Russian Airstrikes in Syria: July 28 - August 29, 2016

By Jonathan Mautner with Christopher Kozak

Russia continued to focus its air campaign against Aleppo City and its environs after opposition groups lifted the siege of the eastern districts of the city on August 6, setting conditions for a potential pro-regime counteroffensive to reestablish the encirclement. Russia conducted airstrikes in support of pro-regime forces in frontline districts on the southern outskirts of Aleppo City undertaking repeated efforts to roll back opposition gains. Meanwhile, Russia increasingly directed its air operations against a swathe of opposition-held terrain in the western and southwestern countryside of Aleppo Province in an attempt to block the opposition from dispatching reinforcements from Idlib Province towards Aleppo City. Russia also continued to conduct sorties targeting opposition-held suburbs northwest of Aleppo City in an effort to prevent the opposition from threatening the new regime ground line of communication (GLOC) to Western Aleppo City through the nearby Castello Highway. At the same time, Russia maintained its targeting of core opposition terrain in Idlib Province, including a wave of reported incendiary attacks on August 28 – 29 that came in likely response to the start of a new opposition offensive in Northern Hama Province. Russia will continue to use its air power in order to disrupt the movement of opposition forces in Northern Syria and thereby render the opposition increasingly vulnerable to a pro-regime counteroffensive in Aleppo City.

The Russian Ministry of Defense announced the start of air operations in Syria from the Shahid Nojeh Air Base in Hamedan Province in Western Iran on August 16 following the deployment of Tu-22M3 ‘Backfire’ strategic bombers and Su-34 ‘Fullback’ fighter-bombers to the airbase the preceding day. Russia claimed to use the base to conduct several airstrikes against ISIS and Syrian Al Qaeda successor Jabhat Fatah al-Sham in Aleppo, Ar-Raqqa, and Deir ez-Zour Provinces between August 16 and August 22. Russia previously used Shahid Nojeh Air Base as a transit point for its aircraft in November – December 2015. Russian MP Adm. Vladimir Komoyedov stressed that the “issue of costs for combat actions is paramount right now” amidst reports that basing the strategic bombers in Western Iran would allow Russia to reduce the flight time of its long-range bombers by roughly sixty percent when conducting strikes in Syria. Russia aims to minimize the financial and logistical costs of its intervention in the Syrian Civil War after almost one year of constant military operations. Russia also hopes to enhance its broader operational flexibility by securing the use of an additional base from which to conduct air operations in support of pro-regime forces in Syria. Russia promoted its use of the airbase in a likely attempt to underscore the participation of regional allies in its military intervention in the Syrian Civil War and highlight for the U.S. the strength and depth of the Russian-Iranian partnership. At the same time, the Russian Ministry of Defense announced that Russian warships launched cruise missiles from their positions in the Mediterranean Sea against alleged Al Qaeda targets in Western Aleppo Province on August 19. The public disclosure of Russia’s use of the airbase nonetheless generated significant domestic pressure inside Iran. The Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated on August 22 that Russia had “finished for now” its operations from the Shahid Nojeh Air Base, claiming that Russia had only sought “temporary” permission for use of the base. Meanwhile, Iranian Minister of Defense Hossein Dehghan condemned Russia for “grandstanding and incivility” in the announcement of its presence at the airbase, noting that there had been “operational coordination” between the two countries but “no written agreement” for use of the facility. The Russian Ministry of Defense confirmed the return of all its aircraft from Iran but added that further use of the base could occur “depending on the prevailing circumstances” in Syria. The abrupt end to the apparent basing deal highlights a degree of tension between Russia and Iran despite their mutual support for the regime of Syrian President Bashar Al Assad. This miscommunication may hamper coordination between Russia and Iran on the ground in Syria, but the potential for Russia to use the airbase in the future suggests that it is unlikely to alter Russia and Iran’s shared objective of bolstering the Syrian regime against its military and political adversaries.

The tempo of the air campaign declined significantly following the departure of Russian warplanes from the Shahid Nojeh Air Base on August 22. This decrease in activity also corresponds with the start of a cross-border intervention by Turkey into Northern Syria on August 24. Opposition groups supported by the Turkish Armed Forces and U.S.-led coalition airstrikes seized the ISIS-held town of Jarabulus as part of an offensive entitled ‘Operation Euphrates Shield.’ The operation began roughly two weeks after Turkish President Recep Erdogan met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in St. Petersburg in the culmination of an ongoing diplomatic rapprochement between Turkey and Russia. The relative lull in airstrikes from August 24 – 29 may be a tangible result of this thawing of relations. Turkey reportedly received assurances from Russia that its forces would not be targeted during the operation. Nonetheless, Turkey’s continued support for the opposition and insistence on regime change in Syria will likely preclude deeper coordination between Turkey and Russia in the Syrian Civil War. Alternatively, the de-escalation of the air campaign during this period could reflect continuing efforts by Russia to negotiate an agreement with the U.S. for joint military action in Syria. U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov claimed on August 26 that the U.S. and Russia had moved "very close" to a new deal to reestablish a nationwide ‘cessation of hostilities’ in the Syrian Civil War following discussions between the two sides in Geneva. Kerry and Lavrov previously held talks in Moscow in July 2016 to discuss a proposal for bilateral military cooperation between the U.S. and Russia against ISIS and Al Qaeda in Syria in exchange for concrete progress towards a ceasefire and political transition. Russia also signaled on August 18 its support for a weekly forty-eight-hour ceasefire in Aleppo City as called for by UN Special Envoy to Syria Staffan de Mistura, albeit under terms and conditions favorable to the regime. The decline in strikes and support for ceasefires mark a continuation of Russia’s efforts to portray itself as a good-faith actor amidst the ongoing negotiations. The trajectory of the campaign on the ground, however, suggests that the recent decrease in the intensity of the air campaign will likely be temporary at best. 

The following graphic depicts ISW’s assessment of Russian airstrike locations based on reports from local Syrian activist networks, statements by Russian and Western officials, and documentation of Russian airstrikes through social media. This map represents locations targeted by Russia’s air campaign, rather than the number of individual strikes or sorties. 

 

High-Confidence Reporting. ISW places high confidence in reports corroborated by documentation from opposition factions and activist networks on the ground in Syria deemed to be credible that demonstrate a number of key indicators of Russian airstrikes.

 

Low-Confidence Reporting. ISW places low confidence in reports corroborated only by multiple secondary sources, including from local Syrian activist networks deemed credible or Syrian state-run media.

Iraq Situation Report: August 31-September 6, 2016

By Emily Anagnostos and the ISW Iraq Team

Iraqi Kurdish parties fractured over the impending no-confidence vote against Kurdish Finance Minister Hoshyar Zebari. The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and Gorran, two Kurdish opposition parties in the Kurdistan Alliance, indicated on August 30 and September 1 that they would dismiss Zebari in order to undermine the influence of his party, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). However, several PUK leaders have recognized both that Zebari’s dismissal could empower former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki to reclaim the premiership, possibly to the detriment of Kurdish political interests, and that the Kurds will lose their influence in the Iraqi Government if the Kurdistan Alliance fails to maintain a unified position. PUK Deputy Secretary Generals Kusrat Rasul and Barham Salih tried to consolidate PUK support for Zebari by creating a “decision center” on September 2, but anti-KDP members, including politburo leaders Mulla Bakhtiar and Hero Ibrahim, wife of PUK founder Jalal Talabani, resisted the attempt. President Fuad Masoum, a senior PUK member, and an Iranian delegation visited PUK and Gorran leaders in Suleimaniyah on September 4-6 in order to ensure Zebari’s survival and resolve the PUK’s internal issues. Continued Kurdish participation in Baghdad is necessary for stability in Iraq and the continuation of a single Iraqi state, key Iranian interests. The attempts were reportedly unsuccessful. However, the Council of Representatives (CoR) failed to reach quorum on September 6, precluding a no-confidence vote against Zebari. The CoR will reconvene September 8, however the upcoming Eid al-Ahda holiday recess, starting on September 9, will likely also result in a lack of quorum, moving any no-confidence vote until after the holiday, around September 27.  The holiday could give the KDP time to secure support for Zebari from other blocs and give PUK time to improve party discipline to support Zebari.

Meanwhile, the National Alliance, the pan-Shi’a bloc in the CoR, selected Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) leader Ammar al-Hakim as its new chairman on September 5. The selection is likely an effort to revive the ineffectual Shi’a alliance, which fractured largely over the political maneuverings of the Reform Front, Maliki’s shadow party in the CoR, and PM Abadi’s attempts to reshuffle the Cabinet. Hakim succeeds Ibrahim al-Jaafari, who held the position for six years as the National Alliance remained deadlocked between electing Hakim or Ali al-Adeeb, a Maliki-backed candidate, as Jaafari’s successor. Hakim’s selection therefore indicates that Maliki was heavily pressured or incentivized to drop his case. Both Hakim and Maliki met with Iranian Ambassador to Iraq Hassan Danaifar on September 3 and 4, respectively, who likely passed on Iran’s insistence that the Shi’a parties reunite and that Maliki stand down on his refusal to support Hakim for the position. A fractured Iraqi Shi’a alliance could promote increased instability, limiting Iran’s influence in Iraq. Political parties, including both Kurdish and Sunni parties, have praised Hakim’s selection, as he is regarded as a mediator figure. A unified National Alliance could provide a stabilizing effect for the Iraqi political system which has rapidly deteriorated since April. However, it remains to be seen how Maliki and the Reform Front will respond to the National Alliance’s revitalization and whether or not the National Alliance will be able to unite Shi’a political parties in the CoR. Hakim may use the Eid al-Ahda recess to realign the Shi’a parties and to mediate ongoing crises amongst the Kurdish and Sunni parties in order to stabilize the government.

Putin's Gambit in Ukraine: Strategic Implications

By Kathleen Weinberger

Vladimir Putin has mobilized military forces in Crimea and on Ukraine's northern and eastern borders.  He has raised the level of fighting in eastern Ukraine to levels not seen in over a year and then arranged a ceasefire.  He has moved advanced air defense systems into Crimea and is raising new Russian divisions near Ukraine.  Analysts are baffled.  Some note that this unprecedented mobilization makes little sense if Putin does not mean to fight Ukraine soon.  Others dismiss it as the normal activities of a great power’s military.  Neither view is correct.  There is nothing normal about this mobilization, but neither does Putin desire a war with Ukraine.  He intends, rather, to use this mobilization and escalation of conflict to create leverage to weaken EU sanctions, destabilize the Ukrainian government, undermine NATO, and present the next American president with a series of faits accomplis.  He is likely to succeed in all these aims.

Escalation against Ukraine

Putin has maintained a significant military presence in Crimea and eastern Ukraine since the Russian invasion in 2014. Putin and the separatists he supports have failed to resolve the conflict by either military or diplomatic means. Putin has steadily increased Russia’s military presence in and around Ukrainian territory and the Black Sea since early 2016, with much of the groundwork having been laid in 2014.  He announced plans to move the advanced S-400 air defense system to Crimea in July.  The recent escalation, however, has been much more sudden, rapid, and substantial than his previous undertakings.

Putin seized on rumors of a Ukrainian sabotage operation in Crimea on August 7^th and 8^th to shift his operations into high gear.  Local sources began reporting many Russian troops and much military hardware moving to the de-facto border between Ukraine and Crimea, onto the Crimean Peninsula from Russia, and along Ukraine’s northern border on those very days. The S-400 system appeared in Crimea on August 12^th. Russian rhetoric during this period hyped the threat of war while framing these measures as defensive. Putin said on August 10^th that Russia would take “additional measure to provide security, including serious additional measures.” These actions and threats are likely intended to press Ukraine, France, and Germany to make significant concessions to Russia in order to avoid further escalation.

The deployment of additional military capabilities to Crimea in the context of this invented tension serves another purpose for Putin.  It allows Russia to create a formidable exclusion zone that extends north into much of Ukraine and across a large portion of the Black Sea. Putin has probably always planned to increase his military capabilities in the region significantly, as his steady expansion of forces in Crimea shows. The “crisis” he created in August, however, has allowed him to frame these deployments as a response to Ukrainian aggression, accomplishing in days what might otherwise have taken months. The atmosphere of crisis and desire on the part of Europeans to de-escalate it, moreover, have spared Putin any consequences for these moves, which are likely to be permanent.

Aims

But what is Putin trying to do?  Conditions for a Russian invasion of Ukraine have been set for some time now.  Continued delay works only to the advantage of Ukraine.  Putin may be pursuing some more nuanced strategy that will end up in war, but it appears that he is actually pursuing other aims.  He is working, in fact, to pressure EU states to remove sanctions and negotiate a settlement in Donbas that will upset Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko’s regime.  He seeks, in other words, to obtain his objectives without having to fight for them, as is his customary strategy.

Putin’s primary desire is likely to erode or eliminate European sanctions against Russia while also advancing his goals in Ukraine.  He seeks to force the Europeans to capitulate on all fronts, in other words, without making any concessions himself.

EU sanctions against Russia based on the conflict in Donbas are valid until January 31, 2017 unless renewed.  Lifting them is, in principle, contingent on Russia fulfilling all points of the Minsk agreements. Those agreements require Russia to withdraw all of its forces from Ukraine and to permit the demobilization of the separatist militias in Donbas.  Putin clearly desires to do neither, and so seeks to use his newly-created leverage to cajole Europe into easing sanctions in any case.

This strategy appears to be working. German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier stated on August 19^th that the EU could “gradually phase out sanctions” if Russia could demonstrate progress and offered that Russia could rejoin the G7. German Chancellor Angela Merkel has softened her previous stance, saying that the “sanctions will be weakened” when Russia makes “progress in the Minsk negotiations.” French President Francois Hollande stated that there is a “real risk of escalation in Ukraine.” Putin will meet with Merkel and Hollande on the sidelines of the G20 on September 4-5 and is likely to press both leaders to take a more lenient stance in exchange for avoiding further conflict.

Putin can also use this escalation to push for a settlement of the conflict that undermines domestic political support for pro-Western Ukrainian President Poroshenko. Pressure from European partners and Russia’s military posture may be sufficient to make Poroshenko accept an unfavorable deal regarding the separatist regions. Poroshenko’s government already faces significant criticism for Ukraine’s poor economic performance. His hold on power is further threatened by populist and pro-Russian parties, which have been positioning themselves to make a comeback in Ukraine. An unpopular resolution of the conflict in Donbas could be enough to trigger snap elections and allow these anti-Western parties to return to power in Ukraine’s parliament. A settlement that grants the separatist regions significant autonomy could also upset the pro-Kyiv volunteer battalions. These militia groups, which have fought hard against Russian-backed forces since the beginning of the conflict, already oppose Poroshenko on many issues. Poroshenko could lose the limited support he now has were he to accept a deal on Donbas that looked like surrender.

Timing

A number of factors combined to make August a propitious moment for Putin to force this issue.  The looming elections to Russia’s legislature, the Duma, as well as the impending U.S. election have long made it likely that Putin would act now.  The failed Turkish coup and resulting Russo-Turkish rapprochement, however, created the ideal environment for the current gambit.

Russo-Turkish Rapprochement

Russo-Turkish relations soured badly at the end of 2015 as Russian aircraft flew combat sorties against Turkish-backed opposition forces in Syria.  Turkish forces shot down a Russian Su-24 jet in November, 2015, starting a tense confrontation between Moscow and Ankara.  President Recep Tayyip Erdogan sought out Russia’s enemies as partners in this confrontation, starting military cooperation with Ukraine. The two states conducted two joint naval drills in the Black Sea in March and April 2016 and signed a military cooperation plan in May.

Erdogan began the rapprochement with Russia in June, before the coup attempt, apologizing for shooting down the Su-24.  He has turned increasingly to Russia after the coup, moreover, discussing economic and military cooperation, while Turkey’s Prime Minister hinted that Russia might be allowed to use the NATO airbase at Incirlik from which the US Air Force is currently operating.  Turkey and Ukraine have not undertaken further joint cooperation efforts, in the meantime, and public displays of close relations have ended.

Erdogan has simultaneously pursued a policy of confrontation with the US, demanding the extradition of a Turkish exile he accuses of plotting the coup and blaming various senior US military officials for supporting it.  Erdogan has not officially changed his policy towards Ukraine or towards the US, and his hostile anti-US rhetoric has softened somewhat in recent days. Turkey’s improved relations with Russia, however, changed the regional security balance so that Russia could escalate the conflict in Ukraine without fear of complications in Turkey.

Russian Parliamentary Elections

The Russian parliamentary elections are likely the main driver of the timing of this offensive, however.  Putin seeks to rally support ahead of the September elections, which is challenging because of the falling popularity of United Russia, his party.  That support could grow if Putin could announce progress on sanctions relief.

Russia’s budget is in dire straits because of the continuing low price of oil, as well as structural problems and corruption.  Putin could hope to stabilize it only through one of two high unpopular measures: drawing more heavily on Russia’s sovereign wealth funds, or introducing confiscatory taxes. The promise of the easing of sanctions and the reintegration of Russia into European markets could allow Putin to avoid taking these measures, at least in the short term. He could expect to gain at the polls if he could secure some promise of sanctions relief from the key European leaders he has been simultaneously courting and threatening.

US Presidential Elections

The timing of US presidential elections is the third factor that makes this moment so opportune for Putin’s aggressiveness.  The Obama administration has been busily attempting to negotiate an agreement to work with Russia in Syria and has eschewed any reaction to various Russian aggressive actions in the Middle East and Ukraine—or even to reports of Russian attempts to influence the US election.  Putin likely sees an opportunity to establish himself solidly in Ukraine, with a settlement or the promise of one in Donbas, with sanctions eased or lifted, and with his base in Syria secure when the next American president takes office.  Such a position would be an admirable baseline from which Putin could begin either to try to normalize relations with the US or to expand his gains further—or both.

Prospects for Putin’s Gambit

Sanctions fatigue in Europe and protracted political instability in Ukraine mean that Putin will likely accomplish two of his goals. Europe is likely to ease and eventually lift most sanctions as Brexit, immigration, and other factors combine to strain the EU as an institution, and as Russia’s long-standing and concerted efforts to improve relations with individual EU states bear fruit. Austria, Greece, Hungary and Italy, among others, have expressed pro-Russian sentiments and are continuously targeted by Russia with economic and diplomatic incentives. The EU Council requires sanctions votes to be unanimous, so one state could veto their renewal, particularly if the leading states of Europe are wavering.

Putin will also likely succeed in removing pro-Western Poroshenko in Ukraine and seeing him replaced with either an anti-Western populist or a pro-Russian leader. Economic hardship, low satisfaction with the current regime, frustration on the part of foreign partners and competition from other political parties mean that Poroshenko is incredibly vulnerable to further shocks, such as an unpopular resolution of the conflict in Donbas. Even if Poroshenko retains power some sort of bad deal, Ukraine’s economy will most likely further suffer as international attention wavers and European desires to reconcile with Russia increase.

Putin will probably be able to use these successes to continue to split Europe to the detriment of NATO and the US.  Europe faces extreme pressure from the refugee crisis and prospect of the United Kingdom’s exit from the EU.  Putin is working hard to advance controversial projects, such as the NORDSTREAM II pipeline to Germany, which would further align western European states with Russia.  The eastern states will continue to fear Russia, however—all the more if it appears that Putin is succeeding in bending Ukraine to his will.  Russia will also continue to try to leverage its operations in Syria to push for cooperation with European countries and the US, which could decrease the alliance’s ability to posture against Russia without threatening interests in the Middle East.  All of these activities will tend to paralyze and divide the Western alliance, making concerted resistance to Russian aggression difficult if not impossible.

Implications

If Putin succeeds in having sanctions significantly eased or removed and resetting relations with a number of key European countries, the new US president may be unable to rely on a united EU or NATO response to Russian actions. Russia would have greater leverage in Europe by which to increase ties with certain states and to undertake increasingly hostile actions against others. Putin might choose to threaten or even undertake military operations against other European countries, such as the Baltic States, Finland or Norway. He is more likely to use the weakening of the Western alliance to cajole them into neutral or pro-Russian policies.

The replacement of pro-Western Poroshenko with a populist or pro-Russian leader would be the first step towards returning Ukraine to Russia’s sphere of influence. Ukraine would not likely be able to reorient again towards a pro-Western, pro-democratic path in the near future. This development would constitute the first forceful reintegration of a former Soviet state back into Russia’s control, and would stand as a precedent for future operations.

Establishment of these conditions will allow Russia to renegotiate relations with the US from a position of significant strength. Without the weight of the conflict in Donbas or the stigma of sanctions, Russia would be able to undergo a second “reset” in relations with the West, despite having illegally annexed the sovereign territory of a European state. The new US administration would be forced to negotiate with a newly emboldened Russia without the same political and economic tools available during the Obama administration, and potentially have fewer allies in countering Russian aggression. 

Warning Update: Dismissal of Finance Minister Possible as Kurdistan Alliance Fractures

By Emily Anagnostos with Tori Keller

Key Takeaway: The Iraqi Council of Representatives (CoR) will likely dismiss Kurdish Finance Minister Hoshyar Zebari if a no-confidence vote occurs on September 6. New interpretations of the Iraqi Constitution require only a simple majority to remove ministers, making his ouster more likely. Zebari, a well-liked and effective minister, is being targeted to undermine the leader of the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), Masoud Barzani, who has centralized power within the Kurdish Regional Government at the expense of rival parties - the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and Gorran. Kurdish political parties lack the discipline to vote as a single voting bloc because of infighting, which the Reform Front, the shadow political party led by former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, has exacerbated. Should the Kurdish Alliance in fact collapse, allowing Zebari’s removal, the Kurds will lose their important influence over Arab Iraq. For this reason, the PUK leaders are attempting to instill party discipline and compel members to support Zebari, but they are unlikely to succeed if the vote proceeds on September 6 as they need more time to organize.

The Situation

Kurdish Finance Minister Hoshyar Zebari will likely face a vote of no-confidence.

• The Reform Front, an unofficial opposition party in the CoR and support base for former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, has driven the campaign to dismiss Zebari. The Reform Front similarly did so to dismiss Sunni Defense Minister Khalid al-Obeidi on August 25.
• The Reform Front is targeting ministers whose dismissal will have the simultaneous effect of undermining PM Abadi’s key alliances and of collapsing major political blocs in the CoR that rival the Reform Front.
• A prominent ruling State of Law Alliance (SLA) member and a member of the Reform Front announced that the CoR would hold a no-confidence vote against Zebari on September 6. The CoR has not officially confirmed that the vote will occur, however. 

If the no confidence vote occurs on September 6, Zebari is unlikely to survive the vote because the Kurdistan Alliance has fractured.

• Intra-Kurdish tensions in the KRG have spilled over into national politics.
• Kurdish opposition politicians may try to punish Masoud Barzani and his Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) by voting against Zebari, a party member.
• Some Kurdish politicians in the PUK and Gorran will not adhere to their party leaders’ demands to support Zebari for the benefit of the greater Kurdistan Alliance.
• The PUK is working to consolidate fractious intra-party differences and has called for a “decision center” to issue all orders of the party on September 1. However, the multiple PUK officials have resisted this attempt as well, revealing an internal PUK split that decreases the chance of Zebari’s survival.

A holiday recess may give the PUK and Gorran leaders the time they need to organize their members to preserve Zebari.

• Kurdish opposition leadership recognizes that the Kurds will lose their influence in the Iraqi Government if the Kurdistan Alliance fractures over Zebari’s dismissal.
• The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), the second largest Kurdish party in the CoR, could ensure Zebari’s survival. However, the PUK currently cannot enforce party discipline to vote in favor of Zebari.
• The PUK leaders are not likely capable of turning the party members around in time for a September 6 vote. However, the PUK could substantially improve party discipline if it delays the vote until after recess.

Context

The Kurdistan Alliance is susceptible to fracture due to intra-Kurdish tensions playing out in both the Kurdistan Regional and Iraq national governments.

• The Kurdistan Alliance has been the framework under which all Kurdish parties in the CoR have formed a consensus agenda. The parties are also the five largest parties in the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG).
• A long-standing rivalry exists between the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), led by KRG President Masoud Barzani, and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), led by Jalal Talabani.
• A political crisis in the KRG between the KDP and Gorran, a prominent offshoot of the PUK, in October 2015 further polarized the positions of the KDP and PUK.
• The KDP and PUK differed over relations with Baghdad during a political boycott in May 2016. The Kurdistan Alliance began to fracture when the PUK and Gorran sought to end the boycott for financial concessions, deviating from the KDP’s intent to use the boycott a springboard for an independence referendum.

Former PM Nouri al-Maliki continues to hit on the fault lines between the Kurdish opposition parties and the KDP in order to benefit his own support base.

• Maliki has courted Kurdish opposition blocs, including the PUK and Gorran, as possible allies to expand his base of support in the CoR at a time when those parties are at odds with the KDP.
• Maliki has repeatedly praised the political alliance between the PUK and Gorran, who merged on May 18, while the KDP heavily criticized the alliance saying it will “deepen the internal problems” in the KRG.
• Maliki visited the PUK and Gorran in Suleimaniyah on July 18, where he met with senior PUK leaders and Gorran leaders, reportedly asking the PUK and Gorran to join the State of Law Alliance (SLA).
• A senior PUK delegation met with Maliki in Baghdad on August 23 to discuss issues between the KRG and the federal government.

The Kurdistan Alliance faces dual pressure from some members’ desire to undermine the KDP’s dominance and the leaders’ fear of Maliki’s return to power.

• The no-confidence vote is an opportunity for Kurdish opposition parties to manifest their animosity towards the KDP by ousting Zebari. The KDP reportedly requested that the all parties withdraw from the CoR on August 27 in protest of the questioning of Zebari on August 25, but the parties did not comply. The Kurdistan Islamic Group (KIG) stated that “most Kurdish parties” support Zebari’s dismissal, stating that the KDP was now “alone.”
• However, several ranking members of the PUK have advocated to follow party line and support Zebari, likely in an effort to preclude taking action that could benefit Maliki’s return to the premiership. Other PUK members have ignored the PUK’s party line in favor of Gorran’s anti-KDP stance.

Complications

The dismissal of Defense Minister Khalid al-Obeidi on August 25 lowered the threshold of support needed to dismiss a minister.

• The CoR dismissed Obeidi on a simple majority vote, despite the Constitution stipulating an absolute majority, which is a 165 CoR members. Conversely, a simple majority is the majority of those attending the session after its reached quorum, also 165 people. This makes the lowest simple majority possible 83 members if base quorum is reached.
• Pro-Maliki supporters are consistently within reach of that minimum, as they demonstrated when the CoR dismissed Obeidi. A fractured Kurdistan Alliance, conversely, is unlikely to garner additional support for Zebari.

Implications

Zebari’s dismissal could compromise the economic stability of Iraq.

• Zebari is an effective and internationally well-liked finance minister who has secured financial benefits that support the economic health of both the Iraqi Government and the KRG.
• He has been instrumental in successfully negotiating the $5.3 billion standby loan with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Discussions are ongoing for fulfilling the conditions of the loan and unlocking the potential for greater loan amounts.
• Zebari likely played a critical role in ensuring a new oil agreement between the KRG and Iraqi Government on August 30 over oil production in Kirkuk Province.
• It is unclear if these efforts would survive if Zebari is removed from office.

The U.S. campaign for Mosul could suffer if the U.S.’s primarily anti-ISIS partners, the KDP and Baghdad, no longer have an effective relationship.

• The bulk of anti-ISIS operations in northern Iraq have occurred in KDP-governed terrain and alongside KDP-led Peshmerga forces. KDP Peshmerga would be the primary Peshmerga force to participate in Mosul operations.
• The breakdown of relations between the KDP and the Iraqi Government may complicate the current plan and timeline for Mosul if the KDP rejects the oversight of the federal government, or if the U.S. ability to work with the KDP is hampered by poor Baghdad-Arbil relations.
• The Peshmerga will likely refuse the Iraqi Government’s orders to withdraw from recaptured and primarily Sunni Arab territory in anti-ISIS operations. Kurdish expansion in northern Iraq could drive the Internally Displaced Refugee (IDP) crisis and exacerbate Sunni Arab-Kurdish tensions, undermining Sunni reconciliation efforts.

Zebari’s dismissal would allow the Reform Front to undercut its rivals in the pan-Shi’a National Alliance.

• Maliki likely has targeted Zebari in order to undermine his political rival, the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), which has opposed the Reform Front’s agenda.
• The call for no-confidence in Zebari also targets ISCI’s role as the primary mediator between the Shi’a and Kurdish parties and may reduce ISCI’s relevance and ability to contest Maliki in the government.
• The Reform Front will continue to try to oust key ministers in order to undermine Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi’s premiership. A Reform Front member stated on August 31 that it will pursue the removal of Minister of Foreign Affairs Ibrahim al-Jaafari (National Reform Trend) and Health Minister Adila Hammoud (Dawa in Iraq) next.

The Reform Front may ultimately target Iraq’s Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi with a no-confidence vote.

• The rump Parliament, from which the Reform Front grew, had called for a no-confidence vote against the PM. 
• The Reform Front and Maliki have established their capacity to oust highly-respected and prominent ministers. They have also cemented the precedent of a simple majority to dismiss a minister.
• The dismissal of Obeidi and Zebari would eliminate two allies important to PM Abadi. The Reform Front may continue to pick off ministers around PM Abadi, or its successful dismissal of Zebari may prompt a call for the dismissal of PM Abadi.
• Without the fundamental support of the Kurdish and Sunni alliances, PM Abadi may have little support base to ensure he survives the vote.

The KDP might leave the Iraqi Government and accelerate efforts towards Kurdish independence should the CoR oust Zebari.

• The KDP would likely see participation in Baghdad as futile and fellow Kurdish parties as unacceptable partners.
• KRG President and KDP leader Masoud Barzani might use the dissatisfaction with the Iraqi Government as a springboard for holding an independence referendum.
• KRG President and KDP leader Masoud Barzani continues his rhetoric calling for Kurdish independence. He called in June for Kurdish parties to convene and decide the “next steps,” though no meeting appears to have occurred.
• Barzani has set the U.S. 2016 presidential elections as a deadline for holding a referendum.
• The U.S. is attempting to prevent the partition of the Iraqi state. U.S. Vice President Joe Biden called President Barzani on August 31 and confirmed U.S. support for a “unified, federal and democratic Iraq.”
• An independent Iraqi Kurdistan without the PUK-governed territories – primarily the oil-rich Kirkuk Province – is not financially viable even in improved economic circumstances, a fact that may dampen a risky move toward independence.

The fracturing of the Kurdistan Alliance would likely deprive all Kurdish parties of their ability to influence the Iraqi Government in Baghdad and extract concessions that benefit the KRG, ending an era of Iraqi politics. In the most dangerous situation, the current Kurdish political fracture can break the unitary Iraqi State.

Iraq Situation Report: August 23-30, 2016

By Emily Anagnostos and the ISW Iraq Team

The Council of Representatives (CoR) dismissed Sunni Defense Minister Khalid al-Obeidi on August 25, complicating the success of anti-ISIS operations and Sunni reconciliation efforts. The removal of Defense Minister Obeidi on the eve of strategic Mosul operations could limit the U.S.’s ability to effectively coordinate with the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). The ISF now lacks both a Defense and Interior Minister, who share responsibility of the security forces. Efforts to fill the defense ministry will likely further political instability within the Sunni parties, which fractured over Obeidi’s dismissal between parties supportive of Obeidi and those supportive of Sunni CoR Speaker Salim al-Juburi, an Obeidi rival. The fracture has already setback government efforts of Sunni reconciliation, a requirement for anti-ISIS operations in Iraq, and could preclude Sunni ability to present and support a nominee. This paralysis could lead to the defense ministry transferring to a candidate more aligned with Iran, which may restrict U.S. involvement in Iraq as the Mosul operation approaches. 

The method by which the CoR dismissed Obeidi sets a dangerous precedence of lowering the threshold of support needed to dismiss a minister. The CoR dismissed Obeidi by a simple majority vote, despite the constitutional requirement for an absolute majority. The ruling was based on a Federal Court statement in December 2015 that qualified absolute majority as the “majority of those attending,” which is the definition of a simple majority. Under an absolute majority, the CoR needs at least 165 people to dismiss a minister, while a simple majority could require as little as 83 votes. The Reform Front, former PM Nouri al-Maliki’s support base, is consistently within reach of that minimum. 

The Reform Front may attempt to similarly oust other ministers who are allies of Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi in order to undermine his premiership, including Kurdish Finance Minister Hoshyar Zebari. The CoR questioned Zebari on August 25, after which the Reform Front announced on August 30 that they had requested a no-confidence vote. No date has yet been set for the vote. Zebari’s dismissal could collapse ongoing negotiations regarding Kurdish oil exports and have a similar effect on the International Monetary Fund (IMF) loan, which was primarily obtained due to Zebari’s efforts. Removing Zebari, who is well-liked across the Kurdish parties, could prompt a Kurdish walk out from the Iraqi Government if they see their participation in Baghdad as futile. The political fallout between Arbil and Baghdad, two of the U.S.’s key allies, could complicate operations in Mosul and may accelerate momentum towards a Kurdish independence referendum. 

Turkish Incursion in Northern Syria Signals Turning Point in Anti-ISIS Fight: August 30, 2016

By Jennifer Cafarella with Leah Danson

Key Takeaway: Turkey is unraveling America’s anti-ISIS partner in northern Syria in order to position itself as a major power broker in planned operations to retake Raqqa City. Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) crossed into Syria to seize the ISIS held border town of Jarablus alongside numerous Turkish- and U.S.-backed Syrian armed opposition groups on August 24. The operation, titled Euphrates Shield, is a turning point in American-Turkish relations and the war against ISIS by fulfilling longstanding American demands for more Turkish involvement in the anti-ISIS fight. Euphrates Shield also aims to prevent the expansion of Kurdish control along the border, however. The U.S. ordered the Syrian Kurdish People’s Defense Forces (YPG) to withdraw to the east bank of the Euphrates River in accordance with Turkish demands at the start of the operation. Turkey is leveraging Syrian opposition groups it trusts in Jarablus and intentionally sidelining groups that joined the Syrian YPG-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), bringing U.S.- and Turkish- backed opposition factions into direct conflict with the American-backed SDF. The SDF opposed the Turkish incursion and attacked the joint Turkish-Syrian opposition force on August 27. A U.S. defense official announced that the two sides agreed to a “loose” truce on August 30. An unidentified Turkish military source, however, subsequently denied the existence of any such agreement. The Turkish intervention has meanwhile inspired local resistance against the SDF and YPG in Sunni Arab areas including Manbij City, south of Jarablus, and the northern Raqqa countryside. Turkey may exploit this local resistance to unseat the SDF from Manbij City and replace it with a military force that opposes the YPG.

Turkey is unraveling America’s anti-ISIS partner in northern Syria in order to position itself as a major power broker in planned operations to retake Raqqa City. Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) crossed into Syria to seize the ISIS held border town of Jarablus alongside numerous Turkish- and U.S.-backed Syrian armed opposition groups on August 24. The intervention brought the TSK and U.S. backed opposition forces into direct conflict with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), America’s primary ally in the anti-ISIS fight. Turkey notified the U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition, the Syrian regime, and Russia about the offensive, which it titled “Operation Euphrates Shield.” Turkish Special Operations forces led a joint military force into Jarablus, including an armored battalion from Turkey’s Second Army and as many as 5,000 Syrian opposition fighters from groups based in the northern Aleppo countryside including: the Sultan Murad Brigade, Suqour al-Jebel, Jaysh al Tahrir, Jabhat al Shamiya, Nour al Din al Zenki, Faylaq al-Sham, and Ahrar al Sham. ISIS mounted little resistance to the attack, instead withdrawing southwest to the town of al Bab. SDF fighters rejected the Turkish intervention as an “occupation” and attacked the joint Turkish/Syrian opposition force. The Turkish intervention meanwhile appears to have emboldened local elements to resist the SDF openly. Sunni Arab elements in Manbij and the Raqqa countryside issued statements rejecting the SDF because of the YPG’s goal to establish an independent Syrian Kurdistan. Turkey likely will continue to advance south in order to unseat the SDF from Manbij and position loyal Syrian opposition forces as necessary ground partners in the operation to retake Raqqa City.

Turkey is leveraging Syrian opposition groups it trusts in Jarablus and intentionally sidelining groups that joined the Syrian YPG-led SDF. Local SDF groups from Jarablus declared the formation of the Jarablus Military Council on August 22 and stated their intent to seize Jarablus. The leader of the Jarablus Military Council (JMC), Abdussatar al-Jadir, was assassinated the following day. The JMC accused Turkish intelligence and attacked the joint Turkish/Syrian opposition force on August 27. Turkey launched airstrikes against JMC and SDF positions south of Jarablus in response and has maintained an active air campaign targeting the area. The joint Turkish/Syrian opposition force advanced south, seizing over a dozen villages and reaching the Sajour River by August 29. The JMC nonetheless continues to marshal support from the Aleppo countryside. The SDF-linked Manbij Military Council announced its support for the JMC on August 27. Prominent Manbij Military Council (MMC) member Kataib Shams al Shamal deployed to reinforce the front line south of Jarablus. A delegation of tribal elders in Manbij later declared its support for the JMC on August 28. The escalation between the joint Turkish/Syrian opposition military force and coalescing SDF elements south of Jarablus have redirected the focus of the SDF’s Sunni Arab fighting force at a time when the U.S. intended to prepare for operations to retake Raqqa City.

Turkey’s intervention aimed to sideline the SDF and check the YPG’s rising strength along the Turkish border. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan stated that Turkey intended to fight the YPG “with the same determination” as fighting ISIS during a visit to Gaziantep on August 28.  He also vowed to provide “all necessary support” to Syrians living in Gaziantep who wanted to return to Jarablus, indicating his intent to repopulate Jarablus – and possibly its southern countryside – with Syrian refugees after finishing clearing operations. He will ensure that the refugees that resettle in Syria are Sunni Arabs in order to block future Kurdish activity in the area. Turkey had conditioned its support for the U.S.-led SDF operation to retake Manbij beginning in April 2016 on the mandatory withdrawal of the YPG to the east bank of the Euphrates river after the SDF captured the city, but YPG forces had not withdrawn as of the launch of Operation Euphrates Shield on August 24, despite seizing the city in early August. U.S Vice President Joe Biden was in Ankara on August 24 and expressed strong support for the operation. He also ordered the YPG to withdraw from Manbij to the eastern bank of the Euphrates, stating that the group, “will not under any circumstances get American support” if it does not comply. The YPG’s general command chose to back down rather than confront Turkey near Jarablus directly, but has not completely withdrawn as ordered. The YPG released a statement confirming its intent to remain focused on the overall anti-ISIS fight on August 27, signaling its acquiescence to American demands. Operation Inherent Resolve spokesman Col. John L. Dorrian confirmed that the main element of the YPG relocated east of the Euphrates River, but stated that some forces remained to finish IED clearing operations. The YPG confirmed its presence near the front line south of Jarablus on August, but claimed the fighters had crossed back across the river to help evacuate civilians targeted by Turkish airstrikes. It is unclear whether the YPG is participating actively in clashes at the time of writing. U.S. secretary of Defense Ashton Carter acknowledged the YPG’s noncompliance on August 29, stating that the U.S. will “deconflict” and “clarify where the YPG elements of the SDF are and are not.”

Turkey will likely attempt to unseat the SDF’s Manbij Military Council next. The SDF formed the Manbij Military Council to recapture Manbij city on April 5. The SDF’s Manbij Military Council did not include the original Free Syrian Army-affiliated Manbij Military Council, which ISIS displaced in 2013. Turkey’s intervention emboldened the original Manbij Military Council and elements of the local population in Manbij to oppose the SDF openly. The original Manbij Military Council released a statement on August 28 rejecting the SDF and calling for shared control with the SDF over Manbij city. Residents of Manbij reportedly also issued a letter rejecting the SDF on August 28. Rising local dissent in Manbij follows a statement by Sunni Arab tribes in the Raqqa countryside that pledged to fight against the YPG in the area. Turkey may capitalize on local resistance to the SDF to recapture Manbij and install the original Manbij Miltiary Council. The commander of the U.S.-and Turkish-backed Sultan Murad Division, Col. Ahmed Osman, appeared to confirm this possibility. He stated that the Euphrates Shield offensive was “certainly heading in the direction of Manbij,” claiming that the YPG force in the area had not withdrawn from the city. Col. Osman stated that he expected Turkish-backed opposition groups would be able to seize Manbij within “a few days.” Turkey expanded its involvement after the SDF began to resist the intervention and appears willing to sustain an increased deployment. The TSK sent ten additional tanks and the same number of armored vehicles on August 25 and another six tanks after hostilities escalated on August 27. An unnamed Turkish official stated that Turkey would “continue operations until we are convinced that imminent threats against the country's national security have been neutralized” on August 25. The official added that Turkey could be willing to increase its total deployment in Syria to 15,000. A U.S. defense official later announced on August 30 that the Turkish and SDF forces reached a “loose agreement” to cease fighting and instead “focus on the [ISIS] threat.” It remains unclear if the tentative truce will hold as an unidentified Turkish military sources and an unidentified Turkish-backed opposition commander subsequently denied the existence of such an agreement.

Composition of the joint Turkish-Syrian opposition force

Operation Euphrates Shield demonstrates Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s willingness and ability to use military force to prevent the creation of an independent Syrian Kurdistan along the Turkish border even after an aggressive purge of the TSK following the failed July 15 coup attempt. The total initial Turkish deployment was close to 450 troops including 150 Special Forces plus 200 soldiers from the armored units and additional soldiers responsible for coordinating Turkey’s close air support and artillery support. Turkish Special Operations Forces under the command of Lieutenant General Zekai Aksakalli led the operation. LTG Akasakalli had remained loyal to Erdogan during the coup and was later promoted to the rank of Lieutenant General. His Deputy, Brigadier General Salih Terzi was in operational command of Special Forces  along the Syrian border before the coup. Terzi was allegedly involved in the coup attempt and was killed by pro-Erdogan security forces that night. The Turkish mechanized component deployed to Jarablus is meanwhile likely from the Second Army’s, 5^th Armored Brigade, which is based in Gaziantep and deployable on short notice. The leadership of this mechanized component is unclear. 5^th Armored Brigade Commander Major General Murat Soysal was detained after the coup attempt and his replacement is unknown at the time of writing. Erdogan’s confidence in the loyalty and capability of the Turkish Special Forces and Turkish second Army indicates his success thus far in consolidating the TSK under his own personal control without completely neutering its combat effectiveness.

Implications

Turkey’s intervention in Jarablus is a turning point in American-Turkish relations and the war against ISIS. Erdogan’s willingness to commit military force to the anti-ISIS fight fulfils longstanding American demands for Turkey to increase its contribution to the anti-ISIS mission. The recapture of Jarablus and ongoing operations to clear remaining ISIS-held portions of the border west of Jarablus have set the desired conditions for an offensive to retake Raqqa city by eliminating ISIS’s final supply line from Turkey. The YPG’s decision thus far to avoid open war with the Turkish forces indicates that the U.S. may be able to refocus the YPG on the planned Raqqa offensive. The infighting between the joint Turkish-Syrian opposition force and the Sunni Arab components of the SDF is a major complication, however. American planning relies on the Sunni Arab component of the SDF to provide the bulk of the fighting force for the Raqqa offensive, because a YPG-led operation would likely alienate civilians in the Sunni Arab-majority Raqqa City. A prolonged clash between the SDF and the joint Turkish/Syrian opposition force would derail planned operations to retake Raqqa City. Turkey may now offer its own military support and that of Turkish-backed opposition forces for an operation in Raqqa as an alternative to the SDF, positioning Turkey as a major power player in northern Syria.

Russian Anti-Access and Area Denial (A2AD) Range: August 2016

By: Kathleen Weinberger

Russia has altered the security balance in the Black Sea, Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East by establishing large anti-access/area-denial (A2AD) exclusion zones. Russia’s power projection in these regions has been further extended by the deployment of the S-400 air defense system to Crimea in August 2016 and to Syria in November 2015. Advanced air defense systems create A2AD “bubbles” that prevent Russia’s opponents from establishing air supremacy in strategically significant theaters. The Baltic States, much of Ukraine and the Black Sea, northern Poland, Syria and parts of Turkey fall under Russian A2AD bubbles created by S-300 and S-400 air defense systems. Russia operates advanced air defense not only within its own territory, but from sites in Syria and occupied Crimea, as well as cooperatively through the Joint Air Defense Network in Belarus and Armenia. Russia can use these systems to impede the ability of the U.S. to defend its NATO allies by disrupting the ability of US air forces to access conflict zones in the event of a crisis.