Russian Airstrikes in Syria: October 12 - November 8, 2016

By Jonathan Mautner

Russia continued to conduct a limited air campaign likely designed to set conditions for a coordinated pro-regime offensive against opposition-held districts of Aleppo City. The Russian ‘Admiral Kuznetsov’ – an aircraft carrier carrying a contingent of Su-33 and MiG-29K/KUB fighter jets allegedly equipped with precision-guided munitions – arrived off the Syrian Coast on or around November 9. The ‘Admiral Kuznetsov’ and its battlegroup of missile cruisers and up to three submarines equipped with ‘Kalibr’ long-range cruise missiles will reportedly conduct ‘training exercises’ in the waters between Cyprus and Greece from November 10 – 15 and November 17 – 22.[i] Russia will likely use the ‘training exercises’ to obscure an aggressive assault on Aleppo City that leverages the Kuznetsov in a projection of force against “terrorism” and thereby bolsters domestic support for its operations in Syria. The carrier, however, will not likely provide sufficient military capability to achieve an immediate victory for Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in Aleppo City; rather, Russia will use the escalation in support of a long-term strategy to render the city uninhabitable and depopulate its opposition-held districts. Russia used its air campaign to target core opposition terrain in Idlib Province and Western Aleppo Province in advance of the carrier’s arrival, hindering the movement of opposition forces vying to reinforce besieged Aleppo City. Russia also conducted targeted airstrikes in support of pro-regime forces on the southwestern outskirts of Aleppo City after opposition factions launched a new operation to break the siege of the city on October 28. Although limited, these strikes blunted the opposition offensive, preserving the siege and rendering opposition-held districts increasingly vulnerable to the upcoming escalation.

In advance of the expected escalation in Aleppo City, Russia also continued to cultivate the false perception that it is intervening in order to defend civilian populations in regime-held western Aleppo City against aggression from the opposition. Russian Minister of Defense Sergey Shoygu accused opposition forces on November 1 of regularly targeting “peaceful civilians” in Aleppo City since the start of a series of humanitarian pauses twelve days before, stating that “prospects for the start of a negotiation process” to end the Syrian Civil War have been “postponed for an indefinite period” due to the ongoing attacks. In effect, Russia conditioned the resumption of its air campaign in Aleppo City on the basis of a red line that the opposition had already crossed, highlighting its continuing efforts to portray its operations in the city as a legitimate response to opposition provocation. With this purported justification in hand, Russia will likely exploit international focus on the recent U.S. presidential election in order to renew concerted efforts to force the ultimate surrender of opposition groups in Aleppo City.

The following graphic depicts ISW’s assessment of Russian airstrike locations based on reports from local Syrian activist networks, statements by Russian and Western officials, and documentation of Russian airstrikes through social media. This map represents locations targeted by Russia’s air campaign, rather than the number of individual strikes or sorties. 

High-Confidence Reporting. ISW places high confidence in reports corroborated by documentation from opposition factions and activist networks on the ground in Syria deemed to be credible that demonstrate a number of key indicators of Russian airstrikes.

Low-Confidence Reporting. ISW places low confidence in reports corroborated only by multiple secondary sources, including from local Syrian activist networks deemed credible or Syrian state-run media.

ISW was unable to assess any Russian airstrikes in Syria with high confidence during this reporting period.

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[i] http://www(.)interfax(.)ru/world/536174.  

Warning Update: Economic and Political Instability in Egypt

By Wesam Hassanein

Key Takeaway: The Muslim Brotherhood called for mass protests on Friday, November 11 in response to harsh economic reforms by the Egyptian government. Egypt is at risk of major economic and political instability following President Sisi's decision to implement severe economic policies in pursuit of a loan from the IMF, which he hopes will stabilize Egypt's turbulent economy. Egypt's dire economic situation is compounded by geopolitical tension. Most notably, Saudi Arabia's decision to halt oil shipments put the Egyptian government in a very precarious financial and political position. Islamist and militant groups will likely take advantage of this instability, and use it as an opportunity to gain power in Egypt.

 

Egypt's dismal economic situation prompted the Egyptian government to implement unpopular economic reforms. Egypt's economic woes began in 2011, when political uprisings prompted the collapse Egyptian tourism, the country's most crucial industry. The tourism industry further deteriorated following ISIS's bombing of a Russian plane in October 2015. Egypt also struggled to attract foreign direct investment after mass protests and a coup in 2013. Furthermore, the Egyptian government began to invest heavily in large public works projects, such as the extension of the Suez Canal, following President Sisi's inauguration in June 2014. These events diminished the state's coffers and put pressure on Egyptian currency. Moreover, the Gulf countries, particularly the United Arab Emirates, reportedly halted their aid to Egypt as of October 2016, in order to further pressure the Egyptian government into reforming its own economy. President Sisi has asked the IMF for a loan, which comes with stringent conditions. The Egyptian government has taken several actions in order to comply with the IMF requirements:

• The Egyptian government floated its currency and raised fuel subsidies by 30-48% on November 3, 2016.
• Additionally, it secured six billion dollars from outside sources, including two billion dollars from Saudi Arabia in September and a $2.7 billion currency swap deal with China in October.
• Furthermore, the Egyptian Cabinet approved 15-20% cut in government spending
• The Egyptian Parliament passed the Civil Service Law in October in order to reform Egypt's bloated bureaucracy.
• The Egyptian Parliament also passed a Value Added Tax Law in August.

Egypt's ability to cope with the IMF's mandated reforms is very limited. President Sisi's popularity declined by fourteen percent between September and November 2016. Inflation rates in Egypt are at their highest in seven years. Egyptian non-oil business activity has not grown in thirteen months, and Egypt is also experiencing severe shortages of sugar and of medical supplies. 

  

Egypt has a history of political instability following drastic economic reforms. Egypt previously experienced mass demonstrations after the lifting of subsidies and price hikes in 1977 and in 2008. 

• In 1977, the Egyptian economy's sluggish performance prompted then-President Anwar Sadat to request a loan from the IMF. The Egyptian government subsequently lifted food and fuel subsidies as conditions for receiving this loan.  Mass protests erupted throughout the country, prompting President Sadat to restore order through military action and to backtrack on economic reforms.
• Similarly, in 2008, grain shortages and high food prices prompted thousands to protest in several Egyptian cities. The Egyptian government blamed the Muslim Brotherhood for provoking these protests, and increased security presence in major squares throughout the country. 

The Muslim Brotherhood has previously taken advantage of protests in Egypt in order to destabilize the Egyptian regime, as it did during the so-called Arab Spring of 2011. Social and economic grievances were a main driver of the mass protests that led to former Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak's resignation in February 2011. 

The risk of political instability brought about by Egypt's dire economic situation is compounded by geopolitical tension. The Egyptian oil minister announced on November 7, 2016 that Saudi Arabia notified Egypt it would halt oil shipments until further notice.  This decision sent shockwaves through Egypt, and rattled its already unstable economy. Tensions between Saudi Arabia and Egypt are increasing. The nuclear deal between the United States and Iran prompted a shift in Saudi Arabia's strategic priorities towards integrating and containing Islamist forces in order to present a unified Sunni bloc against Iranian influence in the region.  Conversely, the Egyptian regime views Islamist forces, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood, as an existential threat to its stability. Egypt and Saudi Arabia have since found themselves at odds in several theaters:

• The Egyptian government has refused to send ground troops to support Saudi efforts against Houthis in Yemen. Additionally, the Egyptian government came out in March 2016 against the idea of sending ground troops to fight Assad and ISIS in Syria. 
•  Meanwhile, Egypt attempted to placate Saudi King Salman during his visit to Egypt in April 2016 by transferring control of two small islands in the Red Sea.  However, the Egyptian court halted the transfer in June. 
• Most importantly, the strain on Saudi-Egyptian relations surfaced publicly following Egypt's decision to vote in favor of a Russian resolution in the U.N. Security Council on October 12, 2016. Two resolutions regarding international involvement in the ongoing civil war in Syria came before the U.N. Security Council in early October. The first resolution, presented by the French, demanded an end to airstrikes and the implementation of a no-fly zone. The Russian resolution called for a ceasefire, and did not acknowledge the French resolution. Egypt voted in favor of both, and in doing so explicitly voted against the position of Saudi Arabia in its support for the Russian resolution. The Saudi envoy to the United Nations called Egypt's position "painful," and well known Saudi Arabians went to social media to criticize President Sisi for being disloyal, and even "anti-Arab."

In light of the decreasing geopolitical cooperation between the two countries, and especially in response to Egypt's vote with Russia in the U.N. Security Council, Saudi Arabia suddenly halted oil deliveries to Egypt on October 11, 2016. Subsequently, the Egyptian government has resorted to buying oil from the international market at a much higher cost.  This increased financial strain on Egypt's foreign currency reserves, and Egypt's hard currency reserves declined by $550 million in October.

 

The Egyptian government's decision to reform its economy presents adversaries with an opportunity to exploit the resulting instability. The Muslim Brotherhood has already taken advantage of this opportunity with its call for protests on Friday, November 11. Whether ordinary Egyptians will heed the call of the Muslim Brotherhood remains to be seen. However, Sisi's regime is on a dangerous path toward turbulent political and economic conditions, compounded by the Muslim Brotherhood's increasing popularity, rising levels of inflation due to drastic, IMF-mandated economic reform measures, ill-timed investments in mega projects by the regime, and the loss of economic support from Gulf countries. These conditions will foster instability and discontent in Egypt, ripe for exploitation.

 

Powerful states, Islamist political groups, and Salafi-jihadi militant organizations will likely seek to take advantage of Egypt's political and economic instability in the short term. The Muslim Brotherhood will likely take advantage of the eruption of any protests in Cairo in order to come back to power. Gulf states, dissatisfied with Egypt's political and economic behavior, may back these Islamist groups. Similarly, Salafi -Jihadi organizations will exploit tensions in Egyptian society and take advantage of governance gaps in order to threaten the Egyptian state. If the economic and political situation deteriorates further, a security vacuum will emerge which could lead various militant organizations, such as ISIS's Wilayat Sinai, to achieve a greater foothold in the Egyptian mainland. As economic conditions threaten President Sisi's hold on power, Egypt could turn in desperation to new sources of economic and political aid - such as Russia and Iran. Russia would demand concessions from Egypt; likely in the form of naval privileges or possibly even establishment of a base on the Mediterranean. 

Ukraine Update: October 13-November 9, 2016

                                                                      By: Franklin Holcomb and Dmytro Hryckowian


Despite the Ukrainian Government’s continued efforts to enact anti-corruption reforms, confidence in the government continues to fall. The Ukrainian parliament established the“Independent Anti-corruption Committee of Defense” and passed amendments to the tax code on October 26th in a public effort to reduce corruption and increase transparency. Ukrainian government officials also released ‘e-declarations’ of their personal assets in order to expose outsized earnings and assets of some government officials. This positive step to make the government more accountable to citizens was, however, greeted with outrage as Ukrainians realized the sharp disparities in earnings and wealth between average Ukrainians and some of their leaders. In another blow to the government’s reformist image, the Governor of Odessa Oblast Mikheil Saakashvili resigned on November 7, citing vast corruption and distrust in President Petro Poreshenko’s government. President Poroshenko will need to enact more substantial reforms targeting corruption in order to preserve trust in the post Euromaidan government.

Increased instability within the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) suggests a lack of control by the separatist leadership. The Commander of the DNR’s veteran “Sparta” Battalion Arseny Pavlov “Motorola” was assassinated on October 16th, and militant police chiefs and members of the DNR security forces were arrested in Donetsk city on November 2nd. This activity in the DNR follows a recent coup attempt and similar arrests in the Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR), indicating a general trend of internal purges aimed at reestablishing control over competing factions within the separatist territories. DNR leader Alexander Zakharckenko’s decision to further postpone local elections suggests that the purges may also be an effort to eliminate internal opposition before elections take place. If separatist leadership is unable to quell infighting amongst separatist ranks, Russia may become more active in order to maintain stability and control of pro-Russia forces in Donbas.

ISIS’s Global Attack Network: November 13, 2015 – November 9, 2016

By: Jessica Lewis McFate and Melissa Pavlik

Key Takeaway

ISIS has organized a number of external attacks worldwide in the past year, some of which have been thwarted. ISIS’s global network is still operating and is poised to continue conducting external attacks in late 2016. The U.S. must recognize that the campaign to recapture Mosul and Raqqa will not defeat ISIS. Rather, any military success in Iraq and Syria must be the first phase of a campaign to counter ISIS globally, whether through military or non-military means.

Overview

ISIS has been planning an external attack from Raqqa, Syria. The U.S. and its partners in the counter-ISIS coalition are assisting the major operations to recover Raqqa and Mosul, ISIS’s main urban hubs. ISIS is conducting  counter-offensives inside Iraq to divert Coalition attention from these main efforts. Similarly, ISIS will direct its global network to launch additional counter-offensives across its global footprint. Coalition partner nations face a high risk of attacks by ISIS on their homelands and their populations abroad while the offensives to recapture Mosul and Raqqa progress. The attack threat emanating from Raqqa highlights that ISIS-linked militants across the world still receive direction from ISIS in core terrain.

ISIS’s global attack network consists of two known campaigns: a general call for individuals to conduct attacks in the name of ISIS; and specific discrete attacks that are planned, coordinated, and executed by organized groups or cells of ISIS members. The specific external attack threat emanating from Raqqa falls in the latter category, over which ISIS exerts more control. Abu Mohammad al-Adnani, ISIS’s former spokesman and director of external operations, may have masterminded this two-pronged strategy and its execution. But his death on the battlefield in Aleppo Province on August 20, 2016 did not eliminate ISIS’s ability to design and coordinate such attacks. ISIS’s global network is still operating within the campaign framework defined by Adnani and other high-ranking ISIS militants and is poised to continue external attacks in late 2016.

The map below depicts coordinated attacks attributed to ISIS’s global network since November 13, 2015, when ISIS’s network in Europe executed a complex attack in Paris, killing 150 civilians. The map illustrates levels of risk for discrete directed attacks on the basis of recent historical patterns. The attacks on the map involved forward-deployed ISIS militants, many of whom were returned foreign fighters. The analysis excludes individual attackers worldwide who responded to official calls from Adnani to attack the West. Successful attacks in the U.S.—such as those on December 2, 2016 in San Bernadino or on June 12, 2016 in Orlando—are excluded for this reason. The only event in the United States considered to fit the profile of a coordinated attack directed by ISIS is the arrest of a Maryland man on December 14, 2015. This man was allegedly given nearly $9,000 from ISIS operatives overseas to conduct an attack in the Washington, D.C. area, suggesting that ISIS in core terrain intended a specific attack.

The map juxtaposes coordinated attacks by ISIS’s global network with foreign fighter flows into Syria and Iraq documented in June 2014 and December 2015 by The Soufan Group. Returned foreign fighters form the basis of ISIS’s global attack network. They also likely form the umbilical cord between ISIS and local Salafi-Jihadi groups whom ISIS recruits worldwide. The activities of ISIS-linked local Salafi-Jihadi groups and wilayats that are conducting ground campaigns are also excluded from this map because they constitute a different arm of ISIS’s global strategy. A ground campaign is a military engagement to contest control of terrain and populations by a rival army. This map therefore excludes ISIS’s ground activities in Libya, Sinai, Somalia, Afghanistan, the Philippines, and Nigeria, which ISW classifies as ground wars. ISIS is also engaged in the ongoing civil war in Yemen, meaning ISIS activity in Yemen is excluded from this map.

Tunisia, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, France, Germany, and Morocco exhibit a high correlation between foreign fighters who left for Syria and Iraq and coordinated external attacks by ISIS’s network. Foreign fighters have also returned to Southeast Asia to plan attacks. The threat in Turkey, including to U.S. persons, is particularly high as of October 29, when the State Department evacuated personnel in Istanbul following a statement by Turkish intelligence that ISIS poses a threat within six provinces in Turkey. ISIS’s attacks in Turkey and Saudi Arabia, two targets highlighted by ISIS’s leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in a statement released on November 2, 2016, also support its strategy to weaken regional power centers, as ISW forecasted in its 2016 Ramadan report. Britain’s MI5 also highlighted the generally high threat of attacks in the United Kingdom on November 1. Recent studies indicate that ISIS is still able to conduct cross-border operations through Syria, and from Libya to Italy through its nexus with organized crime, compounding the threat of attacks that are coordinated remotely from Raqqa.

ISIS’s global campaign may increase as Mosul and Raqqa come under pressure and fall. Coalition partner nations and U.S. homeland security must continue to regard ISIS’s coordinated external operations as a threat despite the death of Adnani and ISIS’s loss of key border crossings from Syria into Turkey due to Coalition anti-ISIS operations in Syria. The U.S. must recognize that the campaign to recapture Mosul and Raqqa will not defeat ISIS. Rather, any military success in Iraq and Syria must be the first phase of a campaign to counter ISIS globally, whether through military or non-military means.

Iraq Situation Report: November 2-8, 2016

By Emily Anagnostos, Staley Smith, Michael Momayezi, and the ISW Iraq Team

ISIS is attacking various locations and forces in Iraq in order to find and exploit a seam that can unravel the anti-ISIS Coalition. ISIS launched attacks in Tikrit and Samarra on November 6, targeting Shi’a civilians, including Iranians visiting for a Shi’a holiday. The attacks likely aim to provoke Shi’a militias to carry out reprisals on Sunni populations in order to marginalize Sunnis from the Iraqi Government. ISIS also detonated a Vehicle-Borne IED (VBIED) in Baghdad on November 8. ISIS may hope to unravel political seams that could undermine the legitimacy of the Abadi administration, like it did with the July 3 VBIED which led to the resignations of senior security officials. Some recent ISIS attacks have had success in exploiting these seams: ISIS’s attack on Kirkuk City on October 21 resulted in Kurdish security officials demolishing the homes of Sunni Arabs in response to the attacks, according to November 3 Human Rights Watch report. Although ISIS has hit on the Kurdish-Arab seam in Kirkuk, it has not been able to fracture the anti-ISIS alliance between the Peshmerga and the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), which continue to make significant gains in eastern Mosul and north and south of the city from November 2 to 8. ISIS will continue to try to exploit seams that can affect the progress of the anti-ISIS alliance in the short-term while hitting seams which keep Iraq’s Sunni population sufficiently disillusioned and victimized by the Iraqi Government in the long-term. Therefore, if ISIS needs to go to ground after it loses Mosul, there are conditions set for a renewed Sunni insurgency, off of which ISIS can rebound.

The Campaign for Mosul: November 4-7, 2016

By Emily Anagnostos and the ISW Iraq Team

The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) moved deeper into Mosul’s eastern neighborhoods as the ISF and Peshmerga made significant gains on Mosul’s eastern and southern axes in an effort to encircle the city.

The Counter Terrorism Service (CTS) and 9^th Iraqi Army (IA) Division advanced deeper into Mosul’s eastern neighborhoods, entering and encircling several neighborhoods from November 4 to 7. The pace of the ISF’s operations in eastern Mosul remains faster than expected, but the ISF still faces resistance from ISIS, which has deployed rooftop snipers, suicide attackers, and heavy artillery in order to slow the ISF’s advance. These tactics, as well as ISIS’s mining of homes and roads with IEDs, likely aim to slow down the ISF’s advance in order to buy ISIS time to fortify their defenses in the city center. Lingering ISIS attacks in eastern Mosul will also require forces to remain in the area. The CTS and Iraqi Army will therefore need to have a hold force in place to secure recaptured neighborhoods and fleeing civilians before they can advance further into Mosul’s center.

 

The ISF and Peshmerga advanced the objective to encircle the city, retaking major towns on Mosul’s northeastern and southern axes. The Peshmerga retook the ISIS-held town of Bashiqa, northeast of Mosul, on November 7, after besieging the city since October 23. ISIS attempted to repel the advance using chlorine and mustard gas, underscoring ISIS’s continued commitment to using chemical weapons during the counter-offensive. Bashiqa’s recapture frees up CTS forces to support ongoing operations in Mosul itself or bolster the 16^th IA Division’s line of effort north of the city. Meanwhile, the Federal Police and 15^th IA Division recaptured Hammam al-Alil, the last major ISIS-held town on Mosul’s southern axis, on November 5. The Federal Police continued its advance north, coming within five kilometers of the airport located in Mosul’s southern city limits on November 7. The airport could prove valuable terrain for the ISF and the Coalition as a staging ground for further operations to recapture the city center.

ISIS countered these gains by striking behind the front lines, demonstrating resurgent attack capabilities in recaptured territory. ISIS launched a major attack in Shirqat on November 4, infiltrating the town from ISIS-held terrain on the eastern bank of the Tigris River before security forces repelled the attack. ISIS also carried out twin suicide attacks in Tikrit and Samarra on November 6, striking far behind the Mosul frontline to target Shi’a pilgrimage routes in the lead up to Arbaeen, a major Shi’a holiday. The suicide attacks were accompanied by the detonation of two stationary IEDs near Tikrit, demonstrating that ISIS has re-established an attack presence in or near the city. These attacks foreshadow ISIS’s coming shift into a traditional-style insurgent group in the face of its loss of control over terrain. ISIS may try to increase spectacular attacks in areas like Samarra and Tikrit, where it can demonstrate its capacity to infiltrate highly-secure areas, and may try to infiltrate inner Baghdad neighborhoods next. ISIS may also refocus its efforts on re-establishing attack and support zones in recaptured parts of the country.

ISIS’s calculus for Mosul’s defense may also change now that the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) opened efforts to isolate ISIS-held Raqqa in Syria on November 6. ISIS may elect to shift assets from Mosul, which it likely assess it will lose, to Raqqa, which it likely calculates it stands a better chance of retaining by exploiting Kurdish-Turkish seams in the anti-ISIS alliance. ISIS may also calculate that it is better able to regroup in the desert in Deir ez Zour, where it can still maintain a connection with the ISIS-held town of al-Qa’im in western Iraq, more so than in Ninewa, where the Coalition is less susceptible to such seams. The U.S. will thus need to both ensure that the ISF continues anti-ISIS operations beyond Mosul, particularly in the upper Euphrates River Valley, and sufficiently bolster the Syrian operations to prevent ISIS from retaining safe havens in the region which could allow it to reconstitute even after losing its capital cities.

Warning Update: Al Qaeda’s Global Attack Campaign

by: Jennifer Cafarella and Katherine Zimmerman

Al Qaeda may be planning attacks in the United States for Monday, November 7, according to a senior FBI official. The FBI continues to assess the intelligence and whether the threat is credible. If true, the plot could signal al Qaeda’s refocus on targeting the US homeland after building significant safe havens in Syria, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. Al Qaeda never stopped planning attacks against the US even when it was prioritizing the local fights and working within local dynamics. The group seeks to lead a global insurgency, rooted in these local fights, that it will take to the West. Al Qaeda’s increasing involvement in local conflicts, especially the Syrian Civil War, accelerates rather than contains the threat of the group globally.

Al Qaeda has active attack planning cells based in its safe havens in Syria and Afghanistan. Safe havens provide al Qaeda bases from which to launch attacks against the US. US officials have been warning of al Qaeda’s re-emergence in Afghanistan and also its sanctuary in Syria. Two recent American strikes targeted high-level al Qaeda operatives involved in external operations in both countries. 

•          A US airstrike killed a senior al Qaeda operative, Haydar Kirkan, on October 17 near Idlib City in northern Syria. Pentagon Press Secretary Peter Cook confirmed the strike on November 2, describing Kirkan as connected to al Qaeda senior leadership, as facilitating al Qaeda’s efforts in Turkey and Europe, and as al Qaeda’s “senior external terror attack planner in Syria.” 
• The US also targeted two high-level operatives in Afghanistan’s Kunar Province on October 23: a senior planner for attacks against the US and al Qaeda’s commander in northeastern Afghanistan, Faruq al Qatani, confirmed killed, and Bilal al Utabi, who was re-establishing al Qaeda’s Afghanistan safe haven “to threaten the West.” 

The US strikes in Syria and Afghanistan last month demonstrate that al Qaeda remains a threat in both theaters.

Al Qaeda has had planning cells developing external attacks from Syria since at least 2014. The US initially launched airstrikes in September 2014 against the “Khorasan group,” an al Qaeda cell in Syria that had entered the “execution phase” of an attack against US interests in Europe. In response to these targeted strikes, Al Qaeda altered its operational methods in Syria but never abandoned its efforts to develop an external attack capability and deploy it. 

• In July 2016 al Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate, Jabhat al Nusra, rebranded itself with a new name, Jabhat Fatah al Sham. At the same time, the group publicly split from al Qaeda’s leadership abroad in order to create a new image within Syria and internationally. Al Qaeda’s Syrian group aimed thereby to strengthen its relationships with Syrian populations and opposition groups which might otherwise find partnering with the group an impediment to outside support. The rebranding also reduces barriers for Jabhat Fatah al Sham, the Syrian al Qaeda affiliate’s successor, to unite the Syrian opposition under its leadership and build a durable safe haven that it can use for attacks in the future.
• Al Qaeda launched an aggressive disinformation operation to signal that it had discontinued active plotting against the West. A senior al Qaeda figure named Mostafa Mahamed, rebranded as a “foreign media relations director” for Jabhat Fatah al Sham, conducted interviews with numerous Western news outlets such as the BBC and CNN in order to highlight the group’s focus on the war against the Assad regime. Jabhat Fatah al Sham sought to rally support against American airstrikes and cultivate allies within the Syrian opposition by demonstrating its commitment to the war against the Assad regime (see publications list below).
• Jabhat Fatah al Sham continues to develop a robust global foreign fighter network in ways that set conditions for al Qaeda to turn those recruits back into a global attack network, as ISIS has done.
• Jabhat Fatah al Sham has forward deployed recruiters abroad who funnel foreign fighters to Syria and likely cultivate al Qaeda attack cells abroad. The U.S. State Department designated one recruiter, French national Omar Diaby, in September 2016. Diaby is now leading a French foreign fighter group in Syria allied to al Qaeda after recruiting numerous French nationals to join the fight there.
•  Jabhat Fatah al Sham has cultivated numerous subunits of French, Libyan, Crimean, Uzbek, Chechen, and other foreign fighters.
• Jabhat Fatah al Sham and allied groups publish foreign fighter recruitment propaganda via a media outlet titled “al Muhajirun,” which publishes videos subtitled in multiple languages including English, Russian, German, Dutch, and Turkish.  
• Individuals who fought with Jabhat al Nusra in Syria have been arrested in numerous countries including the US and Germany, indicating that al Qaeda-linked foreign fighters are returning to Europe from Syria, like their counterparts fighting with ISIS, in a way that can set conditions for future attacks in the west.

 The timing of the recent strikes against senior al Qaeda operators in Syria and Afghanistan could simply indicate that the US acquired actionable intelligence on these operatives’ locations. It could also be a response to the external attacks cells crossing an assessed threshold toward taking imminent action on a planned attack. If the latter, there is the possibility that al Qaeda may have decided to surge external attacks globally.

There are other possible indicators of a resumption of al Qaeda attempts to execute attacks abroad. 

• The US embassy in Kyrgyzstan issued a terrorist attack warning on October 8 after an SVBIED detonated outside Chinese Embassy in Bishkek on August 30. Kyrgyz intelligence stated that the attack was “ordered by Uighur terrorist groups active in Syria.” A Uighur foreign fighter group that has a branch in Syria and operates closely with al Qaeda, the Turkistan Islamic Party, most likely executed the attack. The subsequent US attack warning could indicate that the Turkistan Islamic Party intended to target US personnel in Kyrgyzstan next.
• The US State Department ordered the evacuation of the families of US diplomats in Istanbul, Turkey, on October 29 due to “aggressive efforts” by “extremist groups” to target US citizens. The State Department did not specify whether ISIS or al Qaeda posed an imminent threat. ISIS is most likely, but the now deceased Hayder Kilkan’s role as a planner for attacks in Turkey as well as the US and Europe indicates the possibility that the US faces an immediate al Qaeda threat in Turkey.

The US does not have a global strategy to eliminate the safe havens that al Qaeda uses to design and execute attacks abroad. American airstrikes to disrupt imminent al Qaeda attacks from Syria and Afghanistan are necessary but insufficient. The US needs a plan to deprive al Qaeda of the terrain it holds in Syria, Afghanistan, and elsewhere in order to deprive the group of continued ability to regenerate its attack capability. The US must also recognize that the foreign fighter problem transcends ISIS and take immediate steps to address al Qaeda recruitment abroad, including in US allies in the Middle East as well as Europe. 

 For further reading, please see:

• Jennifer Cafarella, Nicolas A. Heras, and Genevieve Casagrande, “Al Qaeda is Gaining Strength in Syria,” Foreign Policy, September 1, 2016 
• Jennifer Cafarella, “The Myth of a Locally-Focused Former al Qaeda Affiliate,” the Cipher Brief, August 1, 2016 
• Jennifer Cafarella and Katherine Zimmerman, “Avoiding al Qaeda’s Syria Trap: Jabhat al Nusra’s Rebranding,” Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project, July 29, 2016 
• Jennifer Cafarella, “How Turkey Could Become the Next Pakistan,” Institute for the Study of War, July 19, 2016 
• Jennifer Cafarella, “Why Most Dangerous Group in Syria Isn’t ISIS,” CNN, February 26, 2016. 
• Jennifer Cafarella, Harleen Gambhir, and Katherine Zimmerman, “Jabhat al Nusra and ISIS: Sources of Strength,” Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project, February 2016 
• Frederick W. Kagan, Kimberly Kagan, Katherine Zimmerman, and Harleen Gambhir, “San Bernardino Shooting a Terrorist Attack with al Qaeda and ISIS Footprints,” AEI’s Critical Threats Project, December 4, 2015 
• Jennifer Cafarella, “Jabhat al Nusra in Syria: An Islamic Emirate for Al Qaeda,” Institute for the Study of War, December 2014 
• Katherine Zimmerman, “The Khorasan Group: Syria’s al Qaeda Threat,” AEI’s Critical Threats Project, September 23, 2014 
• Katherine Zimmerman, “Competing Jihad: The Islamic State and al Qaeda,” AEI’s Critical Threats Project, September 2, 2014

Warning Update: Russia Prepares to Escalate Military Intervention in Syria

By Jonathan Mautner, Genevieve Casagrande, and Christopher Kozak with Omar Kebbe, Kathleen Weinberger, Franklin Holcomb, and Benjamin Knudsen

Key Takeaway: Russia is preparing to escalate its military operations in Syria in order to tout its standing as a great power, reinforce its claims to be a credible partner against violent extremism, and reinvigorate domestic support for its continued participation in the Syrian Civil War. Russia has set conditions for a major demonstration of its military might following the completion of the latest in a long series of ‘humanitarian pauses’ in Aleppo City set to end on November 4. Russia’s sole aircraft carrier, the Admiral Kuznetsov, is expected to arrive off the Syrian Coast in the coming days. The arrival of the Kuznetsov with its accompanying fleet of cruise missile-equipped submarines and frigates signals Russia’s likely intent to conduct a new wave of strikes against strategically significant targets in Syria. The deployment comes amidst a recent opposition offensive to break the pro-regime siege of Aleppo City as well as continued pro-regime gains in the Eastern Ghouta Suburbs of Damascus. Russia will likely exploit opportunities in both Aleppo City and Damascus to highlight its ability to project force against "terrorism" and demonstrate the continued legitimacy of its client regime.

Russia intends to escalate its military operations in Aleppo City and Damascus within the coming days in order to demonstrate its force projection capabilities and bolster flagging public appeal for its involvement in the conflict. Russia deployed its lone aircraft carrier - the Admiral Kuznetsov – to the Eastern Mediterranean Sea on or around October 17. The Kuznetsov is also carrying a contingent of Su-33 and MiG-29K/KUB fighter jets that Russian sources claim are equipped with precision-guided munitions, as well as Ka-52 attack helicopters armed with long-range anti-tank guided missiles.[i] The Kuznetsov is escorted by a battle group that includes as many as three submarines likely equipped with Kalibr long-range cruise missiles. The Kuznetsov reached the Mediterranean Sea on November 1 and is expected to arrive off the Syrian Coast in the coming days, where it will be joined by an additional frigate armed with Kalibr cruise missiles from the Black Sea Fleet.[ii] Once the battle group arrives, it will likely not remain idle. Russia will likely use these new assets to support pro-regime ground operations in Aleppo City or Damascus in an attempt to improve domestic support for its military intervention in the Syrian Civil War through a showcase of its naval and air capabilities. A recent poll by the Levada Center indicated that support for the intervention has begun to slip since 2015.[iii] Russians now doubt the Syrian Civil War as a route to improving Russia’s international image or finding common ground with the West.[iv] Russian President Vladimir Putin will likely attempt to reinvigorate these sentiments through a high-profile demonstration of military might and effectiveness.

Condition Setting for Escalation in Aleppo

Russia has set conditions for a dramatic escalation in military activity in Aleppo City following a series of ‘humanitarian pauses’ and an overall decrease in the tempo of its air campaign. Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered the Russian Armed Forces to implement a ten-hour ‘humanitarian pause’ on November 4 in order to allow civilians and opposition fighters to evacuate Eastern Aleppo City. The temporary ceasefire follows a series of similar ‘humanitarian pauses’ in Aleppo City on October 20 – 22. The statement follows claims by the Russian Ministry of Defense that its warplanes have halted all air operations in Aleppo City since mid-October 2016. The tempo of the Russian air campaign against opposition-held areas of Eastern Aleppo City decreased significantly from October 28 to November 1 despite concerted opposition ground operations to break the pro-regime siege of Aleppo City. Russia nonetheless continued to conduct heavy airstrikes against opposition terrain on the southwestern outskirts of Aleppo City and its surrounding countryside as recently as October 26 – 27, according to local activist sources. The relative lull in airstrikes followed increasingly public threats of targeted sanctions from the U.S. and EU as well as calls for investigations into potential war crimes committed by pro-regime forces in Aleppo City, suggesting that Russia may aim to relieve mounting international backlash against its attempts to depopulate Aleppo City through an aggressive air campaign.

Russia will likely use the Kuznetsov and its extant military assets in Syria in order to intensify operations against opposition forces in Aleppo City and its surrounding countryside, bolstering the regime’s crippling siege on opposition-held districts of the city. The imminent arrival of the Kuznetsov to the Syrian Coast is currently set to coincide with the expiration of the latest ‘humanitarian pause’ on November 4. Russia will likely use the airframes and cruise missile-equipped submarines accompanying the carrier as part of a new blitz against Eastern Aleppo City as well as core opposition-held terrain in Western Aleppo and Idlib Provinces. Recent infighting between opposition factions may render Eastern Aleppo City particularly vulnerable to such an escalation. Clashes erupted between the increasingly hardline Islamist opposition group Harakat Nour al-Din al-Zenki and current U.S.-backed TOW anti-tank missile recipient Fastaqim Kama Umirat in Eastern Aleppo City on November 2. Russia may attempt to exploit continued infighting by targeting these recently-exposed seams. Despite the infighting, neither the Kuznetsov nor the vessels in its battle group possess sufficient military capability to achieve a decisive victory for Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in Aleppo City. An escalation will nonetheless enable Russia to highlight its ability to project force against “terrorists” in a major urban center, draw parallels to ongoing operations by the U.S. in Mosul, and demonstrate its strength before a domestic audience.

Russia Prepares to Support Regime in Damascus

Russia could also leverage its renewed military intervention to enable the regime to successfully clear opposition forces from Damascus. Damascus holds more strategic significance to Russia than Aleppo City due to its political importance as the seat of government as well as its military role as the hub for military operations throughout Southern Syria. Russia currently weights its military efforts towards Northern Syria due to the threat that opposition groups pose to the regime in Aleppo City. However, Russia currently faces favorable conditions for its air campaign to expand to the capital. Pro-regime forces have set conditions for a major breakthrough in the capital city over the past three years through a brutal siege-and-starve campaign against the opposition-held suburbs. This campaign has now reached a critical tipping point. Pro-regime forces forced the surrender of the key opposition-held town of Darayya in the Western Ghouta Suburbs of Damascus on August 25, resulting in the forced displacement of the seven hundred opposition fighters and several thousand civilians that remained in the town. The regime concluded similar partial evacuations from the nearby opposition-held suburbs of Moadamiyeh, Qudsayya, and Hamah in October 2016 as part of ‘reconciliation agreements’ that brought the towns back under regime control. Pro-regime forces also tightened the siege on the remaining opposition-held pocket of Khan al-Shih in Western Ghouta after seizing the neighboring village of Deir Khabiyah on October 14.

Meanwhile, pro-regime forces have also achieved significant gains against the opposition-held Eastern Ghouta Suburbs of Damascus. An eruption of opposition infighting between Salafi-Jihadist group Jaysh al-Islam and rival Islamist group Faylaq al-Rahman in May 2016 allowed the regime to secure significant gains in the rural farmland that serves as the breadbasket of the besieged opposition-held region. Pro-regime forces seized a steady string of towns over the intervening months, most recently the villages of Tel Kurdi and Tel Sawwan on October 29. These gains have brought pro-regime forces within five kilometers of the opposition stronghold of Douma near Damascus. These continued advances appear to have drawn interest from Russia, which resumed steady air operations targeting both Khan al-Shih and Eastern Ghouta in Damascus beginning in late September 2016. Russia may seek to exploit the demonstrated vulnerability of opposition factions in Damascus as another venue to demonstrate its military prowess and enable success for pro-regime forces on the ground.

Russian President Vladimir Putin and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad appear increasingly confident in the possibility of their victory in the Syrian Civil War. Assad has conducted a public relations blitz since September 2016, conducting interviews with a number of media outlets in the U.S. and Europe with an eye towards demonstrating the stability of his position and the legitimacy of his rule. Syrian First Lady Asma al-Assad conducted a similar interview with state-owned ‘Rossiya 24’ in Russia on October 18 in her first public interview since 2011. This outreach peaked in a two-day conference held in Damascus on October 30 – 31 for several dozen journalists and analysts from the U.S. and Britain in which Assad stated his intent to finish his presidential term through at least 2021. These statements suggest that Putin and Assad do not anticipate a meaningful challenge to their position in Damascus – highlighting the likely intent of Russia to expand its offensive combat operations in the near-future.

Implications

The Russian escalation as part of a Syrian regime offensive in Damascus and a counter-offensive in Aleppo will accelerate the radicalization of the opposition. Russian strikes by air and by sea will target acceptable opposition groups as they have during previous escalations to eliminate legitimate alternatives to the Assad regime. This continued pressure will hasten the ongoing transformation of the opposition into a movement dominated by Salafi-Jihadist groups such as Jabhat Fatah al-Sham, formerly known as Jabhat al-Nusra, al-Qaeda’s affiliate in Syria. In the absence of better options, acceptable opposition groups will increasingly cleave to extremist factions for self-preservation in the face of concerted pro-regime advances enabled by the Russian air campaign. Russia’s support to the Assad regime continues to remove potential partners for the U.S. against ISIS and al-Qaeda in Syria from the battlefield. The U.S. must therefore be willing to counter the support that Russia is currently providing to the Assad regime in order to achieve its national security objective in Syria.

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[i] https://in(.)rbth(.)com/economics/defence/2016/05/30/first-batch-of-mig-29k-kub-deck-based-fighters-placed-in-service_598547; http://rbth(.)com/defence/2016/11/03/admiral-kuznetsov-aircraft-carrier-group-prepares-for-battle-in-syria_644707

[ii] http://www(.)pravdareport(.)com/news/world/asia/syria/03-11-2016/136065-russia_frigate-0/

[iii] http://www(.)levada(.)ru/2016/10/31/sirijskij-konflikt/

[iv] http://www(.)levada(.)ru/2016/10/31/sirijskij-konflikt/