by Kathleen Weinberger
Russian President
Vladimir Putin has kept international attention riveted on Russian operations
in Syria while escalating military deployments and political operations
across Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. Putin’s global strategy relies on creating the impression
that a U.S. challenge to Russian expansion would be met with a conventional military
or even nuclear Russian response. Putin aims to present the incoming administration with the false
dichotomy of partnering with Russia and allowing Putin to operate with impunity
or going to war.
Putin has not changed his approach following the U.S.
election despite the conciliatory tone struck by President-elect Donald Trump.
He has instead continued to make forward military deployments and used
increasingly aggressive rhetoric. Russia announced a massive new deployment of
some of their most advanced anti-aircraft systems to Syria the day after the
president-elect expressed his hope for a "strong and enduring relationship
with Russia" during a phone call with the Russian president.[1]
Putin has continued to act to ensure that the incoming administration must
negotiate any U.S.-Russia reset on Russian terms. The Russian president intends
to cement Russian military presence in strategically significant areas and compel
the incoming administration to accept Russian faits accomplis at the expense of
U.S. interests. Putin will be able
to diminish U.S. influence globally even before Trump takes office if the
outgoing and incoming administrations do not resist him.
Putin has used
Russian military operations in Syria as cover to deploy highly capable air
force, anti-aircraft and naval units into the Middle East. He is already using
these capabilities to limit U.S. freedom of operations in the eastern
Mediterranean. Russia has continued to build its network of anti-air missile
systems, and deployed an additional seven advanced S-300 units along the Syrian
coast on November 15, 2016. Putin has also deployed advanced naval capabilities.
Russia’s sole aircraft carrier, the
Admiral Kuznetsov, deployed to Syria
with much fanfare. The ship itself brings
no meaningful additions to Russia’s military capabilities in the theater and
primarily functions as a propaganda tool.
Highly-capable vessels that do enhance Russia’s ability to challenge
U.S. and NATO forces in the Mediterranean accompany it, however. The
Pyotr
Velikiy and
Admiral Grigorovich, as well as three submarines,
provide Russian forces off the Syrian coast with advanced offensive cruise missile
capabilities, naval air defense systems and anti-ship missiles.
[2] All of
these systems in combination allow Russia to establish an anti-access/area
denial (A2/AD) zone over much of the eastern Mediterranean and Syria. These
systems constrain the operations of US forces.
American aircraft can either operate according to Putin’s desires or risk
a military confrontation with Russia.
Constraining
American activities is the primary purpose for most of these deployments. ISIS, al Qaeda, and affiliated opposition
groups have no air or sea forces and extremely limited anti-aircraft
capabilities. Putin is fighting on
behalf of the Assad regime and with the Iranians, so their aircraft are allies
rather than threats to Russian troops. These
advanced anti-aircraft and anti-ship systems can only be directed against
American forces or those of America’s NATO allies or Israel. The Kremlin itself stated that these systems are
meant to play a “deterrent role”.
[3]
Putin has
also increased the intensity and tempo of military deployments in the Baltic
region, heightening Russia’s military posture and signaling his intention to
continue challenging the U.S. and its NATO allies in Europe. Moscow announced
on November 21, 2016 that it would permanently deploy Iskander-M tactical
ballistic missiles to the European enclave of Kaliningrad along with additional
S-400 anti-air missile systems.
[4] Russian
forces in Kaliningrad will also receive the Bastion-P anti-ship missile system,
which was recently shown to have land attack capabilities.
[5] These
deployments follow the June 2016 overhaul of the Baltic Sea Fleet leadership,
as well as efforts to provide the fleet with advanced surface vessels.
[6]
Putin is
using the symbolic value of these deployments to achieve much larger strategic
gains than the marginal increases in tactical capability most of them
constitute. The permanent deployment of the Iskander system, which can launch
missiles carrying either a conventional or nuclear payload, demonstrates
Russia’s ability to conduct a tactical or operational nuclear strike in Europe
without using its intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) or
submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and without requiring manned
bombers to penetrate NATO air defenses. The renewed armament of the Baltic Sea
Fleet similarly signal Russia’s intention to intimidate the Baltic States and
Poland even as NATO reinforces them with multinational battalions. Putin hopes to
intimidate or coerce the U.S. into ceding influence in Eastern Europe, allowing
him to expand Russian military and political influence.
Putin is watching
how the U.S. and its allies react to deployments in the Middle East and Europe
in order to gauge his ability to increase the Russian military presence in
Asia. Russia has been engaged in a high-profile buildup on the Kuril Islands, the
subject of a territorial dispute between Japan and Russia.
[7] The
Russian Ministry of Defense announced in May that it will build new military infrastructure
there, including a new Pacific naval base, and recently deployed Bal and Bastion-P
anti-ship systems.
[8] The
buildup of Russia’s Far East is likely to follow familiar playbook. Russia already
operates S-400s on the Kamchatka Peninsula and Tor-M2U short-range air defense
systems on the Kuril Islands.
[9] Russian
forces were in the coastal province of Primorsky Krai were equipped with
Iskander-M tactical missile systems in July 2016 and undertook drills on November
19, 2016.
[10]
Anti-air systems may be used to secure the airspace in Russia’s Far East, while
the Iskander systems signal the threat of nuclear escalation. The Russian
Ministry of Defense announced the creation of a new ground forces division in
the Far East, including additional deployments to the Kuril islands, as well as
heavy bomber patrols in the Pacific.
[11] Putin
will become more aggressive in his militarization of the Pacific if his approach
in other theaters goes unchallenged.
Putin has
coupled these deployments with nuclear rhetoric and signaling in order to coerce
the West to acquiesce to or even partner with Russia. Russian officials and media cast the current
situation as a re-emergence of the Cold War, highlighting Russia’s capabilities
and of its willingness to use nuclear weapons. Russia recently codified its
withdrawal from the Plutonium
Accords, a
bilateral agreement with the U.S. to destroy weapons-grade plutonium used to build
nuclear weapons.
[12] Russian media has
launched a propaganda campaign to further the narrative of escalating nuclear
tensions, including claims of nation-wide drills in case of a nuclear
attack.
[13] It
has also highly publicized recent Russia’s new ICBM, the Sarmat (NATO
designation: Satan 2), and tests of the error-prone Bulava, a sub-launch
ballistic missile (SLBM).
[14] Putin
aims to propagate the narrative of Russian capability and readiness to engage
in nuclear war to artificially raise the stakes of U.S. resistance to Russian
military expansion.
In addition to exerting military pressure,Putin has worked to undermine U.S. influence
and support by forming partnerships with foreign governments and political
parties. Putin aims to split the solidarity of U.S. allies while empowering countries
that oppose U.S. interests in an effort to reduce support for U.S. operations
globally.
Putin seeks
to constrain U.S. operations in the Middle East further by courting Egypt as a
military partner and providing advanced weapons to Iran. Russia undertook its
first military exercises with Egypt, involving elite Russia airborne units
along with Egyptian paratroopers, in mid-October. Putin likely seeks to
establish a base on Egyptian territory to further strengthen Russia’s military
presence in the Eastern Mediterranean.
[15] Cairo
may well refuse to allow Russia to base on its territory, as this would risk it
losing significant military aid from the U.S., but Putin has already convinced
President Abdel Fattah el Sisi to support Russian initiatives in the UN
Security Council.
[16]
Putin has
also continued to provide arms and advanced capabilities to Iran, including
S-300 air defense systems, with the intention of strengthening a regional power
that opposes U.S. interests in the Middle East. These systems have serious
implications for Iran’s missile development program and may hamper future nuclear
deterrence measures.
[17] Russia
and Iran recently announced a $10 billion arms deal, which would supply Iran
with Russian tanks, planes and helicopters while increasing military ties
between the two countries.
[18] Russia’s
ongoing intervention and empowerment of Iran strengthens the Moscow-Tehran axis
and could significantly constrain America’s ability to fight against al Qaeda
and the Islamic State throughout the Middle East.
Putin aims to
reduce U.S. and NATO influence in Europe by continuing to support anti-European
Union and pro-Russian political parties in European governments.
[19] Three
key elections have positioned pro-Russian parties to disrupt the stability of
NATO member and partner states. Estonia’s Prime Minister lost a no-confidence
vote on November 9, 2016.
[20] The
pro-Russian party in Estonia is a consolidated minority but is unlikely to gain
a controlling majority in the upcoming elections. The Prime Minister’s fall,
however, weakens the pro-Western majority and creates significant instability
in a country that will soon host one of NATO’s new multinational battalions.
The pro-European Prime Minister of Bulgaria stepped down after a pro-Russian
candidate won the office of the president on November 13, 2016.
[21]
Bulgaria is a NATO member state that has generally attempted to avoid ‘provoking’
Russia by limiting its NATO activity.
[22] A
pro-Russian party would cause Bulgaria to further reduce its participation as a
NATO member and weaken the alliance. Moldova elected a pro-Russian president
whose party aims to prevent Moldova from further integrating with the EU and
NATO, also on November 13, 2016.
[23] Russia
is supporting these parties and others in Europe in order to reduce these
countries’ cooperation with the U.S. and potentially create resistance to
future NATO activity.
Putin has expanded Russia’s military capabilities and
political power globally by pairing the deployment of Russian military forces
with aggressive rhetoric to preclude a U.S. response. If Putin continues to
bolster Russian forces, equipment and influence in strategic theaters, he will be
able to face the new U.S. administration from a defensive position rather than
having to undertake actions that President Trump could portray as aggressive. Putin
aims to leverage these positions to force the U.S. and its partners to form a
pragmatic partnership with Russia at the expense of key U.S. national interests
rather than risk a military confrontation.
The U.S. does
not have to choose between cooperating with Russia at the expense of U.S.
interests and full-scale war, however, nor do Russian military capabilities
outmatch America’s. Putin’s success depends on overselling Russian capabilities
and will to engage militarily with the U.S. even though Russia is neither able
to win nor interested in fighting a full-scale war.
Recent
Russian military actions in Ukraine and Syria have revealed significant
capability gaps and overreliance on elite units. Russia’s ongoing economic
crisis will further exacerbate these problems while offering the U.S. and its
allies key leverage points for engagement.
The U.S. maintains significant military and diplomatic signaling
capabilities, as well as conventional military superiority, with which to
confront Russian actions.
Putin has
been most successful in his campaigns when fighting inferior military forces
and when he has been able to use elite units in combination with the element of
surprise. The successful annexation of Crimea was not an example of
overwhelming force, but rather of Russia’s Special Operations Forces securing
decisive positions before Ukrainian or international forces could respond
militarily or politically.
[24] Russian
elite units, including Spetsnaz and Airborne Troops (VDV), are effective, but they
are limited in quantity and cannot be counted on to deliver military victory in
all situations.
The ongoing
stalemate between Russian proxy forces and the Ukrainian military in the Donbas
region provides an example of Putin’s more likely modus operandi. Russia’s military escalation against Ukraine
in August 2016 demonstrated that Putin would rather use the threat of force to strengthen
Russia’s position at the negotiating table rather than escalate to a
large-scale war of attrition when swift military victory is unattainable.
[25] Forward-deployed
“tripwire” U.S. and allied forces capable of preventing Russian elite units
from attaining rapid decisive victories would remove a critical method from
Putin’s playbook.
[26]
The most
recent example of a prolonged campaign, the Russian intervention in Syria, has
demonstrated both the improvements and the limitations of new Russian military
technology, command-and-control, and coordination of airpower operations. Putin
has used the intervention to display enhanced Russian capabilities, such as long
range Kalibr land attack cruise missiles and improved coordination of air and
ground force operations with the Syrian regime.
[27] Russian
military forces have primarily relied on old hardware and tactics with limited
success, however, outside of select demonstrations of advanced capabilities.
Russian airstrikes in northern Syria still mainly employ unguided gravity
bombs, rather than precision munitions.
[28] The
deployment of the
Admiral Kuznetsov
showcased the aircraft carrier’s ongoing technological problems and the
limitations of ongoing efforts to modernize the vessel.
[29] The
crash of one of the new carrier-based MiG-29K fighters demonstrated the Russian
Navy’s outstanding issues with sustaining air operations.
[30] The
majority of Russia’s conventional forces have not been as thoroughly equipped
or modernized as its forces in Syria. Reductions to planned budget outlays have
already disrupted procurement plans and could further delay the
already-protracted efforts to modernize the Russian military.
[31]
Putin’s
establishment of A2/AD zones across Europe and the Middle East make U.S.
engagement with Russian forces more difficult and expensive, but far from
impossible. The S-300 and S-400 air defense systems are mobile, have been
deployed in numbers so as to create redundancies in Russia’s air defense
network, and are supported by a number of short-range air defense systems to
cover close engagements.
[32] U.S.
forces are nevertheless capable of penetrating the exclusion zones created by these
systems. A successful defeat of a Russian air defense unit would require first
jamming and partially disabling the system, followed by a ‘hard kill’ strike
from a stealth aircraft once the system has been damaged.
[33] The
deployment and use of these U.S. capabilities would be expensive and
time-consuming. It would require
extensive planning and sufficient political will to oversee these and follow-on
operations. It is well within the capacity of the American military to
accomplish these tasks, however. Putin
is counting on the deterrent capabilities of Russia’s air defense systems to
preclude U.S. action and trusting that Washington will acquiesce to his
policies rather than undertake these complicated strikes.
Russia’s
failing economy will further aggravate ongoing problems with Russia’s military
at large and impair Putin’s ability to present Russian conventional forces as a
credible military threat. Putin began large-scale military reforms after the
2008 Russo-Georgia War. These reforms
have proceeded haltingly, however, for both institutional and financial
reasons.
[34] The
Russian Armed Forces continue to face serious personnel deficits and
organizational problems. They are unlikely to complete the long-promised
transition to an all-volunteer professional military any time soon, especially
as reductions to the defense budget continue to hamper their ability to provide
contract soldiers with adequate monetary incentives.
[35]
Budget
restrictions also mean that Putin will have to prioritize what portions of the
military are expanded and modernized, if any. Russia has already postponed or
altered plans for new hardware outlined in the 2011-2020 State Armament Program.
Defense spending has been made a priority in the 2017 federal budget, but it is
a larger share of a smaller pie, as spending has been reduced across all
sectors.
[36] Putin’s
increased pressure on EU countries and the U.S. to lift sanctions reflects the
effect that sustained economic pressure can have on preventing Russian military
expansion.
Putin’s
reliance on inflammatory nuclear rhetoric in light of these conventional
shortcomings is not surprising, nor is it a new strategy. Modernizing and
displaying its nuclear arsenal provides Russia with a relatively cheap method
by which to heighten its military posture against the U.S. and its allies.
Russian officials have kept statements on potential changes to Russian nuclear
doctrine purposefully vague while conducting high-profile tests of strategic
nuclear forces and deployments of nuclear-capable tactical systems in order to
deter conventional action that would overcome Russia’s inferior forces.
[37] The
U.S. maintains its own nuclear capability and has decades of nuclear doctrine
specifically created to deter Russian (Soviet) nuclear attacks. Russia’s
nuclear posturing is undesirable and disappointing, especially in the wake of
START II and other post-Cold War nuclear arms reduction efforts. It is neither novel
nor beyond U.S. capability to address through its own deterrence efforts,
however.
Putin’s
current behavior is in part a litmus test to see how the incoming
administration uses, or does not use, these capabilities when faced with
challenges to America’s standing on the global stage.
Putin is
first and foremost testing U.S. resolve to maintain the NATO alliance. NATO has
stood for decades as a powerful reminder that the U.S. has the military
strength and political will to project power in the face of aggression. The
security guarantee provided by NATO has been instrumental in providing the
stability required to build a Europe that is whole, economically prosperous and
politically free. The U.S. has been able to count on multiple stable allies to
support overseas operations, economic development and international order as a
result. Putin aims to disrupt NATO not only to give himself greater freedom of
action in Europe, but also to disrupt it as a cornerstone of U.S. foreign
policy.
If Putin
manages to destabilize Europe by undermining the credibility of NATO, it will
have serious symbolic and material consequences for the U.S. military. The U.S.
has been able to allocate military resources to other theaters due to the
deterrence value of NATO’s collective security guarantee under Article V. U.S.
forces would have to be deployed to Europe in large numbers to combat a Russian
attack on a NATO ally if the deterrent power of Article V were perceived to be
no longer credible. The U.S. would be confronted with abandoning its allies and
forfeiting its global leadership role, or else redirecting military resources from
addressing threats in the Middle East, Asia and elsewhere.
Other world
powers will take note of how the new administration responds to Putin when considering
their own capacity for disrupting U.S. operations and influence. China has
built significant A2/AD zones through island building and the deployment of
anti-air and anti-ship capabilities.
[38] Chinese
forces could use these systems to deter a U.S. response if China decided to
threaten U.S. allies in the Pacific. Iran is also investing in A2/AD
capabilities with Russia’s help. Iran is undoubtedly watching Russia’s example
of how these systems can be used to preclude U.S. action in Syria and the
Mediterranean. It is likely that China and Iran will be more aggressive in
challenging the U.S. if the new administration allows Putin to use similar
deployments to force policy concessions. Putin’s provocations must be addressed
in order to ensure that the U.S. maintains its influence and leadership role as
other countries consider challenging it.
Putin is
aware of Russia’s limitations and of U.S. capabilities to respond. He is also
aware that he is coming from a position of relative weakness and must
outmaneuver, rather than outmatch, U.S. forces. The new U.S. administration
must prevent Putin from capitalizing on his strategy and using it as a
blueprint by which Russia and other countries may further undermine U.S.
alliances and operations. If the U.S. utilizes its position of
strength, rather than shrinking from the threat of provocation, it will be able
to deter conflict without ceding further ground or compromising its interests.
Commitment to
the protection of U.S. allies in Europe is the lynchpin of deterring Russia’s
global expansion. Cooperation with NATO allies to preposition troops and train
local forces, among other forms of enhanced military assistance, is imperative
to signal that the U.S. maintains the will and capability to defend its allies
and interests. Taking early but sufficient measures now will reduce the need to
pay a much higher cost in political capital and military force later.
This effort
is not a unilateral American undertaking. The United Kingdom, Germany and
Canada will lead multinational battalions in the Baltic States.
[39] Latvia
and Lithuania, two Baltic States that have been criticized for not spending the
requisite 2% of GDP on defense, are taking active measure to ensure that they
are doing their part to support these efforts. Both countries have pledged to
reach this spending threshold by 2018 and are bolstering independent
self-defense measures.
[40]
Estonia, which already meets the 2% requirement, also maintains a 25,000-strong
Defense League.
[41]
As NATO allies demonstrate their commitment to the alliance, Putin is gauging
his next moves based on how the U.S. reacts. The U.S. gains nothing by
retreating from this commitment, and would lose its credibility as a global
leader capable of defending its interests and allies.
The U.S. and
its allies have an opportunity to deter Putin from further expansion in the
Middle East and Asia through creative and unified signaling. There is a wide
range of tools in this box. NATO has recently shifted operations to focus on
the Mediterranean and the Black Sea.
[42] Turkey
has again called on the U.S. to impose a no-fly zone over Northern Syria.
[43] U.S.
forces continue military exercises with Japan, a key ally.
[44] Flexing
U.S. military strength reminds Putin of U.S. capabilities and will while
increasing readiness in the case of an outbreak of conflict.
The U.S. also
has non-military options at its disposal. Economic sanctions against Russia
provide a real incentive for Putin to restrain military action in order to
secure his position and help the Russian economy recover. The existing
sanctions and additional restrictions will help reinforce the U.S. commitment
to maintaining its global position rather than allowing Russia to act with impunity.
These sanctions can be paired with greater economic incentives to encourage
Russian compliance with American demands. Premature easing of sanctions without
a change in Russian behavior would signal lack of U.S. resolve and remove economic
pressure as a credible tool of foreign policy. Removing the sanctions without
gaining real concessions on important issues such as Ukraine and Syria would only
reinforce Putin’s propensity to take what he wants without regard for America’s
power or interests.
The
U.S. must respond to Russia’s behavior globally. Putin views the areas along
Russia’s periphery as a single theater
of
operations.
[45] These regions, in
addition to Russia’s domestic economic sphere, must be treated as a series of
interconnected points of leverage that affect Putin’s ability to undermine U.S.
national security interests. The U.S.
must maintain and enhance military and political support for its allies in
order to protect its interests in areas of strategic importance and preserve
its freedom to operate to ensure its national security. This task will be
critical for America’s global leadership role in the years to come.
[3] “Rossiiskiye voyenniye
razvernuli v Sirii sem’ zenitnikh raketnikh system S-300 [Russian forces deploy
seven S-300 anti-aircraft systems to Syria],” Interfax, November 15, 2016. Available:
http://www.interfax.ru/world/537117
[31] Analysts have noted that
the Russian government has so far shielded the defense sector from the most
austere cuts to the national budget. Reductions in defense spending have
primarily been limited to planned procurements. The Russian lower house of
parliament approved a budget for 2017-2019 on November 18th. The
Russian government has again made defense spending a priority while cutting
welfare spending. The approved budget will draw heavily on the National Wealth
Fund and deplete the Reserve Fund by the end of 2017, however. The available
resource pool will shrink as Russia’s economic situation continues to
deteriorate. Kathleen H. Hicks, Heather A. Conley, Lisa Sawyer Samp, Jeffrey
Rathke, Anthony Bell and John O’Grady, “Evaluating Future U.S. Army Force
Posture in Europe: Phase II Report,” Center for Strategic and International
Studies, June 29, 2016. Available: https://www.csis.org/analysis/evaluating-future-us-army-force-posture-europe-phase-ii-report;
“Russia approves 3-yr federal budget in first reading,” RT, November 18, 2016.
Available: https://www.rt.com/business/367394-russia-budget-state-duma/
; Thomas Nilsen, “Russia empties reserve fund, makes priority to defense
sector,” Barents Observer, November 21, 2106. Available: http://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2016/11/russia-empties-reserve-fund-makes-priority-defense-sector
[34] Chapter Five: Russia and
Eurasia. The Military Balance: 2016. Vol. 116(1).
[36] Lockie, November 2016.
