unwillingness to resolve the conflict peacefully. (link)
• The Ukrainian government repeatedly denied Russia’s claims and issued a warning that Russia is planning to use this to escalate militarily. Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko described Putin’s claims as “cynical and insane.” (link - link - link)

Russia has escalated military activity in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine 07-10 AUG:

• Deputy Chairman of the Meljis Crimean Tartar self-governing body warned on 07 AUG that Russia was moving military personnel and hardware into the northern Crimean towns of Armyansk and Dzhankoy. (link)
• After the warning was issued, internet access in the north of Crimea was restricted. (link)
• The leader of Russian proxy forces in separatist-held Donetsk ordered officials to not go on vacation and adhere to a strict curfew in response to heightened threat environment in Donbas. (link)
• There has been a report of a large military convoy of Russian forces moving towards Debaltseve in Eastern Ukraine on 10 AUG. (link)

Russia has expanded its military presence to Ukraine’s south, east, and northern borders in recent months in an effort to draw out Ukrainian forces, possibly setting the stage for expanded operations.

• On 04 MAY, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu announced the creation of three new divisions in Russia’s Western and Southern Military Districts. (warning: link to .RU site)
• The 150^th division near Rostov, which borders Ukraine to the East, will consist of 10,000 soldiers.
• Two other divisions were created in Smolensk, on the border with Belarus, and Voronezh, on the border with Ukraine.
• Russia moved two motor rifle brigades to Ukraine’s northern border in JUN 2016, one to Klintsy in the Bryansk region, 30 km from the Ukrainian border, one to Valuyki in the Belgorod region, 20km from Ukraine. (link)

Russia may use this to legitimize escalating militarily in Ukraine while framing the escalation as a defensive measure.

More information and analysis to follow.

Opposition Forces Break the Siege of Aleppo City

By Christopher Kozak

Opposition groups lifted the siege of Aleppo City on August 6, dealing a severe setback to efforts by Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and his allies to force the surrender of the primary stronghold of the opposition in Northern Syria. Jabhat Fatah al-Sham – the successor of al Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra – and other groups in the Jaysh al-Fatah Operations Room seized the Ramouseh Artillery College and neighboring Ramouseh Industrial District following several days of heavy clashes with pro-regime forces. These gains opened a one-mile-wide corridor to opposition-held districts of the city, representing the high-water mark of a major opposition counteroffensive that began on July 31 with a stated aim to break the siege after pro-regime forces completed the encirclement of opposition-held districts on July 28. The estimated quarter-million remaining residents of Eastern Aleppo City nonetheless face a continued threat of siege amidst ongoing clashes and heavy aerial bombardment by Russian and Syrian warplanes that have prevented humanitarian groups and civilians from using the newly-established supply route.

Both the opposition and the regime are preparing to escalate their military campaigns in Aleppo City over the coming weeks. The opposition has advertised their intent to carry the fighting into the regime-held districts of Western Aleppo City. Prominent Salafi-Jihadist group Ahrar al-Sham declared a military zone over several regime-held neighborhoods, while the Jaysh al-Fatah Operations Room released a statement on August 7 announcing the start of the battle to seize all of the city. The opposition nonetheless risks losing momentum in the heavily-populated urban terrain of Western Aleppo City, where the population remains largely supportive of the regime. Meanwhile, pro-regime forces have begun to muster reinforcements for a counterattack to reestablish the siege. Unconfirmed sources claimed that Iran deployed several thousand Iraqi Shi’a militiamen as well as a special forces unit from Lebanese Hezbollah on August 7 to reinforce Aleppo City. President Assad also replaced the head of the Aleppo Security Committee with Syrian Republican Guard Deputy Commander Brig. Gen. Zaid Saleh on the same day in a major reshuffle that reflects the prioritization granted to the upcoming fight for Aleppo City. The regime will likely concentrate its upcoming operations in the rural southern outskirts of the city rather than the urban terrain targeted by the opposition. If pro-regime forces succeed in drawing the fight away from the urban core of the city, they could potentially use their advantage in artillery, airpower, and armor to encircle opposition forces within a new, wider perimeter.

The success of the opposition counteroffensive, even if temporary, marks a major victory for al Qaeda in Syria. Aleppo City represents the main hub of acceptable opposition groups in the Fatah Halab Operations Room that retain relative independence from al Qaeda in Northern Syria and thus one of the last remaining pools of potential partners for the U.S. in Syria. The U.S. nonetheless failed to provide meaningful political or military support to prevent the siege of the city, with some commanders even claiming that the U.S. slowed its provision of critical anti-tank missiles to vetted opposition groups in recent weeks. These grievances provide Jabhat Fatah al-Sham and Ahrar al-Sham an opportunity to leverage their integral role in lifting the siege to generate public support and draw opposition groups into a closer partnership. This integration would advance the long-term goal of al Qaeda to unify the jihad in preparation for the establishment of an Islamic Emirate. The conditions for this outcome are already being set. The Fatah Halab Operations Room released a video statement on August 6 praising the unity of all opposition factions. Meanwhile, the spokesperson for the High Negotiations Committee – the delegation representing the opposition in internationally-sanctioned negotiations with the regime - stated on August 8 that the victory in Aleppo City reinforced the message that “depending only on political solutions will achieve nothing” in the Syrian Civil War. The current groundswell of goodwill thus stands to only strengthen irreconcilable extremist groups such as al Qaeda in Syria, setting the stage for further conflict and radicalization that erodes the strategic interests of the U.S.

Iraq Situation Report: August 3-8, 2016

By Emily Anagnostos and the ISW Iraq Team

The Popular Mobilization, including major Iranian-backed Shi’a militias, sought to formalize their participation in operations in northern Iraq. IRGC-Quds Force Commander Qassim Suleimani reportedly visited unnamed locations in Ninewa Province to discuss operations in Mosul with Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and militia leaders on August 4. Suleimani’s presence in theater before the start of major operations in the past has preceded intense militia involvement in the operation. Suleimani’s visits to Fallujah at the start of the operation in late-May and Baiji in mid-October 2015 heralded a significant increase of militia participation in the operations. The pattern will likely remain true, and his visit to Ninewa Province on August 4 indicates that Popular Mobilization, including proxy militias, could play a serious role in upcoming operations in Shirqat and even Mosul. Senior militia leaders, including Badr Organization leader Hadi al-Amiri and Popular Mobilization Deputy Chairman Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, also met with senior ISF officials under Salah al-Din Operations Command on August 6 to discuss participation in Shirqat. The Popular Mobilization, however, will face resistance against their deployment to northern Iraq from Coalition, Kurdish, and Ninewa officials out of fear of sectarian reprisals on Ninewa’s majority Sunni population. The Coalition will also reject militias imposing on long-cultivated Coalition turf. The Coalition will shape the Mosul operation by leveraging air support to eliminate militia participation and by increasing its presence on the ground. The Pentagon announced on August 5 the beginning of the deployment of the 560 soldiers announced on July 11 in order to provide logistical support to Qayyarah airbase, which was recaptured on July 9. The base will serve as a logistics hub for operations into Mosul. Coalition basing in both Qayyarah and Makhmur may limit the militias’ expansion towards Mosul, though they are likely to participate in Shirqat. 

Opposition Forces Launch Offensive to Break the Siege of Aleppo

By Genevieve Casagrande with Jennifer Cafarella  

Key Takeaway: Pro-regime forces accomplished Syrian President Bashar al Assad’s longstanding objective to encircle the opposition in Aleppo City on July 28, with support from Russian airpower and Iranian ground reinforcement. The regime will now carry out a prolonged siege and starve campaign against the estimated 250,000 - 300,000 civilians in Aleppo City in an effort to force the submission of the Aleppo-based opposition. The fight for Aleppo City entered a new phase as opposition forces, including Salafi jihadist groups, launched a counteroffensive to break the regime’s encirclement of opposition-held neighborhoods on July 31. The groups chose to focus on reopening a supply line into Aleppo City from its southwestern outskirts in an effort to take the fight into urban terrain to offset the asymmetric advantages Russian and Syrian airpower provides to pro-regime forces. Aleppo is one of the largest strongholds of acceptable opposition groups in Syria. Their defeat in Aleppo would ensure the dominance of Salafi jihadist groups in northern Syria and deprive the U.S. of options to defeat ISIS and al Qaeda in Syria in the long term.

The Syrian regime, backed by Russian airpower, completed the encirclement of opposition-held neighborhoods of Aleppo City on July 28, solidifying its hold over the siege of an estimated 250,000 -300,000 civilians in the city. Pro-regime forces previously severed the opposition’s last remaining ground line of communication (GLOC) into Aleppo City on July 26 after blockading the Castello Road north of the city. The regime had already established fire control over the road after seizing a nearby hill on July 8. Opposition forces launched a number of operations in an attempt to lift the siege by reopening Castello throughout July, but were ultimately unsuccessful. 

The Syrian regime and Russia intend to defeat the opposition in Aleppo City, which remains one of the largest strongholds of armed opposition factions that are acceptable to the West. The regime and Russia will pursue a protracted “siege and starve” campaign in order to force the submission of these remaining acceptable groups, solidifying the dominance of the Salafi jihadist opposition in northwestern Syria. Pro-regime forces have previously used prolonged sieges against opposition-held pockets entrenched within urban terrain in Homs City and Damascus. Both the Syrian regime and Russia can also use the siege of Aleppo as leverage to procure concessions during future negotiations over the Syrian Civil War. 

The Syrian regime and Russia have been setting conditions for the siege of opposition-held districts of Aleppo City since October 2015. ISW forecasted the regime’s intended encirclement of Aleppo as early as April 2015. Russian airstrikes primarily focused on opposition-held villages in the city’s northwestern outskirts throughout the first five months of the Russian air campaign in order to facilitate regime ground offensives and preclude the arrival of opposition reinforcements through their main GLOCs into the city from Turkey. Russia later shifted its air campaign to intensify airstrikes within Aleppo’s densely-populated urban neighborhoods from April - July 2016 after numerous attempts to complete the encirclement failed. Russian and regime airstrikes during this period increasingly targeted critical civilian infrastructure in opposition-held neighborhoods. The onslaught of airstrikes likely sought to drive refugee flows and prime the civilian population for eventual surrender. Russia and the Syrian regime also opened humanitarian corridors for civilians in Aleppo City in late July in another attempt to further depopulate opposition-held terrain. Local administrative bodies in opposition-held Aleppo, however, have accused regime forces of using the corridors to capture or kill civilians and opposition fighters attempting to leave the city. 

The opposition has responded with an effort to reset the conditions of the siege of Aleppo City, shifting the fight for control of GLOCs from northern to southern Aleppo. The opposition decided to take the fight into Aleppo’s urban terrain rather than attempt to break through the encirclement north of the city. Opposition groups from Aleppo, Idlib, and Hama Provinces launched a concerted counteroffensive on July 31 to break the siege on the city through its urban southwestern outskirts. Jabhat Fatah al Sham – successor of al Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate Jabhat al Nusra – and other members of the Idlib-based Jaysh al Fatah coalition advanced into the city’s southern outskirts, surrounding the Ramouseh Artillery Base from the south and west after seizing the neighboring Al Nasr District and the village of Al Shurfa on July 31. Opposition forces continued to advance into the city on August 2 despite reported increased airstrikes and regime reinforcement to the area, seizing regime-held areas of the Ramouseh District. These advances position opposition forces within approximately 1.5 kilometers of breaking the encirclement and establishing new GLOCs within the urban terrain in southern Aleppo City.

The Syrian opposition refocused its fight to break the siege through urban terrain in southwestern Aleppo City in an effort to offset asymmetric advantages Russian and Syrian airpower provides to pro-regime forces. The completion of the regime’s northern encirclement on July 28 exploited the comparative advantages that Russian air power and the regime artillery provide in flat, rural terrain to force the opposition to defend Aleppo City on unfavorable terms. Russian and Syrian airstrikes will be unable to achieve these same substantive battlefield effects against the opposition inside urban terrain, however. Russia can inflict great structural damage on opposition-held neighborhoods of the city, but cannot achieve fidelity when attempting to strike opposition targets. Opposition forces will therefore be more able to mount an effective defense of a potential supply route through the urban terrain in southern Aleppo City. Pro-regime forces even with airpower and superior armor and artillery would have difficulty expelling the opposition from this dense urban terrain.

The opposition will be able to take advantage of the regime’s force posture in Aleppo in a long and drawn out fight. Pro-regime units occupy well-fortified military positions across regime-held areas of the city that are difficult for armed opposition forces to penetrate without taking high casualties in a frontal assault. These positions are readily identifiable to Syrian armed opposition commanders, however, enabling opposition factions to dedicate considerable time and energy into softening their targets. The use of suicide bombers by Jabhat Fatah al Sham – successor of Jabhat al-Nusra – is a highly effective tactic in rural terrain, but is alone insufficient to penetrate these targets. The opposition maintains an active network of tunnels underneath various portions of Aleppo City for resupply as well as to detonate explosive devises under identified regime positions. The ability of opposition forces to dedicate months of preparation to these tunnels is in part a product of the static nature of the regime’s force posture. Al Fawj al Awl – a U.S.-backed TOW anti-tank missiles recipient and member of the Fatah Halab operations room— detonated a tunnel bomb in the Ramouseh District in southern Aleppo City on August 2 that facilitated the opposition advance into the district. Opposition forces have likely prepared additional tunnels to both resupply and maintain a tactical advantage in the coming weeks as the fight to break the siege of Aleppo continues.

The above photo shows opposition commanders designing their campaign plans with the help of a tabletop model of the Old City of Aleppo. The ability of opposition commanders to plan with a mock-up of the city itself demonstrates how the stalemated nature of the urban fight inside Aleppo City enables the opposition to design military plans based on known positions and predictable regime counterattacks

An urban fight in Aleppo would require the regime to sustain high levels of attrition. The regime has a large military force in Aleppo Province, but has difficulty replenishing its ranks for offensive operations from other front lines because of its overall manpower shortage. The regime has tried to offset this deficit using Iranian-backed militia forces. A substantial influx of Iranian and Iranian proxy fighters enabled the regime’s advance north of Aleppo City in early February 2016. The regime initially deployed hundreds of Iranian backed Afghan militiamen in addition to an increased deployment of Hezbollah fighters in a failed attempt to complete the encirclement of Aleppo City in early 2015. A second major influx of Iraqi Shi’a militia fighters later helped the regime advance south of Aleppo City starting in mid-October 2015 with the support of significant Russian airstrikes. Iran’s casualties in opposition operations south of Aleppo city throughout April and May were high, including the death of 13 IRGC forces and the wounding of 21 others in Khan Touman in early May, forcing the unit to redeploy back to Iran. The remaining forces are enough to encircle and besiege opposition-held neighborhoods, but will not enable the regime to retake terrain if opposition forces are able to establish a foothold in the regime-held southern districts of Aleppo City. It is likewise important for Iran and the Syrian regime to demonstrate progress in order to maintain political support domestically. Iranian officials as well as the Iranian public are currently supportive of operations in Syria. The Syrian opposition, however, could take advantage of a prolonged stalemate in Aleppo City to erode popular support for Iran’s intervention in Syria and limit Iranian will to continue providing manpower for the regime.

Conclusion

The opposition in Aleppo will face an existential threat if they are unable to break the regime’s siege on the city. The possible defeat of the Aleppo-based opposition by the Assad regime and Russia would fundamentally alter the nature of opposition forces in northwestern Syria, posing a direct challenge to U.S. interests in Syria. The collapse of acceptable armed opposition groups in Aleppo would not only solidify the staying power of hardline opposition factions in northwestern Syria, but would also ensure a continued Salafi jihadist safehaven in Idlib Province. The U.S. remains at risk of losing some of its last remaining acceptable partners from within the armed opposition in northern Syria that remain capable of challenging al Qaeda’s influence in the country. Al Qaeada’s Syrian affiliate’s recent rebranding as Jabhat Fatah al Sham does not preclude the group from continuing efforts to transform the Syrian opposition. Rather, the group’s reported split from al Qaeda will likely allow the group to further network itself within the armed opposition, which remains one of Jabhat Fatah al Sham’s – successor of Jabhat al Nursa – largest source of strength in Syria. A regime victory in Aleppo would allow the group to deepen ties with the opposition and further its own strategic vision of establishing an Islamic emirate in Syria.

The encirclement of the city remains the largest source of leverage for Russia and the regime over the international community during negotiations over the Syrian Civil War. Syrian President Bashar al Assad will likely continue to leverage the worsening humanitarian crisis in Aleppo caused by his own siege of civilians in order to extract concessions that will further his own legitimacy. Moreover, the Syrian armed opposition will be less likely to participate in future negotiations as Salafi jihadist groups, who reject political settlement, become increasingly dominant on the battlefield. The encirclement of Aleppo will further protract the Syrian insurgency and inhibit a legitimate settlement to the Syrian Civil War, securing the long-term staying power of U.S. adversaries in Syria.    

Iraq Situation Report: July 26-August 2, 2016

By Emily Anagnostos and the ISW Iraq Team

U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Joseph Dunford arrived in Iraq on July 30 to discuss upcoming operations in Mosul with Coalition, Iraqi, and Kurdish officials. Dunford met with Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi and Defense Minister Khalid al-Obeidi on July 31 and Kurdistan Regional President Masoud Barzani on August 1. The visit comes as the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) continue to make headway around Shirqat and Qayyarah as part of condition setting for Mosul. The question of force composition for the Mosul operation continues to arise as the ISF makes progress towards Mosul. The Coalition can currently enforce which forces participate in operations in northern Iraq by leveraging Coalition airstrikes, as they did in Ramadi to ensure that Popular Mobilization did not participate. Both Barzani and Gen Dunford stressed that the Peshmerga participation was necessary for a successful operation in Mosul, however it is still unclear if the Peshmerga will operate within the city of Mosul itself, rather than its environs. If the Peshmerga fights in the city and remains there after the end of the operation, they may be unwilling to withdraw in an effort to claim Mosul as a Kurdish city rather than cede it back to the Iraqi Government. The Popular Mobilization are also angling for the right to participate in Mosul. They tried to justify this right by surfacing a four-month old decree from PM Abadi which calls for the restructuring of the Popular Mobilization under the ISF. The decree was signed on February 22 in the midst of PM Abadi’s attempts to reshuffle the Cabinet, but remained undisclosed until July 26 when several Popular Mobilization units circulated the document. The decree, however, would not alter the way the Popular Mobilization is organized or operates. It calls for the organization of the Popular Mobilization under the command of PM Abadi and in a brigade-centric structure similar to the Counter Terrorism Service (CTS). Both of these structures already exist, however PM Abadi lacks leverage over the Iranian-backed proxy militias in the Popular Mobilization. The Popular Mobilization likely surfaced the decree now to legitimize their presence in northern Iraq as part of the ISF. However, Coalition, Kurdish, and Ninewa officials will continue to reject militia participation in northern operations.

Partial Assessment of Turkey’s Post-Coup Attempt Military Purge

By: Jennifer Cafarella with Elizabeth Sercombe and Charles Vallee

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s ongoing military purge is not merely a response to a coup, but an aggressive restructure, rebranding, and reorientation of the Turkish military. Erdogan began to purge the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) after elements of it launched an unsuccessful coup attempt on July 15, 2016. Turkish security forces detained nearly 10,000 service members including 143 general officers and admirals in the first week, totaling over 1/3 of the officer corps. Erdogan justified his crackdown on a counterterrorism basis, claiming to remove members of exiled cleric Fetullah Gulen’s movement, which Turkish authorities have designated as the “Fetullah Terrorist Organization (FETO).” He has also dismissed, and in some cases arrested, tens of thousands of judges, civil society members, and academics, and he closed down dozens of newspapers. The extent of Erdogan’s purge and his use of a counterterrorism justification demonstrate his intent to use the coup attempt as an excuse to transform the Turkish military into a source of personal power and eliminate sources of dissent in Turkey.

The current military purge is part of an ongoing campaign by Erdogan to eliminate threats to his Islamist regime. The Turkish military historically has a secular culture and views itself as a protector of the post-Ataturk democratic society. Erdogan thus views the military as a threat to his vision of an Islamist autocracy and has taken steps to eliminate it since 2007. He dismissed 400 Turkish officers including 37 generals and admirals in response to alleged coup conspiracies between 2007 and 2010, prompting the resignation of the Chief of the General Staff and the Commanders of the Turkish Navy, Land Force, and Air Force. About half of the Brigadier Generals and Rear Admirals removed this month were promoted to their rank after the initial purges. Erdogan’s aggressive measures after the recent failed coup attempt indicates that he likely seeks to finish his long-time campaign through this final purge.

Erdogan’s purge targeted a wide swath of the TSK leadership. He used the justification of alleged membership of individual commanders to the alleged FETO rather than direct participation in the coup attempt itself.  The main units that participated in the coup attempt were the Istanbul Gendarmerie, the Istanbul-based 1st Army 3^rd Corps, the Ankara-based 2^nd Army 4^th Corps, the 4^th Main Jet Base group at Akinci, and the 10^th Tanker regiment at the Incirlik Airbase in Adana. Erdogan nonetheless extended his purge throughout non-combat units that did not appear to play a direct role in the coup attempt.. He purged the General Staff, the Training and Doctrine Command, and Turkey’s military and police intelligence community, which he condemned for “significant gaps and deficiencies” in failing to prevent the coup attempt. Erdogan’s purge centralizes his authority, removes internal resistance, and takes control of the training programs for young military officers in order to retain control of the TSK’s future.

Erdogan is centralizing his control over a new national security apparatus as he consolidates. He stated in his first interview after the coup attempt: “a new structure will be emerging. With this new structure, I believe the armed forces will get fresh blood.” Turkish Prime Minister Yildrum later provided additional details, stating: “There are problems in [the] hierarchy between lower level and senior level [officials.] We will restructure [the army] in a manner that will resolve these problems.” His statement indicates that Erdogan will collapse some command echelons in order to ensure that the culture and ideology at the now-loyal senior officer ranks diffuses throughout the entire force. A Turkish parliamentary official reported that Erdogan intends to transfer control of the General Staff and MIT from the Prime Minister’s office to his own, which would provide Erdogan with direct operational control over the TSK and Turkey’s intelligence establishment. The move requires parliamentary approval, which he will almost certainly receive. He is also empowering the Turkish police, which played a major role halting the coup attempt. Turkish Interior Minister Efkan Ala announced that Turkish police will be equipped with heavy weapons on July 28. The strengthening of the Turkish Police is likely a mechanism to balance the strength of the Turkish Gendarmerie, elements of which participated in the coup attempt.

Erdogan will also reward commanders that remained loyal to him during the coup attempt by promoting them to senior positions within the government after they finish their service. The career trajectories of these commanders will signal how Erdogan is consolidating his personal control over the Turkish security apparatus. Commanders to watch out for include:

·       Chief of the General Staff General Hulusi Akar and his deputy General Yaşar Güler

·       Air Force Commander General Abidin Ünal

·       Navy Commander Bulent Bostanoglu

·       Land Forces Commander General Salih Zeki Colak

·       Turkish Police Chief Celalettin Lekesiz

·       Istanbul Police Chief Mustafa Caliskan,

·       Commander of the Ankara Gendarmerie Ferdi Korkmaz.

Erdogan’s purge affects the American military relationship with Turkey. In the short term, the TSK will have limited ability to conduct military operations as Erdogan completes his purge and restructure. Former NATO Supreme Allied Commander General James Stravridis said Erdogan’s purge is having a “chilling effect” on the TSK, stating, “there will be a strong negative impact on the ability of the Turkish military to perform its duties across the spectrum of alliance activities.” Previous options in the anti-ISIS fight such as deploying large numbers of TSK to shut down the Syrian-Turkish border are likely now unviable in the short term, even if Erdogan wanted to undertake them. Erdogan’s consolidation of personal power and removal of the TSK’s secular culture will likely also have long-term implications for Turkish-American military relations.

This report will present a partial assessment of the Turkish Order of Battle prior to the coup based upon the rank and position of general officers and admirals that either remained loyal to Erdogan during the coup attempt (highlighted in green) or that were purged in the first week after the coup attempt (highlighted in red).

Turkish Land Forces

1^st Army (Istanbul). The 1^st Army is headquartered in Istanbul with units stationed along Turkey’s borders with Greece and Bulgaria. 1^st Army Commander General Umit Dundar was critical to Erdogan’s victory over the coup attempt. He warned Erdogan of the coup early enough to enable Erdogan to escape detention. He later appeared on television to declare the coup illegitimate, projecting a source of strength and anti-coup sentiment that fueled anti-coup protests. He then led police and civilians to retake the Ataturk International Airport.

The 5^th Corps’ 54^th Mechanized Infantry Brigade is headquartered in Erdine and stationed along Turkey’s borders with Greece and Bulgaria. Turkish security forces arrested its commander, Brigadier General Hidayet Ari Erdine.

The 1^st Army also includes the Izmir-based 3^rd Corps, currently designated as the NATO Response Force –Turkey. Numerous 3^rd Corps units participated in the coup attempt. Turkish security forces arrested 3^rd Corps Commander Lieutenant General Erdal Ozturk, although his exact role in the coup attempt is unclear. The 52nd Tactical Armored Division’s 66^th Mechanized Infantry Brigade, based in Hasdal Istanbul, participated in the seizure of the Ataturk Airport. Turkish security forces arrested its commander Brigadier General Mehmet Nail Yiğit.

2nd Army (Malatya). The 2^nd Army is headquartered in Malataya with units stationed along Turkey’s borders with Syria, Iraq, and Iran. It is Turkey’s second largest land formation at 100,000 troops, including three corps. The 2^nd Army is the ostensible “invasion force” - Erdogan would use it in a military intervention into Syria, but had objected to proposals for intervention in the past. It played a large role in anti-PKK operations in southeastern Syria.

Turkish security forces arrested 2^nd Army Commander General Adem Huduti and Chief of Staff Avni Angun along with most of the commanding officers in the Diyarbakir-based 7^th Corps, including three mechanized units. Erdogan’s purge of the 2^nd Army may make it more amenable for use in Syria in the future. Alternately, the purge could neuter the 2^nd Army, requiring Erdogan to consider other options for influence in Syria. An alliance with Syrian Salafi-jihadi groups is one possibility, as a previous ISW report examined.

3^rd Army (Erzincan). The 3^rd Army is the largest Turkish land formation. It is headquartered in Erzincan with units stationed along Turkey’s borders with Armenia and Georgia. 3^rd Army Commander Ismail Serdar Savas remained loyal to Erdogan during the coup attempt. The purge left the 3^rd Army’s leadership largely intact, possibly indicating its loyalty to Erdogan.

Aegean Army Command (4^th Army) (İzmir). The Aegean Army Command is headquartered at Izmir with units stationed along the west coast of the Anatolia peninsula. It consists primarily of training brigades and the Cyprus Turkish Peace Force. Turkish authorities arrested its Chief of Staff Mehmduh Hakbilen and Deputy Chief of Staff Hakan Eser during the purge.

Additional NATO Units

The military requirements of allied NATO nations has not deterred Erdogan’s purge. Erdogan has eliminated numerous Turkish generals serving in positions for NATO, demonstrating a newfound defiance. Erdogan’s disruption of NATO could simply be an unhindered extension of his aggressive purge. Alternatively, he could be setting conditions to break with NATO by drawing back Turkey’s role.   

Allied Land Command

NATO’s Allied Land Command (LANDCOM) is based in Izmir alongside the Aegean Army. Its duties include serving as the “headquarters element responsible for the conduct of land operations and the synchronization of land forces command and control (C2)” for NATO operations. Turkish authorities arrested the LANDCOM Chief of Staff, Salih Sevil on July 20.

Resolute Support - Afghanistan

The United Arab Emirates authorities detained the Commander of the Turkish Task Force for NATOs Resolute Support mission in Afghanistan, Major General Cahit Bakir, and the Commander of the Train, Advice, and Assist Command (TAAC) in Kabul, Brigadier General Sener Topuc, and handed them over to Turkish MIT on July 26, 2016. Bakir previously served as the Head of Turkish Air Force Intelligence until his deployment to Afghanistan in January 2015.

Turkish Air Force

Erdogan’s purge of the Turkish Air Force constituted ¼ of the total general officers/admirals purged in the first week after the coup attempt. Erdogan removed the commander of all nine Main Jet Base Group Commands, units that include combat air wings. The arrests included the Commander of the 10^th Tanker Base Command at Incirlik Air Base, General Bekir Ercan Van, who requested American asylum prior to his arrest. American officials denied any involvement in the coup attempt, but the prominent role of the 10^th Tanker Base has provoked popular demonstrations against the U.S. presence at Incirlik. A consolidation of command and control over Turkey’s combat air wings could position Erdogan to halt Turkey’s participation in anti-ISIS operations without meeting internal resistance.

Turkish Navy

Erdogan’s purge of the Navy was less severe, but included two key commanders: Commander of the Black Sea Region, Rear Admiral Hasan Dogan, and Commander of the Dardanelles Straight, Rear Admiral Serdar Ahmet Gundogdu. The Black Sea Region and Dardanelles Straight are strategic regions for Turkey in its relationship with Russia. It is unclear whether both commanders participated in the coup attempt, but Erdogan likely seeks to install loyal leaders in these positions.

This report does not examine detained military personnel at echelons below the general officer/admiral level or the additional personnel dishonorably discharged on July 28. Two unidentified generals in the Land Forces have also since resigned. The purge of these personnel is likely concentrated in key geographic areas where Erdogan seeks to solidify his control. Istanbul and Ankara are likely highly represented, along with Izmir, which hosts the 3^rd Corps/NATO Rapid Reaction Force.

Conclusion

Erdogan is reshaping Turkey’s foreign policy away from U.S. interests as he carries out his purge. Director of National Intelligence (DNI) James Clapper outlined the effect of Erdogan’s purge on July 29, stating “many of our interlocutors have been purged or arrested. There’s no question this is going to set back and make more difficult cooperation with the Turks.” Erdogan and loyal Turkish authorities have also fueled anti-U.S. rhetoric within Turkey. Erdogan created a narrative that the U.S. supported the coup attempt because of the asylum provided to Fetullah Gulen. Turkish officials and media outlets loyal to Erdogan have gone even further, stating that the US was directly behind the coup attempt. One outlet accused former US International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Commander General John F. Campbell of orchestrating the coup attempt. The anti-American sentiment Erdogan is stoking during his purge may indicate that he is setting conditions for a pivot in Turkish foreign policy away from the U.S.

Erdogan is meanwhile pursuing a closer partnership with Russia. Turkey and Russia have revived talks over the Turkstream deal since the failed coup attempt, which would expand Russia’s access to the European gas market. Turkish authorities have also alleged that the Turkish pilot who shot down a Russian jet in November 2015 was a rogue FETO member, further distancing the Turkish government from the escalation. Former Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu contradicted the allegation, stating unequivocally “I gave the order.” Davutoglu’s statement suggests Erdogan is using the alleged FETO conspiracy to ease his rapprochement with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Erdogan is scheduled to meet with Putin on August 9^th in St. Petersburg. Erdogan’s purge of Turkish commanders serving in NATO raises the question of whether he is considering leaving the alliance, perhaps to enter into a partnership with Russia. He is most likely to balance both relationships in the near term, but American policymakers must nonetheless brace for the new reality that America’s alliance with Turkey is not guaranteed.