Ukraine Warning Update: Possible Clashes Could Trigger Snap Elections

By Nataliya Bugayova, Kathleen Weinberger, Franklin Holcomb and the ISW Russia-Ukraine Team

Key Takeaway: President Putin and pro-Russia actors within Ukraine aim to trigger snap parliamentary elections to bring pro-Russian and populist parties to power and start rebuilding the client regime. ISW assesses that Russia intends to provoke clashes during a large march of Orthodox Christians to Kyiv on July 27 to cause a crisis, to try to set conditions for snap elections. Russia’s military action against Ukraine failed to reverse the political defeat dealt to Russia when the Euromaidan movement came into power in 2014. President Putin seeks to find lower profile methods of regaining control of Ukraine, including exploiting lack of political unity and decreasing public support for the current Ukrainian governing coalition. Bringing Ukraine back to Russia’s orbit is a major strategic objective for President Putin in his efforts to reassert Russia’s power globally.

Tripwire: The Ukrainian government may face a Russian-provoked political crisis if clashes erupt between Russian Orthodox members and Ukrainian nationalists, as this could be sufficient to undermine the governing coalition’s mandate, forcing snap elections and allowing pro-Russia and populist parties to regain political influence. The “All Ukrainian Crusade for Peace,” a march of thousands of Orthodox Christian believers, departed from its primary rallying points in Svyatohirs’k in the east and Pochaiv in the west on July 03 headed for the Ukrainian capital of Kyiv. The march, the first of its kind, will move throughout Ukraine, including separatist controlled territory, and will culminate on July 27^th in Kyiv with services projected to be attended by 30,000 people. Ukrainian officials claimed  on July 16^th that Russian intelligence services have infiltrated the march and are preparing provocations to spark clashes. Ukrainian nationalist groups, opposed to the Orthodox march due to its ties to Russia, have blocked roads along the procession and announced their intention to refuse the march entrance to the center of Kyiv. Ukrainian security services are on high alert. The Ukrainian Ministry of Internal Affairs formed a “coordination council” to safeguard the Orthodox march and prevent violence.

Pattern: Russia has previously utilized pro-Russia social movements and the narrative of religious and political rights violations to mobilize resistance against state governments. This is a strategy that has been used in separatist areas in Ukraine, in Georgia in 2008, in the breakaway region of Transnistria in Moldova and with regard to ethnic Russians in the Baltic States. Russia has undertaken a deliberate media campaign since the march began to frame Ukrainian nationalists, who they claim are terrorizing[i] and threatening[ii] the Orthodox believers, as likely perpetrators of violence. These accusations are consistent with Russia’s efforts to frame[iii] Ukraine as a latently fascist society that targets Russian Orthodox[iv] believers and Russian speakers in Ukraine. Russia might use women and children participating in the march as human shields as has been done by Russian proxies in Eastern Ukraine, in order to perpetrate this narrative and further undermine Ukraine’s image in the international community.

Timing: The march is occurring as opposition parties in Ukraine openly prepare themselves for early parliamentary elections. Although the current Ukrainian government holds a mandate until 2019, snap parliamentary elections can be automatically triggered if the parliament is not able to operate for 30 days or if called by the president at will. While Ukraine is showing some progress towards further integration with the EU and rebuilding the economy, the Ukrainian government remains politically vulnerable. Public approval of parliament’s performance and of President Poroshenko is low, the economic situation continues to stagnate, and there is an overall lack of consolidation among pro-western forces. Violent clashes between marchers and Ukrainian nationalists could trigger snap elections by causing political and social chaos that would allow opposition parties to claim that the ruling party no longer holds a mandate. Political players in Ukraine have positioned themselves to increase their presence in parliament in the case that elections are called:

• Pro-Russian former allies of former-President Viktor Yanukovich are preparing for a political comeback. Leaders and members of the Opposition Bloc, the successor to Yanukovich’s pro-Russian Party of Regions, were forced to assume a low profile after he was ousted in 2014. However, recently Opposition Bloc members have begun to reemerge and reinsert themselves into Ukrainian politics. The Opposition Bloc attempted to establish a perception of legitimacy when it claimed victory[v] in a number of local elections in eastern and southwestern Ukraine in October 2015. They have openly called for the new parliamentary elections.
• Ukrainian political parties that are not overtly pro-Russia but oppose the Ukrainian government are attempting to gain political influence as support for the governing coalition wanes. Yulia Tymoshenko, leader of the Fatherland Party and former Ukrainian Prime Minister, called for early elections most recently on July 18^th. Tymoshenko has allied herself with the leader of the Opposition Bloc and former close ally of President Victor Yanukovich, Yuri Boyko. Tymoshenko and Boyko blockaded the podium of Ukraine’s parliament on July 12^th in a protest with highly populist economic overtones. Tymoshenko also aligned herself with the leader of the Radical Party Oleh Lyashko to lead a populist demonstration[vi] in Kyiv on July 6 to protest rising gas prices while accusing Ukrainian President Poroshenko and Ukrainian Prime Minister Volodymyr Hroysman of organizing “tariff genocide.” 
• Reformist and western-oriented politicians in Ukraine have been preparing to join the political race by posturing as reformist alternatives to the Petro Poroshenko Bloc. Former Georgian President and Governor of Odesa Mikheil Saakashvili indicated in May that he will form his own political party in Ukraine. Pro-Western politicians affiliated with the Euromaidan movement also aim to create their own reformist “Democratic Alliance party.”   

Assessment: The eruption of clashes on or around July 27^th could provide opposition groups and pro-Russian forces with sufficient leverage to trigger early elections in Ukraine. The opposition parties will try to exploit low approval ratings of the current government, a deteriorating economic situation, and the lack of unity in pro-western factions to win more seats in parliament. If pro-western reformist parties maintain political unity heading into elections, however, they could stop the Russian loyalists and populists from making significant gains in the elections.

• Russia’s Most Likely Course of Action: Russia is likely to use the Orthodox march to encourage or instigate clashes between Ukrainian nationalists and pro-Russian groups when the march reaches Kyiv. Russia aims to create sufficient political chaos with these clashes that President Poroshenko is pressured to call early elections, or else to disrupt parliament and trigger snap elections according to Ukrainian law. Russia will support Ukrainian political movements that oppose the current government to ensure that they gain power in the case of snap elections and push for representatives from separatist regions to be included. Russia will also exploit the clashes in the march to frame Ukraine as an unstable and violent society in order to discourage further Western support.  If Ukrainian security forces manage to prevent violent clashes, Russia will aim to push for early elections in Ukraine by other means, such as increased economic pressure.
• Russia’s Most Dangerous Course of Action:  Russia could provoke clashes which pro-Russian actors would escalate to the point of major violence or major protests in Kyiv. These clashes could destabilize, and potentially, collapse the Ukrainian government and return a Russian client regime to power. They may tempt separatist forces to escalate militarily in the Donbas region in order to exploit distraction and disunity in Kyiv.

Implications: Opposition parties in Ukraine, including pro-Russian players, have a high likelihood of winning significant political victories in parliament if snap elections are called. Victory of parties loyal to the Russian Kremlin in Ukraine will have far-reaching implications for Ukraine’s relationship with the West and for Russia’s ability to pursue revanchist policies.

1. The return of pro-Russia and populists parties to power in Ukraine would be a major geostrategic victory for President Putin. It would begin the reversal of gains made in the aftermath of Euromaidan Revolution. Ukraine would be pulled further from the EU and the reform path, and closer to Russia. It would also signal to the rest of the former Soviet Union that Moscow will not relinquish control of territory it perceives as within Russia’s presumed sphere of influence. 
2. Political turmoil and nationalist clashes in Ukraine can help Russia build its anti-Ukrainian narrative in the EU to pull Ukraine further away from European integration. 
3. Russia could potentially succeed in persuading European countries to lift sanctions in December of 2016. EU countries suffer from sanctions on Russia and could be convinced to lift them if Ukraine abandons its pro-Western stance and pursues rapprochement with Russia. The easing of sanctions would indicate to President Putin that he may act with impunity in Eastern Europe due to the absence of punishment mechanisms for Russia’s revanchist policies. 
4. U.S. support for Ukraine might weaken if Ukraine realigns towards Russia. Russia may use the violent clashes in its information warfare campaign to undermine Ukraine’s image and cast
   doubt on its reliability as a partner. 

Indicators: The continued propaganda campaign that tracks the Orthodox march indicates that Russia is continuing to prepare the information space in Europe and domestically and believes that clashes are likely. Aggressive or increasingly agitated statements from Ukrainian nationalist organizations such as Right Sector would indicate that Ukrainian nationalists may be preparing to act against what they perceive as Russian provocateurs and infiltrators. Aggressive statements or signs of preparations for rapid escalation by pro-Russia separatist forces in Donbas would indicate that Russia’s military proxies are preparing to exploit political uncertainty and civil discontent within Ukraine. Editorials[vii] by the Russian press predicting snap elections or government collapse could also reveal Russian intent to trigger these events.

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[i] [“Militants of ‘Right Sector’ tried to disrupt the Christian march for peace in Ukraine.”] Lenta.ru, July 13, 2016, [https://lenta.ru/news/2016/07/13/pravosector/

[ii] [“ ‘Right Sector’ and ‘Azov’ attack the Christian march for peace in Ukraine.”] Pravda, July 13, 2016, http://www.pravda.ru/news/world/formerussr/ukraine/13-07-2016/1306523-ukraina-0/

[iii] “Odessa tragedy ‘fascism in action’. RT, May 7, 2016, https://www.rt.com/news/157292-lavrov-odessa-ukraine-fascism/

[iv] [“On the meeting of K.K. Dolgov, Representative on Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia with Samardzic Markovic, the Director General of Democracy at the Council of Europe .”] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, March 23, 2016, http://www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/2184470

[v] “Ukraine’s Opposition Bloc says it has won elections in six regions.” TASS, October 25, 2015. tp://tass.ru/en/world/831691

[vi] “Protest march in Kiev against increased gas prices and civic services.” TASS, July 6, 2016, http://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/3432749

[vii] “Ukraine from July 12-19: Radicals Raged.” RIA, July 20, 2016. http://ria.ru/analytics/20160720/1472413639.html

Moldova Warning: The Next Target for Russian Destabilization

By Franklin Holcomb, Kathleen Weinberger and Greg Steinhelper

Key Takeaway: Moldova has recently overtly signaled its intention to integrate more closely with Western structures, particularly the European Community and NATO, and its neighbor Ukraine. Russia sees such possible integration as a threat to its strategic goal of reasserting itself within the borders of the former Soviet Union. As a result, Russia could move to destabilize Moldova prior to its October 30 elections by stirring social unrest or even escalating to civil conflict or civil war as a means of justifying intervention by Russian forces in Transnistria. If pro-Russia actors can destabilize the Moldovan government and slow Moldova’s pursuit of Euro-Atlantic integration, Russia will have successfully undermined a third member of the former Soviet Union (prior targets include Georgia and Ukraine) as it sought western integration.

Moldova faces escalation by Russia and Russian-proxy forces in response to its increasingly overt advances towards EU and NATO.  The Kremlin perceives Moldova’s pursuit of integration with the west as a threat to Russia’s grand strategic objectives of regaining control of lost territory within the former Soviet Union and reestablishing itself as a global power. Russia may choose to destabilize the Moldovan government, particularly before its October 30^th elections, in order to stop Moldova’s efforts to integrate with the West. Russia can achieve this through use of pro-Russia political parties within Moldova, overt political pressure, and its conventional and proxy military forces in Transnistria. Russia caused civil discontent in and ultimately invaded Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014 as they pursued similar goals.

The Republic of Moldova is a politically and ethnically divided country in which Russia maintains a high degree of political influence as well as conventional military forces.  Moldova, formerly the Romanian province of Bessarabia, was created by the Soviet Union in 1940 and gained its independence in 1991. The Russian separatist region of Transnistria declared independence from Moldova in 1990. Russia’s 14^th Army intervened on the side of the breakaway groups in 1992 and has maintained a presence in the Transnistria region since the conflict froze. Russia justified the intervention as a means to protect the self-determination of Russian “compatriots.” Pro-Russia parties with close ties to Russian leadership continue to operate in Moldova. These movements have wide support among Russian speakers and those dissatisfied with current corruption and low standards of living in Moldova.

Russia and its proxy forces in Transnistria have issued a number of threatening warnings to the Moldovan government, signaling the Kremlin’s intent to alter Moldova’s paths towards NATO and the EU.  Russia reaffirmed its support of ethnic Russians in Transnistria, a narrative Russia also advanced prior to invading Georgia and Ukraine, and warned Moldova against cooperating with its neighbors Ukraine[1] and Romania[2] prior to the July 08-09 NATO Summit in Warsaw. Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin conducted[3] an official visit to Moldova from July 05-July 07, his first visit since 2014. He warned Moldova that if it were to pursue unification with NATO member Romania, Transnistria would seek full independence. He added that Moldova “had better let Transnistria go amicably” and emphasized that Russian forces deployed in support of the Transnistrian separatists would “fulfill their duties until the end.” Rogozin justified Russia’s continued support for Transnistria by claiming that “our compatriots, our citizens, our brethren” live in the region. He announced that Russia would expand[4] its ties to Transnistria in coming years, signaling Russia’s long-term interest in supporting the separatist region. The leader of Transnistria Yevgeny Shevchuk accused[5] Moldova of violating its neutrality by expanding cooperation with NATO July 05^th. He also accused Romanian aircraft of frequently violating[6] Transnistrian airspace to “photograph military facilities.” This explicit warning about alleged Romanian activity in Moldova and Transnistria from Russian proxy forces is a Russian warning to Moldova over its close relationship with Romania. The majority of Moldovans share deep cultural and linguistic ties to Romania and there have been efforts from both sides to reunify the states.  The narrative of Romanian interference in Moldova as preparation for reunification may be used by pro-Russia actors as justification for destabilizing activity in Moldova.

Moldova has been increasingly overt about its intention to integrate further with the western structures and break away from Russia’s grip after Rogozin and Shevchuk made their warnings.  Moldova has crossed four potential Russian redlines in the past two weeks.

• First, Moldovan Minister of Defense Anatol Salaru called on NATO at the NATO summit to support the removal of Russian forces from Transnistria, calling instead for a multinational civil mission. This move by Moldova is not only a clear signal to Russia that it will not follow Moscow’s mandates about its foreign policy, but also that it is willing to go so far as to request support from NATO. This is likely to be seen as highly provocative by the Kremlin.

• Second, the Moldovan government took decisive steps internally to limit Russian influence following Russia and Transnistria’s warnings. The Moldovan parliament adopted[7] amendments to a bill in its first of two rounds of voting that would severely restrict Russian controlled and Russian language media broadcasts in Moldova on July 07. The Russian Foreign Ministry denounced[8] the “unfriendly move” and warned that it would monitor the situation “closely.”  The bill would pose a serious threat to Russia’s domination[9] of the information space in Moldova if implemented.

• Third, Moldova continued its outreach to Ukraine based on the shared goals of integration into the Euro-Atlantic community and common security concerns. President of Moldova Nicolae Timofti met[10] with leading Ukrainian and Moldovan statesmen while Ukrainian Foreign Minister Pavlo Klimkin met with his Moldovan counterpart on July 12 after Rogozin and Shevchuk issued their warnings. Leaders at both meetings discussed[11] the common goal of pursuing integration into the EU and Euro-Atlantic community and the shared threat posed by the Russian occupation of Donbas and Transnistria. Moldova announced that it would end trade restrictions with Ukraine following the meeting on July 12 in order to develop “harmonious” relations with Ukraine.

• Fourth, Moldova and Romania, a NATO member state, continued to strengthen their close relationship. The Romanian ambassador to Moldova promised continued economic assistance for the struggling Moldovan government and reemphasized Romania’s support for Moldova over crisis regarding Transnistria on July 14^th. Prominent leaders,[12] including the former President of Romania on July 08, and political movements in both countries have called for the reunification of the two countries. These movements are opposed by pro-Russia Moldovan parties who accused the U.S. of orchestrating a plot to reunify the two countries in order to provoke conflict between Russia, Ukraine, and the West.

Russia maintains the grand strategic objective of asserting dominance over the former Soviet Union, particularly over non-NATO and non-EU states like Moldova. Russia’s forces in the separatist region of Transnistria provide Russia with valuable terrain near NATO’s eastern border and threatening Ukraine in which they have the opportunity to expand their military infrastructure and troop presence. Russia prioritizes the strategic value of its garrison and proxy forces in Transnitria, which allows Russia to easily exert pressure the Moldovan government and threaten Ukraine’s western border. The Transnistrian border is less than 50 miles from Ukraine’s key port-city of Odesa, allowing Russia to directly threaten and continue to support destabilizing pro-Russian[13] forces within the city. Moldova’s overt steps towards western structures and its efforts to solidify alliances with its neighbors threaten Russia’s ability to apply military pressure in the region.

Russia may choose to escalate social tensions before the October 30 presidential election in order to topple the current pro-western Moldovan government. Moldova’s government would likely collapse in face of widespread social pressure. Russia could attempt to use its soft power assets including the pro-Russian “Party of Socialists” and “Our Party” to mobilize mass protests, similar to the protest movement which stormed the Moldovan parliament on January 21^st. This would destabilize the fragile Moldovan government and likely lead to snap elections. Snap elections would likely result in the greater empowerment of pro-Russia parties in the Moldovan government which could derail the country’s efforts to integrate with western structures.

Destabilization in Moldova could be easily be escalated by President Putin to civil conflict or civil war. Russia could use such clashes to justify intervention by Russian “peacekeeping forces” currently deployed in Transnistria in order to restore stability. Overt Russian military activity in Moldovan territory outside Transnistria is especially dangerous, as it could pull in various regional actors, including NATO member states. Moldova’s regional partner Ukraine may intervene in support of pro-western Moldovans in order to support its vulnerable neighbor and secure its western border. Ukraine would perceive a collapsed Moldova and an empowered Transnistria with an active, combat effective Russian garrison as a direct military threat to its western flank.  Ukrainian forces clashing with Russian or Russian proxy forces in Moldova could escalate the conflict in eastern Ukraine and be used to justify Russian overt retaliation against Ukraine. Romanian intervention to end the crisis on its eastern border and support its compatriots could involve NATO in the conflict. Many NATO members would likely oppose supporting Romania in order to avoid escalation with Russia. States with large Russian minorities such as Latvia and Estonia would interpret Russia’s actions in Moldova as clear signaling about its intentions within the former Soviet Union. These countries, likely be backed by other Eastern European states, would likely call for support of Romania.  This could threaten the integrity of NATO should Romania call for support using NATO Article 5.

President Putin retains the ability to rapidly escalate in Moldova in order to halt its efforts to integrate with the west. Continued or heightened rhetoric from Russian officials and media calling for support of Russian compatriots would likely precede Russian action in Moldova. Events that trigger public or international outcry against the Moldovan government, such as sudden revelations of corruption or gross misconduct within Moldovan government, would indicate that Russia may be laying the groundwork for mass protests aimed at toppling the Moldovan government. Russia would likely couple street protests with overt military pressure on the Moldovan and Romanian governments in order to prevent action against Russian provocations. Increased Russian military activity in Transnistria and the western Black Sea, or sudden Ukrainian deployments to the Ukrainian-Transnistrian border would indicate that Russia is preparing to attempt to pursue this course of action. Widespread protests across the country from all political groups would likely indicate that Russia has managed to generate sufficient outrage against the government to lead to its implosion. Russia would signal its intent to overtly intervene in the crisis by surging military activity in Transnistria and continuing its narrative of having a responsibility to support Russian speakers amidst deadly clashes as it did in Ukraine in 2014, Georgia in 2008, and Transnistria in 1992. Russian escalation in response to Moldova’s efforts to pivot to the west poses security risks for Moldova, Ukraine, and NATO.

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[1] “Russian deputy PM warns Moldova of possible provocations by Ukrainian radicals,” TASS, July 6, 2016, http://tass(.)ru/en/politics/886642

[2] “Russian official: Moldova may lose Transdniestria due to rapprochement with Romania,” TASS, July 8, 2016, http://tass(.)ru/en/politics/887032

[3] “Russian deputy prime minister Dmitrii Rogozin comes to Moldova for a two-day visit,” PUBLIKA(.)MD, July 5, 2016, http://en.publika(.)md/russian-deputy-prime-minister-dmitrii-rogozin-comes-to-moldova-for-a-two-day-visit_2625001(.)html

[4] “Russia adheres to its guarantor of peace status on Dniester – deputy PM,” TASS, July 6, 2016, http://tass(.)ru/en/politics/886651

[5] “Transdniestria leader accuses Moldova of stepping up cooperation with NATO,” TASS, July 5, 2016, http://tass(.)ru/en/world/886438

[6] Ibid

[7] “Russian Foreign Ministry slams Moldova’s intention to toughen broadcast law,” TASS, July 11, 2016, http://tass(.)ru/en/politics/887569

[8] Ibid

[9] “Freedom House report: Press freedom in Moldova remains constrained by partisanship,” Moldova(.)org, June 18, 2016, http://www.moldova(.)org/en/freedom-house-report-press-freedom-moldova-remains-constrained-partisanship/

[10] “Moldovan foreign minister meets Ukrainian counterpart,” MOLDPRES, July 12, 2016, http://www.moldpres(.)md/en/news/2016/07/12/16005628

[11] “Nicolae Timofti Meets With Former Presidents of Ukraine and Moldova,” Tribuna, July 12, 2016, http://tribuna(.)md/en/2016/07/12/oaspeti-de-rang-inalt-la-presedintie-necazul-ii-uneste-pe-oameni/

[12] [“Basescu proposes a referendum on the unification of Romania and Moldova”], Deschide Stirea, August 16, 2015, http://deschide(.)md/ro/news/romania/18181/B%C4%83sescu-propune-un-referendum-privind-unirea-Rom%C3%A2niei-cu-RMoldova(.)htm#

[13] “Ukraine Says It Uncovered Plot to Create People’s Republic in Odessa,” The Moscow Times, October 28, 2014, http://www.themoscowtimes(.)com/articles/ukraine-says-it-uncovered-plot-to-create-peoples-republic-in-odessa-40821

How Turkey Could Become the Next Pakistan

Jennifer Cafarella

The U.S. must recognize the risk a NATO ally may become a safe haven for al Qaeda as Erdogan consolidates power.

The failed coup attempt by elements of the Turkish Armed Forces on July 15 will enable President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to establish himself as an authoritarian ruler in Turkey. His priorities in the next few months will be to solidify the loyalty of the Turkish military establishment and complete the constitutional reform necessary to replace Turkey’s parliamentary democracy with an executive presidency, his longstanding goal. A post-coup Erdogan is much less likely to submit to American pressure without major returns. Erdogan immediately demanded the extradition of political rival Fethullah Gulen from the U.S., accusing Gulen of plotting the coup and condemning the U.S. for harboring him. Erdogan will likely deprioritize the fight against ISIS, undermining the counter-ISIS mission in Syria, as he focuses on consolidating power. He may even revoke past concessions to the U.S., including permission to use Turkey’s Incirlik airbase for counter-ISIS operations.

Erdogan has more dangerous options now that his rule is secure, however. A partnership with al Qaeda could grant him a powerful proxy force to achieve national security objectives without relying on the Turkish Military. American policymakers must recognize the dangerous possibility Erdogan will knowingly transform Turkey into the next Pakistan in pursuit of his own interests.  

Erdogan’s purge will be severe. He declared that the coup attempt was “a gift from God … because this will be a reason to cleanse our army,” in a victory speech on July 17. Turkish security forces immediately arrested over 3,000 soldiers, dozens of colonels, and four high-ranking officers as they reestablished control starting July 16. The subsequent purge has removed approximately one third of all general officers. Erdogan will try the coup leaders and participating rank and file soldiers for treason and approve the reinstitution of the death penalty if passed by Turkish Parliament. He will eliminate political rivals and dissenters and consolidate social control. He is already using the allegation against Gulen to justify a broad crackdown against the judicial establishment and civil society elements allegedly linked to Gulen, including the dismissal and arrest of nearly 3,000 members of the judicial establishment. He has also dismissed at least 8,000 police. His consolidation phase will require significant time, attention and resources for the next few months. He must meanwhile balance national security concerns, including domestic threats from ISIS and the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), as well as a tenuous détente with Russia.

Erdogan may turn to non-state militants for security solutions while he lacks a strong military force behind him. Non-state militants can either supplement a Turkish military or serve as an interim partner while Erdogan rebuilds. Erdogan provided support to al Qaeda and associated groups in Syria even before the coup. He has allowed senior al Qaeda leaders to operate relatively freely in Turkey, although a small number of Turkish raids have targeted al Qaeda elements. He is also a primary patron of Ahrar al Sham, a Syrian Salafi-jihadi group with close links to al Qaeda. A closer partnership with these groups could enable him to:

1. Dampen the domestic ISIS threat while purging the military. ISIS continues to use its support networks in Turkey to generate attack nodes targeting Turkish tourist sites. It intends to conduct mass casualty attacks in order to destabilize the Turkish state, similar to its attack on the Ataturk international airport in Istanbul in June. Al Qaeda likely already possesses intelligence regarding the identity and location of ISIS elements in Turkey. A partnership between al Qaeda and Erdogan could facilitate intelligence-driven raids to neutralize ISIS attack cells. Al Qaeda can also coopt ISIS members by offering an attractive option for defection as counter-ISIS operations in northern Syria continue. These measures would not eliminate the ISIS threat to Turkey, but could reduce it to a manageable level while Erdogan focuses on other priorities. 

2. Address his Kurdish problem. Erdogan regards the Syrian Kurdish YPG as a primary national security threat because of its links to the PKK, which is waging an active insurgency against the Turkish state. Syrian Salafi-jihadi groups have fought against the YPG in Syria and could be willing to do so again in return for higher levels of Turkish support. 

3. Set conditions in Syria for the rise of a Sunni Islamist government. Erdogan seeks to promote the formation of Sunni Islamist governments in the Middle East in order to legitimize his own rule and reestablish a quasi-imperial sphere of influence. Al Qaeda and its allies already govern large areas in northwestern Syria, setting conditions for an Islamic Emirate in opposition-held terrain in the long term. 

4. Prevent outright regime and Russian victory in Syria. Erdogan will continue to support the war against the Assad regime despite rumors of back channeling over shared opposition to the Syrian Kurdish YPG. Pro-regime forces encircled and besieged Turkish- and US-backed opposition forces in Aleppo City July 17, fulfilling Assad’s promise that “Aleppo will be the graveyard where the dreams and hopes of the butcher Erdogan will be buried.” Erdogan also must preclude an outright Russian victory in Syria in order to maintain leverage in the Turkish-Russian relationship.

5. Retain leverage over the U.S. Erdogan opposes American focus on ISIS in Syria and will continue to use his involvement in the anti-ISIS effort as leverage in negotiations with the U.S. He will also continue to leverage his gatekeeper role in the flow of migrants to Europe. These forms of leverage are significant, but they have not enabled Erdogan to affect American policy in the way he desires. After consolidating his rule, he can and likely will increase the scale to which he utilizes these sources of pressure. He may also seek alternate sources of leverage. A partnership with al Qaeda could enable him to disrupt counter-ISIS operations in Syria by attacking the YPG, positioning him as a powerbroker in the anti-ISIS fight independent of the anti-ISIS coalition. It would also inextricably link American success against al Qaeda in Syria to American relations with Turkey, forcing the U.S. to subordinate its strategy against al Qaeda to the requirements to manage its diplomatic relations in Turkey.

Erdogan can establish closer partnership with al Qaeda through a number of simple steps. He can provide covert support to increase the effectiveness of counter-Assad operations, including increased funding and equipment in addition to intelligence and campaign design. He can ensure freedom of movement for al Qaeda and its allies in Turkey and enable the relocation of formal headquarters into Turkish territory. He has already proposed granting citizenship to Syrian refugees in Turkey, likely in order to counter rising Kurdish birth rates in Turkey by adding millions of Arab citizens to the population. Naturalizing Syrian refugees could also enable him to obscure his support to Salafi jihadis in Syria by channeling that support through new Turkish-Syrian citizens. Finally, he can also allow or facilitate new flows of foreign fighters to al Qaeda in Syria.

These steps would take Erdogan much deeper into a partnership with al Qaeda than his current support to al Qaeda’s war against the Assad regime. A reliance on al Qaeda to accomplish Turkish security objectives, and the resulting freedom of maneuver it would provide to al Qaeda, would transform Turkey into a state sanctuary for terrorism. The scale of the problem could be similar to Pakistani harboring of militants fighting American and allied forces in Afghanistan, including the Afghan Taliban. A permanent Turkish safe haven would protect some of al Qaeda’s critical capabilities and critical requirements in Syria from direct targeting, increasing the requirements to destroy the group in Syria. It would also provide an ideal launching point for a future wave of attacks.

An empowered al Qaeda with a durable safe haven in Turkey will pose an even greater threat to Europe and the American homeland than ISIS in the long term. Al Qaeda prioritizes cultivating local support among Sunni populations in Syria and the Middle East, but intends to conduct spectacular attacks in the West and is developing the capability to do so. The future war against al Qaeda will be more difficult to win even without direct Turkish backing because of how al Qaeda is embedding itself into the local population. A partnership with al Qaeda is not the most likely option for Erdogan to take because of its severe implications for NATO and American national security. It is a much more dangerous future scenario for the U.S. than even the loss of Incirlik as a base for anti-ISIS operations, however.

American policymakers must make it a priority to prevent this most dangerous future from occurring. A victorious Erdogan poses a difficult challenge for conventional diplomatic instruments. A partnership with al Qaeda would not strictly violate Erdogan’s NATO obligations because the alliance’s mandate does not extend to terrorism. NATO does not have a formal mechanism for ejecting member states, making it difficult to coerce Erdogan by threatening to revoke NATO protections anyway. It is unclear that Erodgan would respond to such a threat even if credible. The Foreign Policy Chief of the European Union (EU) stated that the restoration of the death penalty would forfeit Turkey’s chance for EU membership in a similar attempt to constrain Erdogan’s behavior on July 18. He is unlikely to submit. The U.S. must abandon presuppositions about how a democratically elected leader will behave in order to explore policy options that engage with Erdogan's calculus. Achieving American objectives in the region – and preventing a more dangerous future from emerging - will require creative thinking about how to incentivize Erdogan to choose policies that favor or do not undermine American interests while serving his own. 

Iraq Situation Report: July 13-18, 2016

By Emily Anagnostos and the ISW Iraq Team

The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) seeks to open and maintain operations in western Anbar and Ninewa Provinces in order to eliminate remaining ISIS strongholds in Iraq. The ISF continues operations to retake Qayyarah and Shirqat, reducing key ISIS terrain in northern Iraq, as it sets conditions for eventual operations into Mosul. Units from ISF arrived at Ain al-Asad Airbase, south of Haditha, on July 15 to launch operations to clear ISIS’s remaining strongholds on the Euphrates River Valley. These strongholds include al-Qa’im on the Syrian-Iraqi border. The loss of al-Qa’im would sever one of ISIS’s main avenues between Iraq and Syria while granting the ISF control over the entire river valley within Iraq. The ISF will also continue to secure terrain south of Haditha and north of Ramadi, where ISIS continues to contest ISF control. The ISF must allocate forces to secure recaptured areas from resurgent ISIS attacks while generating the force to advance. ISIS also retains the ability to launch spectacular attacks against soft and military targets in the vicinity of Baghdad, as witnessed by three suicide attacks at checkpoints on July 13, despite tightened security measures following the July 3 Karrada bombing. ISIS will seek to undermine anti-ISIS operations by diverting resources back to areas that the ISF previously secured, which will require forces to remain in city centers, and by stretching ISF resources thin across the ground. 

Sadrist Trend leader Muqtada al-Sadr led thousands of protesters in Tahrir Square on July 15, giving usual demands for technocratic and anti-corruption reforms. The Sadrist protest remained well-ordered and disciplined, in contrast to the disorder of the protests in May and June in Sadr’s absence. Sadr issued a call on July 17 for his followers to target U.S. troops, however this rhetoric is typical for Sadr and is unlikely to inspire further action. Sadr’s affiliated political party, the Ahrar Bloc, continues to boycott the Council of Representatives, which resumed on July 12. Sadr will continue to use the protest movement in order to affect governmental reforms outside of the political process. He has shown himself capable of doing so, as the mass sit-in in March resulted in an initial push for a technocratic reshuffle. However, Sadr will need to maintain perfect order within the protest movement. Unruliness, such as that on April 30 when protesters stormed the Green Zone, will set back his efforts and cost him his leverage if Iran is forced to intervene again and quell the movement. 

Failed Coup Attempt in Turkey

By: Christopher Kozak, Melissa Pavlik, Jennifer Cafarella, and the ISW research team

The situation

A cadre within the Turkish Armed Forces mounted a failed coup attempt against Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) on 15 - 16 JUL.

• Shortly before midnight on July 15, units in the Turkish Land Forces and Turkish Gendarmerie seized key positions in Istanbul and Ankara, including Ataturk International Airport,the Turkish General Staff headquarters, and major bridges across the Bosphorus Strait.
• Elements of the Turkish Air Force conducted airstrikes against key government buildings including the National Intelligence Organization (MIT) headquarters, the Presidential Palace, and the Grand National Assembly.
• A statement broadcasted by the coup plotters on national television announced the formation of a “committee of national peace” to run the country and prevent the erosion of democratic and secular values.
• At about 12:30 AM local time on July 16, President Erdogan issued a live statement via FaceTime, calling for “people to gather in squares, airports.” Mosques and political party offices also repeated the call to action.
• By about 8:00 AM local time on the morning of July 16, at least 2,839 military personnel had been detained, including four generals and twenty-nine colonels, according to Turkish Prime Minister Binali Yildirim.
• Prime Minister Yildirim noted on July 16 that clashes killed at least 265 individuals and wounded at least 1,440 others as anti-Coup demonstrators and military personal reasserted control. 

The coup-plotter did not receive broad-based support within military ranks, political elite, or from foreign countries. They likely intended to spark popular support for removing Erdogan, but failed.

• Most coup plotters were low-to-mid-ranking officers led by Col. Muharrem Kose, the former head of the legal advisory department in the Turkish Armed Forces, and Gen. Akin Ozturk, former commander of the Turkish Air Force.
• The coup lacked unanimous support among high-ranking officers. Plotters were forced to detain Turkish Chief of the General Staff Gen. Hulusi Akar and other senior officials early in the coup when they refused to cooperate. Other high ranking officers, including Turkish First Army Commander Gen. Umit Dundar and General Zekai Aksakalli, the commander of the military special forces, condemned the coup publically as events unfolded.
• The three main opposition parties – the Republican People’s Party (CHP), the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), and the People’s Democratic Party (HDP) – all publically renounced the coup.
• U.S. President Barack Obama and U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry called upon all parties to respect the “democratically-elected” government roughly two hours after the coup broke out. Other countries quickly followed suit.

Context and Implications

Erdogan has been setting conditions against a military coup since the late 1990’s,slowly purging the military. The failed coup demonstrated the success of these efforts.

• The inability of the junior officers in charge of the coup to broaden their support base indicates that Erdogan has the personal loyalty of most of the senior officer corps.
• Erdogan will take this opportunity to further establish his cult of personality in the military by purging the military at lower levels. Erdogan stated: “This uprising is a gift from God to us because this will be a reason to cleanse our army.”

The size and the scale of popular mobilization against the coup indicates that Erdogan’s domestic base is broad and powerful.

• Erdogan effectively used mosques and religious leaders, in addition to traditional party offices, to draw the masses to the street promptly.
• Thousands of civilians poured into the streets in Istanbul, Ankara, and other cities to protest the coup after Erdogan called for mass unrest. Protestors overwhelmed the Turkish military forces and seized the Ataturk International Airport, forcing the occupying soldiers to surrender. Similar events occurred on smaller levels across Istanbul and Ankara.
• Erdogan has now demonstrated the extent of his domestic support and holds a mandate to purge the military, judiciary, and other bodies under the guise of post-coup reforms without significant public backlash.

Moving forward

Erdogan’s victory on July 15 will allow him to finish consolidating power by eliminating rivals such as members of the Gulen movement.

• President Erdogan blamed the coup attempt on a “parallel state” linked to former political ally Fethullah Gulen, a former cleric who lives in self-imposed exile in Pennsylvania, and his support base known as ‘the Gulen movement.’ Gulen has denied the charges. Gulen fled to the U.S. in 1999, and in 2014 the Turkish government issued a warrant for his arrest. This occurred after a fallout with Erdogan over Gulen's allegations of corruption against officials close to Erdogan.
• Ergodan is using the allegation of Gulen’s involvement in the coup attempt to justify a sweeping crackdown against the judiciary in addition to the Turkish Armed Forces. The Turkish government dismissed up to 2,745 judges on July 16 due to suspected links to the Gulen Movement. Arrest warrants have also been issued for at least 188 members of the judiciary. This purge follows efforts by the AKP to consolidate control over the court system.
•  Erdogan has demanded Gulen’s extradition from the U.S.

Conditions are now set for Erdogan to achieve his goal of transitioning Turkey to an authoritarian regime.

• He will likely use this moment to press for his long-term objective of a constitutional transition from a parliamentary system to an executive presidency under his rule.
• This effort may include a call for new elections that solidify the parliamentary majority currently held by the AKP, allowing it to cross the three-fifths threshold required for unilateral constitutional amendments.
• Erdogan has slowly consolidated control in Turkey through cracking down on media organizations, setting limits on freedom of speech, and broadening anti-terrorism laws. These efforts will likely only increase in the wake of the coup attempt.
• Over the long-term, Turkey will likely trend towards increasing religious radicalization under the authoritarian regime of President Erdogan – raising tough questions for the U.S. and NATO.