Iraq Situation Report: November 18-30, 2016

By Michael Momayezi, Emily Anagnostos, and the ISW Iraq Team

The Iraqi Council of Representatives (CoR) passed a law on November 26 that solidifies the Popular Mobilization, the majority of which are Shi’a militias with a history of sectarian violence, as a permanent security institution in Iraq. The Popular Mobilization Act, passed primarily through the efforts of Shi’a and Kurdish parties, grants qualified Popular Mobilization Units the same rights and financial benefits as members of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). Sunni political leaders and parties, however, rejected the law as a serious blow against national reconciliation efforts and called for its reversal. The law’s current language does not address the structure of this new security institution or clarify which Popular Mobilization units, which includes several Sunni units, would be inducted into it. As it stands, the CoR will need to pass successive laws or amendments regarding the Popular Mobilization’s structure, raising a concern that the Shi’a parties’ dominance in the CoR will sway the structure to favor Shi’a militias. The law could benefit Sunnis if it legitimizes the use of local Sunni militias and tribal forces as security forces in majority Sunni provinces, thereby acting as an alternative to the National Guard Law, a key piece of legislation which Sunnis sought as reconciliation efforts but Shi’a parties blocked. National Alliance chairman Ammar al-Hakim and Sadrist Trend leader Muqtada al-Sadr both called for the form of the Popular Mobilization to be non-partisan and inclusive, but sectarian Iranian proxy militias, who already dominate both the PMUs’ leadership and the CoR, are positioned to benefit from the law the most. A legitimized Popular Mobilization will result in a sectarian security force funded by the Iraqi government but responsive to Iranian advisers, which will further alienate Sunnis from the Iraqi Government.

Anticipating Iraq’s Next Sunni Insurgency

By Emily Anagnostos, Jessica Lewis McFate, Jennifer Cafarella, and Alexandra Gutowski

Introduction

Iraq could face another Sunni insurgency after ISIS loses control of Mosul. The U.S.-led Operation Inherent Resolve has not resolved the political conditions that originally caused Sunni Arabs to mobilize in a non-violent protest movement in 2012-2013. Sunni Arabs in Iraq who are liberated from ISIS’s control will not necessarily be reconciled to the Iraqi Government. The success of anti-ISIS operations in 2016 will open space for other Sunni anti-government actors and armed groups to resurge in ISIS’s absence. Sunni Arabs are displaced in large numbers, which will grow as the Coalition seizes and secures Mosul. Iranian-backed Shi’a militias will exacerbate grievances as they move to clear Sunni-majority villages in northern Iraq and near Tel Afar, a historic stronghold of Sunni insurgents and al Qaeda in Iraq west of Mosul. Shi’a militias have alienated local Sunni Arab populations in other cities cleared of ISIS by conducting extrajudicial killings, ethnic cleansing, and other forms of violence against the local population. A permissive environment is emerging for a Sunni insurgency in the vacuum of control left by ISIS, into which other actors, including al Qaeda, could emerge in 2017.

Sunni Insurgent Groups and ISIS Before Mosul Fell

Iraq stood on the brink of a Sunni insurgency in late 2013 before ISIS began to seize terrain because former Iraqi PM Nouri al-Maliki reversed the gains of the previous U.S.-led Coalition to reconcile and reintegrate Sunni Arabs into Iraqi politics in 2008. Maliki launched a highly sectarian policy to marginalize Sunni politicians and consolidate control over the Iraqi military the day U.S. forces withdrew. His political actions ignited a year-long Sunni anti-government protest movement that erupted in January 2013 after the near arrest of Rafi al-Issawi, the moderate Sunni Finance Minister, in December 2012.

Sunni infighting crippled the Sunni political base in 2013, making it unable to channel or mitigate growing Sunni discontent away from an insurgency. Maliki’s maneuverings compounded these internal fractures, leading to the erosion of the Sunni political alliance, Iraqiyya, throughout 2012. Iraqiyya further split over how to handle Maliki’s administration: Issawi led a boycott of Maliki’s cabinet in January 2013 in solidarity with protests but several Sunni leaders broke rank and returned in March in favor of negotiation. The Sunni political alliance was effectively dead before the June 2013 provincial elections in Ninewa and Anbar Provinces, leaving the protest without an effective channel to a political resolution.

Clashes between the government and protesters kindled the growing insurgency and ultimately created the opening for ISIS’s capture of Fallujah in January 2014. Violent government escalations against the protest movement, such as the April 2013 massacre at the Hawija sit-in protest camp, galvanized the movement. The mass arrest of Sunni males in Baghdad after ISIS attacked the Abu Ghraib and Taji Base prisons in July 2013 heightened grievances.

Multiple anti-government organizations competed to champion the Sunni cause, harness their discontent, and facilitate a full insurgency. Chief among these competitors was ISIS, rebranded from al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). Sunni Arabs had rejected ISIS’s predecessor, AQI, and joined the Iraqi Government to defeat it in the Sahwa, or Awakening, movement from 2006 to 2008.  ISIS resurged in parallel with the anti-government protest movement and conducted a Vehicle-Borne IED (VBIED) wave campaign in 2012-2013 targeting Shi’a civilians to spark a sectarian civil war that would break the Iraqi state.

ISIS’s black flags were present within the protest camps in Ramadi starting in October 2013. AQI’s resurgence and its presence in previously off-limits camps demonstrates that Iraq’s Sunni Arab population became willing to tolerate ISIS’s presence in their midst despite the earlier expulsion of AQI, indicating the virulence of their anti-government sentiment. ISIS’s presence in the camps suggests that ISIS cooperated on some level with other anti-government insurgent organizations that had been present in the protest camps.

Jaysh Rijal al-Tariqa al-Naqshbandia (JRTN), a neo-Baathist insurgent group, harnessed the 2013 protest movement directly in order to stoke its own insurgency. JRTN infused the anti-government protest movement with revolutionary rhetoric and traditional Baathist branding. ISIS likely relied on its support to infiltrate the protest camps. Other legacy revolutionary groups, such as the 1920 Brigades, another neo-Ba’athist group, and Ansar al-Islam, a Kurdish Sunni insurgent group, re-emerged as well prior to December 2013.  Saddam-era Iraqi Army officers made up the core of JRTN and the 1920 Brigade’s manpower and lent military know-how and leadership to the groups. This experience with military organization and knowledge of the terrain made each neo-Baathist group a formidable rival to ISIS.

Maliki’s order for the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) to clear the sit-in protest camp in December spurred the development of an organized Sunni rebellion. The large scale clashes on December 30-31, 2013 between protesters and the ISF in Ramadi signaled the start of an insurgency. The General Military Council of Iraqi Revolutionaries (GMCIR) formed in January 2014 as an umbrella to absorb recently-formed local military councils in majority Sunni areas including Anbar, Fallujah, Mosul, Salah al-Din, Kirkuk, Baghdad, and Diyala. The GMCIR formed as ISIS seized control of Fallujah on January 3, but it reflected the degree of preparation by JRTN over the preceding year to cultivate a Sunni insurgency. Another umbrella organization, the Council of Revolutionaries of the Tribes of Anbar (CRTA), also formed in January 2014 in response to the clearing of the Ramadi protest camp.

JRTN supported ISIS’s rise because ISIS could further the anti-government cause. JRTN and GMCIR leader Izzat al-Douri, a top Saddam-era deputy, acknowledged on July 17, 2014, following ISIS’s first northern offensive, that ISIS “helped the revolutionaries achieve their goals and were semi-[parallel] with them in facing the Iranian Safavid project in Iraq.” These leaders, nonetheless, remained wary of ISIS’s adherence to their brand of an anti-government but pan-Iraqi insurgency: CRTA leader, Sheikh Ali Hatem, warned jihadists from taking advantage of the revolution in his formation statement on January 3, 2014.

The cooperation between ISIS and JRTN over the insurgency came to end likely by the fall of 2014 at which point ISIS began to brutally marginalize and suppress JRTN. JRTN ceased to support ISIS’s means of carrying out the insurgent: JRTN criticized ISIS openly in August 2014 after ISIS targeted Yazidis in Sinjar while the GMCIR, in which JRTN played a dominant role, criticized ISIS for taking the “revolution to a different path” and continuing north, rather than overthrowing the government in Baghdad. In turn, ISIS began to consider JRTN a competitor, especially as JRTN frequently tried to impose its own governance in overlapping territory. In response, ISIS began to systematically assassinate retired Iraqi Army officers, JRTN’s primarily recruitment pool, in Mosul in September 2014, a sign that it had begun to eliminate organized military resistance as a solution to the dispute. ISIS's military dominance forced JRTN to go to ground.

Increasing Sunni Unrest in Late 2016

Contemporary U.S.-led Coalition operations to degrade and disrupt ISIS in 2016 may unlock the Sunni insurgency that began as the GMCIR, CRTA, and other smaller groups. This outcome will transpire if conditions are not set to help Sunni Arabs in Iraq to address their original and mounting grievances. The Coalition has attempted to pursue Sunni reconciliation politically in Baghdad, including through a National Guard Law aimed to provide Sunni communities with a local security structure. These lines of effort largely failed because of efforts by Iranian proxies and pro-Iranian political groups.

The U.S. and Iraqi Governments are unlikely to be able to address the grievances in 2016, as the Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi government faces continued pressure from sectarian political and militia leaders to maintain the Shi’a-dominated status quo. These leaders could further Sunni distrust in the government. The Iraqi parliament passed the controversial Popular Mobilization Act on November 26, which institutionalizes the Popular Mobilization Units, the bulk of which are Shi’a militias, as part of the ISF. Sunni political leaders boycotted the vote, warning that the law hurt national reconciliation efforts. The law, the language of which remains open-ended, could support local Sunni security forces by ensuring that they are equally integrated into the new structure. However, Shi’a parties already rebuffed conditions by Sunni parties to increase the number of Sunni units, suggesting that Shi’a militias, including those charged with sectarian violence, will dominate the future structure of the Popular Mobilization. Meanwhile, former PM Maliki is carving a path to return to the premiership, which would further alienate Sunni Arabs in Iraq from the central government. His intermediate efforts have already resulted in changes that are marginalizing Sunnis, including his facilitation of the dismissal of Sunni Defense Minister Khalid al-Obeidi on August 25. This dismissal highlighted the division among Sunni parties in the government, undermining potential Sunni political unity.

Sunni political infighting has also emerged on the provincial level ahead of provincial elections. These elections are scheduled for April 2017, but the financial crisis could result in its merger with the 2018 parliamentary elections. The Anbar Provincial Government has made repeated attempts to oust its governor over allegations of corruption and mishandling the return of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). The Anbar Provincial Court also issued on October 16 an arrest warrant for Ahmed Abu Risha, who in 2007 succeeded his brother, who was assassinated by AQI, as the leader of the Sunni Awakening, or Sahwa, movement in Anbar that helped the U.S. defeat AQI. The legacy Sahwa elements subsequently resisted ISIS’s first attempt to retake Ramadi in January 2014. A similar dynamic is re-emerging in Salah al-Din Province: the Sunni Jubur tribe dominates local politics, but the tribe is divided on policy, including its relations with Shi’a militias, which constitute a large portion of the security force in Salah al-Din, and the return of IDPs. The divide has resulted in the governorship swapping between the rival branches of the Jubur tribe. This continuous jostling over governance and security arrangements can lend to instability in the province. This divide also appears in federal politics; recently, one Jubur parliamentary member called for the dismissal of Salim al-Juburi, the parliamentary speaker. In Ninewa Province, Sunni Arabs are displaced during anti-ISIS operations, then prevented from returning to villages that Kurdish forces have secured. Sunni Arabs could also be shut out of the post-ISIS administration of Ninewa Province if Shi’a and Kurdish parties dominate security. The failure to create secure, stable and effective local governance could drive Sunni populations to seek alternative ways to protect themselves and redress their grievances, opening avenues for insurgent groups to infiltrate.

Sunnis also remain at odds with each other and these intra-Sunni confrontations are already creating opportunities for Sunni insurgents. Unidentified tribal leaders in Ramadi have reportedly allowed the return of known ISIS militants into the city, only months after its recapture by the ISF in January 2016. Suicide attacks in Fallujah in November 2016 suggest that ISIS has already reconsolidated its networks in the city, which was cleared in June, or found residents that remain tolerant to its ideology. Meanwhile, Sunni tribes have carried out violent reprisals on other Sunni civilians who lived in recaptured ISIS-held towns, accusing those civilians off collaborating with ISIS. These divides within Sunni communities will prevent local, national, and political Sunni unity, and will require the same scale of neighborhood-by-neighborhood Sunni reconciliation efforts that U.S. forces carried out in 2007.

JRTN and AQI After ISIS in 2017

           

JRTN’s rhetorical resurgence has already begun. JRTN is seeking to demonstrate that it is the best champion for Sunnis in Iraq over the alternatives of ISIS and the Iraqi Government. JRTN is setting conditions to take immediate advantage of ISIS’s loss in Mosul in order to reclaim the city and its networks. The group issued a statement on October 17, the day Coalition forces launched operations against ISIS in Mosul, claiming to have attacked ISIS in Mosul and calling for additional resistance against ISIS. ISIS has been systematically imprisoning or killing civilians and retired Iraqi Army officers who refuse to act as human shields, an indication both that resistance to ISIS is mounting and that ISIS is attempting to decapitate it. Meanwhile, JRTN has continued to criticize ISIS’s methods, including issuing a statement against an ISIS attack at the Prophet’s Mosque in Saudi Arabia in early July, in order to show itself as kinder, more reasonable champion for Iraqi Sunnis.

JRTN and its allies are tapping into Sunni disillusionment with the Shi’a-dominated government in order to demonstrate that they are the best alternative for Sunnis. JRTN’s statements on October 15 and 17 rejected any Shi’a militia presence in the city and criticized Iranian presence in Iraq, indicating that JRTN is positioning itself to inherit ISIS’s mantle of Sunni resistance against the government. The GMCIR, on behalf of all armed groups including JRTN, issued a similar statement on October 16 criticizing the Iranian occupation of Ninewa as a way to carry out a “demographic change in Iraq and the region.” The 1920s Brigade warned on November 3 against the presence of Shi’a militias in Mosul during anti-ISIS operations. These statements underscore that JRTN and other insurgent groups are playing on concerns that the Iraqi Government will not be able to protect Sunnis from the Shi’a militias or ISIS.

JRTN’s resurgence will have other indicators. JRTN’s signature attack is a targeted assassination from a moving vehicle. Recent reports of drive-by shootings targeting ISIS militants in Mosul likely indicate that JRTN is already on the rebound. Sunni insurgents, particularly JRTN, also have run extensive IED campaigns in the past. Indicators of JRTN resurgence will therefore likely include assassinations of Iraqi security officials, particularly Popular Mobilization elements in charge of securing refugee camps and recaptured areas; IEDs along major roads targeting ISF access to key terrain in northern and western Iraq; and recruitment within the ISF. JRTN will likely recruit more successfully than ISIS among Iraq’s Sunni Arabs in 2016-2017 because ISIS re-invigorated the blood feud and also lost its control over Sunni Arab populations. ISIS will attempt to limit JRTN’s opportunities to resurge by eliminating current JRTN members and possible recruitment pools from among civilians and former ISF officials. ISIS has already executed hundreds of former police and army officers before withdrawing from cities south of Mosul. These efforts will likely lead to increased violence inside Sunni majority areas and places where Sunni IDPs are aggregating, including Kirkuk and Tikrit.

Al Qaeda in Syria is also positioning to unify disparate Sunni Arab factions in Iraq and gain popular support in the wake of ISIS. AQ seeks to perform the role of the silent vanguard of Sunni insurgencies, and it will enter Iraq with a low signature to evade the Coalition. AQ may even partner with JRTN the way ISIS did before and just after ISIS broke from al Qaeda to build a network of Sunni insurgent groups in Iraq to which AQ can preach. Al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri called on Sunnis globally to resist the “Safavid-Crusader” occupation of Iraq in a speech released on August 25, 2016, in which he called for Iraqi Sunnis to resume a “long guerrilla warfare” in the face of territorial losses and urged AQ in Syria to support this rebuilding process in Iraq, indicating al Qaeda’s intent to reinvigorate and reconstitute a Sunni insurgency against Baghdad. Zawahiri’s call for cross-border relations also suggests that AQ will renew efforts to maintain a unified, single organization across Iraq and Syria, as it tried to do before it split from ISIS in 2014.

AQ will likely seek to build its networks on top of pre-existing cells along the Euphrates River Valley in Anbar Province and in Ninewa Province, including in Mosul. AQ will attempt to coopt remnant elements of ISIS that escaped among the flows of IDPs. Attacks in IDP camps, especially in the Euphrates River Valley and Diyala Province, could signal that AQ or JRTN has infiltrated the camps and is seeking recruits. AQ will conduct outreach among ungoverned Sunni Arab populations, by providing religious classes, infrastructure, and utilities if possible. AQ will portray itself as a local Sunni resistance rather than use the AQ brand, which is a liability that AQ leader Aymen al-Zawahiri has already demonstrated he is willing to avoid. AQ’s resurgence in Iraq will therefore be difficult to track and distinguish from active and vocal Sunni mobilization. The establishment of new organized groups of Sunni resistance fighters is a likely indicator that an AQ resurgence is underway.  AQ will target IDP camps as well as civilians in ungoverned portions of major cities. The Euphrates River Valley could be AQ’s main line of effort because AQ likely has latent networks there that connect to AQ leadership in Syria.[1]

Conclusion

Preventing another Sunni insurgency, particularly one that can be coopted by JRTN and AQ, is a necessary task for the anti-ISIS Coalition. Both JRTN and AQ seek an outcome in Iraq that is antithetical to US interests. Anti-ISIS operations that do not explicitly block AQ and JRTN will instead enable them. The Coalition can prevent another Sunni insurgency if it takes preventative measures that are both military and political. These measures need to include three lines of effort within its current mission: the ISF, IDPs, and Iraqi Government. The Coalition must prepare the ISF in counterinsurgency (COIN) measures, against both the post-Mosul version of ISIS, and resurgent insurgent groups such as JRTN and AQ. Maj. Gen. Gary Volesky, commander of Combined Joint Force-Land Component, stated on October 24 that the ISF will start a new training cycle on COIN to combat an insurgent-like ISIS. These efforts will also need to inure the ISF and tribal militias against AQ and JRTN’s influence. The Coalition will also need to ensure that the IDP camps around Mosul are secured with proper security forces and not with Shi’a militias or compromised ISF units, which could inflame sectarian tensions and lend weight to insurgent ideology. Lastly, the Coalition cannot ensure the defeat of ISIS or any insurgent group without resolving the political conditions that allow it to take root. The Coalition must reinvigorate national reconciliation efforts that have fallen to the wayside. ISIS found initial support from Iraq’s Sunnis because it offered an alternative to the government which many Sunnis saw as oppressive. JRTN and AQ will try to do the same. The Coalition needs to ensure that its lines of effort reconcile Sunnis with the government to the point that Sunnis will use political rather than insurgent means to address grievances.

The U.S. will need to decide if and how it remains involved in Iraq after Mosul’s recapture, which will likely occur after President-elect Donald Trump takes office in January 2017. The Iraqi Government may set conditions for the U.S.’s withdrawal in Iraq after Mosul, but the U.S. and Coalition should not pursue an immediate drawdown of military forces themselves. Doing so could result in similar conditions that developed in 2012 and 2013 after the U.S. withdrew completely in 2011. Instead, the U.S. should continue efforts to train and advise the ISF in order to help prevent the reconstitution of insurgent groups and maintain Iraq’s sovereignty. The U.S. and its international partners should also ensure involvement in resettling IDPs and mediating the reconstruction of cities and their local governing structures. Successful resettlement and reconstruction efforts that earn the population’s trust in the Iraqi Government can prevent Salafi Jihadi groups from finding openings to resurge. The U.S. should also help address the underlying issues that fueled the Sunni insurgency and remain active in shaping Iraqi’s political reconciliation efforts and encouraging inclusive governance. The U.S. should have the expectation that it will remain involved in some capacity in Iraq in order to ensure that anti-ISIS gains stick and that it has resolved the conditions that allowed insurgent groups to arise in 2013.

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[1] Jabhat al Nusra, al Qaeda’s affiliate in Syria, was active along the Euphrates River Valley southeast of Raqqa City before ISIS seized the area in late 2014. Al Qaeda likely retains latent influence with tribes along the Euphrates River Valley that it can use to resurge if ISIS is defeated. These tribes straddle the Iraqi-Syrian border, which can provide al Qaeda with cross-border access to networks in western Iraq.

Aleppo Campaign Update: Pro-Regime Forces Advance in Aleppo City

By Christopher Kozak

Pro-regime forces backed by heavy airstrikes seized the Masakin Hanano, Jabal Badro, Sakhur, and Haydariyah Districts of Eastern Aleppo City on November 26 - 27, recapturing nearly a third of the remaining urban pocket held by opposition forces. At the same time, the Syrian Democratic Forces – a coalition dominated by the Syrian Kurdish YPG – advanced from their local stronghold in the Sheikh Maqsoud District to seize positions at least five opposition-held neighborhoods including the Bustan al-Pasha, Huluk, Ayn al-Tal, Ba’edin, and Sheikh Fares Districts. Activist sources claimed that opposition groups withdrew from the region as part of a handover deal with the Syrian Democratic Forces meant to protect civilians while opposition fighters consolidate their defenses deeper within Eastern Aleppo City. At least sixteen thousand civilians subsequently fled from Eastern Aleppo City to Sheikh Maqsoud District or regime-held districts of Western Aleppo City. 

The looming fall of Eastern Aleppo City to the regime and its allies poses a major threat to the long-term interests of the U.S. in Syria. Eastern Aleppo City serves as one of the last remaining major hubs of acceptable opposition groups in Northern Syria. The surrender of Eastern Aleppo City will likely drive these groups into deeper partnership with Jabhat Fatah al-Sham, Ahrar al-Sham, and other Salafi-Jihadist Groups in order to preserve their military effectiveness on the battlefield. An ongoing humanitarian crisis also appears poised to further exacerbate as pro-regime forces methodically tighten their siege on the thousands of opposition fighters and tens of thousands of civilians remaining in Eastern Aleppo City, generating grievances that will further bolster the appeal of Salafi-Jihadist Groups. At the same time, the fall of Aleppo City will not mark the end of the Syrian Civil War. Opposition groups will likely wage an increasingly-radicalized insurgency across Northern Syria with continued support from regional backers such as Turkey, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia. The success of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in Aleppo City thus stands only to open a new phase of the conflict that bolsters the long-term staying power of Salafi-Jihadist Groups in Syria.

The Campaign for Mosul: November 22-28, 2016

By Emily Anagnostos and the ISW Iraq Team

The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) made limited gains in eastern Mosul from November 22 to 28 as it struggled to identify and target ISIS militants operating among the significant civilian population remaining in the city. Meanwhile, Iraqi Shi’a militias turned their offensive towards remaining ISIS-held cities in far western Ninewa province, as Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi announced that the Iraqi army and police would recapture Tel Afar.

Operations in Mosul remain concentrated in eastern neighborhoods as ISF units look to breach the city in other areas. To the southeast of Mosul, the Iraqi Army has nearly completed operations in the Ninewa Plains, positioning additional units to join efforts to clear ISIS. North and south of the city, Iraqi Army and Federal Police units have not yet moved to breach the city limits, respectively. Inside the city, the ISF reported that they gained control of three northern neighborhoods since November 22, but the ISF has failed to advance in southern neighborhoods. ISIS continues to use the significant civilian population as a primary line of defense, including attacking from positions within refugee flows, which is slowing the ISF’s advance inside the city. 

The Counter Terrorism Service (CTS), operating in eastern Mosul, called for a change in tactic for managing the remaining civilians in eastern Mosul. Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi urged civilians to stay in their homes as the ISF breached Mosul’s city limits in early November, forcing the CTS and Iraqi Army to adopt measures to reduce the risk of civilian casualties. The CTS now is asking for the Iraqi Government to encourage civilians to leave the area, which would allow the CTS to be more aggressive in anti-ISIS operations, including its use of airstrikes. The mass exodus of an estimated 1.5 million civilians from Mosul may overwhelm humanitarian efforts, however, allowing ISIS to take refuge in the refugee flow.

Prime Minister Abadi announced on November 23 that the Iraqi Army and police would recapture Tel Afar, a primarily Turkmen village west of Mosul and former Al Qaeda hot spot. Shi’a militias, including Iranian-backed proxies, had designated Tel Afar as its initial line of effort, raising international concerns that the militias, many of which are charged with human rights violations, may raise sectarian tensions in the area. PM Abadi’s designation of the ISF to retake Tel Afar relegates the Iraqi Shi’a militias to recapture remaining ISIS-held terrain in western Ninewa, including Baaj, Qayrawan, and Qahtaniya. The move will likely satisfy regional actors such as Turkey, which threatened undefined intervention on October 30 if the militias moved into Tel Afar. Instead, the militia units operating around the Tel Afar airbase moved west along the Sinjar highway, making contact with Peshmerga forces operating in eastern Sinjar District. Simultaneously, militia units advanced from Ain al-Jahush westward to Tel Abtah, from where they will approach Baaj from the south. The 15th Iraqi Army Division will take point for the operation into Tel Afar, where the Shi’a militias would have likely struggled to handle the dense urban terrain without taking on significant casualties.

Russian Airstrikes in Syria: October 26 - November 20, 2016

By Christopher Kozak and Jonathan Mautner

Russia announced the start of a “major operation” against positions allegedly held by ISIS and al-Qaeda in Central Syria on November 15. The operation is designed to showcase the military strength and power projection capabilities of the Russian Armed Forces. The Russian aircraft carrier ‘Admiral Kuznetsov’ launched a number of sorties from the Eastern Mediterranean Sea targeting core opposition-held terrain in Idlib and Aleppo Provinces – the first such use of an aircraft carrier in combat by Russia. These strikes were accompanied by a wave of cruise missiles launched from missile frigates accompanying the ‘Admiral Kuznetsov’ as well as long-range strategic bombers sortied from Northern Russia. Russia also reportedly conducted several strikes against inland targets with its Bastion-P anti-ship missile system. These integrated land, naval, and air capabilities are neither necessary nor sufficient to defeat the opposition in Northern Syria. Instead, Russian President Vladimir Putin likely intends to leverage this display of advanced weaponry in order to assert his ‘great power’ status and bolster domestic support for his intervention into the Syrian Civil War.

Russia also resumed its air operations against opposition-held districts of Aleppo City after a nearly month-long pause on strikes in the besieged city. Activists reported the start of heavy airstrikes throughout Eastern Aleppo City on November 15 despite claims by the Russian Ministry of Defense that a moratorium on airstrikes remained in place. Russian Ministry of Defense Spokesperson Maj. Gen. Igor Konashenkov even denied the reports as “public rhetoric” and “blatant lies” from the U.S. State Department. The intensified airstrikes come amidst continued pro-regime ground operations to tighten the blockade on Eastern Aleppo City after opposition forces launched a failed bid to lift the siege of the city in late October 2016. Although pro-regime forces remain unable to seize the entirety of Aleppo City over the near-term, the military assistance provided by Russia will likely precipitate its ultimate surrender under the regime’s siege-and-starve campaign. The UN reported the distribution of the last food rations in the besieged opposition-held districts of Eastern Aleppo City on November 10 and predicted a “killer winter” for their estimated 250,000 residents. The surge in air operations also coincided with an uptick in reports of airstrikes targeting hospitals, schools, and other critical civilian infrastructure across Northern Syria.

The U.S. faces increasing constraints on its available courses of action as Russia takes continued steps to limit future options for engagement in the Syrian Civil War. Russia aims to force the surrender of Eastern Aleppo City and thereby impose a major defeat on the remaining acceptable opposition in Northern Syria. This outcome will hasten the transformation of the opposition into a movement dominated by Salafi-Jihadist groups such as ISIS and Jabhat Fatah al-Sham, eliminating potential partners for the U.S. in Syria and legitimizing the counter-terrorism narrative of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. Meanwhile, Russia also consolidated its control over regional airspace with the deployment of seven additional S-300V4 air defense systems to Syria on November 15, reinforcing the effective no-fly zone created by its integrated air defense systems in the country. These measures aim to raise the cost of any military intervention against the regime and steer the U.S. into accepting military cooperation against ‘terrorism’ with Russia and Syria as the path of least resistance. Any partnership along these terms would only exacerbate the long-term grievances that fuel Salafi-Jihadist groups in Syria while allowing Russia to consolidate its regional influence and advance its strategic objective to expel the U.S. from the Middle East.

The following graphic depicts ISW’s assessment of Russian airstrike locations based on reports from local Syrian activist networks, statements by Russian and Western officials, and documentation of Russian airstrikes through social media. This map represents locations targeted by Russia’s air campaign, rather than the number of individual strikes or sorties. 

High-Confidence Reporting. ISW places high confidence in reports corroborated by documentation from opposition factions and activist networks on the ground in Syria deemed to be credible that demonstrate a number of key indicators of Russian airstrikes.

Low-Confidence Reporting. ISW places low confidence in reports corroborated only by multiple secondary sources, including from local Syrian activist networks deemed credible or Syrian state-run media.

ISW was unable to assess any Russian airstrikes in Syria with high confidence during this reporting period.

Afghanistan Partial Threat Assessment: November 22, 2016

By: Caitlin Forrest

Taliban militants’ military successes during their 2016 campaign, Operation Omari demonstrate requirements for U.S. policy in Afghanistan. The ANSF is incapable of securing major population centers like Lashkar Gah or Kunduz cities or increasing government-controlled territory without significant U.S. support. The ANSF remains highly dependent on current levels of U.S. support to regenerate units and secure government-controlled territory. Resolute Support Commander General John Nicholson stated on September 23 that the Afghan government controls or heavily influences 68- 70% of the population, and Taliban militants control 10% of the population, leaving roughly a quarter of the country contested. The continued expansion of ungoverned spaces in Afghanistan allows global extremist networks like al Qaeda and ISIS and their allies to carve out sanctuaries from which to target the U.S. and its national security interests.

The ANSF is incapable of recapturing significant swaths of Taliban-controlled territory at current levels of U.S. support. The Taliban offensive, Operation Omari is still underway as of November 23. The summer offensive transitioned into a new phase in September that ended when Taliban militants launched multiple concurrent offensives to seize four provincial capitals in October. The ANSF, with vital U.S. support, successfully prevented Taliban militants from capturing the provincial capitals of Helmand, Kunduz, Farah, and Uruzgan during this phase. Taliban militant offensives nevertheless subverted the ANSF’s ability to seize territory from militants, allowing militants to expand their territorial control and threaten remote districts outside of major population centers. Operation Omari did not culminate in October and is continuing into its third phase. Militants have expanded control in remote areas of northern Sar-e Pul Province and threatened a district center in western Farah Province in November while the ANSF prepared to launch the second phase of their 2016 counteroffensive in the eastern provinces. Taliban militants will attempt to besiege provincial capitals in order to pin down the ANSF there through the winter.    

U.S. training, assistance, and funding are essential to helping the ANSF weather the loss of combat effectiveness from high operational tempo, significant casualties, and degradation of unit cohesion. The ANSF will reportedly undergo a U.S.-led force regeneration during the upcoming 2016-2017 winter season after incurring high casualties and defections. This regeneration will limit the ANSF’s ability to go on the offensive during this winter season. Taliban militants will take advantage of the ANSF’s pause during regeneration to expand territorial control and launch ground offensives against district centers. Taliban militants previously launched an aggressive offensive over the 2015-2016 winter season in which they made significant gains in Helmand Province. They will likely attempt to repeat similar successes during the upcoming 2016-2017 winter season while the ANSF rests and refits units.

Meanwhile, spoilers are undermining the U.S.-backed Afghan National Unity Government, weakening its ability to secure the country. Northern warlord and First Vice President Abdul Rashid Dostum is attempting to integrate his personal militias with the ANSF, which would impede U.S. operations in northern Afghanistan. Separately, the lower house of Parliament has dismissed several cabinet members in votes of no confidence between November 12 and November 23, which followed the missed deadlines for a Constitutional Loya Jirga and Parliamentary elections in September and October. The National Unity Government is incapable of closing the readiness gaps of the ANSF in the face of these compounding challenges despite continued U.S. support. Taliban militants and extremist networks like al Qaeda, ISIS, and the Haqqani Network will exploit the security gaps created by the volatile political environment in Afghanistan in order to reconstitute sanctuaries from which to target the U.S., its allies, and its interests.  

Correction: A city marker was incorrectly placed on the map that depicted Bakwah District Center, Farah Province as Taliban-Controlled. It has been removed as of February 8th, 2017. Taliban militants have significant area control in the district, but ISW does not assess that Taliban militants controlled the Bakwah District Center over the reporting period. 

The Road to ar-Raqqah: Background on the Syrian Democratic Forces

By Genevieve Casagrande
 

The composition and behavior of the force that recaptures ar-Raqqah City will in part determine the long-term success of the U.S.-led anti-ISIS campaign in Syria. The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) is the U.S.’s most effective partner fighting ISIS in Syria, but it has limitations that risk undermining the gains it makes on the ground. The SDF, although dominated by the Syrian Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG), is not monolithic. The SDF coalition consists of Kurdish, Arab, Syriac Christian, and Turkmen groups. The U.S. built the SDF in late 2015 by recruiting a “Syrian Arab Coalition” to fight alongside the YPG and other local militias. The SDF continued to attract Arab fighters in the lead up to operations against ISIS in ar-Raqqah, including the recent inclusion of members of the Free Officer’s Union, a group of several high-ranking Syrian Arab Army defectors, in October 2016. 

The YPG nonetheless continues to dominate the SDF, despite increased efforts by the U.S. to diversify the coalition and recruit additional Arab fighters. The SDF remains dependent upon the YPG for logistics and experienced fighters, providing the YPG with outsized leverage within the coalition. Turkey considers the YPG to be a terrorist organization due to the group’s ties to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), placing the SDF in direct conflict with Turkey. Local Arab and Turkmen populations in northern Syria also oppose the YPG, accusing the group of “ethnic cleansing” and forcibly displacing local communities. Moreover, the YPG’s political wing, the Democratic Union Party (PYD), intends to create a semi-autonomous federal region in northern Syria, which Turkey, Arab opposition groups, and other Kurdish parties oppose. The SDF’s effort to advance towards ar-Raqqah City and thereby expand Kurdish influence further into traditionally Arab terrain threatens to exacerbate these tensions and escalate into a more violent Arab-Kurdish and intra-Kurdish struggle in the region.

Read the full backgrounder here. 

The Campaign for Mosul: November 16-21, 2016

By Emily Anagnostos and Patrick Martin and the ISW Iraq Team

The campaign for Mosul entered its second month, with current momentum indicating that the operation will last into January 2017. The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) remained entrenched in eastern Mosul while facing fierce ISIS resistance from November 16 to 21, and Shi’a militias are on the outskirts of Tel Afar after seizing the nearby airbase on November 16.

The ISF has made little progress over the past week in eastern Mosul; they remain engaged in the same neighborhoods they have occupied since entering eastern Mosul on November 1.The Federal Police announced on November 19 that it had completed operations on Mosul’s southern axis and are positioning to breach the city’s southern border, where they will face an immediate fight over the airport and military base, both of which ISIS still occupies. The 16th Iraqi Army Division remains engaged in operations north of Mosul and has made no indication of a timeline to move into the city itself. Iraqi Shi’a militias advanced towards Tel Afar, west of Mosul, after retaking the nearby airbase on November 16. Ninewa Operations Commander Maj. Gen. Najm al-Juburi stated on November 19 that the 15th Iraqi Army Division advanced alongside the militias, likely in an effort to reduce possible backlash from multiple regional actors, including Turkey, that have rejected any Shi’a militia presence in the majority Turkmen town. The 15th Division’s training may also assist in the recapture of Tel Afar, as Shi’a militias have struggled to retake urban terrain without enduring heavy casualty.

The lack of progress in eastern Mosul may indicate that the Counter Terrorism Service (CTS) and Iraqi Army units have paused operationally in order to wait for ISF units nearing Mosul’s northern and southern limits. However, the CTS previously announced its pauses and has not done so now, even though the Joint Operations Command continues to issue daily operations reports. The CTS may also be deliberately slowing operations to ensure that it thoroughly clears neighborhoods before advancing or to wait for reinforcements to arrive.

More likely, the lack of progress may indicate that operations in eastern Mosul are not going as well as the Western or Iraqi media portrays. The CTS and Iraqi Army may be facing a high degree of attrition because of strong ISIS resistance slowing their advance inward. ISIS released a video on November 14 showing numerous, successful Suicide Vehicle-Borne IEDs (SVBIEDs) striking ISF units which tried and failed to stop the attack. The video also showed ISIS militants utilizing captured CTS vehicles. A field report from November 11 revealed that the CTS suffered high casualties in an effort to take al-Samah neighborhood on November 4 and could suggest that the CTS likely suffered similar casualties in following operations. The likely attrition of the CTS is extremely dangerous for the Mosul operation; the CTS is the most elite unit in the ISF and the only one with sufficient training in urban warfare. Moreover, the CTS’s participation in Mosul follows its involvement in Ramadi in January, Fallujah in June, and Qayyarah in August, giving the units limited time to regroup before tackling Mosul.

The ISF will face greater challenges as it moves into western Mosul. ISIS’s resistance in eastern Mosul was expected to be the easier fight as the majority of Mosul’s population is concentrated in the west, especially in the Old City where the maze-like, narrow streets will constrict ISF movement and vision. Several of the western neighborhoods were former areas of operation for al Qaeda, so these areas may have lasting insurgent networks capable of contesting ISF control and a population reluctant to trust government forces. The ISF’s struggle to clear eastern Mosul thus raises concern for its ability to overcome greater obstacles in the western half, especially as continued attrition will renders the force less effective. 

Other ISF units will move into the city to assist this main effort, but they may not provide the needed reinforcement for the CTS or a sufficient force to hold the city. The 9th and 16th Iraqi Army Divisions operating to the north and south of Mosul, respectively, are struggling to overcome ISIS obstacles outside of the city limits and are less effective than the CTS in urban warfare. The 9th Division, as the only armored division, is also likely to deploy to western Anbar after the ISF takes Mosul. The Federal Police, moving towards Mosul’s airport from the south, are compromised by Iranian-backed Shi’a militias and have limited training in urban warfare. The use of sectarian violence by some Federal Police units will also undermine security and civilians’ trust in the ISF. Some Coalition-trained units remain in western Anbar and Baghdad, however the Iraqi Government will likely elect to keep these units in western Anbar for the inevitable operation around al-Qa’im and in Baghdad out of wariness that ISIS will strike in the capital in response to losses in Mosul.

ISIS will take advantage of these limitations of the ISF and try to resurge in the city. The ISF’s difficulty in clearing and holding a limited number of neighborhoods now indicates that it will also struggle to hold the whole city. ISIS has already shown its ability to reinfiltrate cleared cities, such as several suicide attacks in Fallujah on November 14 and 17. The holding operation in Mosul will require significant resources and manpower to ensure the city remains secure and that Salafi-Jihadi groups cannot reestablish attack capabilities in the city.

Warning Update: Kurdish Terrorism in Europe

By: Joan O'Bryan

The intensifying Turkish-Kurdish war in Syria and Turkey is spilling over to the European countries to which these ethnic and linguistic groups have immigrated. Violent attacks by Kurdish youth groups have increased across Europe after Turkey arrested fifteen parliamentarians from the pro-Kurdish People’s Democratic Party (HDP) on November 3, 2016. The continued attacks alongside Kurdish protests have the potential to further damage already fraught relationships between the European Union and Turkey.

Violent attacks by Kurdish youth groups have increased across Europe after Turkey arrested twelve parliamentarians from the pro-Kurdish People’s Democratic Party (HDP) on November 3. The Apoist Youth Initiative (AYI), a Europe-based Kurdish nationalist group formed in the summer of 2015, has claimed six attacks on Turkish-owned business and organizations in Germany and two attacks in England since November 3, and unknown activists have committed three additional attacks in solidarity in Spain and France. The attacks have increased in frequency and intensity, and the embassies and consulates of the Republic of Turkey are increasingly likely targets.

Concurrently, the Kurdish diaspora populations have protested in major cities in Germany, Belgium, Switzerland, and France. Alawite populations in Europe have also joined the protests in support of Turkish Alawites, who as Shi’a Muslims fear the ruling Sunni Justice and Development Party (AKP). Protests in Cologne, Germany are growing, from attracting thousands on November 5 to tens of thousands on November 12. Germany is the center of the Kurdish diaspora, with a population of at least 700,000 ethnic Kurds. France has the second largest population of ethnic Kurds, numbering at least 120,000.

Turkish state media has attributed all the attacks and demonstrations to the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) – a designated terrorist group which is currently fighting an active insurgency against Turkey. On November 16, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan accused Germany of giving the PKK support “implicitly or explicitly.” He then accused Belgium of supporting anti-Turkish militants, calling it “an important center for [the] PKK.” Erdogan’s accusations against the European governments are overstated, but the unrest does show some links to the PKK. The AYI openly seeks the release of PKK founder Abdullah Öcalan, who has been imprisoned in Turkey since 1999. At the demonstrations, protestors have been carrying placards with Öcalan’s picture. Although European governments have condemned the arrests, they have yet to respond to the protests or attacks officially.

Indicators that the unrest will continue are continued calls for protests by leaders of the Kurdish diaspora. The situation could escalate if the AYI injures a Turkish national. Additionally, if Erdogan-loyal Turkish populations begin counter-protesting, the likelihood for violence is high.  The continued AYI attacks and Kurdish protests have the potential to further damage the already fraught relationships between the European Union and Turkey.

European governments will attempt to prevent attacks on consulates but will not suppress Kurdish protests due to protection of free speech, angering a repressive Erdogan. European failure to protect Turkish property or to denounce protest movements could further damage European-Turkish relations. This burgeoning problem could undermine the March 18, 2016 deal between the EU and Turkey, wherein Turkey promised to stem the flow of refugees to Europe in exchange for financial aid, visa-free travel for Turkish citizens, and additional progress towards EU membership. Additionally, soured relationships, as indicated by further statements by Erdogan, could hinder cooperation between Europe and Turkey on the anti-ISIS campaign in Iraq and Syria and further Turkish-Russian rapprochement.