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Thursday, April 3, 2025

Iran Update April 3, 2025

 Ria Reddy, Katherine Wells, Kelly Campa, Johanna Moore, Carolyn Moorman, Alexandra Braverman, and Annika Ganzeveld

Information Cutoff 2:00pm ET

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update every weekday.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of the ongoing opposition offensive in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Iran is continuing to try to bolster its air defenses in preparation for a potential US or Israeli strike on Iran. Iran has built a new Ghadir phased-array radar in West Azerbaijan Province in northwestern Iran in recent months, according to commercially available satellite imagery.[1] An open-source analyst reported on April 2 that Iran also recently built two Ghadir radars in southern Iran near the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. The October 2024 Israel Defense Forces (IDF) strikes on Iran damaged two Ghadir radars in southwestern Iran.[2] The operational status of these radars is unclear. Iran has conducted several air defense exercises in recent months, particularly around Iranian nuclear facilities.[3] The construction of new radars and recent exercises reflect Iran's efforts to strengthen its air defense capabilities amid the Iranian regime’s concerns about a potential conventional conflict with the United States or Israel.


Russia remains an unviable mediator between the United States and Iran given Russian support for the Iranian nuclear program and Axis of Resistance activity in the Middle East. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov stated on April 1 that Russia is willing to mediate talks between Iran and the United States about the Iranian nuclear program.[4] Iranian Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Political Affairs Majid Takht Ravanchi, who serves as the chief Iranian nuclear negotiator, met with Ryabkov in Moscow on April 2 to discuss Iranian nuclear negotiations.[5] Ravanchi and Ryabkov emphasized the importance of "resolving misunderstandings about the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear activities." A senior Russian official similarly downplayed the threat of the Iranian nuclear program in early March 2025, claiming that Iran's production of 60 percent enriched uranium has "no weapons risk."[6] Iran currently has enough 60 percent enriched uranium, if enriched further, to produce six nuclear weapons.[7] Senior Russian officials have also previously criticized the US "maximum pressure" campaign against Iran and called US threats to strike Iranian nuclear facilities "unacceptable.”[8]

Russia has also supported the Axis of Resistance against Israel and the United States. Russia has provided the Houthis with targeting data to support Houthi attacks on commercial shipping and US vessels in the Red Sea, according to Western media.[9] The Telegraph reported on April 3 that there is currently a Russian military expert in Yemen who is advising the Houthis on how to conduct attacks.”[10] Russian support for the Iranian nuclear program and Axis of Resistance activities in the region make it extremely unlikely that Russia would be able to help the United States secure its interests in the Middle East.

A senior Iranian military official told The Telegraph on April 3 that Iran is “abandoning” the Houthis.[11] This statement is very likely part of an Iranian information operation to try to obfuscate Iran’s leading role in the Axis of Resistance and absolve Iran of responsibility for proxy attacks against the United States and Israel. The official told The Telegraph that the Iranian regime has pivoted its focus to a potential US or Israeli strike on Iranian territory.[12] Iran is almost certainly concerned about a potential strike, but that concern has not precluded continued Iranian support for the Houthis. Iranian officials have continued to express support for the Houthis in Persian- and Arabic-language media, including in Houthi media, in recent days.[13] The official also claimed that the Iranian regime ordered Iranian military personnel to leave Yemen because Iran is concerned that the death of an Iranian military official in a US airstrike in Yemen could lead to a “direct confrontation” with the United States.[14] The deaths of Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Quds Force personnel in other Axis of Resistance theaters, such as Iraq and Syria, has not previously caused Iran to leave those theaters.[15] It is therefore unlikely that Iran would leave Yemen and abandon its decades-old strategy of building up proxies across the region to confront the United States and Israel out of concern that a US airstrike could kill Iranian personnel.

The official also claimed that Iran is abandoning the Houthis because it believes that the Houthis are “living their final months.”[16] This statement contradicts Iran’s approach to other Iranian proxies that have been severely degraded since October 2023.[17] The IDF severely degraded Hamas in the Gaza Strip and Hezbollah in southern Lebanon, but Iran continues to support both groups.[18] Iran has attempted in recent months to transfer funds to Hezbollah to aid Hezbollah’s reconstitution in Lebanon, for example.[19] Iran is also attempting to stoke sectarian tensions and rebuild Iranian networks in Syria after the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024.[20] The Houthis’ ability to disrupt international trade and attack Israel makes them a strategic and valuable partner for Iran, which Iran is unlikely to abandon.

US Central Command (CENTCOM) has conducted at least 28 airstrikes targeting Houthi infrastructure and leadership in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on April 2.[21] CENTCOM conducted an unspecified number of airstrikes targeting Houthi sites near Taiz Airport for the first time since the start of the US air campaign on March 15.[22] CENTCOM also targeted a Yemeni-Omani telecommunications site in Jablah District, Ibb Governorate, that reportedly contained Houthi radars and air defense systems.[23] CENTCOM conducted an airstrike targeting a vehicle south of Sanaa. The strike reportedly killed the personal assistant of Houthi Interior Minister Abdulkarim al Houthi, who is Houthi Supreme Leader Abdulmalik al Houthi’s uncle.[24] CTP-ISW cannot verify this claim. CENTCOM also likely targeted Houthi fighters in a separate airstrike targeting a vehicle northwest of Saada.[25]


The IDF engaged armed Syrians during an Israeli incursion 13 kilometers into Syrian territory near Nawa, Daraa Province, on April 2. Syrian media reported that an Israeli convoy of tanks and vehicles entered a forest near al Jabaliya Dam, approximately 13 kilometers from the disengagement zone.[26] The IDF said that several “terrorists” fired at IDF 210th Division forces while they were confiscating weapons and destroying infrastructure in the area.[27] The IDF killed several of the gunmen from the ground and air.[28] Syrian media reported that unspecified Syrian gunmen fired heavy machine guns at Israeli aircraft and that Israeli forces shelled numerous targets near Tal al Jamou.[29] The Islamic Resistance Front in Syria, which is an anti-Israel militia, claimed that its fighters engaged the IDF with "appropriate weapons” near Nawa and Tasil.[30] The fighting killed nine Syrian men and reportedly injured over 20 others.[31] The Syrian Interim Foreign Ministry accused Israel of deliberately attempting to “destabilize Syria.”[32] This incident marks the second time that Syrians have attacked Israeli forces advancing into southern Syrian territory since the IDF killed at least four armed Syrians in Kuwaya, Daraa Province, on March 25.[33]


This incident may present anti-Israel and anti-interim government armed groups with an opportunity to gain support and recruit new fighters. The leader of the prominent Suwayda-based Druze militia Mudafa al Karama, Leith al Balous, praised the Syrians who “defended” southern Syria from Israel as martyrs who fought against Israel in a “battle of existence and dignity.”[34] Over a thousand Syrians participated in a funeral in Nawa on April 3 for the men who died during the fighting.[35] The Islamic Resistance Front in Syria, which claimed that its fighters engaged Israeli forces, amplified calls to attend the funeral.[36] The Islamic Resistance Front in Syria uses iconography widely associated with Iranian-backed actors and has referred to the current government as an “internal enemy,” suggesting that the group is opposed to the current government and may hold Assadist views.[37] The growth of anti-Israel, anti-government activity may provide an opportunity for external actors, such as Iranian-backed actors, to exploit anti-Israel grievances in southern Syria.

The IDF has continued to strike military assets in Syria, including a site where Turkey reportedly seeks to establish an airbase. The IDF struck Hama Military Airport in Hama Province, Tiyas Airbase in the central Syrian desert, and the Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Center (SSRC) in Barzeh, Damascus, on April 2.[38] The Syrian interim government said that the strikes injured several Syrians and “destroyed” Hama Military Airport.[39] Several local Syrian sources reported that the strikes destroyed the airport’s aircraft, hangars, arms depots, and runway.[40] The new Syrian Air Force has used aircraft at the Hama Airport in recent days, according to local media.[41] Local media reported that the strike on the airport killed a Syrian Jaysh al Izza soldier.[42] The new Syrian 74th Division, which is reportedly comprised of mostly Jaysh al Izza soldiers, is based in Hama Province.[43] Syrian media also reported that the IDF struck former Syrian Arab Army (SAA) positions near Damascus on April 3.[44] Local sources reported that the IDF targeted a former SAA air defense battalion.[45]

Israel previously attacked Hama Military Airport and former SAA positions near Damascus in December 2024 to destroy equipment and weapons left over from the Assad regime.[46] Israel recently struck Tiyas Airbase on March 21 and March 24.[47] Turkey reportedly seeks to establish an airbase at Tiyas as part of a potential defense pact with the Syrian interim government.[48] Unspecified Israeli sources told Israeli media on April 2 that the IDF conducted the strikes to send a message to Turkey that Israel will not allow Turkey to establish military bases in Syria.[49] Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz called the strikes “a warning for the future.”[50]


Key Takeaways:

  • Iranian Air Defenses: Iran is continuing to try to bolster its air defenses in preparation for a potential US or Israeli strike on Iran. Iran has built a new Ghadir phased-array radar in West Azerbaijan Province in northwestern Iran in recent months, according to commercially available satellite imagery. Iran has conducted several air defense exercises in recent months, particularly around Iranian nuclear facilities. The construction of new radars and recent exercises reflect Iran's efforts to strengthen its air defense capabilities amid the Iranian regime’s concerns about a potential conventional conflict with the United States or Israel.
  • Russo-Iranian Cooperation: Russia remains an unviable mediator between the United States and Iran given Russian support for the Iranian nuclear program and Axis of Resistance activity in the Middle East. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov stated on April 1 that Russia is willing to mediate talks between Iran and the United States about the Iranian nuclear program. Iranian Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Political Affairs Majid Takht Ravanchi, who serves as the chief Iranian nuclear negotiator, met with Ryabkov in Moscow on April 2 to discuss Iranian nuclear negotiations. Russian support for the Iranian nuclear program and Axis of Resistance activities in the region make it extremely unlikely that Russia would be able to help the United States secure its interests in the Middle East.
  • Iranian Support for the Houthis: A senior Iranian military official told The Telegraph on April 3 that Iran is “abandoning” the Houthis. This statement is very likely part of an Iranian information operation to try to obfuscate Iran’s leading role in the Axis of Resistance and absolve Iran of responsibility for proxy attacks against the United States and Israel. The Houthis’ ability to disrupt international trade and attack Israel makes them a strategic and valuable partner for Iran, which Iran is unlikely to abandon.
  • Israeli Activity in Syria: The IDF engaged armed Syrians during an Israeli incursion 13 kilometers into Syrian territory near Nawa, Daraa Province, on April 2. This incident marks the second time that Syrians have attacked Israeli forces advancing into southern Syrian territory since the IDF killed at least four armed Syrians in Kuwaya, Daraa Province, on March 25. This incident may present anti-Israel and anti-interim government armed groups with an opportunity to gain support and recruit new fighters.
  • Israeli Activity in Syria: The IDF has continued to strike military assets in Syria, including a site where Turkey reportedly seeks to establish an airbase. The IDF struck Hama Military Airport in Hama Province, Tiyas Airbase in the central Syrian desert, and the Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Center (SSRC) in Barzeh, Damascus, on April 2. Unspecified Israeli sources told Israeli media on April 2 that the IDF conducted the strikes to send a message to Turkey that Israel will not allow Turkey to establish military bases in Syria.


Syria

The poor behavior of Syrian government forces at checkpoints in western Syria risks further weakening the relationship between security forces and local Alawite civilians, which will benefit the insurgency. The Syrian interim government has established checkpoints across western Syria to improve security and limit insurgent freedom of movement. The fighters manning these checkpoints have killed civilians—both in extrajudicial killings and accidentally—on several occasions, which risks damaging the relationship between security forces and the local population and providing opportunities for insurgents to exploit. Security forces near Harf al Masaytarah, Latakia, killed two individuals after they failed to stop at a checkpoint on March 27.[51] It is unclear why the vehicle failed to stop or if the men manning the checkpoint fired warning shots. Separately, locals discovered the body of an executed Alawite man near a checkpoint on March 31.[52] These events provide the insurgents an opportunity to present themselves as defenders of the local population by attacking the checkpoints and attempting to force government forces out of Alawite areas. Alawite insurgents have conducted periodic attacks on government checkpoints since early March.[53] Insurgents can force government units to remove outlying checkpoints by making them untenable to maintain.



A northern Syria-based source reported that the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) maintains a presence on Tishreen Dam and west of the dam as of April 3.[54] The source said that neither Syrian interim government forces nor the Syrian National Army (SNA) have entered the dam.[55] The source added that the SDF remains in Khirbet Tueni and Mahshiyat al Sheikh, west of the dam.[56] This report follows reports from several Syrian sources on April 2 that the SDF withdrew from the Tishreen Dam and Qara Qozak Bridge as part of “a preliminary agreement” with the interim government to create demilitarized zones.[57]

The Syrian interim government and the SDF exchanged over 200 prisoners in Aleppo Province on April 3.[58] Syrian media reported that the SDF handed over 97 prisoners to the interim government in exchange for 110 SDF prisoners.[59] The SDF and interim government plan to exchange a total of 600 prisoners.[60] This prisoner exchange is part of the recent agreement that the SDF and the interim government signed on April 1. The agreement stipulates that the SDF and interim government will exchange prisoners who were detained after Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) forces took over Aleppo in November 2024.[61] The agreement also includes the deployment of Syrian Interim Interior Ministry forces to two Kurdish neighborhoods in Aleppo City.[62]

Iraq

Axis of Resistance objectives:

  • Strengthen Iranian and Axis of Resistance influence over the Iraqi state and society
  • Harden the Iraqi government against internal dissent

A “well-placed” Iraqi source told UK-based outlet Amwaj Media that former Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa al Kadhimi is trying to form a political party to compete in the November 2025 Iraqi parliamentary elections.[63] Unspecified Iraqi officials reportedly invited Kadhimi to return to Iraq in late February 2025 to use his foreign connections, purportedly with the United States and Saudi Arabia, to aid Iraq economically. His return to Iraq came amid reports that the United States was planning to sanction Iranian-backed Iraqi officials.[64] Kadhimi worked to curtail the influence of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias and had a positive, working relationship with the United States during his tenure.[65] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias Kataib Hezbollah and Asaib Ahl al Haq attempted to assassinate Kadhimi in November 2021.[66]

The leader of Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada, Abu Alaa al Walai, said on April 2 that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias will support Iran “in blood, sacrifice, and conscience whenever necessary.”[67] Walai is likely mirroring Iranian efforts to discourage a potential US or Israeli strike on Iran by implying that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias would respond to such a strike.[68]

Arabian Peninsula

Axis of Resistance objectives:

  • Harden the Houthi regime against internal dissent in Houthi-controlled areas
  • Destroy the anti-Houthi opposition in order to control all of Yemen
  • Erode Israeli will to continue the war in the Gaza Strip

The Houthis conducted a combined cruise missile and drone attack targeting the USS Harry S. Truman aircraft carrier and US destroyers in the Red Sea on April 3.[69] CENTCOM did not confirm the attack.

The Houthis separately claimed on April 3 that they shot down a US MQ-9 Reaper drone over Hudaydah Governorate.[70] The Houthis claimed that they have shot down 17 US drones since the start of the October 7 War.

The Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

Axis of Resistance objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
  • Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip
  • Rebuild and reestablish Hezbollah in southern Lebanon
  • Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel

Lebanese airport authorities have taken new steps to prevent money transfers to Hezbollah via Beirut International Airport. Lebanese airport authorities fired 30 Hezbollah-affiliated employees who reportedly served as Hezbollah’s “eyes and ears” in the airport, according to an unspecified source speaking to Saudi media on April 3.[71] Iran has sought to financially support the reconstitution of Hezbollah by tasking Iranian envoys and Turkish citizens with transferring large sums of cash to Hezbollah via Beirut International Airport.[72]

CTP-ISW will not be covering the new Israeli operation in the Gaza Strip. We have reprioritized our Middle East coverage to focus on Iran's nuclear program, Iranian domestic security, and Iranian efforts to rebuild its networks into the Levant, including the Palestinian Territories. Given that Israel and its partners have destroyed Hamas' military organization and severed the group's ability to resupply itself, we are now focused on how Iran seeks to rebuild its lines of communication with Hezbollah and Hamas through Syria.

Iranian Decision-Making, Internal Dynamics, and Foreign Policy

The Iranian rial depreciated from 1,029,000 rials to one US dollar on April 2 to 1,042,000 rials to one US dollar on April 3.[73]

Iranian media has continued to threaten nuclear weaponization, likely to try to dissuade a potential US or Israeli strike on Iranian nuclear facilities amid new US threats to strike these facilities. Hardline outlet Mashregh News published an article on April 2 titled “Will Iran Unveil an Atomic Bomb” that summarized recent threats from senior Iranian officials to pursue a nuclear weapon.[74] Mashregh News is reportedly close to Iranian security and intelligence organizations.[75] Mashregh News claimed that “many” people believe it is “harder for Tehran not to build a nuclear weapon than it is [for Tehran] to build one.” The article highlighted Iran’s growing stockpile of highly enriched uranium and warned that the “regional situation in recent months” could affect Iranian policy. This article comes after senior Iranian officials have repeatedly threatened to pursue a nuclear weapon and lobbied Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to revoke his 2003 fatwa that bans the production and use of nuclear weapons.[76]

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.

CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.


[1] https://x.com/obretix/status/1907478109928001657

[2] https://x.com/obretix/status/1850974065713963169

[3] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-7-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-12-2025

[4] https://interaffairs dot ru/news/show/50970

[5] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/01/14/3284635

[6] https://www.bbc dot com/persian/articles/cz7v1y7gj99o

[7] https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/iaea-chief-sees-time-running-out-revive-iran-nuclear-deal-2025-02-14/

[8] https://www.tasnimnewsdot com/fa/news/1403/12/24/3274988/ ; https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/china-iran-russia-kick-off-talks-beijing-over-irans-nuclear-issues-2025-03-14/ ; https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/2006761/

[9] https://www.wsj.com/world/russia-provided-targeting-data-for-houthi-assault-on-global-shipping-eabc2c2b

[10] https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2025/04/03/iran-abandons-houthis-us-air-strikes-trump-yemen-israel/

[11] https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2025/04/03/iran-abandons-houthis-us-air-strikes-trump-yemen-israel/

[12] https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2025/04/03/iran-abandons-houthis-us-air-strikes-trump-yemen-israel/

[13] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1907519485424353408; https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1907519672221913528; https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/735172

[14] https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2025/04/03/iran-abandons-houthis-us-air-strikes-trump-yemen-israel/

[15] https://www.justsecurity.org/68888/after-soleimani-killing-iran-and-its-proxies-recalibrate-in-iraq/; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-30-2023;

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-1-2024

[16] https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2025/04/03/iran-abandons-houthis-us-air-strikes-trump-yemen-israel/

[17] https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2025/04/03/iran-abandons-houthis-us-air-strikes-trump-yemen-israel/

[18] https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/Carter_Hamas_View_War.pdf?x85095; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/understanding-israel%E2%80%99s-campaign-defeat-hezbollah-lebanon

[19] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/iran-hezbollah-financing-lebanon-airport-f9e40343; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-january-31-2025#_edn72ee092b4e8cd365606ee4ab9ca3ff8f1

[20] https://www.criticalthreats.org/wp-content/uploads/Iranian-Commander-Discusses-the-State-of-the-Axis-of-Resistance.pdf; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/09/20/3216620 ; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/irans-power-undiminished-after-assads-fall-syria-revolutionary-guards-commander-2024-12-10/

[21]https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1907488021613527124;

https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1907498123565453467;

https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1907524510791750034;

https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1907525642880692516;

https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1907526043646230895;

https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1907531380390576128;

https://x.com/Alsakaniali/status/1907551275882864746;

https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1907552857206788294;

https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1907568675189829980;

https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1907571161296216439;

https://x.com/BashaReport/status/1907760913265922229

[22] https://x.com/Alsakaniali/status/1907551275882864746

[23] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1907552857206788294; https://x.com/BashaReport/status/1907765205192364152; https://x.com/defenseliney/status/1907568410688397559

[24] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1907524510791750034; https://x.com/BashaReport/status/1907573424823705971;

https://x.com/defenseliney/status/1907580772443369859;

[25] https://x.com/BashaReport/status/1907760913265922229; https://x.com/VleckieHond/status/1907824724048040343

[26] https://x.com/omar_alharir/status/1907510778023805318; https://x.com/Nuorgolan/status/1907510169312838018

[27] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1907652388892078220

[28] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1907652388892078220

[29] https://t.me/Euphrats_post/90840; https://x.com/Nuorgolan/status/1907548742724551148; https://x.com/ScharoMaroof/status/1907553910040006815; https://x.com/Nuorgolan/status/1907526990883606843; https://x.com/Nuorgolan/status/1907532776498409727

[30] https://t.me/almkaomasy/292

[31] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1907738380034617661 ; https://x.com/Nuorgolan/status/1907606859759886772

[32] https://t.me/syrianmofaex1/609

[33] https://t.me/moriahdoron/20677; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-25-2025

[34] https://x.com/suwayda24/status/1907819823754612912

[35] https://x.com/DeirEzzore/status/1907746728419209673

[36] https://t.me/almkaomasy/294

[37] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-27-2025; https://www.annahar dot com/arab-world/arabian-levant/204758/%D8%A3%D9%88%D9%84%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%A3%D8%B3-%D8%AA%D8%AA%D8%A8%D9%86%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B4%D8%AA%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%83-%D9%85%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%8A%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%81-%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%B9%D8%A7-%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%87%D9%8A-%D9%88%D9%85%D8%A7-%D8%B9%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%A7-%D8%A8%D9%85%D9%82%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D9%81%D8%AA%D9%8A%D8%AD%D8%A9

[38] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1907518514614644959; https://t.me/moriahdoron/20675

[39] https://t.me/SyrianArabNewsAgency/126967

[40] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israeli-airstrike-targets-barzeh-neighborhood-syrias-damascus-state-news-agency-2025-04-02/; https://x.com/DeirEzzore/status/1907671730178429306; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1907556546201969025

[41] https://t.me/ALMHARAR/75681

[42] https://x.com/DeirEzzore/status/1907513155497922749

[43] https://x.com/ALBADIA24/status/1892181978578817470; https://www.syriarevisited.com/p/the-new-syrian-army-structure-and?open=false#%C2%A7other-divisions

[44] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1907848347060228458; https://t.me/Euphrats_post/90867

[45] https://x.com/suwayda24/status/1907855000237121922

[46] https://x.com/HalabTodayTV/status/1866192852188852703; https://t.me/damascusv011/26399

[47] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1903203544003465615; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1904373127896805728

[48] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/syrias-sharaa-discuss-defense-pact-with-turkeys-erdogan-sources-say-2025-02-04/

[49] https://www.jpost dot com/breaking-news/article-848620; https://t.me/moriahdoron/20675; https://t.me/moriahdoron/20676

[50] https://www.jpost dot com/breaking-news/article-848630

[51] https://x.com/AlawiteMediaLab/status/1905370250725466253 ; https://www.facebook.com/alhadth.from.beityashout/posts/1100424778767379

[52] https://x.com/AlawiteMediaLab/status/1907163146168717392 ; https://www.facebook.com/qadmoos/posts/pfbid02qfRC3YmBDjhVz2YzbCcVsnXDpUMkPG1aZcLffQk4Zv5e4PB45kLDWsUi2NBz4Qenl

[53] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1907485171265262061 ; https://x.com/Daraa24_24/status/1906766235166994903 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1905215331557126483 ; https://t.me/IqXXrE41gMT8bhiXSDJglU/50026

[54] https://x.com/DeirEzzore/status/1907745909737218353

[55] https://x.com/DeirEzzore/status/1907745909737218353

[56] https://x.com/DeirEzzore/status/1907745388074811856

[57] https://x.com/AbomosaabSharke/status/1907472677264306471 ; https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/140068 ; https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1907421378132738505 ; https://x.com/HalabTodayTV/status/1907415829244715417 ; https://t.me/TelevisionSyria/54161; https://t.me/TelevisionSyria/54165; https://x.com/DeirEzzore/status/1907487903376150982

[58] https://t.me/TelevisionSyria/54281

[59] https://t.me/HalabTodayTV/121454

[60] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1907858907076440466 ; https://x.com/thiqanewsagency/status/1907817014732702115

[61] https://t.me/syrianmoi/23714

[62] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-1-2025

[63] https://amwaj dot media/en/media-monitor/inside-story-kadhimi-eyes-political-party-amid-shifting-sands-in-iraq ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-25-2025

[64] https://apnews.com/article/iraq-kadhimi-returns-prime-minister-2233cc0627be48cd475e085639e0eb6b; https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%B1%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%B0%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF-10-%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B4%D8%AF-%D9%88%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%83%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%B6%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%8A-%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%B9%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA

[65] https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/kadhimis-moment-controlling-iraqs-militias/ ; https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/beltway-confidential/2785510/trumps-successful-meeting-with-iraqi-prime-minister-mustafa-al-kadhimi/#google_vignette

[66] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/irans-axis-resistance-review-october-21-november-7-2021

[67] https://x.com/aboalaa_alwalae/status/1907540711123333483

[68] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-2-2025

[69]https://x.com/army21ye/status/1907714141315375418

[70] https://x.com/army21ye/status/1907689611242954763; https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1907783790124061009

[71] https://aawsat dot com/العالم-العربي/المشرق-العربي/5128562-أمن-مطار-بيروت-يقلّص-نفوذ-حزب-الله-داخله

[72] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-january-31-2025

[73] bon-bast.com

[74] https://www.mashreghnews dot ir/news/1702570/

[75] https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2011/05/iranian-medias-many-angles-on-death-of-osama-bin-laden.html

https://www.mei.edu/publications/iran-russia-ties-never-better-maybe-not-forever

https://www.iranintl.com/en/202310018322

[76] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/01/11/3283982 ; https://x.com/Ahmadnaderi_ir/status/1906701009214185917 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-march-7-2025

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 3, 2025

 Nicole Wolkov, Davit Gasparyan, Olivia Gibson, Anna Harvey, Angelica Evans, and Frederick W. Kagan with William Runkel and Nate Trotter

April 3, 2025, 6:50 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 10:45am ET on April 3. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the April 4 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russia seeks to leverage ongoing ceasefire and future peace negotiations to seize large amounts of territory in Ukraine and install a pro-Russian puppet government in Kyiv but will likely continue military operations in Ukraine if the Kremlin is unable to achieve a full Ukrainian surrender through diplomacy. Bloomberg reported on April 3, according to sources in Moscow familiar with the matter, that the Kremlin is "counting on US President Donald Trump to deliver an acceptable peace deal in Ukraine," but is prepared to continue the war if it is not able to secure its goals through negotiations with the United States.[1] The sources also claimed that the Kremlin is not concerned by Trump's recent statement that the United States is willing to introduce additional sanctions targeting Russian oil and secondary sanctions against buyers of Russian oil if Russian President Vladimir Putin does not make progress towards a general ceasefire.[2] The US Office of the Director of National Intelligence's (ODNI) 2025 Annual Threat Assessment stated that Russia is leveraging its control of the theater-wide initiative and ongoing political and information efforts amid negotiations to end the war in Ukraine to achieve significant concessions from Ukraine and the West.[3] The ODNI report assessed that Putin is "probably" more willing to incur the risks of a longer war than to agree to an end to the war that is unfavorable to Russia. The ODNI report further assessed that Putin "appears resolved and prepared to pay a very high price to prevail in what he sees as a defining time in Russia’s strategic competition with the United States, world history, and his personal legacy." The ODNI assessment that Putin remains committed to pursuing Ukrainian surrender through both diplomatic and military means is consistent with ISW's assessment that Putin is leveraging ongoing negotiations to secure additional concessions from Ukraine and the West as part of its long-term pursuit of total Ukrainian surrender.[4]

Russia is facing significant military and economic challenges that could seriously compromise Russia's ability to wage its war in Ukraine, factors that could increase the Kremlin's desire to accomplish its objectives in a mediated ceasefire or peace negotiation in the short-term if possible. The ODNI report assessed that Russia has suffered significant casualties in Ukraine and that Russia must contend with the poor quality of its new recruits.[5] The ODNI report assessed that the Russian economy is facing significant challenges as Russia continues to balance resource allocation between defense industrial production and civilian sectors. US European Command (EUCOM) Commander and NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) General Christopher Cavoli stated on April 3 that Russian forces have lost over 4,000 tanks in Ukraine.[6] Cavoli stated that Russia started the war with a total of 13,000 tanks and are "starting to approach near the end" of the viable tanks in storage. Cavoli noted that Russia has expanded its capability to produce shells, cruise missiles, and first-person view (FPV) drones and that Russia is preparing either to continue offensive operations in Ukraine or to launch a future campaign against a NATO member state. Cavoli stated that the war in Ukraine has "distorted" the Russian economy and "turbocharged" the Russian defense industry at the expense of Russia's civilian economic sector and that it may be difficult for Russia to "unwind" this imbalance. Cavoli assessed that Russia will be able to replace the significant personnel losses incurred in Ukraine ahead of a future conflict in Europe but noted that Russia's ability to replace materiel losses is contingent on Ukraine's ability to inflict greater losses. ISW previously noted that Russia's ongoing and forecasted economic struggles are closely tied to Russian losses on the battlefield and that it is not possible for the United States or the wider West to exert maximum pressure on Russia with economic tools alone.[7] The United States can leverage Russian vulnerabilities and achieve a stronger negotiating position by continuing — or increasing — military aid to Ukraine such that Ukrainian forces can continue to inflict significant manpower and materiel losses on Russia.

The US Treasury Department announced on April 2 that the United States lifted sanctions on Karina Rotenberg, the wife of Russian businessman and oligarch Boris Rotenberg.[8] The Treasury Department did not provide an explanation for lifting sanctions against Karina Rotenberg. Boris Rotenberg, a close ally of Russian President Vladimir Putin, is the co-owner of the Stroygazmontazh group — Russia's largest construction company for gas pipelines and electrical power supply lines.[9] The US first sanctioned Boris Rotenberg in 2014 after Russia's annexation of Crimea.[10]

Key Takeaways:

  • Russia seeks to leverage ongoing ceasefire and future peace negotiations to seize large amounts of territory in Ukraine and install a pro-Russian puppet government in Kyiv but will likely continue military operations in Ukraine if the Kremlin is unable to achieve a full Ukrainian surrender through diplomacy.
  • Russia is facing significant military and economic challenges that could seriously compromise Russia's ability to wage its war in Ukraine, factors that could increase the Kremlin's desire to accomplish its objectives in a mediated ceasefire or peace negotiation in the short-term if possible.
  • The US Treasury Department announced on April 2 that the United States lifted sanctions on Karina Rotenberg, the wife of Russian businessman and oligarch Boris Rotenberg.
  • Ukrainian forces advanced near Pokrovsk. Russian forces advanced in Kursk and Belgorod and near Lyman, Toretsk, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka.
  • The Russian State Duma adopted a bill on April 3 to grant veteran status to Russian military personnel and volunteer formations that fought in Kursk Oblast.


We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

  • Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
  • Russian Main Effort — Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 — Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 — Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 — Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
  • Russian Supporting Effort — Southern Axis
  • Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
  • Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
  • Russian Technological Adaptations
  • Activities in Russian-occupied areas
  • Significant Activity in Belarus

Alleged Ceasefire Violations

Ukraine and Russia have not yet concluded a maritime ceasefire agreement due to ongoing Russian demands for Western sanctions relief. Negotiations regarding the conditions of the ceasefire on strikes against energy infrastructure are ongoing, and the resolution of these negotiations remains unclear.

Russian sources continued to claim without evidence that Ukrainian forces violated the temporary energy infrastructure strikes ceasefire. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on April 3 that Ukrainian forces struck electrical substations in Bryansk Oblast and occupied Zaporizhzhia Oblast on April 2.[11] Russian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova claimed on April 3 that Ukrainian forces have conducted over 30 strikes on Russian energy facilities since March 18, when Russian President Vladimir Putin announced the unilateral suspension of Russian strikes against Ukrainian energy infrastructure.[12]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 3 that Ukrainian forces are adhering to the terms of the temporary ceasefire on energy infrastructure strikes and are conducting strikes solely on Russian military targets.[13] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces have violated the ceasefire several times since Ukraine, the United, States, and Russia agreed to the temporary ceasefire on energy infrastructure strikes and struck energy infrastructure in Kharkiv, Poltava, Dnipropetrovsk, and Kherson oblasts in late March 2025.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian forces recently advanced along the Sumy-Kursk Oblast border.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 3 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in northern Guyevo, Kursk Oblast (south of Sudzha).[14]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced to Oleshnya, Kursk Oblast (southwest of Sudzha) and east of Basivka, Sumy Oblast (northeast of Sumy City).[15]

Russian sources claimed that fighting continues in northern Sumy Oblast northeast of Sumy City near Basivka and Zhurvaka and that Ukrainian forces counterattacked north of Sumy City near Veselivka.[16]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating near Guyevo.[17]


Russian forces continued offensive operations in northwestern Belgorod Oblast on April 3 but did not advance.

Russian milbloggers claimed that fighting continued northwest of Belgorod City near Demidovka and Popovka.[18]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian "Anvar Spetsnaz" detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 "Anvar" volunteer detachment) are reportedly operating in Belgorod Oblast.[19]


Russian Main Effort — Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 — Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kharkiv direction on April 3 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on April 2 and 3.[20]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kharkiv direction reported on April 3 that Russian forces are restoring mechanized units and resupplying frontline units with ammunition.[21] The spokesperson added that Russian activity in the direction is limited to infantry attacks and drone strikes and that the Russian tactic of combining infantry attacks with armored vehicles has proven to be ineffective as Ukrainian forces quickly destroy Russian mechanized units and infantry without cover.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 — Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)


Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on April 3 but did not advance.
 
Russian forces attacked northeast of Kupyansk near the international border near Kamyanka on April 2 and 3.[22]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 352nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating in the Kupyansk direction.[23]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on April 3 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Zahryzove and Nova Kruhlaykivka, east of Borova near Novoyehorivka and Nadiya, and southeast of Borova near Novoserhiivka and Hrekivka on April 2 and 3.[24]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Lyman direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 3 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northwest of Novolyubivka (northeast of Lyman).[25]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on April 3 that Russian forces advanced two kilometers near Nove (north of Lyman).[26]

Russian forces attacked north of Lyman near Katerynivka, Nove, Zelena Dolyna, and Novomykhailiva; northeast of Lyman near Novolyubivka, Kolodyazi, and Yampolivka; and east of Lyman near Dibrova and Torske on April 2 and 3.[27]


Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 — Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)


Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on April 3 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka and east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske on April 2 and 3.[28]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on April 3 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on April 3 that Russian forces advanced north of the Dniprovskyy Pond in northwestern Chasiv Yar and towards central Chasiv Yar from positions near the Refractory Plant.[29] A Russian source claimed on April 3 that Russian forces seized a fortified area in southern Chasiv Yar.[30]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations north of Chasiv Yar in the direction of Novomarkove and south of Chasiv Yar in the direction of Stupochky and Predtechyne on April 2 and 3.[31]

The chief sergeant of a Ukrainian fire support company operating near Chasiv Yar stated on April 3 that Russian forces are accumulating forces along the Siversky Donets-Donbas canal, which runs through Chasiv Yar.[32] The officer said that Russian forces use motorcycles and buggies and occasionally conduct mechanized assaults in an attempt to advance from Chasiv Yar to Kostyantynivka (southwest of Chasiv Yar). The officer noted that Ukrainian drone strikes are inhibiting Russian advances.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[33]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 2 indicates that Russian forces advanced on Mykhaila Hrushevskoho Street in central Toretsk, but this advance is not recent and likely happened in mid-March based on weather conditions visible in the footage.[34]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on April 3 that Russian forces advanced to the outskirts of Valentynivka and toward Sukha Balka (both southwest of Toretsk) and advanced in a forested area near the Tsentralna Mine in southern Toretsk.[35] A milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 68th Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) and the 20th Motorized Rifle Regiment (possibly a reformed Soviet unit) cleared Panteleymonivka (southwest of Toretsk).[36]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations in Toretsk itself; west of Toretsk near Leonidivka; north of Toretsk near Dachne, Druzhba, and Dyliivka; and northeast of Toretsk near Ozaryanivka and Krymske on April 2 and 3.[37]

A Ukrainian battalion commander operating in the Toretsk direction reported on April 3 that Russian forces are attacking Ukrainian positions using various means, including small infantry groups, motorcycles, and all-terrain vehicles (ATVs), and occasionally attack in large assault detachments with armored vehicle support.[38] The battalion commander also noted that Russian forces are using stolen Ukrainian engineering maps to locate sewage and water pipes to infiltrate Ukrainian lines.[39]

Order of battle: Elements of the Russian 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment and 174th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (both of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division), 346th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]), and the 77th Motorized Rifle Regiment (likely a reconstituted Soviet unit) are reportedly operating near Dyliivka (north of Toretsk).[40] Elements of the Russian 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Oleksandropil and Panteleymonivka (southwest of Toretsk).[41]


Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 2 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced along Lenina Street in western Novoyelyzavetivka (southwest of Pokrovsk) and seized Nadiivka (west of Novoyelyazvetivka).[42] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced into the western outskirts of Solone (southwest of Pokrovsk).[43]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 90th Tank Division (41st Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) advanced to central Troitske and that Russian forces seized Bohdanivka (both southwest of Pokrovsk).[44] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced southwest of Kotlyarivka (southwest of Pokrovsk).[45]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Pokrovsk near Tarasivka; east of Pokrovsk near Yelyzavetivka, Vodyane Druhe, and Promin; south of Pokrovsk near Zelene and Vidrodzhennya (formerly Novyi Trud); and southwest of Pokrovsk near Udachne, Novoserhiivka, Nadiivka, Uspenivka, Kotlyne, Novoukrainka, Kotlyarivka, Sukha Balka, and Bohdanivka and toward Muravka on April 2 and 3.[46] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Solone (southwest of Pokrovsk) and that Solone is a contested "gray zone."[47]


Russian forces recently advanced in the Kurakhove direction during a reinforced company-sized mechanized assault.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 3 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced west along the T-0428 Andriivka-Novopavlivka highway west of Andriivka (west of Kurakhove) during a reinforced company-sized mechanized assault.[48] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck 12 Russian vehicles and completely destroyed seven vehicles involved in the assault.[49]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in the fields west of Kostyantynopil (west of Kurakhove), southwest of Rozlyv (southwest of Kurakhove), and in an area up to one kilometer deep and 1.5 kilometers wide near Bahatyr (southwest of Kurakhove).[50]

Russian forces attacked west of Kurakhove near Kostyantynopil, Oleksiivka, and Andriivka and southwest of Kurakhove near Rozlyv on April 2 and 3.[51]

Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported on April 3 that Russian reconnaissance and sabotage units recently entered Rozlyv.[52] ISW observed evidence indicating that Russian forces likely recently seized Rozlyv as of April 1.[53]


Russian forces recently advanced in the Velyka Novosilka direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 3 indicates that Russian forces advanced to the southwestern outskirts of Vesele (northwest of Velyka Novosilka).[54] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and other Russian sources claimed that elements of the Russian 5th Tank Brigade (36th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) seized Vesele (northwest of Velyka Novosilka).[55]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in an area up to 1.5 kilometers deep and one kilometer wide near Fedorivka (northwest of Vesele), up to 500 meters deep and one kilometer wide near the Vilne Pole-Burlatske area (west of Velyka Novosilka), and south of Vilne Pole.[56]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Vesele, Burlatske, and Dniproenerhiya and toward Myrne and west of Velyka Novosilka near Pryvilne, Novosilka, and Shevchenko on April 2 and 3.[57]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 1461st Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 36th CAA, EMD), 5th Tank Brigade, and 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Velyka Novosilka direction.[58]


Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces reported on April 2 that Ukrainian drone operators recently destroyed two Russian Buk air defense systems and one Tor air defense system in an unspecified area of Donetsk Oblast.[59] Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces reported that the destroyed systems cost an estimated 50 million dollars.

Russian Supporting Effort — Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on April 3 but did not make any confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on April 2 that elements of the Russian 429th Motorized Rifle Regiment (19th Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are advancing toward Kamyanske (northwest of Robotyne).[60]

Russian forces attacked north of Robotyne near Novodanylivka and northwest of Robotyne near Stepove, Shcherbaky, Mali Shcherbaky, and Kamyanske on April 2 and 3.[61] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking along the entire western Zaporizhia Oblast frontline.[62]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Orikhiv direction stated on April 2 that the Russian military command reinforced the 70th Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, SMD) and that the regiment intensified operations in the area.[63] The spokesperson noted that Russian forces primarily attempt to advance at night using heat-shielding cloaks and are leveraging dry ground conditions to probe Ukrainian defenses.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 247th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in Lobkove and drone operators of the Chechen “Vostok-Akhmat” Battalion are reportedly operating near Robotyne.[64] Drone operators of the Russian ZVENO Reconnaissance Battalion are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[65]


Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dnipro direction on April 2 and 3 but did not advance.[66]


Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of April 2 to 3. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 39 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Kursk City; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[67] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 28 drones over northern and eastern Ukraine and that 7 drones were “lost,” likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that drone strikes affected Kharkiv, Donetsk, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts.

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

The Russian State Duma adopted a bill on April 3 to grant veteran status to Russian military personnel and volunteer formations that fought in Kursk Oblast.[68] The bill also grants veteran status to Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), Rosgvardia, Federal Penitentiary Service, Investigative Committee, and other personnel who participated in operations to repel the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast. The Kremlin's extension of veteran status will likely further strain the Russian state budget and economy and indicates that the Kremlin continues to prioritize appeasing the veteran population over long-term economic issues. Putin stated on December 19, 2024 that he would remedy the Russian government's mistake in failing to grant veteran status to personnel operating in Kursk Oblast.[69]

Russian President Vladimir Putin instructed Kremlin officials on April 1 to develop a policy that will integrate recent university graduates into the Russian military. Putin tasked the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and People's Front (formerly known as the All-Russia People's Front) to develop a special conscription procedure for university graduates to serve in the military.[70]

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Nothing significant to report.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

ISW is suspending occupation coverage in its daily Russian Offensive Campaign Assessments. ISW is introducing a new product line tracking activities in Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine. The occupation updates will examine Russian efforts to consolidate administrative control of annexed areas and forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems. Click here to read the April 3 Russian Occupation Update.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.


[1] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-04-03/putin-bets-trump-delivers-on-ukraine-while-priming-for-more-war

[2] https://isw.pub/UkrWar033025

[3] https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2025-Unclassified-Report.pdf

[4] https://isw.pub/UkrWar032925 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031925 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032825 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031825

[5] https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2025-Unclassified-Report.pdf

[6] https://www.c-span.org/program/senate-committee/generals-testify-on-european-africa-combatant-commands/658098

[7] https://understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russia%27s%20Weakness%20Offers%20Leverage%20PDF.pdf

[8] https://meduza dot io/news/2025/04/02/ssha-snyali-sanktsii-s-zheny-borisa-rotenberga ; https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20250402

[9] https://www.occrp.org/en/project/the-rotenberg-files/when-a-rotenberg-is-your-client

[10] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jl23331

[11] https://t.me/mod_russia/50855

[12] https://t.me/tass_agency/309107 ; https://t.me/MariaVladimirovnaZakharova/10126

[13] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22645

[14] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8807; https://t.me/Arbat_dobrocor/1158

[15] https://t.me/wargonzo/25714 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/26363

[16] https://t.me/wargonzo/25714; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/26363; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/26363; https://t.me/dva_majors/68232

[17] https://t.me/dva_majors/68256 ; https://t.me/warriorofnorth/7305

[18] https://t.me/wargonzo/25714 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/68232; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/26399; https://t.me/milinfolive/145463

[19] https://t.me/epoddubny/23000 ; https://t.me/epoddubny/22998

[20] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02zFdmqMW8H7eNquBoddQEbUEvcwcwnhg1D2j5DPQgBovjmbK4udUYXo4hovBU8kr1l; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22638; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22625; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/7314

[21] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/04/03/praktyka-pokazala-shho-nahlost-ne-rezultatyvnyj-na-harkivshhyni-vorog-atakuye-pihotoyu-i-nakopychuye-syly/

[22]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02zFdmqMW8H7eNquBoddQEbUEvcwcwnhg1D2j5DPQgBovjmbK4udUYXo4hovBU8kr1l ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22638 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22638 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/7314

[23] https://t.me/dva_majors/68239 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/68277

[24]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02zFdmqMW8H7eNquBoddQEbUEvcwcwnhg1D2j5DPQgBovjmbK4udUYXo4hovBU8kr1l ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22638 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22625 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/7314

[25] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8805 ; https://t.me/Ci4team_4mb/352

[26]

[27]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02zFdmqMW8H7eNquBoddQEbUEvcwcwnhg1D2j5DPQgBovjmbK4udUYXo4hovBU8kr1l ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22638 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22625

[28] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22638; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22625

[29] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/26410

[30] https://t.me/tass_agency/309089

[31] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22638; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22625

[32] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/985839-vijska-rf-nakopicuutsa-na-mezi-kanalu-siverskij-donec-donbas-ta-namagautsa-jogo-perejti-5-osbr/

[33] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/26389

[34] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1907727610802475170; https://t.me/Khyzhak_brigade/851

[35] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/26412; https://t.me/dva_majors/68232; https://t.me/yurasumy/22214; https://t.me/yurasumy/22217

[36] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/26412

[37] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02zFdmqMW8H7eNquBoddQEbUEvcwcwnhg1D2j5DPQgBovjmbK4udUYXo4hovBU8kr1l

[38] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/04/03/gotovi-zustrity-na-vyhodi-z-truby-v-toreczku-okupanty-probuyut-atakuvaty-z-kanalizacziyi/

[39] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/04/03/gotovi-zustrity-na-vyhodi-z-truby-v-toreczku-okupanty-probuyut-atakuvaty-z-kanalizacziyi/

[40] https://t.me/nm_dnr/13636

[41] https://t.me/motopatriot78/34045; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/160040

[42] https://t.me/PershyiTankovyi5OVMBR/41 ; https://x.com/auditor_ya/status/1907783566848573511

[43] https://t.me/yurasumy/22215 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/34042

[44] https://t.me/yurasumy/22213

[45] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63291

[46] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02zFdmqMW8H7eNquBoddQEbUEvcwcwnhg1D2j5DPQgBovjmbK4udUYXo4hovBU8kr1l ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22638 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22625 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63288

[47] https://t.me/yurasumy/22215 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/34042

[48] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1363424128301028; https://x.com/GeneralStaffUA/status/1907720637197545662; https://x.com/blinzka/status/1907730393098252397; https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/1907732702331093478; https://x.com/Danspiun/status/1907740510564864170; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8804; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22644; https://x.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1907750244504207427

[49] https://x.com/GeneralStaffUA/status/1907720637197545662; https://x.com/blinzka/status/1907730393098252397; https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/1907732702331093478; https://x.com/Danspiun/status/1907740510564864170;

[50] https://t.me/voin_dv/14222

[51] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/7314 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63291 ;

[52] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/985985-u-rajoni-sela-andriivka-na-novopavlivskomu-napramku-trivaut-boi-osuv-hortica/

[53] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-1-2025

[54] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8803 ; https://t.me/pidrozdilshadowoficial/674

[55] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/89278 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/50856 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/50865 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/89338 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/68232

[56] https://t.me/mod_russia/50856 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/50865 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/89338 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63286 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/68232 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/14222 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/25714 ; https://t.me/sashakots/52847 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/22212 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63295 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63287

[57] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/7314 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02zFdmqMW8H7eNquBoddQEbUEvcwcwnhg1D2j5DPQgBovjmbK4udUYXo4hovBU8kr1l ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22638 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22625 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63286 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63295

[58] https://t.me/voin_dv/14217

[59] https://t.me/usf_army/497 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/7282

[60] https://t.me/rybar/69360

[61] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02zFdmqMW8H7eNquBoddQEbUEvcwcwnhg1D2j5DPQgBovjmbK4udUYXo4hovBU8kr1l; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22638 ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02M2LDayF6iTH88pmCFfL4yyseRYR2f8V8pH4Mt388h1dqrCVQDUDnbThAzxaoTEBfl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22625; https://t.me/dva_majors/68232; https://t.me/wargonzo/25714

[62] https://t.me/rybar/69360

[63] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Dw3_GwIHW2I ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/04/02/maskuyetsya-plashhamy-nevydymkamy-vorog-otrymav-popovnennya-i-aktyvizuvavsya-na-orihovskomu-napryamku/

[64] https://t.me/rybar/69360; https://t.me/epoddubny/23004; https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5617

[65] https://t.me/sashakots/52843; https://x.com/sashakots/status/1847981918492467462

[66] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02zFdmqMW8H7eNquBoddQEbUEvcwcwnhg1D2j5DPQgBovjmbK4udUYXo4hovBU8kr1l; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22638 ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02M2LDayF6iTH88pmCFfL4yyseRYR2f8V8pH4Mt388h1dqrCVQDUDnbThAzxaoTEBfl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22625

[67] https://t.me/kpszsu/31822

[68] https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/23589677

[69] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-19-2024

[70] http://www.kremlin dot ru/acts/assignments/orders/76618 ; https://t.me/sotaproject/96009